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3 
Abstract 
 
 
The widely accepted external incentives model of conditionality (EIM) argues 
that the rewards promised by the EU need to be credible for target states to 
comply with costly EU conditions. Accordingly, compliance should come to a 
halt or decline significantly in countries where the credibility of accession – the 
most powerful reward used by the EU – is very low. The case of Turkey appears 
therefore to present a puzzle, since the current AKP government is still 
complying with costly EU conditions despite the negative signals from the most 
powerful member-states and the EU general public. This thesis first establishes 
that there is indeed a puzzle. The quantitative and qualitative data gathered on 
formal and behavioural compliance demonstrates that credibility is not a 
necessary condition for compliance. There are absolutely no signs of decline in 
compliance, which challenges the EIM’s credibility assumption. The second part 
of this thesis moves to consider why the Turkish authorities continue to comply 
under diminished credibility. It finds that the AKP makes strategic use of EU 
conditionality. Firstly, compliance with EU conditions serves to curb the powers 
of the Kemalist/secularist establishment and thereby to secure the party’s 
continued presence. Secondly, compliance helps the government to appear as a 
Western, reformist, moderate and neo-liberal party to the electorate so as to 
widen its domestic support. Moreover, lock-in effects of Turkey’s already 
established pro-European foreign policy, together with issue-specific 
costs/benefits, also inform the AKP’s decision to comply, albeit to a lesser 
extent. Finally, this thesis analyses the role of the EU-related bureaucracy as a 
separate, but limited, actor in the compliance process. In contrast to the political 
leadership, strong organisational lock-in effects and a high level of social 
learning motivate bureaucratic agents’ further compliance, which suggests there 
is a specific bureaucratic politics of compliance at work in Turkey.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
‘I do not think that Turkey has a place in Europe.’ ‘I have always been 
opposed to this entry and I remain opposed.’ Nicolas Sarkozy (Laciner, 
2009; Charter, 2009) 
 
‘I don’t believe that Turkey can become a member of the Union in the 
foreseeable future.’ Angela Merkel (Inal and Yegenoglu, 2005) 
 
24 years after Turkey’s formal application to the European Union (EU) its 
chances of membership look grim even in the long-run. 59% of the EU public is 
against Turkey’s membership, which is the highest opposition compared to other 
(potential) candidates, like Kosovo, Albania, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Eurobarometer, 2010b). Moreover, the leaders of the most influential EU 
member-states (MSs) are staunchly opposed to Turkish entry. Given all these 
negative signals coming from the EU, one would expect the political leadership 
in Turkey to be pessimistic about accession. Similarly, it is no surprise that 
Turkish people have increasingly become suspicious of the EU, demonstrated by 
their declined support for and trust in the EU after 2004. Yet, despite the 
discouraging mood-music from the EU, as well as declining public support, the 
political leadership is still continuing to comply with the stringent requirements 
of EU conditionality. So why is Turkey still complying with EU conditionality 
under these adverse circumstances? 
 
1.1 The Research Puzzle 
 
Incontrovertibly the EU’s Eastern enlargement has entailed major achievements 
both for the EU and its Central and Eastern European applicants. The EU and its 
MSs have not experienced most of the anticipated unfavourable consequences 
linked to widening (Falkner and Treib, 2008; Sedelmeier, 2008) and the 
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applicants have democratised to a significant degree. Such accomplishments owe 
a great deal to the EU’s conditionality instrument, which attached an alluring 
incentive structure to these countries’ ongoing transition processes. The credible 
prospect of becoming a member of the Club prevailed over the costs associated 
with particular reforms.  
 
Yet, a brief look at the current and potential candidates suggests that a similar 
degree of policy change is less likely because the prospect of membership has 
decreased for many of them (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008: 798-9; 
Schimmelfennig, 2008: 919). The foremost question that troubles the minds of 
both EU and candidates’ policy-makers is: how can conditionality operate 
without a proximate, probable and credible membership carrot? The leading 
theoretical explanation of the EU’s impact through conditionality – the external 
incentives model (EIM) (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) – would expect 
the candidates’ governments to put an end to or significantly reduce their 
compliance with costly reforms if the EU’s membership offer does not appear to 
be sincere or credible. The central aim of this thesis is to explain patterns of 
continued compliance in Turkey which appear puzzling from the perspective of 
the EIM.  
 
According to the EIM, credible incentives exert the push for compliance in 
candidates, since credibility is assumed to be a necessary condition for 
candidates’ compliance with costly EU-led reforms. Given that the credibility 
that compliance will be rewarded as promised in Turkey is particularly low, the 
EIM does not expect Turkey to continue to comply with EU conditions. 
However, the Turkish case is noteworthy as there is evidence demonstrating that 
compliance continues, which directly contradicts the EIM.  
 
1.2 Aims and Methodology 
 
This research aims to address this puzzle by examining the patterns of 
compliance in Turkey (the dependent variable) under diminished credibility. To 
do this it, firstly, tests whether credibility is a necessary condition for 
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compliance as the EIM suggests. As this necessity assumption is not found to 
hold, this research inquires into the motives behind continued compliance by 
examining: why do candidates keep complying with EU conditionality under 
diminished credibility? 
 
To test whether or not credibility is a necessary condition for compliance, two 
temporal cases that offer very different credibility levels for the prospect of 
Turkish membership are compared: 2001-2005 and 2005-2010. The credibility of 
the EU’s membership offer to Turkey gradually increased from 1999, when 
Turkey was recognised as an EU candidate, until October 2005 when the 
accession negotiations started. After this date, credibility experienced a 
significant and continuous decline, due to a number of events. Firstly, certain EU 
MS leaders voiced objections to Turkish membership by supporting instead the 
idea of a ‘privileged partnership’ rather than full membership. In addition, the 
Negotiating Framework (NF) referred to the ‘open-ended’ nature of accession 
negotiations, and amendments to the French constitution made referendums 
compulsory for accession of each country to the EU unless a high threshold for 
parliamentary approval is attained. Finally, due to the conflict over the 
recognition of Cyprus, the Commission partially suspended the negotiations in 
eight chapters and Cyprus blocked six chapters. Moreover, France also blocked a 
further five chapters due to its opposition to Turkey’s full membership. All these 
developments resulted in extremely low levels of credibility after 2005. In this 
respect the period between 20011  and 2010 can be conceptualised as two 
temporal cases, which enables before-after analysis.  
 
The case of Turkey, where a comparative analysis of two temporal cases in the 
fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and EU’s political conditionality can 
be conducted, is particularly useful for this theory testing purpose. The 
exceptionally low levels of credibility in Turkey offer a very tough test for the 
EIM’s credibility assumption, which considers credibility a necessary condition 
for compliance. In this sense, the Turkish case serves as a least-likely case to test 
                                                
1 This date is preferred as a start date for the analysis over 1999 because the actual conditionality 
with specific rewards and deadlines for compliance started with the EU’s first Accession 
Partnership for Turkey in 2001. 
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the EIM. Furthermore, under diminished credibility, compliance becomes even 
less likely if the costs of compliance are high. The fact that JHA and political 
conditionality incorporate some of the most challenging conditions, and that both 
23rd and 24th chapters incorporating JHA and political conditionality issues are 
blocked after 2005 make this test more rigorous, since compliance becomes less 
likely. 
 
Secondly, after the EIM’s credibility assumption is contested in the first part of 
the thesis, the research aims to resolve this puzzle by explaining the reasons 
behind the Turkish actors’ continued compliance with the EU after 2005. In this 
respect, the second part of the thesis serves as a heuristic study to refine the 
theoretical approaches to the study of conditionality by introducing new 
variables, hypotheses and causal mechanisms. A number of independent 
variables derived from the conditionality and new institutionalist literatures, 
namely government’s partisan interests, political/economic costs, administrative 
capacity, sunk costs, vested interests, political lock-in, organisational lock-in and 
social learning, are tested to explain continued compliance under diminished 
credibility. 
 
Explanatory variables which vary across policies, namely political/economic 
costs, sunk costs and vested interests, are tested through a comparative study of 
six issue areas: external borders; illegal migration and asylum; organised crime; 
human trafficking; drugs; and cultural and political rights of minorities. At the 
same time, other variables which cannot be tested through a comparative analysis 
due to a lack of variance, namely government’s partisan interests, political lock-
in, social learning, organisational lock-in and administrative capacity, are tested 
through within-case analyses using congruence method, counterfactual design 
and process tracing.  
 
This thesis also contributes to the theoretical approaches to the study of 
conditionality by distinguishing between different types of domestic actors that 
are engaged in compliance – namely politicians and bureaucrats. The political 
leadership is the most crucial actor in the process of compliance with EU 
conditionality, as the governing party decides which EU conditions to comply 
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with, thereby determining the timing and extent of compliance. Given the 
politicians’ importance in compliance, almost all the literature on conditionality 
examines their motivations to explain compliance outcomes. At the same time, 
there is evidence to believe that EU-related bureaucrats may play a positive role 
in compliance despite diminished credibility in Turkey. For instance, their 
frequent contacts with EU officials makes it likely for them to experience 
socialisation, which may motivate them for further compliance. In this respect, 
this thesis takes a more nuanced approach to investigate the compliance patterns 
of EU-related bureaucrats and examines the driving forces behind their 
compliance. It tests whether these bureaucrats are an independent force in 
improving compliance under diminished credibility in Turkey. Put differently, 
are there specific bureaucratic politics of compliance at work and can it explain 
continued compliance? 
 
1.3 Findings 
 
Most importantly, this thesis offers a more nuanced and qualified formulation of 
how credibility matters for compliance. The macro-level quantitative analysis in 
the first part of the thesis challenges the EIM’s credibility hypothesis. It 
demonstrates that the Turkish government continued to comply with the EU in 
the areas of JHA and political conditionality after 2005. In other words, the level 
of both formal (legal adoption) and behavioural (practical application) 
compliance increased over time. Turkish authorities adopted new laws, 
practically applied them, adopted and/or ratified new international treaties, built 
new institutions, made infrastructural improvements, rather than simply 
maintaining existing levels of compliance or even reversing some of the already 
conducted reforms. All these developments are crucial since the EIM would not 
expect them to happen when credibility declines significantly, which is the case 
in post-2005 Turkey. Furthermore, the speed of formal and behavioural 
compliance, which is measured by the number of reforms per year, did not 
decline. In fact, it even improved in a number of cases after 2005. 
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This finding is also validated by micro-level qualitative evidence. The levels of 
formal and behavioural compliance increased in all of the cases examined – 
external borders; illegal migration and asylum; organised crime; human 
trafficking; drugs; and cultural and political rights of minorities. Moreover, the 
speed of formal and behavioural compliance remained stable at worst. Overall, 
both the macro-level and case study analyses demonstrate that the level and rate 
of compliance has either improved or at least remained stable. The fact that there 
has been absolutely no sign of decline in the level or average speed of 
compliance demonstrates that credibility is not a necessary condition for 
compliance with costly conditions in Turkey. 
 
This claim contradicts a number of analysts who argue that Turkey’s compliance 
with the EU has deteriorated after the opening of accession negotiations. In this 
respect, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is seen as having lost its 
motivation to comply with EU conditionality given Turkey’s slim chance to 
become an EU member. Some of the bureaucrats, opposition party officials and 
civil society representatives interviewed for this research also shared this view. 
Although this may be a common perception, it needs to be qualified and 
compared against empirical data, which is something this thesis offers.  
 
Firstly, when analysts talk about stagnation in Turkey’s reform process they 
generally refer to a slow down in the speed of compliance rather than the level. 
This thesis shows that the speed of compliance did not decline in the policy areas 
under analysis, but on average remained stable after 2005.  
 
Secondly, the remarks about declining compliance both in media and in the 
literature tend to focus on a single issue area, namely EU’s political 
conditionality. However, important reforms in various acquis communautaire2 
fields continued to be conducted after 2005 but have not received the same level 
of media or even political attention. This thesis demonstrates that the level of 
compliance in JHA field increased and speed of compliance remained stable after 
2005, rather than declining.  
                                                
2 What is now the acquis de l’union, i.e. the entirety of the EU legislation incorporates more than 
170,000 pages of rules and regulations (Open Europe, 2005). 
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Thirdly, those claiming there has been a decline focus on the quantity of reforms 
rather than quality. It is true that both the coalition government prior to AKP and 
AKP itself conducted significant reforms before 2005 predominantly addressing 
the EU’s political conditionality. The Turkish constitution has been revised twice 
and nine EU harmonisation packages were adopted before the opening of 
accession negotiations. In light of this, the number of reforms appears to have 
declined after 2005 in the field of political conditionality. However, this view has 
a number of shortcomings. It is important to bear in mind that EU conditionality 
is not an endless list of requirements, which grows longer as candidates comply. 
It is to be expected that as Turkey conducts reforms there will be a lower number 
of conditions remaining to be complied with. Put differently, the compliance 
pattern of a successful candidate is expected to show a decline in the number of 
reform acts over time. Of course Turkey is still not close to meeting the EU’s 
demands in the area of political conditionality. However, a more thorough 
assessment is still necessary. It is very likely that candidates start their 
compliance with the politically least costly technical conditions. Therefore, in the 
initial periods of conditionality there may be a higher numbers of reforms, but 
the economically and politically more costly legislation and more difficult 
aspects of behavioural compliance are postponed till later stages. The apparent 
‘slow down’ in Turkish compliance can be explained this way, as Turkey is still 
required to solve the Cyprus issue, demilitarise politics fully and bring an end to 
the Kurdish problem. Moreover, this thesis demonstrates that, despite the fact 
that more costly reforms were not conducted in the post-2005 period, Turkish 
authorities made substantial progress. For instance, a significant constitutional 
reform package and a wide-ranging judicial reform strategy were adopted. 
Moreover, important developments in the field of minority rights were 
accomplished. Therefore, a more qualitative comparative assessment of pre-2005 
and post-2005 reforms in the field of political conditionality is likely to 
demonstrate that the above-mentioned ‘declining compliance’ arguments are not 
necessarily accurate.  
 
In sum, this thesis adopts a more holistic approach to measuring compliance by 
using both quantitative as well as qualitative indicators and examining both 
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political and acquis conditionality. In this respect, it demonstrates that in all 
cases under analysis the level of compliance increased and in most of the cases 
the speed of compliance increased as well. This evidence presents a serious 
challenge to the EIM’s credibility hypothesis.  
 
The second empirical part of the thesis explains why compliance continues in 
Turkey under diminished credibility. It argues that the political leadership 
complies with the EU mainly out of domestic cost-benefit calculations. More 
specifically, the AKP’s compliance is best explained by a particular variable – 
the government’s partisan incentives. The AKP is seen as making strategic use of 
EU conditionality to attain domestic benefits irrespective of diminished 
credibility. The party, on the one hand, benefits from particular aspects of EU 
conditionality that curb the powers of the Kemalist3/secularist establishment, 
thereby securing its survival as a political party and ensuring it can effectively 
govern the country without military intervention. On the other hand, a pro-EU 
stance allows the AKP to increase its voter base by branding itself as a moderate, 
Westward-looking, neo-liberal party to the Turkish public. The AKP’s pro-EU 
stance attracts not only the newly emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie and the 
secular business groups because of its economically neoliberal policies, but also 
the liberal sections of society and the religious-conservative segments due to the 
party’s reforms to comply with the EU’s human rights standards. Process tracing 
analysis on the broadcasting rights of minorities in Chapter Seven also confirms 
this conclusion. 
 
A number of other factors contribute to explaining the AKP’s continued 
compliance. Firstly, the EIM would also suggest that economic and politics costs 
associated with individual reforms would impact the governing party’s 
compliance. In other words, the AKP is likely to prioritise less costly reforms. 
Chapter Eight conducts a comparative analysis of six issue areas to show that 
both the economic and political cost variables carry explanatory power. While 
                                                
3 Kemalism, developed by Ataturk, is the official Turkish state ideology. It incorporates six 
principles: republicanism, economic statism, populism, laicism, nationalism and reformism. Most 
significantly it views religion as a threat to the Turkish nation-state and aims to separate religion 
from worldly affairs. What this has meant in practice is putting religion under strong state 
control. 
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these issue-specific costs are powerful in explaining why the government 
complies selectively with certain conditions and not all, they are not strong 
enough to explain the broader pattern of continued compliance after 2005. For 
instance, in the politically very costly area of the cultural rights of minorities, 
partial compliance occurred after 2005. This outcome can only be explained with 
reference to the government’s partisan incentives. 
 
Secondly, this research finds that historical institutionalism (HI) holds some 
weight, since path-dependency and lock-in effects play a part in continued 
compliance. The political lock-in variable measures whether the general 
orientation of Turkish foreign policy (FP) and/or already conducted compliance 
has an impact on future compliance patterns. According to HI, once the political 
leadership sets a FP target, it becomes very costly to reverse this policy. The 
empirical evidence demonstrates that this lock-in dynamic is causally related to 
continued compliance, however it is not sufficiently strong to explain it on its 
own.  
  
Finally, a number of other variables fail to explain continued compliance after 
2005. Most significantly, social learning which hypothesises that compliance 
increases with higher identification and closer institutional/personal contacts of 
politicians with the EU, does not appear to be a relevant part of the explanation 
in the Turkish case. This research demonstrates that the AKP does not identify 
strongly with the EU and the conditions which make social learning more likely, 
such as an exposure to the EU and having a European background, are not 
conducive in the AKP’s case. Therefore, even though we cannot rule out the 
possibility that social learning may matter for compliance, the case at hand does 
not allow us to confirm this hypothesis, since it seems very unlikely that low 
levels of social learning would have led to continued compliance under 
diminished credibility. Furthermore, the level of issue-specific sunk costs and 
vested interests were found to be incongruent with the levels of compliance after 
2005, therefore they are ruled out as possible explanations of compliance.  
 
In sum, this thesis demonstrates that the AKP’s continued compliance under 
diminished credibility is predominantly due to the particular domestic incentives 
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these reforms offer to the governing party, lock-in effects due to the general 
direction of Turkish FP and specific costs associated with different reforms.  
 
In addition to the compliance of politicians, this thesis also analyses whether the 
EU-related bureaucrats are an independent force driving further compliance. The 
findings demonstrate that they continued to conduct administrative preparatory 
work after 2005 for formal and behavioural compliance to take place. However, 
these bureaucrats do not operate as independent actors and the work they conduct 
does not autonomously improve compliance. Rather than presenting a case of 
agency shirking, their activities follow the preferences of the political leadership. 
The level and speed of administrative work they conduct is determined by the 
economic/political cost-benefit calculations of their principals – the politicians. If 
the politicians find various reforms beneficial they instruct the bureaucrats to 
comply and if compliance is costly for the politicians then the bureaucrats 
postpone reform preparations. At the same time, even though the EU-related 
bureaucracy’s actions cannot explain compliance alone, bureaucracy is still an 
important actor in the compliance process and may be able to improve 
compliance in areas where the political leadership is indifferent. For instance, it 
can use its agenda-setting capacity by coming up with new initiatives to further 
compliance.  
 
This analysis on bureaucrats also demonstrates that their motives for compliance 
are different from those of the politicians. For the EU-related bureaucrats, strong 
organisational lock-in mechanisms encourage them to comply. Furthermore, they 
are more likely to experience social learning throughout the compliance process 
in comparison to the political leadership. High organisational lock-in and social 
learning suggests that there is a distinct bureaucratic politics of compliance at 
work.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Following this Introduction, Chapter Two presents the theoretical framework and 
the methodology applied by this thesis. The chapter uses Schimmelfennig and 
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Sedelmeier’s (2005) conceptual framework for the EU’s impact on candidate 
countries to set the theoretical framework. The EIM and the social learning 
model are employed in this research to offer (partially) competing explanations 
of compliance. Furthermore, the chapter clarifies how the new institutionalist 
theories – rational choice institutionalism, HI and sociological institutionalism – 
contribute to explaining continued compliance under diminished credibility and 
presents the research hypotheses derived from the new institutionalist variables. 
The second part of this chapter details the research design. It operationalises in 
detail the dependent variable, as well as the independent variables, by explaining 
the methods used for measurement. Finally, the case selection is justified and the 
research methodologies used in the thesis, such as before-after design, 
comparative methodology, counterfactual design and process tracing, are 
explained. 
 
Chapter Three provides an overview of how the compliance process is 
coordinated and operates in Turkey with specific attention to policy-formulation 
and policy-making phases. It explains how the decision to comply is taken, how 
the compliance agenda is set, what the EU-related bureaucrats do to prepare the 
ground for compliance, how the elected officials comply and finally how much 
power and autonomy each actor in the process possesses.  
 
Chapters Four and Five constitute the first empirical part of the thesis to test the 
EIM’s credibility assumption. Chapter Four analyses the levels of formal and 
behavioural compliance over time to see whether compliance in the post-2005 
period is significantly lower than it was in the pre-2005 period. This chapter 
makes use of quantitative macro-level data in the 23rd and 24th chapters of the EU 
acquis and concludes that compliance in terms of adoption and application of 
new laws continued after 2005. Chapter Five examines how the level and speed 
of formal and behavioural compliance change over time in the fields of external 
borders; illegal migration and asylum; organised crime; human trafficking; 
drugs; and cultural and political rights of minorities. This qualitative micro-level 
data also supports the claim that compliance continued after 2005. 
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The second empirical part of the thesis explains why the political leadership and 
EU-related bureaucrats in Turkey continue to comply with EU conditionality 
under diminished credibility.  Chapter Six tests whether continued compliance 
can be explained by the preferences and actions of the political leadership, 
comparing three explanations derived from the new institutionalist theories – 
government’s partisan incentives, political lock-in and social learning. 
Congruence method together with counterfactual design is used to demonstrate 
that government’s partisan benefits offer the strongest causal explanation for 
continued compliance.   
 
Chapter Seven then tests these same variables in an in-depth case study of a 
specific issue area – broadcasting rights of minorities – through process tracing, 
and reaches similar conclusions. It finds that government’s partisan incentives 
motivate the AKP to comply in this area and allow it to increase its voter base, 
control the content of broadcasting in minority languages and gain credit with the 
EU at the same time. Moreover, the lock-in effects created by the direction of 
Turkish FP and earlier reforms make it more likely that the AKP will comply. 
 
Chapter Eight compares the political leadership’s compliance across various 
issue areas with distinct costs and benefits. It tests whether differences in the 
economic costs, political costs, sunk costs and vested interests related to the 
fields of external borders; asylum and illegal migration; organised crime; human 
trafficking; drugs; and cultural and political rights of minorities matter for 
compliance. It concludes that, together with the broader explanations of 
compliance detailed in Chapters Six and Seven, economic and political costs 
associated with reforms also contribute to explaining continued compliance 
under diminished credibility.  
 
The final empirical chapter – Chapter Nine – accounts for the continued 
compliance of EU-related bureaucrats after 2005. It also explains the extent to 
which the EU-related bureaucrats are a driving force behind improving 
compliance, independent of the preferences and actions of the political 
leadership. Congruence method is employed in this section to test whether 
organisational lock-in and social learning variables explain bureaucratic 
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compliance. Both variables are found to be causally related to continued 
compliance. At the same time, this chapter concludes that the EU-related 
bureaucrats are not autonomous actors in compliance and instead their 
compliance is highly dependent on the preferences of the political leadership 
regarding the economic/political costs of reforms.  
 
Finally, the Conclusion discusses the findings and presents areas of further study. 
Most importantly, it concludes that the most basic tenets of the EIM are largely 
confirmed by this thesis, as Turkey’s compliance can mostly be explained by 
government’s cost-benefit calculations. At the same time, the EIM generally 
assumes that compliance involves domestic costs. This thesis demonstrates the 
shortcomings of this view and refines it by arguing that the rewards offered by 
EU are not the only benefits used by the candidates’ governments in compliance 
process. Rather, there may be intrinsic domestic partisan benefits at work. 
Therefore, external rewards offered by the EU and the credibility of these 
rewards are not always necessary for candidates’ compliance.  
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Chapter Two: 
Theoretical Framework and Research Design 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This research aims to investigate an apparent puzzle for the widely accepted 
external incentives model of conditionality (EIM), which assumes that credibility 
is a necessary condition for compliance with costly conditions. To do this, it 
firstly establishes that the empirical evidence indeed confirms that there is a 
puzzle. It conducts a comparative study of two temporal cases during which 
credibility varies to answer the following question: does compliance deteriorate 
after credibility declines? The macro-level quantitative and micro-level 
qualitative data in the fields of JHA and political conditionality show that 
compliance continued despite diminished credibility.  
 
Secondly, this thesis seeks to solve this puzzle by explaining continuing levels of 
compliance under diminished credibility. It draws on rational choice, historical 
and sociological institutionalist theories to explain why the political leadership 
and bureaucrats in Turkey continued to comply with EU conditionality at a time 
when the EU’s membership promise lost most of its credibility. This analysis is 
conducted by a combination of comparative case studies and within-case 
methods, including congruence method, counterfactual analysis and process 
tracing. 
 
The first part of this chapter sets out the theoretical framework for the thesis. 
Initially, it introduces the dependent variable used in the research. It then reviews 
theories of Europeanisation and explains why the rationalist approaches consider 
credibility as a necessary condition for compliance. Subsequently, it presents the 
case of Turkey and explains why it offers a puzzle for rationalist theories, and 
develops the research hypotheses which guide this research. The second part of 
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the chapter presents the research design. More specifically, it operationalises the 
dependent and independent variables, justifies the selection of cases, sets out the 
research methodology and clarifies data sources.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1.1 The Dependent Variable – Compliance 
 
This thesis aims to solve the puzzle of and explain continued compliance with 
costly conditions under diminished credibility. Therefore, compliance, or the 
process through which candidates adopt EU demands and institutionalise them, is 
the dependent variable of this research. Conditionality studies distinguish 
between two types of compliance. Firstly, in formal compliance candidates 
legally adopt the EU rules. Since the EU generally considers such legal adoption 
as satisfactory, most conditionality studies limit their definition to formal 
compliance.4 The observable implications of this type of rule adherence are the 
transposition of EU law into domestic legislation through laws and secondary 
legislation or signing and/or ratifying international treaties (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005: 7). However, candidates may not limit themselves to legal rule 
adoption, and may also adapt to the new environment. The degree to which 
candidates change their behaviour and implement the EU conditions determines 
behavioural compliance. For this second type, it is important to examine whether 
the candidates have altered their domestic political practices, implemented new 
legislation in courts, and allocated necessary resources to appropriate institutions 
to realise the formal changes.5  
 
                                                
4 See Schimmelfennig et al., 2006. 
5 There is a third type of compliance, namely discursive compliance. It occurs when the 
candidates’ domestic actors absorb a condition into their discourses. These actors either truly 
internalise the norms, or behave strategically by paying lip service to them (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005: 8). One could examine the media and elite discourses to capture this type of 
compliance. However, due to methodological barriers, the research does not incorporate 
discursive compliance into its design. It goes without saying that it is extremely difficult to 
differentiate actual internalisation from rhetoric. Moreover, it is difficult to attain valid and 
comparable measures for such compliance across policy areas and actors. These methodological 
difficulties make discursive compliance an inaccurate indicator for compliance, and therefore 
make its use problematic for theoretical reasons as well. 
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This thesis takes into account both compliance types, which entails tracing new 
legislation and institutional developments, as well as examining the 
implementation records in areas where formal compliance has already taken 
place. This research also aims to contribute to compliance studies by introducing 
an additional indicator for compliance, namely administrative compliance. 
Administrative compliance incorporates the totality of work done at the state 
level prior to formal/behavioural compliance, which helps bring about 
formal/behavioural compliance. A similar concept has been employed by Falkner 
et al. who make the distinction between the formal/behavioural compliance stage 
and the earlier pre-compliance phase (2007: 407). The authors label the pre-
compliance stage the ‘administrative phase of the transposition process’ where 
the administrative systems identify reform requirements to comply with the EU 
and initiate a process leading to formal compliance (ibid.: 407). Whereas the 
authors limit themselves to identifying a phase of compliance, this research 
extends this by defining the outcomes of this pre-compliance stage as 
administrative compliance. 
 
Time devoted to compliance-related activities; as well as the preparation and 
monitoring of draft laws, secondary legislation and National Programmes for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAAs) are factors to consider in order to determine 
the level of administrative compliance. Clearly, one must be cautious when using 
this as an indicator, since it is not a type of compliance as such, and having a 
high level of administrative compliance does not necessarily bring about formal 
compliance. But the speed, quality and ambitiousness of the preparatory work 
conducted does matter because it informs our understanding of candidates’ 
seriousness, motivation and determination about compliance. It is also a 
prerequisite for formal rule adoption.  
 
Including this indicator of compliance into research allows us to examine a new 
facet of compliance, which involves a distinct temporal framework and a new set 
of actors – the bureaucracy. More importantly, bureaucracy’s administrative 
compliance may offer an alternative explanation for candidates’ compliance with 
the EU. It therefore may help to solve the puzzle identified in this thesis for the 
Turkish case because we might expect the EU-related Turkish bureaucrats who 
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conduct administrative compliance to have a positive impact on compliance 
despite diminished credibility, potentially due to greater levels of socialisation 
with the EU officials and path-dependent effects of earlier administrative work. 
Moreover, they are among the most pro-EU actors in Turkey, particularly in 
comparison with the Kemalist elite which is seen as an obstacle to EU-led 
reforms in the area of political conditionality (Turkmen, 2008: 161-2). These 
factors inform our choice to include administrative compliance into the research 
design and therefore study the EU-related bureaucrats in the Turkish case. 
 
2.1.2 Compliance and Conditionality 
 
The successful operation of a single European market depends heavily on the 
member-states’ (MS) timely and correct implementation of EU legislation. As 
the EU’s internal market developed into a substantive legislative programme,6 
compliance became a pivotal issue for the EU. Parallel to this development, in 
the early 1990s, the extent and the sources of non-compliance in the EU drew a 
great deal of academic attention (Krislov et al., 1986; Duina, 1997; Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998; 2000; Ciavarini Azzi, 2000; Haverland, 2000; Boerzel, 2000; 
Dimitrakopoulos, 2001a; 2001b; Checkel, 2001; Tallberg, 2002; Mastenbroek, 
2005; Falkner et al., 2005; 2007; Falkner and Treib, 2008; Treib, 2008). At the 
same time, the EU compliance research agenda goes beyond MSs and the EU 
boundaries to consider EU candidates and its neighbourhood. Hence, the 
question of enlargement and new members offer brand new avenues and 
challenges to researchers of compliance and the domestic impact of international 
institutions more broadly.  
 
Inclusion of outsiders into a ‘members club’ may be risky for the club’s existing 
standards. Viewed from this angle, enlarging the EU to those countries that are 
unable to adapt to this new environment endangers the benchmarks that current 
MSs live by, namely the EU’s acquis. Despite high requirements, the 1995 
enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden actually posed no major threats for 
                                                
6 With 1481 Directives and 1110 Regulations as of October 31, 2010 (Internal Market 
Scoreboard, 2011). 
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EU’s compliance records, since these states were already a part of the European 
Economic Area and also possessed the necessary institutional, administrative and 
economic resources to transpose EU legislation into their national systems in a 
successful and timely manner. However, the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) faced greater challenges on the road to accession. As 
Geoffrey Pridham argues the concept of new MSs and their ability to cope with 
the problems of adaptation is a ‘fresh academic and political concern’ arising 
from the 2004 enlargement (2008: 368). Fears of non-compliance encouraged the 
EU to adopt a firm incentive structure called conditionality to Europeanise the 
applicants prior to accession. 
 
Conditionality7 entails a state or an international organisation requiring an actor 
to fulfil specific conditions prior to granting them benefits (Smith, 2003: 108). 
The EU uses this tool to stabilise and shape the domestic structures and policy 
processes of the applicants in line with existing EU standards. In so doing, it 
places the prospect of membership at the heart of this incentive structure and 
thereby increases its influence over the candidates through the conditions it sets 
for them (Grabbe, 2006: 7). For an applicant to become an EU member it must 
have achieved stability in the institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities and have a 
functioning market economy. In addition, the bulk of EU conditionality requires 
the adoption of the entirety of the EU legislation, its effective implementation 
through appropriate administrative and judicial structures and ‘adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union’ (European Council, 1993).  
 
In EU conditionality studies the key questions are ‘why do the candidates 
comply?’ and ‘under what conditions is conditionality effective?’. To address 
these questions, the analysis of conditionality needs to be grounded in theory. 
Following the framework developed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), 
the explanations of candidates’ compliance with EU conditionality are presented 
                                                
7 Initially, international financial institutions, such as the IMF or World Bank, adopted 
conditionality in the form of ‘aid conditionality’ by linking specific privileges to internal policy 
reform. For more discussion on aid conditionality see Collier, 2000; Killick et al., 1998; Mosley, 
1987; Mosley et al., 1995. 
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in the remainder of this section and the value of each model for this research is 
assessed.  
 
Theoretical explanations of Europeanisation are distinguished according to two 
dimensions. Firstly, the process of Europeanisation may be induced directly by 
the EU actors or domestically-driven by the candidates (ibid.: 8-9).8 In the 
presence of EU conditionality the process of rule adoption is EU-driven for the 
most part.  At the same time, candidates may take the initiative in areas where 
the EU influence is not deep-seated, where conditionality is extremely weak, or 
where a process of domestic change has been initiated independently of the EU 
influence (ibid.: 9).  
 
Secondly, Europeanisation models can differ in the institutionalist logics they 
follow, i.e. a rationalist logic of consequences or a constructivist logic of 
appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989, 160-2). Each approach proposes 
divergent rationales and mechanisms for compliance. Whereas the logic of 
consequences highlights strategic rational actors that are engaged in cost-benefit 
calculations in search of maximising their interests, the latter logic motivates 
actors to choose the most appropriate and legitimate course of action in line with 
their identities, values and norms. This typology is illustrated in Table 2.1 below.  
 
Table 2.1: Models of EU Impact under Conditionality 
 
 
Principal Actor 
Logic of Rule Adoption 
Logic of Consequences 
 
Logic of Appropriateness 
EU-driven External incentives model9 
 
Social learning model 
 
CEEC-driven Lesson-drawing model  Lesson-drawing model  
 
Source: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005: 8) 
 
                                                
8 Similarly, Diez et al. distinguish between the impact initiated by tangible EU measures and 
more diffuse effects of integration that are not directly EU-led (2006). 
9 This model is also referred to as the conditionality model in the literature (see Schimmelfennig, 
2007: 6-7). Conditionality is used as a more generic term in this research, which defines the 
entire process where candidates conduct domestic alterations in the face of EU demands.  
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The external incentives model (EIM) encapsulates the logic of conditionality 
through its emphasis on rationalist action in an environment of external 
incentives and (positive) sanctions. In the existing literature it is also widely 
accepted as the dominant model for explaining when EU conditionality is 
effective (Vachudova, 2002; 2005; Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). It considers EU conditionality as a 
strategy of reinforcement by reward (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 
670) where compliance is rewarded. Applicants’ domestic actors engage in cost-
benefit calculations following a logic of consequences and comply if the 
material/political costs are lower than the expected benefits. It is in light of the 
promised rewards – the most valuable of which is EU membership – that 
applicants comply with EU demands. This reactive reinforcement model starts 
off with upsetting the domestic equilibrium, since it introduces additional 
incentives into the status-quo position (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 
11). It mainly targets the candidate’s government directly which then calculates 
the costs of compliance against the benefits to be gained.  
 
Within this model the likelihood of rule adoption increases, firstly, with the 
determinacy and formality of accession conditions (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004: 663-7). Compliance is easier with clearer rules since the 
applicants know what exactly is expected of them. Moreover, by binding both 
sides with determinate conditions, it avoids interpretation and manipulation. 
Secondly, the effectiveness of conditionality increases with the size and 
proximity of rewards. Thirdly, rule adoption is more effective if the EU is 
perceived to be credible in delivering rewards in case of compliance and 
withholding them in case of non-compliance. Lastly, the effectiveness of 
conditionality is enhanced with smaller domestic adoption costs and fewer 
domestic veto-players (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 12-17).  
 
The first three variables are solely to do with the quality of EU’s conditionality 
instrument and have been fully conceptualised and operationalised in the 
conditionality literature. The last one, on the other hand, is slightly different, 
since it analyses domestic cost calculations conducted by candidates’ actors in 
light of the EU rewards. Even though it has been incorporated into conditionality 
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studies under the broad label of domestic costs, various types and components of 
these costs are under researched and not entirely unpacked. This thesis 
predominantly focuses on such costs, and distinguishes this final factor from the 
previous three as the domestic politics model (DPM) within the EIM. The DPM 
differs from the EIM because it predominantly sees domestic political 
considerations as the driving factor behind compliance. At the same time, it is 
conceptualised as part of the EIM as the EU still plays a causal role. In other 
words, compliance is not expected in the absence of EU conditionality. 
 
The second model, developed as an alternative to the EIM, is the social learning 
model (SLM) (Checkel, 2000; 2001; Epstein, 2005).10 This model incorporates 
those processes at work during the course of candidates’ compliance, which have 
largely been ignored by the rationalists. According to this line of thought, the 
applicants may comply with EU rules because they have undergone experiences 
of learning or persuasion by the EU, or they identify themselves with the EU or 
consider the EU rules as appropriate and/or legitimate. Here the EU is still the 
direct facilitator of change but candidates follow a different logic of action when 
they comply – one of appropriateness. Examining conditionality through such a 
constructivist perspective involves analysing social identities, norms, values and 
ideas rather than material cost-benefit calculations. In this respect, the EU is 
conceptualised as an international community equipped with a particular 
collective identity and a set of values. Its pull for compliance stems from its 
normative power and the legitimacy of the conditions it propagates.    
  
A number of variables are incorporated in the SLM. As in the EIM, the 
determinacy of rules is considered important for the effectiveness of 
conditionality, but operates differently. The compliance pull is enhanced by 
unambiguously defined rules that are generally accepted and consistently applied 
among the MSs. Moreover, the societal salience and the degree of legitimacy of 
                                                
10 Even though these two approaches are frequently presented as contradictory, the actual 
differences between the two are often a matter of degree rather than principle (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, 2002: 508). Therefore, it is more suitable to regard them as partially competing 
and partially complementary. For example, Andonova argues that, while the EIM is the dominant 
mechanism of EU influence during the pre-accession preparations and negotiations, the SLM 
operates to ‘ease and legitimise the process of adopting EU legislation’ (2005: 139). 
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European rules and norms within the applicant countries’ society and elites 
augment compliance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 18-20). 
 
Finally the lesson-drawing model (LDM)11 significantly differs from the previous 
models through its focus on the candidates’ actors as the main initiators of 
domestic change. The size of EU’s incentives or its persuasion efforts do not 
drive compliance. Instead, the candidates recognise EU rules as efficient 
solutions to their already existing problems and therefore import them. Put 
simply, the motive for compliance does not come from outside but derives from 
within. The extent of lesson-drawing depends on the level of policy 
dissatisfaction, presence of EU-centred epistemic communities, degree of rule 
transferability, and the number and position of domestic veto-players 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 20-5). In Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier’s typology (ibid.) the LDM incorporates both the logics of 
consequence and appropriateness. Per the rationalist logic, candidates’ actors 
engage in simple learning where the means of achieving the original goal are 
altered, whereas in the sociological variant the underlying goals are substantially 
changed through complex learning (ibid.: 20-2).12  
 
This research does not use the LDM as an alternative explanation of compliance, 
since it does not necessarily apply to the Turkish case. What essentially 
distinguishes a domestically-driven process from an externally-driven one is that, 
in a domestically-driven process the EU demands simply coincide with the 
already ongoing reform efforts. Whereas this model was particularly pertinent in 
the context of the CEECs that were already undergoing a substantial transition, it 
is more appropriate to use the DPM, as part of the EIM, in the Turkish case. 
There is a wide consensus among the Turkish policy-makers and academics that 
Turkey would not have committed itself to these wide-ranging reforms were it 
not for the EU. More specifically, even though the AKP already preferred certain 
reforms to strengthen its domestic power, it would not have been able to push 
through these changes if they were not set as EU conditions. Overall, both the 
                                                
11 See also Rose (1993). 
12 In a later classification, Schimmelfennig further differentiates the two logics. In this 
classification, lesson-drawing refers to rationalist simple learning mechanisms and ‘imitation’ is 
used for complex learning following the sociological variant (2007: 7-8). 
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LDM and the DPM agree that compliance results from domestic political 
considerations. However, the DPM does not see domestic change as possible 
without the EU or its conditionality mechanism, and therefore is conceptualised 
as part of the EIM. 
 
Overall, this research considers distinguishing between the two logics of action 
as a key problematique in compliance research and therefore takes both the EIM 
and SLM into consideration. Let us now examine the EIM in more detail to 
illustrate how it can be tested in the context of current EU candidates.  
 
2.1.3 Credible Conditionality: A Necessary Condition? 
 
In comparison to the original form of conditionality practiced by International 
Financial Institutions, the EU’s accession conditionality was more effective in 
initiating domestic change. The main reason behind this can succinctly be 
explained by the EIM which has a stronger explanatory power over the SLM. 
(Vachudova, 2005; Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Its 
central power stems from the presence of a conditional and credible membership 
offer to candidates. Epstein and Sedelmeier identify the EIM’s hypothesis as: the 
EU’s pull for compliance is enhanced when conditionality is credible and when 
the costs of compliance are low (2008: 796). More specifically, the EIM treats 
credibility as a ‘necessary condition for the EU to bring about substantial 
domestic change’ (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 918).13 This is because ‘nothing short 
of a credible conditional accession perspective has proven effective’ 
(Schimmelfennig, 2008: 920).  
 
The relatively problem-free enlargements in 2004 and 2007 owed a great deal to 
the credible nature of conditionality, coupled with relatively low domestic 
adjustment costs. However, if credibility is a necessary condition for compliance 
as the EIM suggests, one would expect the levels of compliance to alter 
                                                
13 Schimmelfennig also states that ‘[c]redible accession conditionality, however, is only a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition of EU success’ since it also has to fall on ‘fertile 
domestic ground’ (2008: 918, 921). 
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considerably after these enlargements (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008: 796). One 
should witness declining compliance in two different contexts, namely the new 
MSs and the current applicants.  
 
Firstly, the credibility of conditionality declined dramatically once the CEECs 
became EU members, since one can no longer talk about the credibility of 
handing and withdrawing rewards as significant as EU membership. In the 
absence of such rewards, domestic adoption costs generally weigh heavier in 
cost-benefit calculations. In this context, the EIM would expect the EU to have 
less influence over the new MSs. Moreover, one could even expect a revengeful 
behaviour from the new MSs’ domestic actors (Falkner and Treib, 2008: 299).14 
In the absence of credible threats in post-accession, the new members might be 
expected to pose an ‘Eastern problem’ (Sedelmeier, 2008) according to the 
EIM.15 
 
A second context where a similar inquiry may be held is the current and potential 
candidates. Firstly, compared to earlier candidates their prospect of accession lies 
further in the future. Secondly, the open-ended nature of negotiations was 
underlined for them, which as Epstein and Sedelmeier argue, departs from ‘the 
practice of earlier enlargement rounds when the start of negotiations indicated a 
commitment on both sides to conclude them successfully’ (2008: 799). 
Credibility is further weakened due to references made to the EU’s ‘absorption 
capacity’ by the EU institutions and MSs. As an additional factor, these 
candidates face larger challenges with regards to adjustment costs particularly in 
the areas of political conditionality. This puts the effective operation of the EIM 
further at risk.  
 
                                                
14 The candidates were generally absent from the rule-making procedures and had little influence 
on the rules they were required to take up, which were pre-determined single-handedly by the 
MSs.  
15 Studies on post-accession compliance show that new MSs are not lagging behind old MSs in 
the transposition record and number of infringement cases, and in fact are considerably better 
(Falkner and Treib, 2008; Sedelmeier, 2008). However, such high rule adoption and 
implementation levels are not necessarily accurate. As Falkner and Treib argue, the legal 
provisions adopted by the new MSs ‘have so far largely remained dead letters’ (2008: 308). 
Similarly, due to the relative weakness of civil society in the CEECs, non-compliance is less 
likely to be detected, which accounts for the low number of open infringement cases (ibid.: 809). 
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Even though the context of new MSs has been subject to analysis, only a few 
studies have explored the effectiveness of the EIM in the current candidates 
under diminished credibility.16 This research addresses this gap with its focus on 
the Turkish case. The Turkish case is a particularly interesting, since the already 
low levels of credibility have diminished further recently. Let us now look closer 
at the Turkish case to understand why it is a valuable case to study the credibility 
assumption of the EIM. 
 
2.1.4 The Case of Turkey 
 
Turkey first signed an Association Agreement, otherwise known as the Ankara 
Agreement, with the European Economic Community in September 1963, after 
its first application for associate membership in September 1959. Turkey’s 
official proposal to become a full member of the European Community came on 
April 14, 1987. Its application was rejected mostly on economic grounds, and on 
the basis of its poor democratic and human rights records (Buzan and Diez, 
1999: 43). After a period of deteriorating relations, the EU Helsinki Council 
recognised the candidacy status of Turkey in December 1999. This marks the 
official start of the pre-accession process and the first time when Turkey attained 
a credible membership incentive.  
 
The relations between the two parties blossomed after this date. On March 8, 
2001 the first Accession Partnership (AP) was signed. This was an extremely 
important date, since the AP initiated the EU’s ‘active leverage’ (Vachudova, 
2005) over Turkey through determining short and medium-term priorities. Aid 
and continued institutional ties were made conditional on ‘progress in meeting 
the specific priorities’ (European Council, 2001). In other words, this date marks 
the formal start of EU conditionality with clearly set conditions, a set time frame 
for fulfilling them and specific rewards to be gained in return.  
 
After this date Turkey sped up the reform process considerably, especially after 
the election of the AKP into government in 2002 (Onis, 2003a: 30). On 
                                                
16 However, see Noutcheva (2009); Freyburg and Richter (2010); Schimmelfennig (2008). 
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December 17, 2004 the European Council declared that Turkey had fulfilled the 
Copenhagen Criteria to an acceptable extent and announced the beginning of the 
accession negotiations with Turkey as of October 2005. Until 2005, the Turkish 
actors viewed negotiations as a tangible reward on the road to full membership 
and they could see that Turkey progressed towards this goal. Therefore, the 
credibility of conditionality continued to increase until the opening of accession 
negotiations in October, 2005. However, a number of events after this date 
significantly reduced credibility. For instance, references to ‘privileged 
partnership’, ‘open-ended nature of negotiations’, ‘EU’s absorption capacity’; 
the French referendum requirement for Turkish accession; partial suspension of 
negotiations in eight chapters; and the French and Cypriot block on 11 other 
chapters diminished the credibility of conditionality dramatically.17 
 
The EIM would either expect Turkey to stop complying with EU conditions 
altogether or expect the levels of compliance to fall considerably after 2005, 
parallel to this significant decline in credibility. The fact that Turkish authorities 
continued to conduct politically and economically costly reforms after 2005 
presents a puzzle for the EIM’s credibility assumption. This study addresses this 
puzzle, firstly, by answering: does compliance deteriorate after credibility 
declines in 2005 in Turkey? The empirical evidence demonstrates that 
compliance with costly conditions continues under diminished credibility in 
Turkey despite the EIM’s expectations. Once credibility is shown to not be a 
necessary condition in the Turkish case, the thesis investigates the reasons 
behind the Turkish domestic actors’ continued compliance under diminished 
credibility. In other words: why keep complying? 
 
2.1.5 Research Hypotheses  
 
The credibility hypothesis18 which is tested in the first part of the thesis is: 
 
                                                
17 A more detailed analysis of how credibility of conditionality changed over time in Turkey is 
conducted in Chapter Four. 
18 All hypotheses in this research are ceteris paribus. 
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• Compliance will come to a halt (or decrease significantly) in the absence (or 
significant decline) of credibility. 
 
This hypothesis suggests not only that compliance levels are related to credibility 
in a linear manner, but also credibility is necessary for compliance. As for the 
linear relationship, this hypothesis suggests that compliance levels before 2005 
can be expected to be higher than after 2005, since the level of credibility prior to 
2005 is higher than the post-2005 period. The necessity relationship, on the other 
hand, is harder to test because threshold levels for both variables need to be 
established. If credibility is demonstrated to have declined significantly after 
2005 in comparison to before, then the necessity hypothesis would expect the 
level of compliance in Turkey to decrease significantly after 2005. 
 
A second set of hypotheses examine the reasons behind continued compliance 
under diminished credibility. The previous section has suggested that the Turkish 
case seems not to fit the EIM’s expectations about credibility since compliance 
appears to continue even under diminished credibility. This empirical finding 
constitutes a puzzle and requires explanation. Three sets of hypotheses are 
derived from the three new institutionalist theories (Hall and Taylor, 1996) to 
explain these patterns of compliance. Let us first review the concept of 
institutions and the varieties of new institutionalisms, before outlining what they 
hypothesise. 
 
Institutions, as defined by March and Olsen, are ‘collections of interrelated rules 
and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles 
and situations’ (1989: 160). Following this definition, institutionalists theorise 
about the impact of institutions on human behaviour and decision-making. They 
share a common dislike of the behavioural and rational choice approaches’ 
overemphasis on the individual, and a common concern for bringing institutions 
back into social sciences. However, theories vary over the extent to which 
institutions matter and over the relative weight that culture (social norms and 
conventions), structures (institutional context within which decisions are made) 
and agency (individual action) play (Koelble, 1995: 231). In this respect, 
different institutionalisms follow different theoretical assumptions. 
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Firstly, rational choice institutionalism (RCI) adopts the logic of consequences 
and follows the assumption that relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences 
and they behave strategically to maximise those preferences (Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 944-5). In this respect, institutions are influential in structuring the 
interactions between these actors and determining their expectations about how 
others might behave. They may do this by increasing/constraining the range of 
available options, offering opportunities for agenda-setting, providing/limiting 
information and increasing/reducing uncertainty (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 945). In 
other words, institutions do not determine individual choice but they set the 
parameters and limits within which the act of choosing takes place.  
 
The central premise of the second approach, historical institutionalism (HI) 
(Steinmo et al., 1992), is that the policy choices made when an institution is 
being formed, or when a policy is initiated, have a continuing and determining 
influence over the policy in the future (Peters, 2005: 71). History progresses in a 
path-dependent manner and these contextual features inherited from the past 
determine and constrain the options available to relevant actors. HI, thus, is able 
to explain why some suboptimal institutions are sticky and continue to exist even 
though the initial incentive structure that once created them has been altered and 
even though the institution itself is no longer efficient. Once the 
institutions/policies are locked-in it becomes very costly to reverse them. In light 
of this, historical institutionalists emphasise the gaps in agency control (Pierson, 
1996: 128-36) and the unintended consequences of existing institutions (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 941-2).  
 
This approach differs from RCI, firstly, in that the institutions play a more 
determining role. Whereas RCI sees institutions as a ‘contextual constraint upon 
individuals and their choices’, for HI they shape actors’ strategies and goals by 
making certain behaviour more costly (Koelble, 1995: 237). Secondly, HI also 
follows a logic of consequences but this differs from the RCI’s rationalist logic. 
HI acknowledges the individual’s ability to calculate utility, but at the same time 
considers this calculation to be taken place under bounded rationality where there 
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are unintended consequences and ‘outcomes are shaped by a number of structural 
factors beyond individual calculation or control’ (Koelble, 1995: 242).  
 
Thirdly, sociological institutionalism (SI) emphasises the logic of 
appropriateness as the driving force behind actors’ behaviour. Institutions 
provide cognitive scripts, norms, meaning and identity to individuals who are 
associated with and socialised into those institutions. In this respect, the 
institutions do not just affect the strategic cost-benefit calculations of individuals, 
but instead they reconstruct the individuals by shaping the limits of acceptable 
and appropriate behaviour. Therefore, the individuals no longer choose to behave 
in a certain way, but rather they do so because they cannot think of an 
alternative. As Hall and Taylor stress this does not mean individuals are not 
purposive, goal-oriented or rational. Instead, what it entails is that ‘what an 
individual will see as “rational action” is itself socially constructed’ (1996: 949).  
 
In sum, RCI follows a logic of consequences and treat institutions as an 
intervening variable that is able to affect individuals’ behaviour without 
determining them. Here, agency has the determining role. HI, on the other hand, 
considers the structural context (the institutions) to play a more determining role 
in moulding individuals’ actions. The individuals themselves, even though 
constrained by structures, still follow a logic of consequences. Finally, SI sees 
institutions as being ‘dependent upon larger “macro level” variables such as 
society and culture, and the individual is a largely dependent and rather 
unimportant variable’ (Koelble, 1995: 232). The underlying operational logic is 
the logic of appropriateness. The three theories are summarised in Table 2.2 
below. 
 
Table 2.2: New Institutionalist Theories 
 
 RCI   HI SI 
 
Background 
Discipline 
 
Economics Political Science Sociology 
Operational 
Logic 
Logic of 
consequences 
Logic of consequences 
(bounded rationality) 
Logic of 
appropriateness  
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Variables 
Determining 
Behaviour 
 
Agency, 
individual 
action 
Structures, institutional 
context 
Culture, society, 
social norms and 
conventions 
Role of 
Institutions 
Constrain but 
not determine 
behaviour 
Constrain individual 
behaviour 
Constitute 
identities/interests 
and determine 
behaviour  
 
When this framework is applied to this specific research, the behaviour that 
needs to be accounted for is the act of compliance conducted by relevant actors, 
namely the political leadership and EU-related bureaucrats, under diminished 
credibility in Turkey. It is, therefore, imperative to look at what each theory 
hypothesises about continued compliance.  
 
Firstly, the EIM of conditionality corresponds to the operational logic of RCI. 
The most basic assumption of this model is that behaviour change follows 
changes in the incentive structure. The credibility hypothesis outlined above is 
the main research hypothesis of this model. The fall in credibility in Turkey is 
the most important change in the incentive structure, therefore the EIM proposes 
declining levels of compliance as a result. However, a number of other factors 
under the EIM may also play a role to alter the incentive structure and, to a 
certain extent, compensate for the decline in credibility. These additional 
explanations are part of the EIM because actors take into account the external 
incentives offered by the EU when making their utility calculation, but they 
predominantly focus on domestic costs of compliance. These factors are taken 
into account within the context of the more specific DPM. Three hypotheses are 
formulated:  
  
• Government’s partisan incentives: if the governing party obtains intrinsic 
benefits from specific EU conditions; and/or gains electoral and reputational 
benefits from pursuing EU membership in general, then the governing party 
is likely to comply. 
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In the Turkish context, this factor is relevant for the moderately Islamic 
governing party, the AKP, since part of the Turkish public is suspicious and 
concerned about whether they have hidden religious aspirations. Therefore, the 
EU may play an important role for such a party to allow it be perceived as more 
mainstream to the electorate. Their strategic commitment to the EU and the 
accession process validates the party as a modern, Westward-looking one. The 
AKP may not be the only party making use of the EU this way. This factor can 
also be tested for other parties with nationalistic tendencies or communist roots 
in other EU candidates.  
 
• Economic/political costs: if the economic/political benefits associated with 
complying with a specific EU condition are higher than its economic/political 
costs, then the political leadership is likely to comply. 
 
• Administrative capacity: if the political leadership improves the structure of 
the candidate’s administration and institutional resources, such as budget and 
staff, then compliance is likely to improve. 
 
Additionally, public opinion also plays a role in the government’s cost-benefit 
calculations. Particularly, the changing levels of public support for the EU have 
an influence on compliance patterns, since it is more costly to comply in the face 
of low or declining public support.19 Figure 2.1 below demonstrates how Turkish 
support for the EU declined in 2004 and remained stable on average thereafter. 
Since support is not increasing, there is no need to test for this factor as a motive 
for continued compliance under diminished credibility. Actually, these low 
support levels even make the Turkish context a less likely case to find continued 
compliance and if the explanatory factors are found to have an impact in this 
context, their explanatory power will only be greater when public support is 
higher/increasing. 
 
                                                
19 The effects of this factor are more pronounced immediately before the elections, particularly 
general elections, therefore it is crucial to take into account the timing of elections. In Turkey, 
general elections were held in 2007 and 2011, and local elections took place in 2009 in the post-
2005 period. 
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Figure 2.1: The Level of Turkish Public Support for EU Integration (2001-2010) 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis from the Eurobarometer Surveys (2001-2010) 
Note: Responses to the following question are considered: generally speaking, do you think that 
Turkish membership of the EU is a good thing? 
 
Secondly, HI focuses on path-dependency, which allow policies/institutions to be 
sticky even when the initial incentive structure is altered through diminishing 
credibility. In other words, reversing/altering policies may be more costly than 
maintaining the status-quo.  
 
• Political lock-in: if integration with the EU is the main facet of Turkish FP; 
and/or if the political leadership has already established EU membership as a 
policy goal and started complying with EU conditionality (before 2005), then 
it is likely to continue complying. 
 
• Sunk costs: if Turkish authorities have already invested resources into 
compliance (before 2005); and/or if projects funded by the EU are ongoing 
(in 2005), then the political leadership is likely to continue complying. 
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• Vested interests: if the already conducted reforms (before 2005) are 
beneficial for the (potential) domestic constituencies of the governing party, 
then the political leadership is likely to continue complying. 
 
• Organisational lock-in: if a specific institution/department has been created 
for the purpose of complying with the EU; and/or if remaining on the EU 
path maintains/strengthens the role, power and mandate of an 
institution/department;20 and/or if the relevant institutions/department has 
developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) and prepared long-term 
programmes for compliance; then the bureaucrats within those 
institutions/departments are likely to continue complying. 
 
All the above variables capture HI’s logic of consequences, and therefore align 
with RCI’s rationalism assumption. However, the key difference is that in RCI 
preference formation is exogenous and not context-specific, whereas HI treats 
preference formation as endogenous and defined through an institutional context 
and not separable from it (Thelen, 1999: 375). In other words, rationality is 
bounded. The above hypotheses are in line with this HI assumption, since they 
causally relate continued compliance to previous decisions, confirmed plans, set 
practices, vested interests and sunk costs. In this respect, behaviour is path-
dependent and self-reinforcing. Past trajectories, positive feedback mechanisms, 
enduring legacies, patterns of interactions, timing and sequencing of events 
matter for the reproduction of institutions and by extension, the continuation of 
compliance, as opposed to a strong exogenous rationality assumption of RCI. In 
the case of political leadership, the beneficial effects of already conducted 
reforms or the established direction of Turkish foreign policy encourage the 
governing party to continue complying. However, the governing party does not 
do so through an independent, non-context-specific utility calculation as in the 
DPM variables. Instead, due to the distributional effects of already conducted 
reforms it becomes extremely hard to reverse policies, since ‘over time, some 
avenues of policy become increasingly blocked, if not entirely cut off’ (Weir, 
1992: 18). Thus, these policies are reproduced and compliance continues. In the 
                                                
20 Or, if diverting from the EU path, weakens their role, power and mandate. 
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context of bureaucrats, continued compliance is accounted for by the increasing 
role, power and mandate of EU-related institutions. The key here is that the 
decision to establish specific bureaucratic institutions/departments, to enhance 
the power of EU-related bureaucracy or to give them a specific mandate act as 
critical junctures which makes it hard for the political leadership to reverse these 
acts. Continued compliance can therefore be explained through path-dependency.  
 
Thirdly, the SLM of conditionality is compatible with SI. According to the SLM, 
behaviour change does not always follow the change in incentives (diminishing 
credibility), since the political leadership and bureaucrats also find themselves to 
be locked-into various policies/processes as in HI. But the difference is that these 
actors cannot comprehend a legitimate alternative behaviour because their 
identities have changed significantly.  
 
• Social learning: if the political leadership and bureaucrats identify with the 
EU; and/or have institutional contacts with the EU and MS officials; and/or 
have a European professional/educational background, then they are likely to 
comply. 
 
2.2 Research Design 
 
This following section sets the research design for the thesis. Firstly, it 
operationalises the dependent variable of the study – compliance. Subsequent to 
unpacking the independent variable used in the first part of the thesis – 
credibility; it operationalises the independent variables derived from 
institutionalist theories. Finally, it provides an overview of the selection of cases, 
research methodology, as well as data sources and data collection. 
 
2.2.1 Operationalisation of Dependent Variable  
 
Measuring compliance is extremely challenging. Measuring it in a way which 
ensures replicability and inter-coder reliability is even more challenging. There 
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are a variety of different measures of compliance in the literature, but they have 
all been subject to criticism. What this research has done is to use the widest 
number of indicators and methodologies feasibly possible to assess compliance. 
This way the specific shortcomings associated with using single measures are 
aimed to be offset. Additionally, using a combination of methodologies allows us 
to verify the findings in a comparative manner.   
 
Four indicators, three of which are quantitative, are used to determine formal and 
behavioural compliance levels and a qualitative method is used to measure 
administrative compliance. In the first indicator for formal and behavioural 
compliance, a number of positive references made by the EU in progress reports 
(PRs) about Turkey’s compliance are compiled. This allows for a yearly 
comparison of Turkey’s compliance.21 Using the EU’s PRs ensures that only 
those legislative acts or behavioural compliance efforts that directly address 
specific EU conditions are counted. This methodology also prevents the research 
from using – possibly – inflated data sets prepared by the Turkish parties to 
impress the EU about the progress achieved, such as the EUSG’s own sources on 
compliance. 
 
This dataset predominantly consists of acts of formal compliance, in other words, 
the number of legal transpositions adopted by the cabinet and the parliament 
between January 2001 and December 2010 in JHA.22  On the other hand, 
behavioural compliance data are included if and only if such adaptation is 
measurable. For instance, establishment of institutions, centres, systems or 
infrastructure projects are considered as successful compliance. Moreover, not all 
positive remarks made by the EU are considered as compliance. For example, 
EU’s references to quantities of illegal migrants caught by Turkish officials, 
smuggled goods/drugs confiscated by authorities, projects which are ‘being 
                                                
21 Analysis starts with the 2001 PR. Positive developments which took place prior to 2001 but 
which were mentioned in the post-2001 PRs were not taken into consideration not to skew the 
design. 
22 Even though this thesis examines compliance from March 2001 onwards, Turkey’s successful 
compliance between January and March 2011 is also taken into account so that a yearly 
comparison is possible and accurate. 
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completed’ or legislation which are ‘under preparation’ are not counted as 
successful compliance.23  
 
There are some important problems associated with assessing compliance 
through a nominal count. Firstly, a decreasing number of adopted laws do not 
necessarily signal a decline in compliance. Instead, over time, it is expected that 
the EU would demand less from candidates that are successfully complying with 
EU conditions, thus accounting for a lower number of transpositions. Secondly, a 
nominal number does not tell us much about the importance of the reform or its 
compatibility with the EU legislation. Due to these deficiencies additional 
indicators are necessary. 
 
The second quantitative indicator aims to overcome the above problem by 
compiling a complete list of all the conditions set by the EU in its PRs. 
Subsequently, Turkey’s year by year compliance with this comprehensive list is 
assessed. This way, it is possible to take a step further from a mere numerical 
score and determine Turkey’s level of successful compliance as a proportion of 
all available conditions. As before, the criterion of successful compliance is the 
EU’s own favourable assessment in its reports. Even though this thesis observes 
the period between March 2001 and December 2010, the EU conditions from the 
earliest PR onwards (1998) are registered. This way the data are not skewed by 
omitting some of the EU’s requirements which were voiced prior to the 2001 
PR.24  
 
A couple of further methodological points need to be explained. In these reports, 
the EU predominantly makes specific and tangible recommendations, such as 
asking Turkey to ratify various international conventions or adopt specific laws. 
All these recommendations, requirements and criticisms which are specific and 
against which compliance is measurable are taken into account. In these cases, it 
is straightforward to say there is or there is not compliance in a year. In others 
cases, the EU sets vaguer conditions mostly related to behavioural compliance, 
                                                
23 Similarly, when the EU states that Turkey has ended visa free regime or signed readmission 
agreements with a list of countries in one PR, these are considered as one positive development. 
24 Those EU requirements which Turkey was able to comply with prior to March 2001 are 
omitted from the analysis. 
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such as: enhancing cooperation and coordination; reinforcing efforts and 
capabilities; organising training sessions, awareness programmes and seminars; 
strengthening agencies and institutions. All such conditions are disregarded 
because they require a high level of subjective judgment, which harms inter-
coder reliability. At the same time, a number of demands related to behavioural 
compliance are taken into account, but only if they are specific, such as 
establishing an institution like the Judicial Academy. The main drawback of not 
taking into account unclear behavioural compliance measures is that this research 
may be incorporating easier conditions and leaving out more difficult ones. Even 
if this is the case, this choice is justified for achieving measurement consistency 
and reliability. Moreover, the level of behavioural compliance is not altogether 
ignored, since it is measured qualitatively in six cases. 
 
As a third indicator of formal/behavioural compliance, this research borrows 
from Zubek’s study (2008). The indicator is also a quantitative measure and 
determines the level of successful compliance as opposed to a mere nominal 
number as in the first indicator. In this approach, compliance is measured and 
expressed by the proportion of transposing measures planned for adoption by the 
state authorities in a given period that are actually adopted within that period. 
This makes it possible to assess whether the Turkish government lives up to its 
own long-term plans. In other words, target projections are compared to reality.  
 
Zubek, in his research, studies the Polish NPAAs which are published yearly 
(ibid.). This allows him to assess successful compliance each year in a systematic 
manner. This approach is useful when the NPAAs are published regularly and 
have similar content. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the Turkish NPAAs. 
Firstly, there are only three available NPAAs in the time period under 
consideration (2001, 2003 and 2008), in addition to Turkey’s Programme for 
Alignment with the Acquis (TPAA) (2007), all of which differ widely from one 
another. For instance, whereas the 2003 and 2008 documents are very specific 
with regards to the names and deadlines of reform proposals, the initial 2001 
NPAA is much vaguer. Moreover, a reform proposal included in one document 
with a specific deadline may also be included in a later document with an earlier 
deadline. Such inconsistencies across NPAAs make it difficult to assess 
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successful compliance with a particular proposal. Similarly, the deadlines used in 
various NPAAs and the TPAA usually overlap. For instance, the 2008 NPAA 
includes a deadline in the form of a range, such as 2008-2010, and the TPAA 
uses the end of parliamentary years as deadlines, such as September 30, 2008. 
Such overlaps make it difficult to analyse the level of successful compliance for 
a single year, such as 2008. Finally, if Zubek’s methodology is followed in the 
case of Turkey, there would be a number of gap periods where no reform is 
planned and no deadlines exist, such as the period between January 2007 and 
October 2007. These inconsistencies within and across the documents prevent us 
from arriving at systematic yearly results as Zubek does. Therefore, a slightly 
different methodology is followed. 
 
Turkey’s ability to comply with each document (the three NPAAs and the 
TPAA) is assessed separately and then a comparison between the four is made. 
This way it is possible to see whether Turkey’s ability to comply with its own 
targets have improved, stayed the same or deteriorated over time. This 
methodology also allows one to break away from the problems related to the 
inconsistencies across the documents and the deadlines.  
 
A number of points still need to be clarified about using this method. Firstly, in 
cases where Turkey is unable to comply with a target stated in an NPAA, the 
same target usually reappears with a new deadline in a future document. This 
methodology allows us to assess the same target twice in the context of two 
different documents with possible different compliance outcomes, i.e. failed 
compliance for the earlier document and successful compliance for the later one. 
By their nature, the earlier NPAAs tend to be longer and more comprehensive. 
The inability to comply with a challenging condition at the very early stages of 
conditionality does not mean that future compliance with the same target should 
not be considered as a success, particularly if compliance takes place within the 
stated deadline.  
 
A second important consideration in this analysis is to determine which targets to 
take into account and which ones to omit. As in the second indicator, only bills 
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clearly identified by name and deadline are considered.25 Most of the behavioural 
compliance measures are excluded from the selection unless they clearly propose 
the creation of an institution.26 Thirdly, for any inconsistency of deadlines within 
the same document, the later date is considered. Fourthly, the 2001 NPAA lacks 
specific deadlines for each reform target but instead includes the following 
account: ‘[t]he following are the main objectives on which work is being 
initiated in 2001 to be completed by the medium-term’ (2001: 15). In line with 
the EU’s understanding of short and medium-term priorities expressed in AP 
documents, medium-term is judged to be composed of four years (European 
Council, 2008). Therefore, the deadlines for all the JHA conditions within the 
2001 NPAA are set as March 2005. Fifthly, in some documents a bill, composed 
of a number of sub-sections, may be referred to more than once as a target, since 
all sub-sections need to be brought in line with separate EU regulations. Given 
that these sub-sections are part of one piece of legislation, this research takes it as 
a single target. Finally, a target is considered to be successfully complied with 
when the bill is published in the official gazette, rather than being adopted in the 
parliament. Similarly, signing an international covenant is not sufficient for 
compliance, instead it needs to be ratified and published in the gazette. 
 
For the final indicator of formal/behavioural compliance qualitative analysis is 
conducted over time in six issue areas, namely external borders; illegal migration 
and asylum; organised crime; human trafficking; drugs; and minority rights. In 
this analysis, reforms are examined for their importance and compatibility with 
the EU law using the PRs.27 The issues which EU prioritises and regularly 
repeats over the years are judged to be relatively more important than others. 
Moreover, if the EU praises Turkey’s reform attempts with regard to a specific 
law and deems it to be sufficient, then compliance is judged to be compatible 
with EU demands. The quality of formal and behavioural compliance is 
expressed in five degrees: very high (++), high (+), partial (+/-), low (-) and very 
low (--).  
 
                                                
25 The human rights section within the JHA chapters is excluded for this reason. 
26 The reforms in the 2008 NPAA, which are targets for adoption after 2010, are also omitted 
from the research.  
27 The EUSG sources on compliance are also consulted (2009g; 2009h). 
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The thesis uses two different measurements of changes in compliance over time. 
Firstly, the change in the level of compliance is measured. Any new laws or 
developments in their practical application after 2005 would mean that 
compliance has increased over time. On the other hand, if adopted/amended laws 
revert back to previous forms or behavioural compliance backslides after 2005, 
this would signal a decline in compliance. Secondly, the speed of change in 
compliance is also examined. Here the speed of formal and behavioural 
compliance before 2005 is compared to post-2005 levels. The speed of 
compliance, measured by the number of reforms per period, also takes on five 
values: major improvements (++), minor improvements (+), stable (+/-), minor 
reductions (-) and major reductions (--). Clearly, this qualitative analysis is 
subjective in nature and aims to complement the previous findings by fleshing 
out what formal and behavioural compliance entails. 
 
Finally, the level of administrative compliance is measured through analysing the 
work of EU-related bureaucrats. Interviews with officials examine the amount of 
time devoted to compliance-related activities and how their workload has 
changed over time. Moreover, the preparation of draft laws, secondary 
legislation, NPAAs and their coordination and monitoring activities are analysed. 
This type of compliance is assessed in qualitative terms and takes on three 
values:  stable, enhanced and reduced compliance. 
 
2.2.2 Operationalisation of Independent Variables 
 
The following two sections operationalise credibility and the explanatory factors 
offered by the institutionalist theories.  
 
2.2.2.1 Credibility of Conditionality 
 
Conditionality is judged credible when the EU is able to deliver rewards in cases 
of compliance and withhold them when candidates fail to comply. The first 
premise of credibility is a power differential between the norm-exporting and 
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norm-importing parties which increases the credibility of the norm-exporter’s 
threats and its ability to deliver them. In EU conditionality while both the EU 
members and the candidates benefit from EU enlargement, the candidates benefit 
relatively more, hence desire membership far more than the current MSs wish to 
accept them (Grabbe, 2005: 128). This power differential is called asymmetrical 
interdependence (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 44).  
 
Secondly, the norm-exporter needs to possess the resources and the will to 
deliver the rewards, otherwise conditionality loses its credibility. In other words, 
paying the rewards of conditionality should be at a low cost for the norm-
exporter. For instance, the discussions about the EU’s absorption capacity 
demonstrate unwillingness to enlarge further reducing the credibility of 
conditionality for current applicants. Moreover, the EU needs to follow a 
consistent and meritocratic approach when rewarding the candidates on the 
grounds of progress they make, as opposed to other ad hoc measures allowing for 
positive/negative discrimination (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 920-1).  
 
Thirdly, credibility requires clear and unambiguous conditions and finally, cross-
conditionality, where other actors offer similar benefits at a lower cost, weakens 
credibility (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 15).  
 
As an additional factor, the phase of conditionality also has an impact. As 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue, due to the increase in ‘sunk costs’, the 
credibility of rewarding the candidates increases as the pre-accession process 
progresses (ibid.: 14). But this is only the case if rewards become more 
immediate and tangible. At the same time, the EU is less able to use threats in 
later stages of negotiations (ibid.: 14). This critical point when conditionality 
loses its effectiveness is considered either as the opening of accession 
negotiations  (Haughton, 2007) or setting the date of accession (Avery, 2009; 
Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000).  
‘The question of when and how the date of accession is fixed is 
crucially important for the exercise of the conditionality of 
enlargement… On the one hand, unless the EU maintains the 
credibility of accession perspective, its conditionality is 
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ineffective; on the other hand, if it gives a promise … of a specific 
date, the conditionality is diminished’ (Avery, 2009: 263-4). 
 
When the above criteria are used to assess the credibility of conditionality in 
Turkey,28 it becomes clear that credibility has started from a low base in 
comparison to the CEECs, and has diminished further over time. This finding 
makes it necessary to clarify three further points related to operationalisation: 
 
Firstly, although this analysis does not aim to determine the reasons behind the 
decline in credibility, taking a brief look at these factors allows us to evaluate 
whether the conclusions in this thesis are likely to be valid even after 2010. On 
the one hand, the decline in the EU’s willingness to enlarge into Turkey can be 
due to structural factors, such as Turkey’s size, population, religion, economic 
development, culture; European public’s resistance to Turkish enlargement; as 
well as problematic issues like Cyprus. These factors are expected to be present 
in the long-term, thus a future increase in the credibility is not expected.  On the 
other hand, other factors are more cyclical and context-dependent. The electoral 
cycles in MSs are an example. It can be argued that the leadership of the 
Christian Democratic Union in Germany and the Union for a Popular Movement 
in France diminishes the credibility of conditionality. This opposition may 
become less evident if the Social Democrats or the Socialist Party form 
governments after the next elections. In this respect, the levels of credibility may 
change over time. However, the time frame of the thesis allows us to control for 
government changes in the most important MSs, since a positive change in the 
level of credibility did not occur before 2010.29 
 
The second issue relates to how credibility is treated throughout the thesis. In the 
first empirical section (Chapters Four and Five) credibility is the independent 
variable, varying between 2001-2005 and 2005-2010 periods. The discussion 
above maintained that the levels of credibility have declined after 2005. The 
change in credibility is useful in the first part of the thesis, since the independent 
variable by definition should vary. However, in the second part, the focus is on 
                                                
28 This analysis is conducted in Chapter Four.  
29 Next German federal elections are held in October 2013 and French presidential elections are 
held in April/May 2012. 
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the reasons behind continued compliance after 2005. Even though credibility 
does decrease within this second period, it is methodologically more appropriate 
to treat credibility as constant. Since credibility does not increase at all after 
2005, treating it as constant does not skew the design. If it were increasing at 
various points and if it had been treated as constant this would mean the 
continued compliance could have been explained by such occasional increases in 
credibility. That way the explanatory power of the other independent variables 
may be overestimated due to omitted variable bias.  
 
The third issue relates to alternative measures of credibility. In this thesis, a list 
of conditions for a credible conditionality is extracted from the literature and the 
Turkish case is assessed against them. However, this evaluation may differ from 
how the Turkish domestic actors actually perceive credibility. Such analysis on 
the perceptions of Turkish actors would rely on interviews. This empirical 
methodology would be time consuming, complex and the results may be 
misleading since perceptions are difficult to measure. It is very hard to aggregate 
the range of responses received through such an open-ended inquiry. These 
difficulties have informed our decision to assess the credibility against 
established standards in the literature. At the same time, an empirical 
methodology is used to confirm this evaluation. For this a single question is 
posed to the interviewees – ‘when do you think Turkey will accede to the EU?’. 
An average date is calculated from the responses and the results are discussed in 
Chapter Four.   
 
2.2.2.2 Variables Derived from Institutionalist Theories 
 
This section operationalises the variables derived from the three institutionalist 
theories: government’s partisan incentives, economic/political costs and 
administrative capacity from RCI/DPM; political lock-in, sunk costs, vested 
interests and organisational lock-in from HI; and social learning from SI/SLM.  
 
The government’s partisan incentives variable within the DPM measures the 
extent to which the governing party makes use of the benefits provided by the 
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EU and particularly by its political conditionality. It is related to the security, 
legitimacy and electoral benefits the EU provides to the governing party 
domestically. Methodologically, interviews with the governing party’s members 
of parliament (MPs) are conducted and their public speeches are analysed to 
determine how they perceive they benefit from the EU. Moreover, data on 
election results are also examined to test whether the AKP electorally benefits 
from supporting the EU and whether the percentage of EU supporters has 
increased among its constituency. Finally, the relevant literature is studied to 
discover the relationship between the AKP and the EU. Overall, this variable is 
treated as dichotomous and takes on two values: high or low. Since this variable 
is specific to the government in power it does not vary over the time period under 
analysis making it impossible to conduct a comparative analysis. Instead, 
congruence method, together with counterfactual analysis and process tracing, is 
used to test for the relationship between this variable and compliance.  
 
The DPM also incorporates variables which vary across issues, such as economic 
and political costs. Economic costs take into account both the domestic material 
costs of compliance and the financial benefits provided by the EU, thereby 
calculating the net costs. It is inversely related to compliance. If there is a good 
policy/institutional fit between the existing domestic standards and the EU 
legislation, then the economic costs of compliance are estimated to be low. 
Similarly, if a specific reform requires a simple legislative alteration or training 
of judges/law enforcement bodies, then costs are limited. However, if 
compliance necessitates costly implementation measures, such as institution-
building, infrastructural developments or strict monitoring mechanisms, then 
costs are high. The Turkish state authorities have put forward cost analyses for 
compliance in the 2003 and 2008 NPAAs. At the same time, the material benefits 
provided by the EU in the form of pre-accession aid are also considered.30 There 
are expected to be sizable financial benefits associated with Turkey’s full 
membership to the EU. However, they are in distant future due diminished 
credibility and therefore discounted. Relying on this assessment as well as 
                                                
30 Data available on the EU’s PHARE projects database for the years between 2002 and 2008. 
For each project the EU provides at least 75% of the funding and only EU contributions are taken 
into account.   
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interviews, the policy areas are estimated to have costs, which are either very 
high (++), high (+), medium (+/-), low (-) or very low (--).   
 
For the political costs variable a similar cost-benefit analysis is conducted. 
Firstly, it is examined whether the proposed rule contradicts or threatens Turkish 
state’s Kemalist ideology or unitary nature.31 If so these issues are concluded to 
have very high political costs. For this assessment, a review of the literature and 
interviews are used. Secondly, political costs also depend on domestic groups’ 
preferences; particularly those that are veto-players or concentrated groups. If 
powerful groups support specific EU-led reforms then non-compliance is costly 
for the government.32 On the contrary, if there are veto-players or important 
groups strongly opposed to certain reforms, it becomes costly for the government 
to commit itself to such policies.33 This is assessed through literature on domestic 
groups, as well as through interviews. Subsequently, the political benefits 
associated with each policy area are measured. If the governing party’s policy 
aims overlap with the EU demands, then these provide political benefits. Put 
differently, the political leadership complies better with EU conditions that are 
also part of its own party’s programme.34 Such policy areas provide high political 
benefits, whereas the lack of overlap produces low benefits. The governing 
party’s election manifestos and party programme, as well as interviews are used 
to assess political benefits. Subsequent to comparing the political costs and 
benefits, the net political costs of compliance are assessed to be either very high 
(++), high (+), medium (+/-), low (-) or very low (--).  
 
Finally, the administrative capacity variable measures the changes in the 
bureaucracy’s institutional resources, such as budget and staff levels; and its 
leadership structure in the compliance process. For the resources component, the 
changes in staff levels in the relevant public institutions and the institutional 
                                                
31 For instance, conditions related to minority and cultural rights are politically very costly in 
Turkey, since they are perceived to challenge the unitary state structure. 
32 This could be illustrated by the powerful business groups’ support for EU’s economic 
liberalisation policies (Heper, 2005: 42). 
33 In the face of opposition from the Turkish military, it is politically very costly for the 
government to substantially fulfil the EU’s demands on Cyprus (Heper, 2005). 
34 Issues like religious freedoms and making it more difficult to ban political parties have always 
been a priority for the AKP, regardless of the EU. 
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budgets are examined. The changing structures of hierarchy and leadership 
within the administrative phase of compliance are also studied. Interviews and 
primary sources are used for this analysis and the variable takes on three values: 
improved, stable or weakened.  
 
There are four variables associated with HI. The political lock-in variable 
measures the extent to which the current government’s compliance is path-
dependent on past policy trajectories. It has two components. Firstly, if 
Westernisation and Europeanisation are set as FP goals in Turkey, then this 
increases the government’s likelihood to comply with the EU. Secondly, 
governing party’s previous policies are analysed. If the governing party has 
adopted a language of reform and democratisation and has conducted important 
reforms prior to 2005, this is likely to create path-dependency, making it likely 
for them to continue complying. In addition to the current government’s past 
reform performance, interviews are used to measure this variable. This variable 
takes on two values: high and low. 
 
The sunk costs variable is related to preparations and compliance conducted 
before 2005. The investments made into compliance in terms of time and money 
increase the likelihood of rule adoption in the T2 period. Since accurate data 
regarding the financial investments made into compliance is not available, the 
focus here is on already conducted reforms. Most particularly, the preparation of 
long-term programmes, such as action plans or roadmaps; establishing various 
institutions; setting up reception houses and treatment centres; building statistical 
systems or databases; enhancing cooperation among law enforcement officials 
impact future compliance. These reforms create more sunk costs than stand-alone 
pieces of legal change and make future compliance path-dependent. Moreover, 
the EU’s financial investments toward compliance also contribute to sunk costs. 
If there are ongoing projects funded by the EU at the end of 2005, it makes it 
more likely that Turkish officials will continue complying. This indicator is 
measured through interviews and the data on EU’s pre-accession funding and 
takes on the following values: very high (++), high (+), medium (+/-), low (-) or 
very low (--). 
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The vested interests variable relates to the beneficial lock-in effects of the 
already conducted reforms on the domestic groups. If the governing party’s 
(potential) constituency stands to gain from already achieved reforms then vested 
interests are high. This makes it likely for the governing party to continue 
complying. This indicator is assessed mainly through an examination of the 
literature on important domestic groups and interviews. It takes on the following 
values: very high (++), high (+), medium (+/-), low (-) or very low (--). 
 
The organisational lock-in variable measures the degree to which the EU-related 
state departments/institutions are created only for the purpose of EU 
harmonisation and whether their continued existence is under threat in the 
absence of compliance. Moreover, just as the political parties may have built-in 
interests to comply with the EU, the bureaucrats may also ‘have independent 
incentives to adopt EU rules’ which might increase ‘their influence in the 
political system’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 11). If staying on the 
EU road increases organisational resources (staff, budget) and power of 
bureaucrats, then organisational lock-in is higher. Additionally, the presence of 
routine processes, SOPs and long-term programmes for compliance also 
contribute to higher organisational lock-in, since they make it likely for an 
institution to continue complying. On the other hand, if the staff employed in 
these units can be transferred to other departments; and/or if the 
institution/department works on issues other than EU compliance; and/or if the 
SOPs are lacking, then organisational lock-in is judged to be low. This variable 
takes the following values: very high, high, medium, low or very low. 
 
The social learning variable within the SLM can be unpacked with identification 
considered as an indicator of socialisation and exposure and background 
considered as preconditions which make social learning more likely.  
 
Firstly, identification with the EU and its underlying values makes it more likely 
that actors will comply. As Checkel argues actors are more easily persuaded 
when the ‘persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the 
persuadee belongs or wants to belong to’ (2001: 563). For this indicator two 
separate things are measured: actors’ attachment to the EU on the one hand, and 
 
64 
to the underlying values of the EU, such as democracy, rule of law, human 
rights, pluralism, freedom of thought and expression, respect for diversity and 
minorities on the other. Interviews and survey data are used to measure the level 
of identification of political leadership and bureaucrats with the EU. Even though 
the Eurobarometer questions relating to identity have been criticised for their 
methodological shortcomings (Bruter, 2004: 186-213), they allow the researcher 
to compare the identification of interviewees with the general Turkish public. For 
the political leadership, the references made to the EU, human rights and 
democracy in their party programme, election manifestos and public speeches are 
also examined to demonstrate their level of identification. Here the key is 
whether they want to be a part of the EU due to feelings of closeness and 
attachment to its underlying values, or for strategic reasons. Finally, secondary 
literature is consulted to determine whether the governing party genuinely 
supports and believes in the EU and its norms or whether this support is strategic. 
One point to consider when using identification as an indicator for social 
learning is that social learning may take time and may occur over a medium to 
long-term perspective. If an individual was assessed not to identify with the EU, 
this does not rule out the possibility that they may experience social learning in 
the future.  
 
Secondly, the political leadership’s and bureaucracy’s exposure to the EU is a 
significant precondition for social learning. Drulak et al. find that greater 
intensity of interactions between domestic officials and their EU counterparts is 
related to deeper support for integration (2003: 647-9), which may be associated 
with more compliance. In this thesis, exposure is measured by the extent of 
institutional contacts between the Turkish political leadership and bureaucrats on 
the one side and the EU and MSs on the other. Moreover, institutional contacts 
through TAIEX seminars, twinning exercises, MS embassy visits and training 
courses are also taken into account. The data for this are collected through 
interviews and secondary literature on the relations between Turkish parties and 
the EU. 
 
The final precondition, background, follows the assumption that ‘people are 
social beings who are influenced by the experiences and views that they 
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encounter in different walks of life’, such as their social backgrounds, childhood 
or young adult experiences, education, and work experiences (Hooghe, 1999: 
439). Accordingly, elected officials and bureaucrats with prior Western 
experiences are more likely to comply. Firstly, the presence/absence of Western 
education is a crucial part of this, since ‘students abroad are exposed to different 
ways of thinking and living in a formative period of their life’ (Hooghe, 1999: 
441). Secondly, the presence/absence of previous work experience in the West 
also matters. To assess these background effects, the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey’s (TGNA) database on the MP biographies is used. A single score is 
given to each MP35 by taking into account the total number of educational and 
professional experiences in the West. 36  The MPs’ backgrounds are then 
compared across different political parties within the TGNA. Additionally, the 
MPs’ knowledge of foreign languages is also measured37 to calculate average 
scores for each party and subsequently these scores are compared. It should be 
acknowledged that the index used for educational/professional backgrounds and 
language knowledge is an imperfect measure of social learning, since it does not 
necessarily relate to Europeanisation. However, it does allow one to compare the 
governing party’s outlook with the other parties.   
 
Overall, all these indicators and preconditions of social learning are not perfect 
and require a subjective assessment on the part of the researcher. However, 
relying on a number of measures as done here and complementing this analysis 
with the secondary literature allows one to distinguish between very high, high, 
medium, low or very low levels of social learning. This variable is assumed not to 
vary significantly within the time period under analysis, therefore comparative 
                                                
35 A drawback of this methodology is that a four-year PhD carries the same weight as a six-month 
internship. 
36 Social learning variable considers the underlying values of the EU as well, therefore MPs’ 
experiences in other Western countries, such as the US and Canada, are also considered. 
37 The MPs’ biographies on the TGNA website give a systematic overview of the MPs’ foreign 
language knowledge. A score of four is given for ‘very good’ knowledge, three for ‘good’, two 
for ‘medium’ and one is given for ‘little’ knowledge. If none of these adjectives are used and the 
text only states that the MP speaks a certain language, then a score of three is given. If an MP 
speaks more than one language then the scores for different languages are added. For instance, if 
an MP speaks very good English, little German and little French, a score of six is given to the 
MP, which is equal to someone who speaks two languages at a good level. Knowledge of non-EU 
languages, such as Russian, Albanian, Chinese, Japanese or Urdu are not considered. 
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analysis cannot be used. Instead, congruence method, counterfactual analysis and 
process tracing are used to test its impact on continued compliance.  
 
The Table 2.3 below operationalises in detail all the above variables and 
specifies the data sources used for their measurement. 
 
Table 2.3: Operationalisation of the Independent Variables 
 
Variable  Data 
Sources 
Measurement Aggregated Scoring 
 
 
 
Govern-
ment’s 
partisan 
incentives 
(DPM) 
Interviews In what ways does the EU work to the 
advantage of the governing party? 
High: The governing party’s 
electoral support and legitimacy are 
enhanced due to the EU  
Low: No such relationship is found 
Document 
/media 
analysis 
What is the influence of the EU on the 
political party?  
How does the political party use the 
EU/EU issues to portray a better image 
domestically? 
Secondary 
literature/ 
election 
results 
What is the relationship between the EU 
and the governing party?  
Does the governing party benefit 
electorally from the EU? 
 
 
Economic 
costs 
(DPM) 
Database 
search 
(PHARE38) 
How much financial assistance does the 
EU provide in this policy area? 
Very high: No fit between domestic 
and EU standards, reforms require 
costly infrastructural developments 
and implementation measures, and 
EU does not provide meaningful pre-
accession funds  
High: Intermediary score between 
very high and medium 
Medium: Domestic and EU standards 
roughly fit, required reforms are 
materially costly but the EU funds 
Document 
analysis 
(NPAAs) 
What are the estimated costs of 
compliance in this area? 
Interviews What are the material costs associated 
with compliance in this area? 
                                                
38 A major pre-accession instrument of the EU originally used in Poland and Hungary. 
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cover some of these costs 
Low: Intermediary score between 
medium and very low 
Very low: There is a very good fit 
between domestic and EU standards, 
reforms only require legislative 
changes, and the EU provides 
significant pre-accession funds 
 
 
 
Political 
costs 
(DPM) 
Interviews What are some barriers against this 
reform? 
Which domestic groups support/oppose 
this legislative change? 
How much do you think their preferences 
matter?  
What is the relationship between these 
domestic groups and the governing party?  
Do you think realising/not realising this 
change would have negative 
consequences on the governing party? 
Which one of these reforms the 
governing party would have conducted, 
in the absence of EU conditionality?  
Very high: Kemalist ideology and/or 
unitary state is threatened, no overlap 
between governing party’s aims and 
EU-required reforms, 
important/concentrated groups 
oppose reforms  
High: Intermediary score between 
very high and medium 
Medium: There is approximately 
equal opposition and support for 
reforms, reforms do not touch upon 
the fundamental characteristics of the 
Turkish state 
Low: Intermediary score between 
medium and very low 
Very low: Governing party’s aims 
and EU’s demands overlap 
considerably, important/concentrated 
groups support changes, reforms do 
not touch upon the fundamental 
characteristics of the Turkish state 
Document 
analysis 
Is this reform mentioned in the party 
programme, election manifestos and 
public speeches of the governing party?  
Is the governing party committed to this 
reform independently of the EU? 
Secondary 
literature 
Does this EU condition threaten the 
unitary nature of the Turkish state?  
Do important domestic groups strongly 
support/oppose the changes in question? 
 
Admin. 
Interviews How many bureaucrats work in your 
institution/department? Has this changed 
Improved: Bureaucracies’ budget, 
staff levels and the leadership 
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capacity 
(DPM) 
over time? 
What is the budget of your institution? 
Has this changed over time? 
structure has, on average, improved 
Stable: Bureaucracies’ budget, staff 
levels and the leadership structure 
has, on average, remained stable 
Weakened: Bureaucracies’ budget, 
staff levels and the leadership 
structure has, on average, weakened 
Document 
analysis 
What are the staff levels and budgetary 
resources of the EU-related bureaucrats? 
 
 
Political 
lock-in 
(HI) 
Interviews Would compliance continue anyways 
after 2005, regardless of who was in 
government? 
Under what circumstances, would the 
AKP stop complying? 
High: Integration with the EU has 
been set as a FP goal and the 
government has a reformist past  
Low: Integration with the EU has not 
been set as a FP goal and the 
government does not have a 
reformist past 
Secondary 
literature 
What are the main features of Turkish 
FP?  
What is the governing party’s reform 
performance before 2005? 
 
 
Sunk 
costs  
(HI) 
Interviews Is the reform in question a stand-alone act 
or is it connected to others that have 
already been conducted?  
Have you worked on this policy before 
(in the cabinet, parliamentary 
committee)?  
Have you made any preparations for or 
devoted any resources (time, money, 
staff) to this reform? 
Very high: Previous reforms include 
adoption of long-term programmes 
and institution-building measures, 
and there are ongoing EU projects at 
the end of 2005 
High: Intermediary score between 
very high and medium 
Medium: Previous reforms are a mix 
of stand-alone laws and long-term 
programmes and institution-building 
measures, there are some ongoing 
EU projects at the end of 2005 which 
are not materially significant 
Low: Intermediary score between 
medium and very low 
Very low: There are no previous 
reforms or previous reforms are 
Database 
search 
(PHARE) 
Are there ongoing projects for the 
realisation of this policy funded by the 
EU at the end of 2005? 
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stand-alone legislative changes, and 
there are no ongoing EU projects at 
the end of 2005 
 
 
 
 
Vested 
interests 
(HI) 
Secondary 
literature 
Do important domestic groups strongly 
support/oppose the already conducted 
changes? 
Very high: Important groups in the 
governing party’s (potential) 
constituency have gained from 
previous reforms  
High: Intermediary score between 
very high and medium 
Medium: Some groups from the 
governing party’s constituency have 
benefited from previous reforms, but 
they are not electorally significant 
for the governing party 
Low: Intermediary score between 
medium and very low 
Very low: Previous reforms have not 
benefitted the government’s 
(potential) constituency 
Interviews Which domestic groups support the 
already conducted changes? 
How much do you think their preferences 
matter?  
What is the relationship between these 
domestic groups and the governing party?  
Do you think discontinuing the 
implementation of already conducted 
reforms would have negative 
consequences on the governing party? 
 
 
 
Organ-
isational 
lock-in 
(HI) 
Interviews When and for what purpose was this 
unit/institution created?  
What issues does your unit work on (only 
EU or other issues as well)?  
Do you prepare medium/long-term 
programmes? 
What is the influence of the EU on your 
ministry/department? In what ways does 
it benefit it?  
What has changed with regard to your 
institution/department’s role, power, 
resources, staff, budget since your 
engagement with the EU?  
Very high: EU-related bureaucracies 
are created only for EU purposes, EU 
pre-accession process increases their 
organisational power, and there are 
SOPs/long-term programmes for 
compliance 
High: Intermediary score between 
very high and medium 
Medium: EU pre-accession process 
enhances bureaucracies’ power or 
there are SOPs/long-term 
programmes for compliance 
Low: Intermediary score between 
medium and very low 
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Very low: EU-related bureaucracies 
have been created and work on 
issues other than EU accession, their 
staff can easily be transferred to 
other departments, and SOPs/long-
term programmes for compliance do 
not exist 
 
 
 
 
Social 
learning 
(SLM) 
Interviews Do you see yourself as, Turkish only, 
Turkish and European, European and 
Turkish, or European only? 
Generally speaking, do you think that 
Turkish membership of the EU is a good 
thing/ bad thing/ neither good nor bad/ do 
not know?  
What is your institution’s/party’s view on 
the EU and its underlying values?  
Do you think the governing party would 
still comply with the EU conditions, if 
Turkey were no longer an EU candidate? 
What kind of institutional contacts do 
you have with the EU and MSs?  
Did these contacts influence the way you 
see the EU or comply with the EU? 
Very high: Actors identify with the 
EU and its constituent values, have 
strong exposure to the EU, and they 
have a Western background 
High: Intermediary score between 
very high and medium 
Medium: Actors are exposed to the 
EU to a certain degree but they do 
not identify with the EU 
Low: Intermediary score between 
medium and very low 
Very low: Actors do not identify with 
the EU and its constituent values, 
their exposure to the EU is weak, and 
they do not have a Western 
background 
Document 
analysis 
How are the EU and its underlying values 
presented in the party programme, 
election manifestos and public speeches 
of the political leadership? 
Secondary 
Literature 
Does the governing party genuinely 
identify and believe in the EU and its 
underlying values? 
Database 
search 
(TGNA) 
Have the MPs ever worked or conducted 
any part of their education abroad? 
What foreign languages do the MPs 
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know? 
 
2.2.3 Selection of Cases and Observations 
 
Cases are the units of analysis in a study about which information is collected 
and inferences are made (Collier et al., 2004: 250). In this research, Turkey is the 
broader case within which the values of the variables are reported and 
interpreted. Turkey has been selected since the preliminary evidence challenges 
the established theories of conditionality. The broader Turkish case is broken 
down into further cases to increase the number of observations.  
 
In line with the objectives of the thesis, different sets of cases are analysed in the 
first and second parts. Firstly, to test whether credibility is necessary for 
compliance two temporal cases with varying levels of credibility are established, 
namely T1 (March 8, 2001 to October 10, 2005) and T2 (October 11, 2005 to 
December 31, 2010). March 8, 2001 is preferred as the start date for analysis 
over the 1999 candidacy decision since it marks the formal start of conditionality 
with the publication of the first AP, incorporating clearly set conditions, a set 
frame for fulfilling them and specific rewards to be gained in return. As 
explained earlier, October 10, 2005 marks the start of accession negotiations 
where the final sizable reward was handed to the Turkish authorities and after 
which the level of credibility continuously diminished. Finally, December 31, 
2010 is chosen as the end date for practical considerations, since it fits the 
research schedule for the completion of the PhD. 
 
In the first empirical section (Chapters Four and Five) compliance levels in these 
temporal cases are compared to test the EIM’s credibility hypothesis. This 
analysis is conducted in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which 
incorporates both 23rd (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights39) and 24th (Justice, 
                                                
39 23rd chapter promotes the establishment of independent and efficient judiciary; impartiality, 
integrity and a high standard of adjudication by the courts; a firm commitment to eliminating 
external influences over the judiciary; an adequate financial resources and training for the 
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Freedom and Security40) chapters of the acquis, as well as parts of political 
conditionality. These areas are chosen for analysis for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the negotiations in both of these chapters were blocked after 2005, which 
means that credibility takes even a lower value in these areas. Therefore, if 
compliance is found to continue in these areas after 2005, it is likely to continue 
in other acquis chapters as well. Secondly, compared to other acquis chapters, 
23rd and 24th chapters and political conditionality in particular incorporate some 
of the most challenging and costly requirements. In this respect, high cost areas 
have been selected since they constitute hard cases for compliance to take place 
under diminished credibility.  
 
The macro-level quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter Four, takes into 
account the whole of JHA, although political conditionality is not considered for 
a number of reasons.41 Firstly, it is more difficult to quantitatively measure 
compliance with political conditionality, not least because it predominantly 
consists of behavioural compliance, which therefore challenges inter-coder 
reliability. Secondly, political conditionality is not treated consistently in the 
Turkish documents. For instance, none of the NPAAs have clear deadlines about 
the planned reforms in this field and the 2007 TPAA does not even take political 
conditionality into account. Overall, all these documents have much clearer 
reform plans and deadlines for JHA, allowing a more accurate quantitative 
measurement of compliance. 
 
In the micro-level qualitative analysis (Chapter Five) six case studies have been 
selected to examine formal and behavioural compliance more closely over T1 
and T2. External borders; illegal migration and asylum; organised crime; human 
trafficking; drugs, and cultural and political rights of minorities are considered. A 
                                                                                                                               
judiciary; legal guarantees for fair trial procedures; fighting corruption effectively; a solid legal 
framework and reliable institutions to underpin a coherent policy of prevention and deterrence of 
corruption; and respect for fundamental rights and EU citizens’ rights.  
40 24th chapter incorporates issues such as border control; visas; external migration; asylum; 
police cooperation; the fight against organised crime and against terrorism; cooperation in the 
field of drugs; customs cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters; well-
integrated administrative capacity within the law enforcement agencies and other relevant bodies; 
professional, reliable and efficient police organisation; and the Schengen acquis. 
41 23rd chapter also incorporates some aspects of political conditionality and this section is also 
excluded from the quantitative analysis.  
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qualitative study of minority rights, one of the most difficult areas of political 
conditionality, poses a less acute risk of measurement problems than in the case 
of quantitative analysis. Moreover, the EU’s PRs which are used for this analysis 
treat political conditionality consistently over the years, unlike the Turkish 
documents. As one of the most difficult aspects of political conditionality, 
cultural and political rights of minorities serves as a least-likely case for 
continued compliance. Once again if compliance if found to continue in this area, 
it is highly likely that it will continue in other areas. 
 
As a second objective, this study aims to explain candidates’ continued 
compliance under diminished credibility. For this it is necessary to focus on the 
actors that conduct compliance. The governing party’s officials42  that pass 
legislation are the main actors for formal and behavioural43 compliance, whereas 
EU-related bureaucracy, i.e. officials form the Secretariat General for European 
Union Affairs (EUSG), Ministry of Justice (MJ), Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), and Ministry of Interior (MI), are the key actors for administrative 
compliance in the field of JHA and political conditionality. This distinction is 
made only for practical purposes to meaningfully distinguish between the 
different indicators of compliance and examine them in separate but appropriate 
contexts. In other words, the dependent variable used in each context is different.  
 
Distinguishing between the two types of actors also offers some advantages for 
the research. Generally speaking, most conditionality studies are concerned with 
the question of ‘why do candidates comply’ and they use candidates as a proxy 
for ‘candidates’ governments’ which is the main unit of analysis. The domestic 
actors are only assumed to have an indirect role on the outcomes via their 
influence on the government. The candidates’ bureaucrats are often treated as 
dependent or independent variables in conditionality studies, rather than being 
treated as a separate actor conducting compliance. Conditionality studies either 
assess the impact of European integration on the civil service (Dimitrova, 2002; 
                                                
42 The focus, here, is on the AKP rather than elected officials in general, since, as a majority 
government, they alone have the power to make legislative changes in T2, with the exception of 
constitutional changes. 
43 There are obviously other actors crucial for behavioural compliance such as the judiciary and 
the security forces.  
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Lippert et al., 2001; Drulak et al., 2003; Meyer-Sahling, 2001; 2004; 2006; 2008; 
Goetz, 2001; Goetz and Wollmann, 2001; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004) 
or analyse the impact of the nature and composition of the bureaucracy on the 
effectiveness of conditionality (Zubek, 2005; 2008; Hille and Knill, 2006).  
 
This research is similar to these studies since it devotes additional attention to 
bureaucracy. However, it examines it separately from the political leadership.44 
In this respect, it does not treat candidates as unitary entities. Instead, it suggests 
different actors may have different motivations for compliance and their 
compliance may operate differently. In other words, it does not only respond to 
‘why do candidates’ governments comply?’ but also to ‘why do candidates’ 
bureaucrats comply?’.  
 
To explain the political leadership’s and bureaucrats’ motives behind 
compliance, issue-specific variables, such as economic, political and sunk costs 
as well as vested interests, are tested through a comparative analysis between six 
cases in Chapter Eight. These areas are: external borders; illegal migration and 
asylum; organised crime; human trafficking; drugs; and cultural and political 
rights of minorities.  
 
For the remainder of independent variables which do not vary across issue areas, 
this research adopts congruence method (Chapters Six and Nine) and 
complements this with process tracing. The process tracing analysis (Chapter 
Seven) focuses on the broadcasting rights of minorities where political costs for 
reform are high, making compliance less likely.  If the thesis demonstrates 
continued compliance in such a difficult area, the conclusions are highly likely to 
be applicable to other areas. 
  
2.2.4 Research Methodology 
 
This research aims to solve the puzzle of continued compliance in Turkey under 
diminished credibility. To do this it firstly tests the rationalist models of 
                                                
44 This differs from Zubek who treats them jointly (2005; 2008). 
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conditionality in the longitudinal case of Turkey. According to George and 
Bennett’s classification this qualifies as a ‘theory testing case study’ (2005: 
75).45 It examines whether credibility is necessary for compliance in a ‘before-
after’ analysis where the credibility variable is discontinuous. For this test 
Turkey serves as a least-likely case,46 since credibility takes on an extremely low 
value making it a tougher test for the necessity condition. According to George 
and Bennett such cases not only serve the purpose of theory testing well, but also 
having a variable ‘at an extreme value can be very useful for heuristic purposes 
of identifying new theoretical variables or postulating new causal mechanisms’ 
(ibid.: 80-1).  
 
This brings us to the second part of the research: to explain continued 
compliance under diminished credibility with new causal mechanisms. This 
second part of the research qualifies as a ‘heuristic study’, since it inductively 
identifies new variables, hypotheses and causal mechanisms (ibid.: 75). This is 
where a number of independent variables derived from institutionalist theories 
are considered and the role played by the bureaucrats in compliance is examined.  
 
Overall, the aim here is not to refute an established theory with a single case, but 
instead to introduce scope conditions to refine it. In order to fulfil the dual goals 
of theory testing and theory refinement, George and Bennett’s (ibid.) qualitative 
methods, bringing together cross-case comparison with within-case analysis, is 
followed. Non-statistical comparative analysis of a small number of cases is used 
to make causal inferences.47 Cases that are similar to each other in many respects 
but vary with regard to the independent variable are selected. This provides the 
control and the variation necessary for testing the independent variables. The 
before-after analysis conducted in the first part of the thesis comes very close to 
an experimental design in that (almost) only the independent variable 
(credibility) is allowed to vary between T1 and T2. In the second part of the 
                                                
45 See also Lijphart, 1971; Eckstein, 1975. 
46 A least-likely case is ‘a case that is not expected to conform to the prediction of a particular 
theory. A least-likely case often has extreme values on variables associated with rival hypotheses, 
such that we might expect these other variables to negate the causal effect predicted by the 
theory’ (Brady and Collier, 2004: 293). 
47 John Stuart Mill, in his seminal work ‘A system of logic’ developed the essential logic of 
comparative method (1843). 
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thesis, comparison of six issue areas are conducted to make causal inferences 
about the following independent variables: economic costs, political costs, sunk 
costs and vested interests. 
 
There are a number of limitations associated with using a strict controlled 
comparison. Firstly, not all the variables of interest vary within the selected 
observations. For instance, government’s partisan incentives variable does not 
vary since the governing party has not changed during the period under study. 
Similarly, comparative analysis cannot be used for the following variables: 
political lock-in, organisational lock-in, social learning and administrative 
capacity. Secondly, there exists the ‘problem of too many variables and too few 
cases’ or in other words the ‘degrees of freedom problem’.48  Thirdly, the 
comparative method has difficulty accommodating equifinality, i.e. the 
possibility of having different causal patterns leading to similar outcomes (ibid.: 
161). In the face of these limitations, George and Bennett suggest using within-
case analysis, which ‘focuses not on the analysis of variables across cases, but on 
the causal path in a single case’ (ibid.: 179). Such analysis ‘provide[s] 
alternatives to controlled comparison’ and ‘can significantly ameliorate the 
limitations of Mill’s methods’ (ibid.: 179).  
 
In light of these suggestions, congruence method (ibid.: 181-204), counterfactual 
analysis and process tracing are employed. In congruence analysis the researcher 
initially establishes the expected relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables, including the expected direction and magnitude of the 
variance. These results are then compared to the empirically established values 
for both variables. This methodology is employed for the following variables 
which cannot be tested through comparative analysis: government’s partisan 
incentives, political lock-in, organisational lock-in, social learning and 
administrative capacity. However, caution is necessary. The observed 
congruence need not be causal and instead may be limited to a mere correlation. 
Therefore, combining this method with process tracing and counterfactual 
                                                
48 Degrees of freedom refer to the number of observations (sample size) minus the number of 
estimated parameters or characteristics of the population being studied (George and Bennett, 
2005: 28). 
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analysis can greatly enhance the validity of the findings and allows one to 
distinguish a spurious relationship from a causal one.  
 
Process tracing (ibid.: 205-32) aims to establish the casual effect through 
identifying the causal chain and causal mechanism. In this respect, it traces the 
link between possible explanatory variables and observed outcomes. The key in 
this research is to identify all the intervening steps, and establish theoretical 
expectations about the causal chain linking the independent variable to the 
dependent variable. If the observed evidence is in line with the predicated 
hypotheses at every single step, then a causal relationship can be said to exist. In 
this research, process tracing is used to complement congruence analysis 
conducted for the following variables which cannot be tested through 
comparative method: government’s partisan incentives, political lock-in and 
social learning.  
 
Finally, counterfactual analysis, which is a different form of comparative study, 
is employed. For reliable analysis the hypothetical mental construct is supported 
by a well-validated theory and is clearly defined. In this research, counterfactual 
cases are developed when testing the effects of various variables, such as 
government’s partisan incentives, social learning, political lock-in as well as 
organisational lock-in. These counterfactual cases complement the congruence 
analysis by testing whether the relationship established between the independent 
and dependent variables is a causal one. 
 
2.2.5 Data Sources and Data Collection 
 
This thesis is based on data collected during fieldwork in Ankara in July 2008, 
September 2009 and March/April 2011. In addition to the secondary literature, it 
mainly relies on primary sources.  
 
The document research draws from five different sources. Firstly, official 
documents published by the EU, such as the PRs, the NF, Association 
Agreement, and the APs are analysed. Secondly, sources compiled by the 
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Turkish state, such as the NPAAs, the TPAA, the EUSG’s online databases and 
the TGNA’s online database are used. Thirdly, the governing party’s documents, 
such as its programmes, election manifestos, public speeches and press 
conferences are examined. Fourthly, media sources are used to find evidence for 
court cases, implementation measures and media statements of political 
leadership. Finally, the Eurobarometer survey results are used. 
 
Additionally, interviews49 were conducted with the governing party’s officials, 
particularly from the EU Harmonisation Committee, as well as bureaucrats from 
the EUSG, MI, MFA and MJ. Moreover, civil society representatives as well as 
academics working in this field were consulted. The interviews were semi-
structured with differentiated templates for particular types of actors to allow 
both for comparability and a degree of flexibility during the interviews. Non-
probability sampling techniques, such as reputational and positional criteria, as 
well as snowballing, were used to identify the elites to be interviewed.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the main theoretical approaches in the conditionality 
literature and subsequently shown how the Turkish case presents a puzzle for the 
EIM’s credibility assumption. To address this puzzle of continued compliance 
under diminished credibility, the chapter introduced various other explanations 
of compliance making use of the new institutionalist literature. More specifically 
the government’s partisan incentives, economic/political costs and administrative 
capacity variables within RCI; political lock-in, vested interests, sunk costs and 
organisational lock-in variables from HI; and social learning variable from SI 
have been developed.  
 
The second part of the chapter provided a detailed operationalisation of the 
indicators of the dependent variable, as well as the independent variables. 
                                                
49 See Appendix for the list and coding of interviewees. 
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Subsequently, the selection of Turkey, T1/T2 and various policy areas as case 
studies are justified. Finally, the research methodology and the data sources are 
explained.  
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Chapter Three: 
The Structure of the EU Compliance Process in Turkey 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Turkey’s EU candidacy and, more significantly, the start of accession 
negotiations has put the Turkish authorities under considerable pressure to 
conduct wide-ranging domestic reforms. The prerequisite for conducting such 
reforms effectively is the establishment of a domestic system to coordinate 
decision and policy-making to ensure national legislation is harmonised with the 
EU acquis. This chapter provides a detailed examination of the nature of EU 
policy coordination in Turkey by tracing each step in policy-formulation and 
policy-making. This analysis identifies how Turkey’s compliance process works 
in practice, and demonstrates the important role played by the EU-related 
bureaucracy.  
 
The first part of the chapter provides an overview of how EU policy coordination 
operates in Turkey and specifically looks at how the decision to comply is taken. 
The second section analyses the initial administrative phase of compliance, 
where the role, power and autonomy of the EU-related bureaucracy are 
examined. Specifically the following institutions are examined: Secretariat 
General for European Union Affairs (EUSG), Directorate General of EU 
(DGEU) within the MFA, the DGEU within the State Planning Organisation 
(SPO), Permanent Representation of Turkey (PRTEU) in Brussels, Foreign 
Affairs Department in the Prime Ministry (FADPM), Reform Monitoring Group  
(RMG) and Negotiations Monitoring and Steering Committee (NMSC). The 
final section gives an overview of how rule adoption operates within the formal 
compliance process, where political leadership within the cabinet and parliament 
play a key role.  
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The chapter finds that the Turkish coordination of EU policy is very centralised 
and coherent when it comes to setting the medium and long-term agenda of 
Turkey’s EU policy and formally complying with the EU acquis. The executive 
responsible for these agenda-setting and policy-making duties has substantial 
control in the process. Its hierarchical structure makes the management of EU 
policy easier. The presence of a single party majority government since 2002 has 
contributed to this centralised structure.50 However, there is less centralisation 
lower down in the administrative hierarchy, where preparatory work is 
conducted. This lack of centralisation is partly because of the plurality of actors 
involved in the administrative phase of compliance with overlapping 
responsibilities. Most significantly, the newly created EUSG, with its limited 
staff and resources, has initially struggled to establish its authority as the main 
coordinator of Turkey’s EU policy. However, the appointment of a separate 
minister of state as the chief negotiator (CN) for the EU and the 2009 reform 
strengthening the EUSG have improved the hierarchy in the process and firmly 
established the EUSG as the central actor.51 Overall, despite evidence of the EU-
related bureaucracy becoming more structured over time, the dominance of the 
executive still prevails in the Turkish compliance process. 
 
3.1 An Overview of EU Policy Coordination in Turkey 
 
The coordination of EU policy is a multifaceted process for both EU MSs and 
candidates, since it requires the management of numerous sectors and 
involvement of many public institutions and civil society organisations. Turkey 
demonstrates this complexity. The compliance process requires that various 
bodies meet frequently, discuss reform efforts, agree on common proposals and 
subsequently adopt these laws. Such levels of cooperation between public 
institutions may be commonplace for various EU MSs, but present a brand new 
challenge for Turkey, where public agencies are not used to working together 
                                                
50 The fact that the AKP is reasonably unified on the EU front is also a significant benefit. 
51 More recently, the cabinet has adopted a decree law in June 2011 to close down the EUSG and 
establish a Ministry of European Union. Even though this development is outside of the time 
frame of this thesis, it demonstrates how the administrative phase of compliance is becoming 
more centralized and hierarchical.  
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(EUSG2).52 In order to handle the compliance process more effectively, the 
Turkish authorities devised a system of EU policy coordination once Turkey was 
given candidacy status in 1999. The mandate for coordinating this was given to 
existing institutions, such as the MFA and the State Planning Organisation 
(SPO). When this structure proved to be inadequate for managing compliance, 
the EUSG was established in 2000. This institution assumed the formal authority 
to coordinate Turkey’s EU policy and monitor compliance.  
 
The coordination of EU policy in Turkey is conducted in two consecutive stages 
where different actors, structures and processes are at work. In the initial 
administrative phase of compliance long-term programmes for harmonisation are 
organised, draft bills are prepared and aligned with the EU acquis. In the 
subsequent formal compliance stage reform proposals go through the approval of 
the cabinet and finally are adopted in the parliament.  
 
The preparation of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA) is the most important step in the administrative phase of compliance. 
The manner in which this document is prepared has changed over the years. For 
the first NPAA, the experts in the SPO prepared the document and submitted it to 
the cabinet. Following cabinet discussions, the document was then adopted by a 
cabinet decision on March 19, 2001 (Cabinet Decision, 2001). In this original 
method, the draft NPAA was neither sent to the Turkish Parliament (TGNA), nor 
presented to the opposition parties. The lack of a wide consultation mechanism 
attracted broad criticism (Dursun, 2003). As a result, subsequent NPAAs were 
prepared slightly differently. Once the 2003 NPAA was submitted to the cabinet 
from the EUSG, the cabinet shared this draft version with the National Security 
Council (NSC), the opposition parties and the TGNA prior to adopting the final 
version on June 23, 2003 (Cabinet Decision, 2003). Similarly, the draft 2008 
NPAA was forwarded to the TGNA, all the ministries and opposition parties, 
relevant public institutions, as well as to 87 civil society organisations (Demiralp, 
2008). During this consultation process the CN, Ali Babacan, got together with 
the leaders of opposition parties for feedback. Moreover, 51 out of 87 civil 
                                                
52 All interviewees are coded according to their institution. See Appendix for a list and coding of 
interviewees. 
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society organisations provided their views on the NPAA. All this feedback was 
then sent to the Prime Minister (PM) for consideration and finally the revised 
version of NPAA was once again discussed and adopted in the cabinet. In total, 
the consultation process took around four months between the time the NPAA 
was made public in August 2008 and by the time it was officially adopted.  
 
The NPAA informs the line ministries about the laws and secondary legislation 
they are responsible for preparing within a set timetable. Each ministry, whose 
issue area relates to the EU acquis, has a deputy undersecretary responsible for 
EU affairs. The EU unit within the ministry works on legislative proposals under 
the coordination of this deputy undersecretary. Once the draft proposal is ready, 
the ministry circulates it to other public institutions for feedback. If the NPAA 
requires the cooperation of more than one public institution on an issue, the 
relevant institutions get together under the coordination of the EUSG and prepare 
the proposals jointly. Once opinions of other institutions are considered, line 
ministries send their proposals to the EUSG so that its compatibility with the EU 
acquis can be checked. Subsequent to the EUSG’s verification, the proposals are 
forwarded to the Prime Ministry, which signals the end of the administrative 
phase of compliance.  
 
One significant point to note about administrative compliance is that the route 
described above is employed for technical issues related to the EU’s acquis. 
However, for most of the political aspects of the accession negotiations, the 
MFA coordinates the process in cooperation with the EUSG. In cases where the 
issue in question is a matter of Turkish foreign policy (FP), such as the Cyprus 
issue, the MFA’s views prevail over the EUSG’s. However, both in acquis areas 
and political conditionality, the PM and the cabinet are decisive in deciding 
whether or not to adopt proposals prepared in the administrative phase. 
 
At the Prime Ministry the formal compliance process commences when the 
proposed law is brought to the attention of the PM. Subsequent to the PM’s 
approval, the legislative proposal goes through the cabinet and is then forwarded 
to the TGNA. At the parliament, proposals with EU references are passed on to 
the EU Harmonisation Committee (EUHC) and other relevant committees. For 
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EU-related legislation there is no non-standard procedure in the parliament that 
speeds up the legislative process, although special procedures have been 
proposed in the past.53 At the same time, two methods used in the TGNA to save 
time have been applied to EU-related laws. Firstly, laws which are 
comprehensive can be treated as fundamental laws. This allows the MPs to vote 
on up to a group of 30 articles in one instance, rather than voting one by one for 
each article.54 Secondly, a number of laws can be grouped together and voted as 
a package. The TGNA has used such packages ten times in the past to pass EU-
related laws in the area of political conditionality. Overall, these methods do not 
revolutionise the time required for passing the EU-related legislation. The speed 
of legislation significantly depends on the government’s eagerness to comply 
with the EU and the extent to which the opposition cooperates55.  
 
Overall, the role of the executive is central in the process compared to the 
legislature. This is predominantly due to the single party majority government, 
which limits the role played by the parliament and the opposition parties. The 
PM and the cabinet are important veto-players, since the proposed legislation can 
always be significantly amended and even rejected by these actors. Moreover, 
even though EU-related bureaucrats working in line ministries and the EUSG 
have a strong role in the preparation of legislation, their behaviour is 
significantly shaped by the preferences of the ministerial leadership and more 
generally by the government. However, this does not mean that the bureaucrats 
do not play an important role in the EU policy coordination, particularly in the 
administrative compliance phase. Even though the government steers the overall 
direction of Turkey’s EU policy, the bureaucrats conduct all the administrative 
work required for compliance and come up with new initiatives for compliance. 
Moreover, their powers have increased considerably over time, particularly with 
                                                
53 The previous speaker of the parliament, Koksal Toptan, has proposed a special procedure for 
EU issues. Koksal suggested establishing an EU reconciliation committee where two delegates 
from each political party would agree on the TGNA’s agenda by prioritising EU-related issues. 
However, the committee failed to come into existence (AKP7). Additionally, the Reform 
Monitoring Group proposed a special legislative procedure where the TGNA would discuss EU-
related laws one week per month or one day per week (EUSG, 2010b: 3). The cabinet has 
ignored this proposal.  
54 For instance the ‘Law on the Organisation and Duties of the Secretariat General of EU Affairs’ 
(TGNA, 2009b) has been adopted this way. 
55 The opposition’s cooperation is necessary for constitutional changes.  
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the 2009 changes that restructured the EUSG and established a minister solely 
responsible for EU affairs.  
 
This chapter now examines the major actors involved in the administrative and 
formal compliance stages of Turkey’s harmonisation (see Table 3.1 for an 
overview). 
 
Table 3.1: The Duties of Actors Involved in the EU Compliance Process 
 
 Institution Responsibilities  
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
EUSG 
 
- Coordinate the process of harmonisation with the 
acquis and its correct implementation 
- Comply with the EU’s political conditionality 
- Coordinate, program and monitor financial 
cooperation between EU and Turkey  
- Provide education and training on the EU to public 
institutions 
- Prepare strategic documents (e.g. NPAA) 
- Coordinate relations between Turkish public 
institutions and EU or MSs (e.g. Twinning, TAIEX, 
SIGMA) 
DGEU 
(MFA) 
- Follow compliance in Turkey and disseminate this 
information abroad 
- Take leadership role in the coordination of EU policy 
in issues directly related to Turkish FP (e.g. Cyprus) 
- Contribute to harmonisation efforts in areas within its 
mandate 
DGEU (SPO)  - Coordinate EU policy within the SPO  
- Manage the EU’s Pre-Accession Assistance, EU-
Turkey Financial Cooperation and regional 
development projects 
PRTEU - Perform liaison function between Turkey and EU and 
inform the MFA about developments in the EU 
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FADPM - Follow the EU compliance process in light of cross-
conditionality 
- Perform secretariat function for the NMSC 
RMG - Monitor and coordinate Turkey’s harmonisation with 
the EU’s political criteria and with 23rd and 24th 
chapters of the acquis 
NMSC - Monitor and coordinate Turkey’s harmonisation with 
the EU acquis 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Fo
rm
al
 C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
PM - Perform leadership role in the harmonisation process 
- Set the medium and long-term agenda of Turkey’s EU 
policy and act as a veto-power before the legislation is 
passed onto the TGNA 
Government - Set the medium and long-term agenda of Turkey’s EU 
policy 
- Discuss, accept, reject or introduce amendments to the 
proposed bills before they are forwarded to the TGNA 
- Constitute the Turkish delegation for the Association 
Council 
Association 
Council 
- Review the functioning of the Association Agreement 
and take the necessary steps to implement the 
association relationship 
TGNA - Formally adopt legislation to harmonise Turkish legal 
system with the EU acquis 
EUHC - Debate draft bills that make a reference to the EU and 
present reports to the parliament on their alignment 
with the acquis 
Joint 
Parliamentary 
Committee 
(JPC) 
- Build contacts between the TGNA and the EP and 
discuss matters related to EU-Turkish relations with 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
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3.2 Administrative Compliance 
 
This section analyses the actors involved in the administrative phase of 
compliance. Here, the EUSG is the predominant actor coordinating the work of 
public institutions involved in the EU harmonisation process. Additionally, this 
section analyses the role of the MFA, the PRTEU, the FADPM, as well as other 
bodies active in the process.  
 
3.2.1 EUSG 
 
The EUSG is the key body that coordinates and manages Turkey’s administrative 
compliance. Its authority has also been somewhat undermined at times by other 
actors, such as the MFA and SPO. However, it is still a very influential 
institution, whose powers have been recently reinforced, particularly with the 
appointment of a separate minister responsible solely for EU affairs. Following 
an overview of the responsibilities and the structure of the EUSG, these crucial 
2009 reforms are discussed.  
 
The EUSG, established in July 2000 under the Prime Ministry, is assigned with 
six main responsibilities (EUSG, 2009c). Its main role is to coordinate the 
process of acquis harmonisation and implementation within the framework of the 
NPAA (EUSG, 2009b). It monitors public institutions’ compliance efforts from a 
legal, technical and institutional point of view. Furthermore, it oversees all draft 
legislation prepared by these bodies before they are submitted to the Prime 
Ministry. If needed, it also prepares draft laws or coordinates workshops for the 
relevant public institutions to draft laws jointly. Moreover, it prepares and 
presents any necessary documents, and provides guidance and coordination for 
eight Association Committee sub-committees, as well as the working groups 
formed under them (EUSG, 2009a: 18). During accession negotiations it assumes 
the secretariat function and forms working groups in necessary policy areas to 
achieve coordination between institutions. It also provides secretarial services to 
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the boards/committees, established to prepare Turkey for EU membership and 
guides the implementation of their decisions. 
 
Secondly, the EUSG plays a crucial role in the political reform process by 
drafting new legislation and monitoring implementation in areas related to 
political conditionality (ibid.: 16-17). It also provides secretarial functions for the 
RMG, which coordinates and gives overall direction to Turkey’s compliance 
with EU’s political conditionality.  
 
Thirdly, it coordinates, programs and monitors financial cooperation between the 
EU and Turkey. It assumes the secretariat and National Aid Coordinator role for 
the EU grants. The EUSG, in cooperation with the relevant public organisations, 
determines the technical, institutional and financial costs of adopting the EU 
acquis. In line with these costs, it establishes how the EU’s financial assistance 
should be used by various proposed projects and subsequently monitors their 
implementation. It also conducts some projects itself, which are formulated in the 
framework of civil society dialogue (ibid.: 17, 20). 
 
Fourthly, the EUSG provides education on the EU and the accession process to 
Turkish public institutions. It also provides presenters and trainers for the 
conferences, seminars, workshops and meetings organised by public institutions 
on issues related to EU acquis, accession negotiations, the NPAAs, EU PRs and 
EU-Turkey Financial Cooperation. EUSG experts also assist the EUHC in the 
parliament. Moreover, it coordinates the translation of the EU acquis into 
Turkish and of harmonised Turkish legislation into English (ibid.: 19-20).  
 
Another responsibility of the EUSG is to prepare the strategic documents in the 
EU accession process. Taking into account the AP adopted by the EU, the EUSG 
collects contributions from public institutions and other relevant parties, and 
prepares Turkey’s NPAAs. It also monitors the implementation of the NPAA and 
prepares reports. Additionally, together with the relevant public institutions, it 
prepares Turkey’s contribution to the EU’s PRs, screening reports and 
negotiation position reports (ibid.: 17-18). Moreover, it contributes to the 
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preparation of more issue-specific documents, such as the TPAA, action plans 
and strategy documents.  
 
Finally, the EUSG coordinates relations between Turkish public institutions and 
the EU. For instance, in line with the priorities of the AP and the NPAA, it 
coordinates the technical support provided by the EU to Turkish public 
institutions and TAIEX activities organised by the DG Enlargement.  
 
In addition to these six formal responsibilities, the EUSG assumes an important 
informal responsibility to resolve conflicts which arise between public 
institutions within the compliance process. The EUSG organises coordination 
meetings among parties in disagreement and conducts one to one meetings with 
the relevant parties in priority areas. To resolve conflicts related to 23rd and 24th 
chapters and political conditionality, the EUSG brings the issues to the attention 
of the RMG, a high level organ involving the four most important ministries 
operating in these policy areas, namely the foreign minister, the interior minister, 
the justice minister, and the CN. This ensures that the conflicts are resolved at 
the highest level (EUSG3). 
 
The EUSG was initially created as a relatively small institution with seven 
departments as depicted in Figure 3.1 below (EUSG, 2000a: articles 8-15).56 The 
Department of National Programme assumed the most important duties within 
the institution.57 It was responsible for coordinating the NPAA preparations, the 
overall negotiation process, the Twinning, SIGMA and TAIEX programmes, the 
translation of the EU acquis, and the Association sub-committee meetings; 
preparing the contributions towards PRs; drafting the NPAAs; and implementing 
and monitoring most of the projects carried out by the EUSG (EUSG, 2008: 12-
13). However, the role played by the Department of Political Affairs is more 
important for the issue areas under consideration in this research. This 
department is responsible for conducting work towards compliance with EU’s 
political criteria and 23rd and 24th chapters of the acquis. It also supports civil 
society in Turkey, strengthens EU-Turkish civil society dialogue, coordinates 
                                                
56 Strategy Development was added as an eight department in 2006 (EUSG, 2008: 15). 
57 The Department of Accession Policy fulfils these tasks under the current structure. 
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23rd and 24th chapters in the negotiation process, conducts secretarial functions 
for the RMG, and monitors projects related to political conditionality which are 
conducted by public institutions (ibid.: 12). 
 
Figure 3.1: The Organisation Chart of the EUSG between 2000 and 2009 
 
 
Source: EUSG, 2008: 18 
 
Originally, the EUSG incorporated a permanent staff of 76, composed of a 
general secretary (GS), four deputy general secretaries (DGS), seven department 
heads, 20 EU experts, 22 assistant EU experts, three legal advisors, two 
translators and 17 administrative and maintenance personnel (EUSG, 2000b). 
The EUSG is able to employ staff seconded from other ministries and public 
agencies and secondees continue to be a permanent staff member of and receive 
salary from their original institution. For the policy areas in question the most 
significant secondees are those seconded from the MFA. The GS and one of the 
four DGSs was originally appointed by the MFA, whereas the remaining three 
came from the SPO, the Undersecretary of Treasury and the Undersecretary of 
Foreign Trade. The department head of the political section was also always 
appointed by the MFA. Their duration of employment at the EUSG is determined 
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by the MFA’s rotation schedule. The DGSs and the department heads usually 
stayed for two years, whereas the GS stayed around three years.  
 
A number of EU experts resigned over time due to the failure to adopt a law 
strengthening the EUSG’s structure (EUSG3), causing the permanent staff to fall 
to 60 by 2010 (EUSG, 2010a: 20). The total number of EUSG staff was therefore 
119 in January 2010, including 59 temporary staff (ibid.: 20). This number is 
extremely low considering the wide-ranging duties of the EUSG. Comparing the 
EUSG to other similar public agencies, let alone ministries which employ 
significantly larger numbers of staff,58 demonstrates how limited its human 
resources were. For instance, 1366 officials were employed in the 
Undersecretary of Treasury in 2008 and this number increases to 1824 when 
people working in the provinces and abroad are considered (Undersecretary of 
Treasury, 2008: 7). The SPO is allowed to employ 1000 officials but only 688 of 
these positions were utilised in 2008 (SPO, 2008: 14). Similarly the 
Undersecretary of Customs employs 1464 people in its central organisation and a 
further 7415 officials in the provinces and abroad (Undersecretary of Customs, 
2010: 8).  
 
Comparing the EUSG’s size to its counterparts in CEECs also illustrates this 
point. The Office for the Committee for European Integration in Poland, which 
was the largest candidate and therefore the most appropriate comparison to 
Turkey, employed around 500 people before EU accession (Bouquet, 2006: 11). 
Until late 2010, Turkey only had around one fifth as many employees, despite 
the fact that Turkey’s population is almost twice that of Poland. This deficiency 
caused significant problems for the EUSG. Its underprivileged status with 
regards to its resources meant that at times it experienced problems being 
recognised as the coordinator of Turkey’s EU policy in Turkey and abroad.  
 
The most radical change to the structure of the institution came on June 24, 2009 
with the ‘Law on the Organisation and Duties of the Secretariat General of EU 
                                                
58 For instance, the MJ employed a total of 71,170 people (MJ, 2008: 9), whereas the Ministry of 
Interior employed 2049 people in its central organisation and a further 18,224 officials in the 
provinces in 2008 (MI, 2008: 18-20). 
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Affairs’ (EUSG, 2009d). The reform addressed the EU’s continuous criticisms in 
PRs about the limits of the EUSG’s staff and resources by increasing the number 
of EUSG departments from seven to 16 (see Figure 3.2 below). Its permanent 
staff increased to 33359 and seven further officials were appointed to establish an 
additional EUSG office abroad (ibid.:  articles 14 and 20). The reform also 
allows for more flexibility in the appointment of EUSG staff. For instance, the 
GS no longer needs to be seconded from the MFA. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Organisation Chart of the EUSG after the 2009 Reform 
 
 
Source: EUSG, 2010a: 16 
 
This legal alteration was also very significant for achieving coherence in the EU 
harmonisation process and for reinforcing the power of the EUSG within it, since 
it abolished the SPO’s DGEU. The SPO is a key governmental agency operating 
under the Prime Ministry, with the duty to accelerate the economic, social and 
                                                
59 The number of EU experts increased from 20 to 75 and assistant EU experts from 22 to 140 
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cultural development of Turkey by providing consultancy services for the 
government; preparing long-term development plans, sectoral and regional 
development strategies; and coordinating and monitoring the implementation of 
these policies. Due to its role as a coordination institution with a staff composed 
of sectoral policy experts, it was originally the obvious candidate for handling 
EU issues. Therefore, a specialised EU department was established which was 
subsequently transformed into a DGEU consisting of 35 officials. Due to the lack 
of a separate institution coordinating EU policy at the time, the DGEU took the 
responsibility for coordinating EU-related issues between different public 
agencies after Turkey was declared an EU candidate in 1999. 
 
Once the EUSG was created, the presence of two institutions working on similar 
issues with similar coordination roles generated a level of dualism in the process. 
On the one hand, this dualism resulted in the duplication of outputs, which 
created a level of uncertainty among the public institutions regarding who was in 
charge in the compliance process. On the other hand, such dualism in some cases 
manifested itself in institutional rivalry and caused tensions between the SPO and 
the EUSG. The DGEU unit resisted giving up some of its existing EU 
responsibilities to the brand new EUSG through fear of losing its bureaucratic 
power, status and resources.  
  
The most important tension between the two institutions arose during the 
screening process in 2005-6. The EUSG was unable to perform a duty that would 
typically be seen as its responsibility, due to limited resources. Therefore, with 
the prerogative of the political leadership, this duty was delegated to the DGEU. 
This department coordinated the preparatory works conducted by Turkish public 
agencies for each negotiation chapter, assisted them in preparing their 
presentations for the screening meetings, and organised the screening meetings 
between the Turkish and EU sides. The SPO’s strong presence undermined the 
EUSG’s powers and authority during the screening process. 
 
A similar incident took place in December 2004 the DGEU sent a letter to all the 
public institutions, including the EUSG and the MFA, asking them to inform the 
SPO of all staff working on EU issues within their institutions. This led to 
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Foreign Minister Gul sending a warning letter to the SPO and reminding them 
that the EUSG is the institution responsible for coordinating the EU accession 
process and not the SPO (EUSG, 2004). 
 
Finally, the EUSG was responsible for preparing the third NPAA in response to 
EU’s renewed AP in 2006, but failed to do so partly due to the limitations of its 
resources and partly due to political problems that emerged between the EU and 
Turkey regarding Cyprus. However, a year later, with the approval of the 
government, the SPO produced a document very similar to an NPAA, titled 
‘Turkey Programme for the Alignment with the Acquis’ (TPAA). This incident 
added further vagueness to the process.  
 
As demonstrated above, having two bodies with overlapping responsibilities is 
not only costly in terms of time and effort, but is also harmful for the EUSG, 
since it creates uncertainty among the public institutions about its authority for 
coordinating EU policy. Closing down the DGEU, firstly, reduced the amount of 
duplication. Secondly, some of the SPO’s EU experts moved to the EUSG, thus 
concentrating accumulated information, experience and capacity in one body. 
Finally and most importantly, it allowed for a more coherent and consistent EU 
policy coordination by strengthening the EUSG’s authority. 
 
In addition to the EUSG’s interactions with other public institutions, its 
institutional independence from political leadership, and its turnover of staff in 
particular, is a good determinant of its power. Since its inception, the level of 
turnover in the EUSG’s staff has been fairly low and in particular the change in 
government in 2002 did not have a significant impact on the composition of the 
EUSG (EUSG2). However, the EUSG cannot generally be described as being 
completely independent from the political leadership, particularly after 2009 
when a state minister became the CN responsible for the EUSG. 
 
Turnover at higher levels of the EUSG was low until the 2009 reform. Since the 
EUSG’s creation there has been continuity in the GS, DGS and department head 
positions with the exception of those seconded from the MFA on a rotation basis. 
Although such rotations may harm continuity, they are not detrimental for the 
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EUSG’s institutional stability or independence, since the secondees from the 
MFA are not political appointees. Instead, they come from similar social 
backgrounds and have been socialised in the secular, Kemalist culture of the 
MFA (Robins, 1997: 90). Overall, the MFA’s rotations have very little impact on 
the planned harmonisation efforts, policies or the overall direction of the EUSG. 
The 2009 reform, on the other hand, created more avenues for politicisation by 
allowing non-MFA state and non-state officials to be appointed by the CN as a 
GS. Notwithstanding this change, the most recent GS was again appointed from 
the MFA in September 2009, namely Volkan Bozkir.60 At the same time, the 
appointment of a state minister solely responsible for the EU affairs undermined 
the EUSG’s independence and moved it closer to the political authority. 
Moreover, there were claims that the new CN appointed people close to himself 
as DGSs after he came to power and this resulted in resignations of officials who 
thought they deserved the positions (EUSG1; EUSG2; GDS1). 
 
Turnover at lower levels of the EUSG, which is less relevant for the 
independence of the EUSG, has been very low. The 2009 reform allowed for 
people that have never worked in public institutions to apply for an assistant EU 
expert position through an examination. However, the majority of applicants 
were the EUSG’s current temporary staff seconded from other public institutions, 
who wanted a permanent role within the EUSG. The combination of examination 
and the previous experience of most candidates meant that only those who are 
fully equipped to take up employment in the EUSG were accepted, and thereby 
politicisation was minimised. Overall, politicisation and turnover in the EUSG 
have been very low until 2009, although there have been signs of politicisation 
after this date.  
 
This section has so far demonstrated that the EUSG is a crucial actor in the 
compliance process. However, the lack of personnel, coupled with the presence 
of other institutions working on similar issues, challenged the authority of the 
EUSG until 2009. The 2009 reform almost tripled its staff and made the 
harmonisation process more coherent with a stronger EUSG at its heart. 
                                                
60 The DGS Haluk Ilicak replaced him as the Acting GS in April 2011. 
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However, what was even more important for the empowerment of the EUSG was 
the appointment of Egemen Bagis as the CN on January 8, 2009 with an 
exclusive EU portfolio. According to Zubek, such a post allows for a more 
hierarchical structure in EU policy coordination, which in turn, significantly 
improves the EU rule adoption record (2008: 5-6). When the PM or a non-
sectoral minister acts as a central authority in the area of EU rule adoption, he 
has ‘by virtue of his or her institutional position – individual incentives to 
sanction and/or reward ministers, act as a competitive agenda-setter and monitor 
ministerial action’ (ibid.: 5-6).  Bagis’s appointment, on the one hand, reinforced 
the EUSG’s position in the process particularly with the 2009 reform, and on the 
other, made Turkey’s EU policy coordination process more effective.61  
 
3.2.2 MFA 
 
The MFA has always been influential in setting the direction of and managing 
Turkey’s EU policy. This section provides an overview of the MFA, describes its 
EU department, examines its responsibilities in EU policy coordination and 
finally discusses any points of conflict between the MFA and EUSG in the 
administrative phase of compliance. 
 
The MFA holds a unique place within the Turkish state. Its accumulated 
knowledge and human resources are superior to other institutions. It is almost 
certainly the most difficult ministry to get into and therefore the opportunities for 
people with political connections to join the ministry are extremely low. This 
difficulty has been more pronounced for those favouring the current governing 
party, since the MFA has a predominantly secular and Kemalist outlook (Robins, 
1997: 90). In other words, the possibility of political turnover is very low making 
the MFA more independent from the political authority than other ministries and 
public agencies. 
                                                
61 It is also significant that the new CN Bagis is someone who is personally very close to the PM 
Erdogan. He has accompanied Erdogan in most of his trips abroad since 2002, acted as his 
personal translator and FP Advisor between 2002 and 2009 (Egemen Bagis, 2009). Additionally, 
the fact that Bagis is young and holding his first ministerial position means that he is likely to 
work very hard to speed up the EU harmonisation process in order to obtain a good reputation for 
himself.  
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Within the MFA, the Directorate General of EU Affairs (DGEU) is divided into 
two sections, namely Accession Process and Political Affairs. The Accession 
Process section manages issues related to EU accession negotiations, EU-Turkey 
financial cooperation and free trade agreements. In this department, there is one 
deputy director general, two department heads, two first level secretaries and two 
officials. Similarly, the Political Affairs section which works on EU’s political 
conditions has one deputy director general, two department heads, two 
department managers and two officials. In total, including the DG, there are 15 
officials working at the DGEU.  
 
The DGEU has four main responsibilities. Firstly, it follows Turkish compliance 
with the EU and disseminates this information to its officials abroad who in turn 
are in charge of explaining the Turkish position and reforms outside of Turkey.  
 
Secondly, a number of EU-related issues are exclusively under the MFA’s 
mandate. For instance, the MFA represents Turkey in Turkey–EU troika 
meetings and the foreign minister leads the Turkish delegation in the Association 
Council meetings. Moreover, when the Cyprus issue or Turkey’s relations with 
Greece or Armenia emerge on the EU’s agenda, the MFA’s preferences carry the 
heaviest political weight in the formation of Turkish policy (EUSG4).  
 
Thirdly, as any other ministry, the MFA is invited to join the discussions for 
draft laws on relevant issue areas. For instance, when the EUSG coordinates 
reform efforts in the area of asylum, the MFA is invited to attend a workshop 
together with the MI, General Directorate of Security (GDS) and the MJ.  
 
Finally, the MFA has an informal role of being the engine for change and 
bringing enthusiasm to the reform process. In a way, the MFA is like a double-
sided mirror, reflecting Turkey abroad but also projecting the EU to Turkey. The 
MFA officials are the first ones to comprehend the EU’s demands and their 
consequences for Turkey, since they spend majority of their lives abroad and are 
more familiar with the EU standards. Therefore, they play a key role in 
informing Turkish public institutions about these demands. The way this 
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communication is handled is crucial for the process of domestic transposition, 
therefore, as a MFA official expressed, they try their best to pass on their 
enthusiasm about the reforms to the public officials (MFA2). Their role as the 
engine for reform was particularly significant before the EUSG was established 
in 2000. For instance, the MFA prepared and championed the draft law 
abolishing the death penalty, which was extremely controversial at the time 
(ibid.). Overall, the MFA is not merely active in the external coordination of 
Turkey’s EU policy but also active in the domestic reform process.  
 
An open conflict between the MFA and EUSG did not take place, but the 
powerful position of the MFA in the process has to some extent undermined the 
authority of the EUSG. The MFA did not disagree with the EUSG in regards to 
the general direction of the EU policy or with the final form of the reform 
proposals, simply because it did not need to. There are two reasons for this. 
Firstly, for issues that are under the exclusive mandate of the MFA, such as 
Turkey’s relations with Armenia, its preferences prevailed. For other issue areas, 
it had to meet with other relevant ministries, thus the joint proposal reflected the 
MFA’s preferences. Secondly, the preferences of the MFA and the EUSG were 
very much in concordance in most occasions. This is because the MFA officials 
hold the most important positions within the EUSG departments that are most 
relevant for the MFA, such as the GS, the DGSs and the department head of 
political affairs. This organic tie allowed the preferences of the MFA to be 
infiltrated into the EUSG and was strongly felt when the foreign minister also 
acted as the CN. Both institutions share a strong willingness to comply with the 
EU’s political criteria. At the same time, the MFA’s red lines about the Cyprus 
issue, for instance, are not always shared by the EUSG bureaucrats whose main 
policy preference is to terminate deadlocks between the EU and Turkey to move 
closer to accession (EUSG4). However, by and large, the EUSG tends to adopt 
the MFA’s red lines due to the senior EUSG officials seconded from the MFA. 
As a result of this firm bond between the two institutions, the other public 
institutions perceived the EUSG as an agent of the MFA.62 This evidently 
undermined the authority of the EUSG. However, with the appointment of a state 
                                                
62 This would explain why some public institutions, when asked by the EUSG for information on 
a specific topic, sent their contribution to the MFA, as opposed to the EUSG (EUSG2). 
 
99 
minister as the CN, the EUSG was finally able to separate itself form the MFA to 
some extent. 
 
3.2.3 PRTEU 
 
The Permanent Representation of Turkey in Brussels (PRTEU) is predominantly 
composed of officials from the MFA and bureaucrats who are seconded from 
ministries or agencies that are relevant for specific EU policies. Its role in the 
compliance process is two-fold. Firstly, it performs upstream (Kassim, 2003: 
142) functions by providing liaison between Turkish and EU officials. Secondly, 
it contributes to the administrative phase of compliance by following and at 
times attending EU meetings and subsequently, reporting them back to the MFA 
downstream (ibid.: 142). On the one hand, they are the ‘gurus’ who have expert 
knowledge on the EU. On the other hand, they do not get to play an active part in 
the internal coordination of EU policy, since they do not have a hands-on role in 
policy-making or policy coordination in Turkey (EUSG2). Depending on the 
policy area, the relevant PRTEU bureaucrat may attend the Association Sub-
Committee meetings in Turkey, but they otherwise entrust the EUSG and the 
MFA with the duty of EU policy coordination. Overall, the PRTEU behaves like 
a transmission belt in the EU policy coordination by communicating the 
necessary information to the relevant parties within Turkey, which in turn set the 
agenda for and coordinate the harmonisation process.  
 
3.2.4 FADPM 
 
The Foreign Affairs Department in the Prime Ministry (FADPM) is involved in 
the administrative phase of compliance in two limited respects. Firstly, as a 
foreign affairs department its mandate requires it to follow Turkey’s relations not 
only with the EU but also with other international organisations, such as the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. This gives them access to a broader perspective with regards to 
conditionality. This broader view is significant not least because EU 
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conditionality goes in parallel with the conditionality of other international 
organisations particularly in the areas of human rights. Therefore, it is imperative 
for the FADPM to follow parallel conditionality – that is when other 
international institutions offer the Turkish government additional benefits for 
complying with the same conditions put forward by the EU (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005: 15) – and steer the direction of Turkish reform process in the 
light of these other sources of conditionality.  
 
Secondly, the FADPM performed the secretariat function for the NMSC, partly 
due to the EUSG’s limited staff during the screening process. Since the Prime 
Ministry is at the top of the executive hierarchy, the FADPM was able to bring 
together various public institutions and carry out this coordination function 
successfully.  
 
3.2.5 Other Configurations in the EU Policy Coordination 
 
There are a number of other bodies which contribute to administrative 
compliance in Turkey. Two among these, namely the RMG and the NMSC play 
a crucial role in the process, therefore require further attention. 
 
The RMG was established on September 10, 2003 as an ad hoc group to monitor 
Turkey’s harmonisation with the EU and ensure the successful implementation 
of the reforms. The RMG is a very high level group bringing together the four 
most important ministers, namely the foreign minister, the interior minister, and 
the justice minister, together with the CN.63 They predominantly discuss issues 
related to EU’s Copenhagen political criteria and 23rd and 24th chapters. This is 
an extremely important body for the democratisation attempts in Turkey, since it 
allows for a high level ministerial discussion. Moreover, it also allows the 
bureaucrats working on EU issues to bring new issues and reform proposals to 
the ministers’ attention. This is particularly the case for the EUSG’s political 
affairs department which conducts the RMG’s secretarial duties.  
 
                                                
63 The Turkish Permanent Representative to the EU also attends this meeting on occasions.  
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The second important body in the process, the NMSC, brings together the deputy 
undersecretaries of the MFA, the SPO and the Prime Ministry, together with the 
GS of the EUSG, as well as the permanent representative to the EU. The CN 
leads this group. In contrast to the RMG, the NMSC focuses mainly on technical 
issues that are related to EU negotiations. However, similar to the RMG, the 
bureaucrats from these institutions are able to bring new issues to the attention of 
senior officials. The NMSC gets involved in the administrative phase of 
compliance once the legislative proposals prepared by the relevant ministries and 
checked by the EUSG are submitted to the Prime Ministry. Before the proposals 
are forwarded to the parliament, the NMSC checks the technical aspects of the 
proposals. If there are any problems with the proposals, the NMSC assumes the 
coordination role and brings together the relevant ministries to solve the 
problems.  
 
3.3 Formal Compliance 
 
In the formal compliance phase, the PM and the cabinet are influential veto-
players. Their approval is required for draft laws to pass to the TGNA. The role 
played by the TGNA, particularly after 2002, has been very limited in terms of 
amending or rejecting legislative proposals related to the EU. However, it plays a 
crucial role in communicating with the EP and MS parliaments. 
 
3.3.1 The PM 
 
As opposed to the FADPM’s limited role in administrative compliance, the PM 
has a substantial role to play in formal compliance. Since the PM is situated at 
the top of the executive hierarchy, he has predominance in the EU policy 
process. Just as he can turn down other types of legislation, he also has a veto-
power in this area. Moreover, he can also speed up the process of harmonisation. 
By issuing a circular about the government’s determination to comply with the 
EU or regarding the significance of EUSG’s coordination role, he provides an 
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opportunity for the EUSG to pressure other line ministries to further their reform 
efforts.64  
 
Even though the PM is equipped with these powers, the current PM Erdogan 
who has been in power since 2002 has not made full use of them. He has not led 
the EU compliance process, even when the EUSG was attached to the Prime 
Ministry. Leadership was always delegated to either the minister of foreign 
affairs or a state minister in charge of EU affairs. He has also not used his veto-
powers. He intervened on very rare occasions on issues to do with the EU’s 
political conditionality by amending or delaying legislative proposals.65 
 
3.3.2 The Government 
 
The government plays a central role in the compliance process. This is 
particularly true for the current governing party which has been a majority 
government since 2002. The AKP government determines the shape of Turkey’s 
EU policy both in the administrative phase of compliance through its leadership 
of ministries and the EUSG, as well as in the formal compliance process in a 
more direct manner. The cabinet’s main involvement in formal compliance takes 
place before the proposals are forwarded to the TGNA. The cabinet discusses the 
proposals and can accept, introduce amendments or reject them. Therefore, it is 
one of the two most important veto-players in EU policy coordination, alongside 
the PM.  
 
Additionally, it assumes more specific responsibilities in the context of the 
Association Agreement. The government constitutes the Turkish delegation to 
the Association Council, which has been established through Article 6 of the 
Ankara Agreement. It is formed by the ‘members of the Governments of the 
member-states and members of the Council and of the Commission of the 
                                                
64 See Prime Ministry 2004; 2003. 
65 According to an EUSG official, such intervention usually occurred either because the proposals 
were economically too costly to realise at a specific point in time or they were contrary to the 
preferences of the AKP government. The delay in the reform on fight against corruption can be 
explained by these political costs (EUSG2). 
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Community on the one hand and of members of the Turkish Government on the 
other’ (Ankara Agreement, 1964: articles 6, 23). It meets at least every six 
months at the ministerial level and whenever necessary at the representatives’ 
level (MFA, 2009). The Council’s main duty is to review the functioning of the 
Association Agreement and take the necessary steps to implement and develop 
the association relationship between the two parties. This mandate gives the 
Association Council the power to take decisions and make appropriate 
recommendations acting on a unanimity basis (Ankara Agreement, 1964: article 
22). In practice, the Council allows high level officials from both sides to get 
together and review the process, rather than take critical decisions that alter how 
the negotiations are handled.  
 
3.3.3 The Parliament 
 
The TGNA’s involvement in Turkey’s EU compliance process should not be 
overemphasised. Its approval is certainly required for adopting legislation to 
comply with the EU acquis and it is important for providing democratic 
accountability and transparency to the process. However, its ability to introduce 
significant amendments to draft legislation is limited. This lack of influence can 
firstly be viewed in the context of the overall decline in the role of the parliament 
vis-à-vis the executive branch particularly in the context of European integration 
(Andersen and Burns, 1996). Secondly, the AKP’s single party majority 
government since 2002 has meant that the executive has dominated the TGNA, 
and has set its agenda single-handedly. This differs from the period between 
2000 and 2002 where the TGNA was less constrained by the coalition 
government made up of the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Democratic Left 
Party (DSP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). 
 
A few limited avenues still exist for the TGNA to influence Turkey’s 
compliance. Firstly, the TGNA uses regular methods of parliamentary scrutiny, 
such as questions, debates and examinations to keep the government under close 
check. Secondly, it contributes to the process by building a dialogue with the EP 
through the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), as well as by 
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building contacts with other European parliaments and parliamentary 
committees. 
 
To achieve the task of scrutiny, a specific committee has been set up, namely the 
EUHC. The EUHC was established on April 15, 2003 as a subsidiary committee 
and currently consists of 26 MPs. Its central aim is to debate those draft 
proposals submitted to the TGNA which make a reference to the EU and 
subsequently present reports on their level of compliance with the acquis to the 
principal parliamentary committees (TGNA, 2009a). To do this, the EUHC 
almost always invites a policy expert from the EUSG for expert opinion. The 
EUHC also prepares a report at the end of each legislative year on Turkey’s 
overall progress on the EU accession (TGNA, 2003). Moreover, it is part of the 
committee’s duty to follow and analyse developments in the EU and inform the 
parliament (ibid.). Finally, it builds contacts with EU institutions, as well as with 
similar committees in EU MSs, and welcomes ambassadors, members of the 
parliamentary committees from EU MSs, and foreign delegations who are 
visiting the TGNA (TGNA, 2009a).  
 
Despite these powers, the political weight of this committee is extremely low or 
even ‘zero’ (TGNA2). This weakness stems from a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the EUHC was established as a subsidiary committee and the principles of its 
workings are not governed by the TGNA’s bylaw as is the case with other 
parliamentary committees. A principal committee report on a draft bill can be a 
basis for a TGNA meeting. However, the EUHC can only ‘present its views’ on 
whether the drafted legislation is compatible with EU law to the principal 
committee that is operating above it.66 In other words, its function is limited to 
presenting opinions, since the principal committees are under no obligation to 
take these positions into account. Secondly, the principal committee is endowed 
with the authority to analyse the draft bill from a variety of different angels. 
Therefore, it also can and usually does invite an EUSG expert for consultation 
(TGNA2). This further undermines the special role given to the EUHC. Thirdly, 
                                                
66 The EUHC usually works below either the Constitutional Committee, the Justice Committee or 
the Foreign Affairs Committee depending on whether the proposed bill requires a constitutional 
change, a legal change, or signing an international treaty/charter respectively. 
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the mandate of the EUHC also allows for other subsidiary committees to ask 
EUHC’s opinion on the compatibility of draft bills with EU legislation. This 
indicates that it is also possible for the EUHC to work under another subsidiary 
committee, adding to its weakness. Finally, and most importantly, since its 
inception, the number of legislation for which the EUHC’s views were requested 
has been very modest. This may be due to the failure of the parliament 
presidency to forward all the EU-related legislation to the committee or the lack 
of an EU reference in the proposed bill despite being directly or indirectly related 
to the EU. According to the EUHC, the fact that Turkey is conducting accession 
negotiations with the EU makes it essential for all the bills adopted in the TGNA 
to be checked for their compatibility with the EU acquis and therefore to be sent 
to the EUHC (EUHC, 2006).  
 
There have been attempts to overcome the EUHC’s weaknesses, although these 
have not been completely successful. The chairman of the EUHC, Yasar Yakis, 
has prepared a draft proposal on May 31, 2006 to transform the EUHC into a 
principal committee, thereby significantly enhancing its resources, mandate and 
power in the TGNA (Yakis et al., 2006). However, this proposal became a dead 
letter. Another attempt has been the first EU twinning project prepared by the 
TGNA titled ‘strengthening the capacity of the TGNA’, which incorporated as 
one of its aims ‘reinforcing the role of the EUHC’ (TGNA, 2009a). Training 
activities and study visits were conducted to meet this goal and experts from 
Italian and Hungarian parliaments came to visit the TGNA (ibid.). This project 
contributed significantly to inform the Turkish MPs about the importance of 
having an effective committee on EU affairs.  
 
The limited powers of the EUHC and the executive dominance over the 
legislature can be clearly demonstrated with a topical example. The proposal for 
a ‘Law on the Organisation and Duties of the Secretariat General of EU Affairs’ 
was initially discussed at the EUHC. Subsequently, the EUHC’s report was 
submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), which operated as the 
principal committee for the discussion of this bill. Once the FAC produced its 
report suggesting some revisions, the proposed bill together with the FAC’s 
report was discussed in the TGNA. During the discussions the chairman of the 
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FAC, Murat Mercan, represented the views of the principal committee and the 
CN Bagis, represented the government’s position. As discussed above, the views 
of the EUHC were not represented directly in the TGNA, instead they were only 
indirectly taken into consideration through the opinions of the FAC.  
 
The TGNA minutes on this bill demonstrate the executive’s supremacy over the 
parliamentary committees, as well as the legislature in general (TGNA, 2009b). 
Firstly, the opposition MPs from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), MHP, 
DSP, and the Democratic Society Party67 (DTP), have complained about their 
lack of influence within the parliamentary committees by lodging a statement of 
opposition (TGNA, 2009c). Secondly, the EUHC MPs stated that the views of 
their committee were not reflected in the final version of the proposal put 
forward in the TGNA for a vote (TGNA, 2009b: 143, 176).68  
 
For the bill consisting of 20 articles, governing party MPs put forward five 
amendments and the opposition, i.e. CHP and independent MPs, proposed eight 
amendments. Whereas the government party aimed at creating an EUSG with 
rich resources and a flexible mandate, the opposition MPs attempted to limit the 
staff and resources of the EUSG and clarify its mandate to avoid the possibility 
that it could gain increased powers in the future without the TGNA’s approval. 
More specifically, the opposition aimed at decreasing the number of 
administrative departments in the EUSG from 16 to six; allowing the 
establishment of only temporary committees for research as opposed to 
establishing temporary and permanent committees; limiting the bonuses that can 
be given to the EUSG staff and applying tax on the bonuses; as well as clarifying 
and limiting the manner in which the EUSG can outsource certain services 
(TGNA, 2009b: 183, 188-9, 198-214). However, all of these amendments 
received an unfavourable opinion from the Government and all were rejected by 
simple majority in the final TGNA vote (TGNA, 2009b: 183-214). In contrast, 
the AKP-proposed amendments to clarify the duties of the EUSG staff operating 
                                                
67 Pro-Kurdish party founded in 2005. The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) replaced it after it 
was banned by the Constitutional Court in December 2009. 
68 Several other MPs also welcomed the fact that some of the opinions they expressed at the 
EUHC have been included in the new proposal (TGNA, 2009b: 164, 191). However, such 
influence appeared to be very modest.  
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abroad; increase the number of staff working abroad; as well as increase the 
maximum age for applying for an assistant EU expert position from 45 to 50 
years (TGNA, 2009b: 209-10, 215, 217) received favourable opinion from the 
Government and were subsequently adopted in the TGNA (TGNA, 2009b: 209-
17). In two other cases, the AKP’s amendments coincided with the proposals of 
the opposition MPs (TGNA, 2009b: 198-209). In both cases, the precise 
amendments proposed by the AKP were adopted and the opposition’s proposals 
were rejected by the majority in the TGNA (TGNA, 2009b: 186-209). Overall, as 
the parliamentary minutes demonstrate the executive branch has predominance 
over the legislature in Turkey’s harmonisation process and the EUHC’s impact is 
very limited.  
 
The second channel through which the TGNA can be involved in Turkey’s 
compliance process is through the JPC, which is an essential body in building 
contacts between the TGNA and the EP. The JPC consists of an equal number of 
MEPs and Turkish MPs (18 from both sides) and meets twice a year. Its task is to 
deliberate on the annual report of the Association Council, to scrutinise the 
application of the Customs Union and to follow the progress of the accession 
negotiations. Since 1989, the JPC has also analysed specific cases of alleged 
human rights violations in Turkey at the request of the EP’s sub-committee on 
Human Rights. At the same time, it can issue recommendations to the EP and the 
TGNA where agreed by a majority of each delegation. 
 
A final way through which the TGNA is involved in the compliance process of 
EU integration is by building institutionalised, as well as ad hoc, relations with 
European parliaments. For institutionalised relations, the TGNA is represented in 
the annual conference of EU MSs’ parliamentary chairmen; the biannual 
Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of 
the European Union; the biannual conference held by the Foreign Affairs 
Committees of the EU Parliaments; the relatively new conference that brings 
together the committees working on national defence; and finally in the Euro-
Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (Turkish Delegation to the JPC, 2005). 
The TGNA is also represented in more ad hoc gatherings such as the inter-
parliamentary committee on human genetics, annual conference of candidate 
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countries, meetings of political parties and the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe meetings (Turkish Delegation to the JPC, 2005).  
 
Conclusion  
 
Turkish coordination of EU policy in regards to decisions on compliance is 
centralised through the role of the executive, which is organised hierarchically 
and is able to speak with one voice. However, the same cannot be said for the 
EU-related bureaucracy. As demonstrated in this chapter, the administrative 
phase of process is characterised by a plurality of actors and numerous fora. On 
the one hand, this provides the EU-related bureaucrats numerous avenues to have 
their voices heard by the executive. On the other hand, it has resulted in 
incoherence at times, due partly to the multiplicity of the actors involved with 
overlapping responsibilities. More specifically the lack of centralisation has 
stemmed from the resource constraints of the main coordination institution – the 
EUSG. This contrasting situation has resulted in a system where decision-making 
with regard to compliance as well as adopting legislation are fast and efficient. 
However, there are problems of coordination, communication and uncertainty in 
the administrative phase of compliance. 
 
In 2009, these problems with administrative compliance were significantly 
addressed by two developments. Firstly, a separate minister for EU policy 
coordination was appointed and, secondly, the EUSG’s power and resources 
were considerably strengthened. These changes contributed to the centralisation 
of the administrative phase of compliance by placing a much more powerful 
EUSG at the centre. At the same time, the 2009 reforms created opportunities for 
staff turnover in the EUSG. Whereas the MFA remains the most independent 
bureaucracy within the compliance process, the EUSG’s independence from the 
political authority has been undermined to a certain extent.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that, although the current system of EU policy 
coordination in Turkey still marks the dominance of the executive over the 
legislature and the EU-related bureaucracy, the EUSG, as the coordinator of EU 
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policy, is expected to gain more power and influence – and has already done so 
with the 2009 reform.  
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Chapter Four: 
Compliance Levels in Turkey (2001-2010): Macro-Level 
Analysis 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The EIM suggests that credibility is a necessary condition for candidates’ 
compliance. This chapter tests whether compliance comes to a halt (or decreases 
significantly) in the absence (or significant decline) of credibility. It initially 
identifies changes in the credibility of conditionality for Turkey and 
subsequently measures the extent of compliance in two temporal cases between 
2001 and 2010. October 2005 marks a clear fall in credibility and allows the 
research to make use of before-after analysis to test the credibility hypothesis. 
The credibility hypothesis can be reformulated more specifically for the case at 
hand as follows: if credibility in T2 is significantly lower than in T1, the levels of 
compliance will deteriorate after T1.  
 
The empirical findings of this chapter do not support the expectations of the 
EIM’s credibility hypothesis. The macro-level evidence on formal and 
behavioural compliance in the area of JHA demonstrates that levels of 
compliance continuously increased over time. Moreover, the speed of formal and 
behavioural compliance did not fall within T2, instead it remained on average 
stable. Overall, there is convincing evidence that there is no decline in levels or 
average speed of compliance after 2005. Therefore, this chapter finds that 
credibility is not a necessary condition for compliance. This conclusion suggests 
that there are likely to be other factors compensating for diminished credibility 
leading to continued compliance in T2. 
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4.1 Levels of Credibility over Time in Turkey 
 
The credibility of conditionality is measured over time using the four criteria 
discussed in the methodology section of this thesis. Overall, the analysis below 
demonstrates that the credibility of conditionality in the case of Turkey has 
generally been low and has deteriorated significantly over time, particularly after 
2005.  
 
As a first condition, there needs to exist an asymmetrical interdependence 
between the norm-exporter and norm-importer states. This hierarchical 
relationship characterises the EU conditionality in all the candidates, including 
Turkey. Therefore, the first condition of credibility is fulfilled for the Turkish 
case.  
 
The second criterion related to the EU’s resources and more importantly its will 
to deliver the rewards of conditionality is the most problematic one for Turkey 
among the four criteria. In the Turkish case, the EU does possess the resources to 
deliver the rewards, however its will to enlarge to Turkey has generally been 
extremely weak. This is especially in comparison to the CEECs, since the 
potential European veto-players against Turkish accession are stronger and 
higher in number. In the case of CEECs, no European leader stated they were 
against enlargement, whereas in the Turkish case, this has been commonly 
voiced. Most particularly the centre-right and right-wing parties in Germany, 
France and Austria have expressed their opposition to Turkish membership. For 
instance, the current President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy has maintained; ‘I do 
not think that Turkey has a place in Europe’ (Cagaptay, 2007) and ‘I have always 
been opposed to this entry and I remain opposed’ (EU Business, 2009). 
Similarly, Angela Merkel has stated ‘I don’t believe that Turkey can become a 
member of the Union in the foreseeable future’ (Inal and Yegenoglu, 2005) and 
Edmund Stoiber agreed with her: ‘[w]e will do everything possible to achieve a 
privileged partnership with Turkey instead of EU accession’ (ibid.:1).  
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In addition to these statements weakening the credibility of conditionality, a 
number of other factors demonstrate the lack of willingness on the side of the EU 
to enlarge to include Turkey. Firstly, in the immediate aftermath of the 
December 2004 decision to open the negotiations in 2005, the Austrian 
government demanded the inclusion of the ‘privileged partnership’69 concept as 
an alternative to ‘full membership’ into the NF. Similar opinions were also heard 
during this period from leading figures in France and Germany, such as Angela 
Merkel, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, and Nicolas Sarkozy (Bennhold and Bilefsky, 
2006). 
 
The NF did not explicitly mention a ‘privileged partnership’, but instead made a 
more indirect reference to it through referring to the ‘strongest possible bond’ 
between the two parties in the case of Turkey failing to fulfil the obligations. The 
final version of the Framework states: 
‘The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These 
negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which 
cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all 
Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the 
Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the 
obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully 
anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible 
bond’ (Commission, 2005b: 1). 
What were also included in this document that differentiated it from its earlier 
versions were the references made to the ‘open-ended’ nature of the negotiations 
as well as the ‘absorption capacity’ of the Union. According to Hakura, the term 
‘open-ended negotiations’ allows the EU to keep the Turkish accession process 
ambiguous by refraining from making an irrevocable commitment (2005: 2). 
Along similar lines, the absorption capacity of the EU can be read as a ‘specially-
designed extra obstacle’ to the membership aspirations of the current candidates 
(Icener and Phinnemore, 2006). Overall, this discussion was extremely damaging 
to the credibility of conditionality not least because the NF is still in force and 
similar arguments about privileged partnership are being voiced today. 
 
                                                
69 Privileged partnership entails the free movement of goods, services, and capital; market 
liberalisation; and agricultural trade; as well as bilateral cooperation in military and FP spheres 
(Hakura, 2005: 1). 
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Secondly, the French government’s reluctance to Turkish accession informed its 
decision to introduce a constitutional change on February 28, 2005 to hold a 
compulsory referendum every time a new country is to join the EU after Bulgaria 
and Romania (Richard and Pabst, 2005: 7-8).70 The constitution was once again 
amended in July 2008. According to the recent revision, a motion adopted by 
both houses of the parliament convened in congress by a three-fifths majority 
does not need to be ratified by a referendum (Assemblée Nationale, 2008). 
Despite this alteration President Sarkozy has maintained in a television interview 
that he would still call a referendum for Turkey’s accession if he were still in 
power (EU Business, 2008). Therefore, this final constitutional amendment did 
not necessarily increase the credibility of conditionality.  
 
France is actually not alone in throwing grave doubt on the future of EU 
enlargement. The Austrian government has also promised its public that there 
would be a referendum on the Turkish membership when or if the time comes 
(Rachman, 2006: 54). The decision to hold referendums is particularly damaging 
for credibility, since it not only demonstrates the strong opposition of 
governments to Turkish accession, but, at the same time, makes the accession 
process highly unpredictable. With these referendums the governments give up 
the power to decide on Turkey’s accession in intergovernmental bargains and 
instead leave it to their public to decide, who are generally more opposed to 
enlargement than the elites.  
 
Thirdly, the credibility of conditionality was further weakened due to a European 
Parliament (EP) decision five days before accession talks started on September 
28, 2005. The EP delayed its assent to an additional protocol to the Ankara 
Agreement, which aimed to extend the customs union between the EU and 
Turkey to the ten new EU members. This additional protocol was actually signed 
by the Turkish and EU parties on July 29, 2005. However, Turkey had added a 
unilateral declaration to the protocol asserting that it does not recognise Cyprus 
and the EP’s move was aimed to address Turkey’s failure to recognise one of the 
                                                
70 This amendment states that: ‘any Government Bill authorising the ratification of a Treaty 
pertaining to the accession of a State to the European Union and to the European Communities 
shall be submitted to referendum by the President of the Republic’ (Assemblée Nationale, 2008: 
Title XV, Article 88-5). 
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MSs. On September 28, the European People’s Party/European Democrats – the 
largest transnational party organisation in the EP – called for an adjournment of 
the session, which was backed by simple majority of the MEPs, thus forcing the 
postponement of the protocol. Superficially, this may seem like a minor issue on 
Turkey’s road to membership but actually it had great repercussions for the 
credibility of conditionality. Socialist, Liberal and Green MEPs as well as the 
Commission officials harshly criticised this move. As the Dutch MEP Joost 
Lagendijk put it: 
‘Though it does not impede the opening of accession talks with 
Turkey on Monday, it sends a very bad signal. … [It] damages 
both Europe’s credibility and further reforms in Turkey’ (Connon, 
2005). 
 
Another blow to conditionality’s credibility came at the end of 2006. On 
November 29, 2006 the Commission put forward its recommendation to partially 
suspend the membership negotiations on eight chapters. This was due to 
Turkey’s continued refusal to recognise Cyprus and open its ports and airports to 
Cypriot ships and planes. The recommendation aimed at effectively freezing 
talks on the free movement of goods; right of establishment for companies and 
freedom to provide services; financial services; agriculture and rural 
development; fisheries; transport policy; customs union; and external relations. 
What this recommendation also entailed was that no chapter could be 
provisionally closed until Turkey fulfilled its obligations. On December 11 the 
General Affairs Council accepted the Commission’s recommendation and the 
European Council ratified this on December 14-15, 2006.  
 
Along similar lines, France also blocked the opening of the chapter on economic 
and monetary union on June 26, 2007. Moreover, on August 27, 2007 the French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that:  
‘Of the 35 chapters that remain to be opened, 30 are compatible 
with association. Five are compatible only with accession. I told 
the Turkish Prime Ministers: let’s deal with the thirty that are 
compatible with association and then we’ll see’ (Présidence De La 
République, 2007). 
 
What this means is chapters on agriculture and rural development; economic and 
monetary union; regional policy and coordination of structural instruments; 
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institutions; and financial and budgetary provisions would also be inaccessible 
for the Turkish negotiations, amounting to a total of twelve chapters being 
suspended.71 
 
Lastly, Cyprus blocked a further six chapters at the end of December 2009, 
namely freedom of movement for workers; energy; judiciary and fundamental 
rights; justice, freedom and security; education and culture; and foreign, security 
and defence policy. As a result, a total of 18 chapters out of 35 have been 
blocked by the EU and its MSs for political reasons, which significantly 
diminishes the credibility of conditionality in Turkey. 
 
Moreover, there is also evidence that EU conditionality suffers from 
inconsistencies and does not follow a meritocratic approach in the Turkish case, 
since measures other than compliance, such as Turkey’s size, culture, religion, 
economic development, have an effect on EU decisions. This damages the 
credibility of conditionality even further. 72  As Schimmelfennig suggests, 
‘creating uncertainty about admission even after full compliance, as in the case 
of the referendum on Turkish membership, destroys credibility…’ 
(Schimmelfennig, 2008: 933).73 Sarkozy’s statement is a good demonstration of 
this: ‘[w]hether Turkey meets the conditions for entry or not does not solve the 
problem. On this matter, I have always been clear: I do not think Turkey has a 
right to join the European Union because it is not European’ (Yavuz, 2009: 227). 
Overall, as the evidence above demonstrates, the second condition for a credible 
conditionality is not only unfulfilled, but it has also deteriorated over time in the 
Turkish case. 
 
As a third condition, conditionality is credible if the conditions are clear. 
Regarding this point, the credibility of conditionality in Turkey has deteriorated 
                                                
71 The total number is not thirteen because the chapter on agriculture and rural development was 
included in both blocked lists. 
72 Saatcioglu argues that the EU’s insistence on the Cyprus issue challenges the credibility of 
conditionality, since as part of EU’s peaceful settlement of border disputes principle, this 
condition was only demanded from Turkey but not from Greece or Cyprus when they acceded 
into the EU. This reduced the credibility of conditionality according to Saatcioglu (2009: 567). 
73 Karen Smith has also argued that ‘Turkey had every reason to suspect that it would never 
become a member of the club even if it had a fully functioning democracy and exemplary human 
rights record’ (2003: 132). 
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over time. Over the first period (T1) the conditions in the field of JHA were set 
by the EU’s PRs and the APs. These documents, despite being vague at times, 
provided a general roadmap for compliance. After the opening of negotiations 
(T2) these documents continued to guide the process, but more importantly the 
negotiations required additional information about EU conditions. Prior to each 
chapter negotiations, a screening process is normally conducted and the EU 
prepares a screening report to clarify the benchmarks that must be fulfilled for 
that chapter to be opened for negotiations. However, in JHA (23rd and 24th 
chapters) these screening reports have not yet been published. This not only 
means indeterminacy but also an absence of conditionality, which considerably 
challenges its credibility.  
 
Finally, the last condition for a credible conditionality is related to the presence 
of cross-conditionality. However this factor is not relevant for the Turkish case 
as there is no alternative actor applying conditionality at a lower cost. Therefore, 
credibility of conditionality is not weakened on this front.  
 
An additional factor to consider is the timing of conditionality. In the later stages, 
as a rule of thumb, credibility gets stronger, since the rewards generally become 
more tangible and closer. For instance, the opening of accession negotiations or 
setting an accession date are likely to strengthen credibility. However, this logic 
does not fit the Turkish case, since the opening of accession negotiations in 2005 
has not enhanced credibility. This is particularly because of the EU’s reluctance 
to enlarge to include Turkey as discussed above and its unwillingness to set a 
date for Turkey’s accession in the foreseeable future. In sum, the credibility of 
conditionality in Turkey has not gradually increased after the start of accession 
negotiations as the literature suggests, rather it weakened over time. In the words 
of Avery: 
‘As for Turkey, the statements made at the opening of their 
accession negotiations in 2005, that the negotiations are “open-
ended” and could last 10-15 years, show that the concept of 
“temporality” for this applicant country is of a different nature 
from any preceding case. Indeed, the credibility of traditional 
method of enlargement is put in question by the case of Turkey, 
since … one can see that the incentive for Turkey to meet the 
EU’s requirements for membership is severely reduced by the risk 
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that the EU may never concede a date for Turkey to join’ (2009: 
265). 
 
 
Overall, it can be argued that the credibility of Turkish accession has always 
been relatively weak when compared to the CEECs, since the EU actors were 
more willing to enlarge the EU to incorporate the CEECs. Despite this, the 
credibility of conditionality towards Turkey increased gradually starting from 
December 1999, when Turkey was granted candidacy status, until the decision to 
start the negotiations in December 2004. Between December 2004 and October 
2005 a number of events contributed to the weakening of credibility. However, 
during this period, the Turkish actors could still see a tangible and sizable reward 
in the near future, i.e. negotiation talks. The presence of this reward compensated 
to a certain extent for the incidents that exerted a downward pressure on 
credibility. 
 
After 2005 the credibility of conditionality diminished dramatically, due to the 
continued negative signals coming from the EU institutions and MSs. But most 
importantly, after this date, it became extremely hard for Turkish actors to see a 
tangible reward that could be attained in the near future. Even though Turkey 
started negotiating the terms of membership, this does not automatically mean 
that it was moving closer to accession. One important reason behind this was 
there was not a gradual progression of the negotiations. At the moment only one 
negotiating chapter is provisionally closed. There are 13 other chapters that are 
being negotiated but are not allowed to be provisionally closed. More 
importantly 18 of the most difficult chapters in the negotiations, including 23rd 
and 24th chapters are suspended. Additionally, the Council has not approved the 
screening reports containing the benchmarks which need to be fulfilled prior to 
the negotiations in nine chapters, including 23rd and 24th chapters. Therefore, the 
Turkish parties do not have a list of clear and determinate conditions that they 
need to fulfil to start negotiating in those chapters. This ambiguity weakens the 
credibility of conditionality particularly in the areas encapsulated by this 
research. In sum, the period of T2 witnessed a continuous decline of credible 
conditionality. As Schimmelfennig maintains: 
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‘[T]he EU is reluctant to extend a membership perspective to 
further countries… [E]ven existing commitments to Turkey and 
the Western Balkans have come under pressure from relevant 
member-states. [Developments] [a]fter 2004 … seem to indicate 
that new candidates for membership face more uncertainty and 
higher hurdles than previous applicants. These developments are 
likely to reduce the credibility of the membership perspective on 
which the effectiveness of EU political conditionality has been 
based in the past’ (2008: 919). 
 
 
The views of the interviewees also confirm the analysis above. When they were 
asked about their expected date for Turkey’s EU entry, the average date quoted 
by those interviewees that did not seriously doubt the fact that Turkish accession 
would ever happen, was 2020.74 It is clear from this date that the political 
leadership and bureaucrats do not anticipate to be part of the EU in the short-
term. Some interviewees did not even think Turkey would ever become a 
member of the EU. One of these interviewees stated that he had ‘serious doubts 
about the other side’s [the EU’s] sincerity’ (EUSG7) and another claimed the 
best expected outcome for Turkey was some sort of ‘privileged partnership’ or 
‘differentiated integration’ but never ‘full membership’ (AKP13). 
 
The interviewees also voiced their concern regarding the consistent application 
of EU’s conditionality, which poses a challenge to its credibility: ‘[t]he signals I 
am getting from the EU, of course not all, suggest that the EU has concerns 
independent of these [accession] criteria for not taking Turkey into the EU’ 
(EUSG7). Another argued that EU’s decision to enlarge to include Turkey will 
always be a ‘political’ one, rather than based on performance (SPO1). The 
response given by an EUSG official strongly supports the above analysis on how 
credibility declined over the years: 
‘When I first started working here [in the EUSG in 2001] … my 
guess [on Turkey’s accession date] was 2013-2014, considering 
the EU’s budget terms. But, of course, due to political issues as 
well as due to Turkey’s size as a country, but also due to the fact 
that many of the chapters have been blocked in the negotiations 
because of various reasons, my current perspective points to the 
next [EU] budget term’ (EUSG2). 
                                                
74 TGNA2; EUSG5; EUSG6; AKP9; SPO1; EUSG4; EUSG2; AKP12; AKP14; MFA5; 
EUSG10. 
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Figure 4.1: Credibility of Conditionality in Turkey over Time 
 
 
 
In light of this data, it can be concluded that credibility was significantly higher 
in the period between March 8, 2001 and October 10, 2005 (in T1) than between 
October 11, 2005 and December 31, 2010 (T2). Moreover, the findings show that 
it increased gradually within T1 and decreased substantially in T2, as shown in 
Figure 4.1 above  
 
In the face of this decline in credibility the EIM’s credibility hypothesis expects 
compliance to either come to a halt or decrease significantly. The first and more 
pessimistic scenario describes a case where credibility has declined to ‘level 
zero’. In this case, the EIM’s credibility hypothesis would expect Turkey to stop 
complying with EU conditions altogether because Turkey no longer possesses 
any incentives to do so.75 However, considering the assessment conducted above, 
it is very unlikely for credibility of conditionality to have declined to level zero 
within T2 in Turkey. The second scenario is more realistic for the Turkish case at 
                                                
75 This scenario strictly follows the necessity requirement of credibility for the effectiveness of 
conditionality. 
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hand. This alternative assumes a ‘significant decline’ of credibility in T2 as 
opposed to an absolute one. In light of this, the EIM would expect the Turkish 
compliance to fall considerably in T2 compared to T1, parallel to the decline in 
credibility. 
 
Since credibility has been shown to have declined significantly after 2005, the 
question needs addressing is: is there a decline in the level of compliance in T2 in 
comparison to T1? The remainder of this chapter examines the data on formal, 
and behavioural compliance in the JHA field to respond to this question. 
 
4.2. Levels of Formal and Behavioural Compliance in JHA 
 
This section examines the trends in legislative transposition and its practical 
application in Turkey between 2001 and 2010 in the field of JHA, using three 
quantitative indicators. The findings demonstrate that credibility does not 
determine the compliance patterns in Turkey. The levels of formal and 
behavioural compliance continuously increased throughout this period despite 
the decline in credibility. Moreover, even though the rate of compliance 
decreased at the start of T2 in line with the expectations of the credibility 
hypothesis, it increased in the remainder of T2. In other words, the speed of 
formal and behavioural compliance has not experienced a substantial decline 
after 2005, following the significant decline in credibility. Instead the picture that 
emerges from the data below show that the rate of compliance has remained 
roughly stable and even increased in some cases. This evidence that diminished 
credibility has not been detrimental for compliance in Turkey strongly challenges 
the credibility hypothesis. 
 
In the first indicator, compliance is represented by the Commission’s positive 
references flagged up each year between 2001 and 2010 in the PRs about formal 
and behavioural compliance in the area of JHA. The Commission’s assessments 
demonstrate that Turkish authorities continued to progress on the road to EU 
membership, since each year new developments were reported regardless of the 
fall in credibility after 2005. Put differently, the level of compliance continuously 
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increased over time. Similarly, the rate of compliance has not deteriorated over 
time. Even though the speed of formal and behavioural compliance decreased at 
the start of T2, they picked up to reach levels which are actually slightly above 
the T1 average. The figure 4.2 below demonstrates this trend. Turkish authorities 
have made an average of 45.8 developments per year between 2001 and 2005,76 
whereas this average increased to 48.6 between 2006 and 2010. 
 
Figure 4.2: Positive Developments Recorded in the PRs between 2001 and 2010 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis from PRs (1998-2010) 
 
The second compliance indicator is the proportion of the total number of EU 
conditions Turkey has complied with over the years. The dataset represents the 
number of all the EU conditions and the number of legal transposition and 
behavioural compliance conducted by Turkey each year. All the demands, 
requests, suggestions and criticisms made by the EU in the PRs between 1998 
and 2010 are taken into account, where these demands are clear and compliance 
with them is measurable. Since the EU’s PRs are published in October each year, 
this database is updated each October. For instance, the EU made a total of 60 
demands by October, 2002 (see Figure 4.5), which includes 14 demands made in 
                                                
76 T1 period actually ends in October 2005, but for simplicity reasons the averages have been 
calculated by including the whole of 2005 in the T1 period. This way the compliance conducted 
in T1 is actually magnified, but even then the average compliance in T2 is higher than T1. 
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the October 2002 PR, in addition to the 46 made previously. The data on 
Turkey’s compliance, however, are collected by examining the whole year, i.e. 
four pieces of legislation adopted between January 2001 and December 2001 
(see Figure 4.5). Another methodological point to underline here is regarding the 
period prior to 2001. The conditions the EU stated between 1998 and 2000 have 
been included in the design, even if they are not restated in the post-2000 PRs. 
The reason behind this is that these conditions are still part of EU’s 
conditionality and it is still in the interest of this research to measure compliance 
with them. Leaving them outside the design would skew the research results. 
Therefore, these conditions have been treated as if they have been put forward by 
the EU in the initial year of analysis, i.e. in 2001. There is one caveat to this. If 
compliance has been achieved with these criteria before 2001, then these criteria 
are excluded from the dataset, since this research does not consider compliance 
prior to 2001.  
 
Let us start with the level of Turkey’s compliance, firstly by looking solely at the 
number of EU conditions Turkey complied with. The line in Figure 4.3 shows 
the total number of conditions complied with over the years in a cumulative 
fashion and the bars demonstrate the number of conditions complied with per 
year. For example, Turkish authorities have complied with four EU conditions in 
2002, which makes a total of eight conditions cumulatively including the 
compliance conducted in 2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Total Number of Conditions Complied with since 2001 
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Source: Author’s analysis from PRs (1998-2010) 
 
It is clear from the line in this graph that the level of Turkey’s compliance 
continuously increased over time, including after 2005. Similarly, the rate of 
compliance has also increased over time. The bars which demonstrate the 
number of laws adopted per year also portray the rate of Turkey’s compliance 
with EU conditions between 2001 and 2010. They show that the speed of 
compliance, which started out fairly stable, experienced a sharp increase in 2003. 
However, following this peak, the speed of compliance continuously declined 
until 2006. Following the lowest point, the rate of compliance increased in 2007 
and subsequently remained more or less stable until 2010 where the speed 
increased significantly. What is interesting in this graph is that, contrary to the 
expectations of the credibility hypothesis, both the level and the speed of 
compliance did not deteriorate in T2 following the decline in credibility and 
instead increased within T2. The fact that Turkey has complied with an average 
of 7.6 conditions per year between 2001 and 200577 and an average of 9.6 
conditions between 2006 and 2010 demonstrates this point. 
 
It is also crucial to underline at this point that Turkish compliance has not shown 
any significant cases of reversal in legislation or worsening in behavioural 
compliance after 2005 as expected by the EIM’s credibility hypothesis. When 
                                                
77 As per above, the T1 period actually ends in October 2005, but for simplicity reasons the 
averages have been calculated by including the whole of 2005 in the T1 period. This way the 
compliance conducted in T1 is actually magnified, but even then the average speed of 
compliance in T2 is higher than T1. 
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compiling this data from the Commission’s PRs the researcher made sure to 
check for any evidence of legislative reversal or behavioural backsliding, since 
this information would have come up in the analysis. However, the data 
demonstrate that there have not been any noteworthy cases of legislative or 
behavioural reversal between 2001 and 2010 with the exception of two cases.78 
This is crucial since the credibility hypothesis would expect acts of formal 
compliance to reverse and behavioural compliance to backslide in costly cases. 
However, the Turkish case demonstrates not only that significant reversal was 
absent, but also new legislation continued to be adopted and implemented at an 
even higher speed than T1.  
 
Figure 4.4 below organises the same data in a different manner to clearly 
demonstrate the difference between compliance levels in T1 and T2. Within the 
T1 period Turkey has complied with 38 EU conditions and a total of 48 
conditions in T2. Since the duration of these two periods are not equal, i.e. T1 
falling short of five years and T2 slightly over five years, these levels have been 
weighted so that the duration of two periods have been equalised. This analysis 
shows that the number of conditions complied with in T2 (46) are slightly more 
than the compliance level in T1 (41) as the Figure 4.4 below demonstrates. Once 
again this goes against the expectations of the credibility hypothesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Weighted Number of Conditions Complied with in T1 and T2 
                                                
78 Firstly the Commission has criticised Turkey for revising its anti-terror legislation in 2006 in a 
restrictive manner. Secondly, Turkey has lifted visa obligations for a number of countries in 2007 
and 2010, such as Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, and this is not in line with the EU’s negative visa list. 
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Source: Author’s analysis from PRs (1998-2010) 
 
Figure 4.5 below shows the cumulative picture for all the conditions set by the 
EU in the last ten years, together with Turkey’s cumulative compliance record 
with these conditions over time. Figure 4.6 represents the same data in 
percentages. The evidence in these two figures clearly shows that Turkish 
authorities complied at a quicker rate at the start of the compliance process. By 
2003 Turkey had complied with about a quarter of the total conditions set by the 
EU. This rate of increase in compliance slowed down after 2003, and remained at 
a steadier rate. By 2010 Turkey had complied with about a half of the EU 
conditions set in the PRs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Cumulative Representation of All EU Conditions and Turkish 
Compliance 
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Source: Author’s analysis from PRs (1998-2010) 
 
Figure 4.6: Percentage of Compliance with All EU Conditions 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis from PRs (1998-2010) 
 
The evidence shown in these two figures provide a good overall picture of 
Turkey’s compliance performance over the years. However, they are not able to 
demonstrate the actual rate of change in compliance, which is shown in Figures 
4.7 and 4.8. The above figures illustrate the total number of EU conditions which 
have been set and the total compliance achieved by Turkey cumulatively. Figure 
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4.7, by contrast, presents the number of EU conditions which are unmet and 
available for compliance each year. In other words, the conditions that have been 
complied with previously are not considered. This may result in a situation, as in 
2008 and 2009, where, even though the EU sets new conditions each year, the 
number of available conditions decreases, because Turkey complied at a quicker 
rate than the EU set new conditions. The number of available conditions is 
compared to the number of conditions complied with each year, which is the 
same data in the bar graphics in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.8 shows the percentage of 
compliance with all the available conditions for each year.  
 
Figure 4.7: All Unfulfilled Conditions and Conditions Complied with Each Year 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis from PRs (1998-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Percentage of Compliance with Available Conditions Each Year 
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Source: Author’s analysis from PRs (1998-2010) 
 
According to Figure 4.8, the average percentage of compliance Turkey has 
conducted per year between 2001 and 2010 is 11%. The evidence demonstrates 
that Turkish compliance started out as fairly low in 2001 and 2002. 2003 was an 
important date since Turkey’s compliance level experienced a sharp boost. After 
2003, percentage of compliance experienced a steady decrease until 2006, where 
it reached its minimum point. After 2006, compliance levels once again 
increased. Compliance levels between 2007 and 2009 period failed to reach the 
2003 levels, but still performed better than the initial years of conditionality 
(2001-2002). What is striking in this figure is the sharp increase in compliance in 
2010, which brings the percentage of compliance significantly over the average 
level and closer to the peak point of 2003.  
 
The minimum compliance level recorded in 2006 is in line with the expectations 
of the rationalist credibility hypothesis that compliance would fall once the 
reward79 of accession negotiations has been granted to the norm-importer state. 
However, it cannot explain the increase in the level and rate of compliance 
subsequent to 2006 demonstrated in the evidence above. 
 
Overall, all the figures above demonstrate that Turkey’s compliance levels have 
increased continuously over time, whereas the rate of compliance has varied. 
                                                
79 This relates to the credibility of an intermediary reward – accession negotiations – as opposed 
to the credibility of the reward of accession.  
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There are two dates worth noting. Firstly, 2003 was a year of substantial 
compliance for Turkey. In all the figures, it is clear that the level and rate of 
compliance was high in 2003. Secondly, 2006 was the year where compliance 
particularly suffered. However, compliance picked up in 2007 and the overall 
rate of compliance has increased after this date, particularly in 2010, reaching 
levels which are slightly higher than T1. In sum, neither the level nor the speed 
of compliance deteriorated in T2. These findings challenge the feasibility of the 
EIM’s credibility hypothesis, which expects compliance with costly conditions to 
deteriorate significantly in T2.  
 
The final indicator of compliance is the percentage of Turkish reform targets 
planned to be adopted by a certain deadline that are actually completed by that 
deadline (Zubek, 2008). The four main long-term programmes are considered in 
this methodology, namely the 2001, 2003 and 2008 NPAAs, and the TPAA. The 
compliance levels are compared across the documents to assess Turkey’s 
compliance pattern over time.  
 
Figure 4.9: Turkey's Compliance with Self-imposed Targets 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis from PRs (1998-2010), NPAAs (2001; 2003; 2008); TPAA (2007)  
 
 
Figure 4.10: Percentage of Compliance with each NPAA and TPAA 
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Source: Author’s analysis from PRs (1998-2010), NPAAs (2001; 2003; 2008); TPAA (2007) 
 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 above demonstrate, firstly, that Turkey continued to comply 
with its self-imposed reform targets after 2005, rather than not adopting any 
measures, even under diminished credibility. This poses a challenge to the EIM’s 
credibility hypothesis.  
 
Secondly, although Turkey was able to comply with 34 out of a total of 64 
conditions included in the 2001 NPAA (53% compliance), compliance with 
conditions in other documents has not been as high. The compliance level was 
27% for the 2003 NPAA, 30% for the TPAA and 19% for the 2008 NPAA.80 
This suggests that the rate of compliance declined after the 2001 NPAA. 
Moreover, the reform targets set by the Turkish authorities also showed a 
decrease after the 2001 NPAA. These results regarding the decline in the rate of 
compliance and compliance targets seems to fit the credibility model better than 
previously presented data, which showed either steady or increasing rates of 
compliance over time. However, this data need to be analysed further, to account 
for the fall in the speed of compliance after the 2001 NPAA.  
 
The very high level of compliance observed in the case of 2001 NPAA can be 
explained by a number of factors. Firstly, the first NPAA lacks specific deadlines 
for each reform target and instead incorporates a more general deadline, namely 
‘medium-term’. Medium-term is interpreted to mean four years in line with the 
                                                
80 In this data, the 2001 NPAA and the 2003 NPAA are classified as being part of T1, as 2005 is 
the latest deadline in both of these documents (with the exception of three pieces of legislation 
which have 2006 as their deadlines in the 2003 NPAA). 
53% 
27% 30% 
19% 
2001 NPAA 2003 NPAA 2007 TPAA 2008 NPAA 
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EU guidelines (European Council, 2008). What this means is that March 2005 is 
the deadline for all of the 64 conditions set by the 2001 NPAA covering almost 
the whole of T1 period, whereas the following documents have significantly 
shorter deadlines. For instance, deadlines in the 2003 NPAA are set between 
2003 and 2005. The fact that 2001 NPAA’s deadlines are longer means that 
compliance with its conditions is easier and therefore compliance levels are 
higher in comparison to other documents.  
 
Secondly, there is a need to take a closer look at the types of targets included in 
these different documents. It is expected that the levels of compliance with the 
very first long-term programme would be higher because the first document 
formulated at the start of the compliance process tends to be predominantly 
composed of the most technical and easiest targets. It is also often the case that 
the candidates comply with the easiest and the most technical conditions at the 
initial stages of compliance process. Materially and socially costly laws are 
postponed. What this means is that candidates tend to perform much better, and 
their compliance record may be inflated, during the early years of conditionality. 
This also explains why the number of compliance targets set by the Turkish 
authorities declined over time. As candidates comply with a high number of 
relatively easier EU conditions, there remains a lower number of criteria to be 
complied with over time. But rather difficult reforms remain, such as the Kurdish 
and Cyprus questions, limiting the role of military in politics and more difficult 
aspects of behavioural compliance (Kirisci, 2007: 10; Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 
67). More specifically, with regard to the JHA area, Kirisci has maintained in 
2007 that ‘the harmonisation process has reached a point where difficult 
decisions are needed to actually start implementing action plans and also bring 
about breakthroughs in a number of areas’ (2007: 10). These two reasons largely 
account for the exceptionally high compliance level for the 2001 NPAA and 
explain the reason why the rate of compliance seems to decline after 2005.  
 
The evidence from Turkey’s compliance with its own targets demonstrates that 
contrary to the expectations of the credibility hypothesis the level of formal and 
behavioural compliance increased continuously over time. At the same time, the 
rate of compliance appears to have declined after the 2001 NPAA. However, this 
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can largely be explained by the inflated levels of compliance for the 2001 NPAA 
due to longer deadlines and easier legislation. If the 2001 NPAA is left out of the 
analysis, the remaining three documents can be compared more accurately, since 
they have similar deadlines and the level of compliance with them is less skewed 
due to easier conditions. This comparison demonstrates that the rate of 
compliance increased after 2005, from 27% to 30%, and subsequently the rate 
decreased to 19% in the 2008 NPAA. Clearly the initial increase in the rate is not 
substantial; therefore its significance should not be overstated. However, the 
decline in the rate of compliance at the end of T2 is more noteworthy and is more 
in line with the expectations of the credibility hypothesis.  
 
Overall, the three different indicators used in this section do not substantiate the 
EIM’s credibility hypothesis which expects declining levels of compliance after 
2005. This assumption is falsified by the evidence shown above, since all three 
indicators demonstrate that both formal and behavioural compliance levels have 
increased continuously over time. Moreover, two out of three indicators 
demonstrate that the rate of compliance has also increased in T2. If all three 
indicators are taken into account, it can be argued that on average the rate of 
compliance in T2 remained stable at worst. In other words, Turkish authorities 
continued to conduct more difficult reforms at a similar speed as T1, sometimes 
even faster, under diminished credibility. The fact that the constitutional reform 
and judicial reform strategies were adopted; democratic opening process for 
minority groups was initiated; and article 301 of the penal code on freedom of 
expression was revised are cases in point. Given that compliance becomes more 
difficult each year with more challenging conditions remaining, a stable rate of 
compliance under diminished credibility contradicts the credibility hypothesis.  
 
4.3 Level of Administrative Compliance 
 
This section measures the change in administrative compliance over time. It 
concludes that even though administrative compliance has declined to some 
extent at the start of T2 (2005-2006), the developments in the subsequent years 
(2007-2008) have brought administrative compliance levels back up. Even more 
 
133 
striking, administrative compliance increased significantly in 2009. This 
evidence suggests that even though the level of administrative compliance was 
subject to significant variation, the average T2 levels were equal to T1 levels, at 
worst. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, EU-related bureaucrats working in the 
candidates’ EU coordination institutions and the EU units of line ministries are 
the principal actors in administrative compliance. For the purposes of this 
research the MFA, MI and MJ and, most importantly, the EUSG are the focus for 
administrative compliance in the field of JHA. In very broad terms, 
administrative compliance incorporates all activities conducted by the 
aforementioned actors prior to formal/behavioural compliance, which helps bring 
about formal/behavioural compliance. This section specifically examines the four 
most important outputs of administrative compliance, namely the preparation of 
the NPAAs or other long-term plans for compliance; composition of other 
strategic documents; preparation of draft laws and substantial reform packages; 
and the management of the screening process. Moreover, the time devoted to 
compliance-related activities by these bureaucrats is also considered to be part of 
administrative compliance. 
 
Firstly, the NPAAs, which address the priorities and conditions incorporated into 
the EU’s Accession Partnerships (APs), are the most important outputs of the 
administrative phase of compliance. The first NPAA was prepared in 2001 as a 
response to the EU’s AP in 2001. The second programme was completed in 2003 
shortly after the EU announced its second AP. However, Turkey failed to prepare 
a national programme in response to the EU’s third AP in 2006.81 Instead, only 
minor revisions were made to the 2003 NPAA. The final NPAA was prepared in 
2008 in response to the final AP document.  
 
                                                
81 This was partly due to the negative climate between the EU and Turkey stemming from the 
Cyprus problem and the upcoming general elections in 2007; as well as the limitations in the 
EUSG’s staff. 
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When these three NPAAs are compared in terms of their length and level of 
detail,82 it is clear that the 2003 NPAA is much more detailed than the 2001 
NPAA. This is due to the fact that, after the first NPAA, the Turkish officials 
became more experienced at preparing such documents and were able to review 
the EU acquis in a more detailed fashion to formulate a more comprehensive 
plan. Moreover, the 2003 document incorporates detailed cost calculations for 
reforms. The 2008 NPAA, on the other hand, was much shorter – almost half in 
length – in comparison to the 2003 NPAA. However, this should not be 
interpreted as a decline in Turkey’s commitment to reform. Instead, a lot of 
reforms which were included in the 2003 NPAA have been conducted in the 
period between 2003 and 2008, and these reforms were naturally excluded from 
the new document. Put differently, as Turkey complies with EU conditionality, a 
smaller number of reforms remain. This is the main reason behind the brief 
nature of the 2008 NPAA which in other respects is as detailed or comprehensive 
as the 2003 NPAA. Overall, the 2008 NPAA was not less ambitious and 
comprehensive than its earlier versions. This suggests that the quality of 
administrative compliance has remained stable after T1. At the same time, it is 
also clear that the Turkish officials were less effective in terms of fulfilling the 
EU’s demands at the start of the T2 period in comparison to T1, since they failed 
to adopt an NPAA in 2006. This implies that the level of administrative 
compliance in T2 was reduced. However, the recent years have witnessed two 
important developments with regard to the preparation of long-term programmes 
for compliance, which challenge the above conclusion that administrative 
compliance has slowed down in T2.  
 
The first of these developments is the TPAA, prepared by the SPO. Even though 
the TPAA was very similar to an NPAA in terms of structure,83 the motives 
behind its formulation were different. This programme was formulated with the 
aim of full membership by 2013, therefore the reforms were aimed to be adopted 
between 2007 and 2013. What differentiated the TPAA from a regular NPAA 
was that it was not a formal EU requirement and has not been prepared by any of 
                                                
82 Only the JHA is considered. 
83 The TPAA, as in the NPAA, was divided into negotiation chapters and put forward the 
legislation that Turkey needed to adopt. 
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the CEECs. Instead, it was entirely an invention of the EU-related bureaucracy in 
Turkey. On the one hand, it is clear that Turkey’s failure to formulate an NPAA 
in 2006 had informed the bureaucrats’ and political leadership’s decision to 
initiate this programme (EUSG4). On the other hand, it demonstrated the EU-
related bureaucracy’s will to shape Turkey’s compliance process according to 
Turkey’s own needs and priorities.84 It prioritised those reforms which would 
contribute to the country’s development, and deferred others which were 
economically and socially costly. This would allow Turkey to progress rapidly 
on the road to EU accession, but in a less costly manner, according to its own 
needs and with less resistance. As the previous CN, Babacan, highlighted, with 
this programme Turkey attempted to determine the timetable for reforms rather 
than it being imposed by the EU (BBC, 2007). In this sense it is clear that this 
programme was not solely prepared with the goal of compliance with the EU, but 
also to achieve Turkey’s own developmental goals. Put differently, the TPAA 
allowed the ‘Ankara criteria’85 to be materialised (Erdogan, 2004). Overall, this 
programme demonstrates the firm commitment of both the EU-related 
bureaucracy and political leadership to foster further compliance with the EU, 
even if on their own terms. More importantly, it shows not only the willingness 
but also the ability of the EU-related bureaucracy to come up with new initiatives 
for EU compliance and its capability to exert a push from below on political 
leadership. In this respect, it is a good illustration of the dynamic nature of the 
administrative phase of compliance in T2. 
 
As a second development, the EUSG devised an Action Plan as part of its new 
EU Strategy on March 15, 2010 (EUSG, 2010d). This programme aims to revive 
the commitments laid down in the TPAA based on Turkey’s own priorities and 
timetables (EUSG, 2010b: 2). This programme was prepared with the 
contribution of 67 state institutions (Euractiv, 2010a) and was modelled on the 
NPAAs, although it bears a closer resemblance to the TPAA. It is organised 
along the negotiation chapters and each chapter lists in detail all the legislation 
that needs to be adopted. As in the TPAA, there is no separate section on the 
                                                
84 The programme was prepared shortly after the EU blocked the negotiations in eight chapters 
due to the Cyprus problem, therefore the EU-related bureaucracy decided to establish a plan 
where Turkey’s needs, even in the blocked chapters, are prioritised (SPO2). 
85 A term coined by the PM Erdogan. 
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political criteria. A total of 96 primary and 261 secondary regulations are 
targeted for adoption in less than two years, i.e. the remainder of 2010 and 2011. 
In this respect, it is more ambitious than the latest NPAA (2008), which lays 
down a plan to adopt 131 primary laws and 342 secondary legislation in a longer 
period of time with less specific deadlines. Most of planned changes in the 
NPAA were to be adopted in three years: between the end of 2008 and the end of 
2011. However, a considerable number of changes were planned to be adopted 
‘after 2011’, ‘2009-2013’, ‘2010-2012’, ‘1 year prior to full membership’, ‘2 
years prior to full membership’ or ‘in the framework of full membership 
perspective’ (NPAA, 2008). These deadlines suggest a compliance timetable 
which is much lengthier than the Action Plan. Moreover, as maintained above, a 
smaller number of reform targets in the Action Plan should not be interpreted as 
a loss of enthusiasm, instead this decline demonstrates the fewer number of 
legislation which remain to be adopted. Overall, the Action Plan puts forward an 
ambitious programme for Turkish compliance. It demonstrates the EU-related 
bureaucracy’s commitment to Turkey’s accession process, since it devises 
compliance schedules on all 35 chapters, regardless of whether the chapters have 
been opened, suspended or blocked (EUSG, 2010b: 2). Therefore, it is further 
proof of the increased activity taking place within the administrative phase of 
compliance in the recent years.  
 
A second area that is worth discussing as part of administrative compliance is the 
preparation of an important strategy document by the EUSG, namely the 
‘European Union Strategy for Turkey’s Accession Process’ (EUSG, 2010b). The 
EUSG adopted this on January 4, 2010 and subsequently forwarded it to its 
European counterparts (EUSG, 2009e: 11). This strategy incorporates four pillars 
structuring Turkey’s EU accession process from January 2010 onwards. The first 
pillar aims to intensify Turkey’s efforts in the ongoing negotiation process by 
fulfilling the commitments on already opened chapters, such as the closing 
benchmarks; as well as performing activities on chapters that can be opened, 
such as preparing negotiation positions and working on the opening benchmarks 
(EUSG, 2010b: 1-2). The second pillar considers Turkey’s own priorities and 
timetables as key and aims to fulfil the commitments laid down in the TPAA 
(ibid.: 2). More specifically, work will be performed in all of the 35 chapters, 
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regardless of whether they are blocked or suspended, allowing Turkey to proceed 
speedily once the EU decides to lift these blocks. By doing this, Turkey aims to 
‘determine the pace of the reform process in accordance with its own preferences 
and priorities’ (ibid.: 3), by postponing problematic areas and giving precedence 
to its needs. The third pillar of this strategy centres on the EU’s political criteria, 
which are essential not only for Turkey’s accession to the EU, but also for 
overall democratisation. To ensure progress in this field, the RMG and the 
Political Affairs Sub-committee (PAS) are given an active role in initiating 
legislation and monitoring implementation. The final pillar of this strategy 
aspires to support the first three pillars through a strong communication strategy 
(EUSG, 2010c). This communication strategy has been prepared by the EUSG in 
January 2010. It aims to enhance the communication between Turkey and the EU 
and has two dimensions. Its internal dimension intends to rejuvenate the Turkish 
public’s enthusiasm and support for the EU accession process. Externally, it aims 
to neutralise the negative public opinion of certain EU MSs by communicating 
the benefits of the Turkish membership to the EU (ibid.). In sum, the formulation 
of this strategy in 2010 also demonstrates the recent enhancements in 
administrative compliance.  
 
Thirdly, various reform packages need to be considered as part of administrative 
compliance, since it is predominantly the EU-related bureaucrats who prepare 
these reforms. In the T1 period two major constitutional revisions were made. 
The 2001 constitutional reform incorporated changes related to the restricted use 
of death penalty, easing restrictions on using languages other than Turkish, 
making it more difficult to ban political parties and other changes regarding 
fundamental rights and freedoms. The 2004 constitutional revision abandoned 
the death penalty completely, made sure that international law is supreme over 
domestic law regarding fundamental rights and freedoms, abolished controversial 
state security courts,86 and finally introduced changes regarding civil-military 
relations. In addition to these two major constitutional reforms, nine 
harmonisation packages were adopted in the period between 2002 and 2004 to 
align Turkish legislation with the EU acquis. These harmonisation packages 
                                                
86 These are mixed courts incorporating both civilian and military judges and public prosecutors, 
which deal with crimes against the security of the state (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 56).  
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included important reforms in the areas of freedom of expression, association, 
assembly and religion; prevention of torture and mistreatment; minority rights; 
international protection of human rights; and civil-military relations (Hale and 
Ozbudun, 2010: 57-62). 
 
After the adoption of the 9th reform package in June 2004 there was a decline in 
the number of such packages. Even though individual laws continued to be 
adopted as demonstrated in the previous section, no comprehensive reform 
package was adopted until 2009. The November 2009 reform package was 
prepared by the EUSG and the RMG, and incorporates extensive reforms in the 
field of JHA and political criteria, ranging from illegal migration to children’s 
rights.  
 
Additionally, the EU-related bureaucrats developed a very comprehensive 
judicial reform strategy in the second half of T2. This strategy is extremely 
important for Turkey’s compliance with the EU acquis, since it addresses almost 
all of the EU requirements in 23rd chapter. In line with the EU’s demands for 
such a strategy, the MJ established a special Commission in January 2008, which 
worked in coordination with the EUSG. This Commission initially prepared a 
draft strategy in April 2008. Various symposiums and workshops were organised 
in 2008 and 2009 in to take into account the views of all the important Turkish 
legal entities, other relevant state institutions, civil society organisations, as well 
as the European Commission. Finally, this Commission took into account the 
feedback and finalised the strategy in 2009 (MJ, 2009a: 9-10).  
 
This strategy is extremely comprehensive and ambitious in its aim to reform 
Turkish judiciary by strengthening its independence, promoting its impartiality, 
enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness, enhancing professionalism, improving 
its management, enhancing confidence in it, facilitating access to it, improving 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and improving the penitentiary system 
(ibid.: 11). Moreover, an action plan detailing the timetable for implementing 
this strategy was also adopted in 2009 (MJ, 2009b). The preparation of this 
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strategy and action plan demonstrates the significant improvements in the level 
of administrative compliance in the second half of T2.87 
 
The EU-related bureaucrats have also contributed significantly to the preparation 
of the constitutional reform package presented to the public as a referendum in 
September 2010. This package significantly altered the current constitution 
which is a legacy of the 1980 military coup and has been criticised extensively 
both by the political parties within Turkey, as well as by external actors, 
including the EU and the CoE (Alessandri and Taspinar, 2010: 3). It is 
considerably restrictive with regard to individual and group rights and has also 
been criticised for the privileged role of the Turkish military in the political 
system, simple means to ban political parties, as well as for the high (10%) 
threshold for parliamentary representation for political parties. Even though the 
new constitutional reform package did not address all of the EU’s critiques, it 
focused on a number of important points, such as the reform of the judiciary, 
opening up ways for the military to be tried in civilian courts for civilian crimes, 
as well as making it more difficult to ban political parties.88  
 
The EU-related bureaucracy has contributed substantially to parts of the package 
directly related to EU demands. The proposed package was analysed by the 
EUSG who prepared a report on its compatibility with the EU acquis. 
Subsequently, the political leadership and the high level bureaucrats in the RMG 
discussed this report in detail in their 20th meeting. It should also be emphasised 
that, even though the constitutional amendment was considered in the TGNA in 
May 2010, the background work on it started in 2007 in line with the AKP’s 
demands for a new constitution (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 66). The EUSG 
officials were very much involved in this process, particularly in the areas related 
to JHA and political conditionality. 
 
                                                
87 The EU-related bureaucrats in the MJ also stated that their workload has increased 
substantially since 2008 due to this strategy and action plan and they spent much more time on 
compliance-related activities (MJ1; MJ2; MJ3). 
88 Although this last point was voted down in the TGNA in May and therefore was not part of the 
referendum.  
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In addition to these broad constitutional reforms and harmonisation packages, the 
EU-related bureaucrats have also produced important outputs in specific areas of 
JHA. Within the T1 period, the EU-related bureaucrats have prepared strategy 
documents for border management and asylum and illegal migration. However, 
the level of administrative compliance conducted by these officials were higher 
after 2005. More detailed action plans for external borders and asylum were 
adopted in 2006 and 2005 respectively. Moreover, in the last couple of years, 
EU-related officials conducted substantial work to prepare more thorough 
roadmaps in these two areas and formulated three very comprehensive laws on 
asylum, foreigners and asylum unit. Moreover, all the strategy documents and 
action plans in the areas of organised crime and drugs have been adopted in the 
T2 period. This shows that even though comprehensive reform packages were 
lacking at the start of T2, this does not mean that the EU-related bureaucrats 
stopped complying. Instead, they continued to produce long-term reform 
programmes, such as action plans and roadmaps. Therefore, in these specific 
areas of the JHA, administrative compliance has not slowed down or remained 
stable, but instead improved after 2005.  
 
Finally, the screening process, which compares the degree of fit between the 
national legislation and the EU acquis prior to negotiations, is also a very 
important part of the administrative phase of compliance. The SPO’s EU unit 
coordinated the process in Turkey, which commenced on October 20, 2005 and 
lasted for one year. Additionally, other EU-related bureaucrats, such as the 
EUSG and the permanent representation, as well as representatives from public 
institutions whose work is related to the specific chapter under evaluation, also 
contributed to the process. Initially, explanatory sessions were held where the EU 
officials explained the acquis to the Turkish delegation. Subsequently, the 
Turkish side prepared reports and presentations for follow-up detailed screening 
meetings to explain Turkey’s preparedness and its schedule to comply with the 
specific chapter in question. Even though this section has so far showed that 
administrative compliance experienced a decline at the start of T2, the screening 
process was actually a very busy period for the EU-related bureaucrats. Detailed 
analyses of the EU acquis were conducted and thorough reform targets and 
timetables were prepared for harmonisation. In this respect, the slowdown in 
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administrative compliance at the start of T2 should not be overstated, since the 
bureaucrats were preparing for screening meetings between October 2005 and 
October 2006. 
 
Table 4.1: Main Outputs of Administrative Compliance over Time 
 
Date Outputs 
2001 NPAA 
Constitutional reform 
2002 1st Harmonisation Package (HP) 
2nd HP 
3rd HP 
2003 NPAA 
4th HP 
5th HP 
6th HP 
7th HP 
2004 Constitutional reform 
8th HP 
9th HP 
2005 Screening process  
2006 Screening process 
(2003) NPAA revised 
2007 TPAA 
2008 NPAA 
2009 Reform package 
Judicial Reform Strategy and Action Plan 
2010 2010 Action plan 
EU Strategy for Turkey’s Accession Process 
Turkey’s EU Communication Strategy 
Constitutional Reform 
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Overall, as the Table 4.1 demonstrates, even though administrative compliance 
was lower in the first part of the T2 in comparison to the T1, the level of 
compliance picked up once again in the second part of T2. The development of 
long-term programmes such as the TPAA, the NPAA and the Action Plan; the 
preparation of strategic documents, action plans, roadmaps, and the judicial 
reform strategy; and the introduction of the constitutional reform demonstrate 
that administrative compliance reached a similar level as T1, particularly after 
2008.  
 
The final factor to take into account to assess the level of administrative 
compliance is the time devoted to compliance-related work by the EU-related 
bureaucrats. This factor is analysed through data collected in interviews.89 EUSG 
officials, who have been working at the political affairs department since its 
creation in 2000, have stated that the early years of the institution and the 
screening period (2005-2006) were the busiest times for them (EUSG2; EUSG5). 
An official who used to work in the political affairs section until 2009 also 
maintained that when the EUSG was first established, those in the department 
often had to work until 5am, coming back to the office at 9am the following 
morning (EUSG6). They worked solely on preparing legislation for the 
democratic reform packages, and had no spare capacity at that time to go to 
Brussels to attend meetings, seminars or training sessions organised by the EU. 
They experienced a similarly busy period during the screening process. 
However, after 2006 the EUSG’s political section started working on more 
routine activities, and the personnel were able to participate in seminars, 
conferences and training sessions. As one official put it, ‘the work tempo was 
really different’ after 2006 (EUSG6). At the same time, interviews with officials 
working in other departments demonstrate a slightly different picture. The 
previous head of Department of National Programme has maintained that the 
speed of work in her department has not really changed (EUSG1). Similarly, the 
head of Department of Social, Regional and Regeneration Policies, who has been 
employed in the EUSG since 2000, has maintained that she has not felt any 
slowing down in their workload or work tempo over the years (EUSG10). These 
                                                
89 EUSG is taken as the key institution for this analysis. 
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differences can be explained by the fact that most of the compliance with 
political conditionality had been achieved within T1 through the harmonisation 
packages. The fact that more difficult reforms remained to be complied with in 
the T2 period explains the relative slow down in the workloads of bureaucrats in 
the political affairs department. At the same time, the acquis harmonisation 
gained speed with the opening of negotiations and particularly with the screening 
process. 
 
Even though some EUSG officials felt a slow down in their work tempo at the 
start of the T2, further changes took place in the EUSG since 2009 and work has 
again become busier for all EUSG bureaucrats (EUSG6; EUSG7; EUSG5; 
EUSG2). Working under a non-sectoral minister whose only portfolio is the EU, 
as well as having to coordinate more frequent RMG meetings and comply with 
more ambitious Action Plans and NPAAs, have significantly increased the 
EUSG’s workload. Overall, it can be concluded that the time devoted to 
administrative compliance by some of the EU-related bureaucrats have declined 
at the start of T2 in comparison to T1, however it has picked up since and 
reached levels that are equivalent to T1.  
 
Overall, the above analysis demonstrates that administrative compliance did not 
show a consistent pattern. Two periods are particularly noteworthy. Firstly, the 
start of the T2 was crucial as both the time devoted to and the important outputs 
of administrative compliance declined. For instance the 2006 NPAA was not 
formulated and there was delay in the preparation of reform packages, strategic 
plans, primary and secondary laws. This trend was reversed somewhat in the 
subsequent period (2007-2008), as important developments, such as the 2007 
TPAA and 2008 NPAA, improved the levels of administrative compliance. 
However, the most significant changes were observed from 2009 onwards. In 
this second period, both the time devoted to and the outputs of administrative 
compliance increased significantly. A new political reform package, a judicial 
reform strategy and a constitutional reform were adopted; a closer link between 
civil society and the EU-related bureaucrats was built through the 
Communication Strategy; and finally an Action Plan and an EU Strategy for 
Turkey’s Accession were developed. These developments indicate a significant 
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enhancement in the level of administrative compliance, even in comparison to 
T1. Overall, the evidence above demonstrates that the average level of 
administrative compliance in T2 remained ‘stable’ at worst.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has presented a substantial amount of evidence demonstrating 
continued compliance under diminished credibility in T2. The quantitative 
evidence shows that the level of compliance continuously increased between 
2001 and 2010. Moreover, even though the speed of formal and behavioural 
compliance initially suffered at the start of T2, it increased from 2007 onwards 
reaching the average T1 levels (and even higher in some cases) at a period when 
credibility levels deteriorated. Overall, it is clear from this evidence that there 
has not been any deterioration in compliance. This finding alone is sufficient to 
pose a serious challenge to the EIM’s credibility hypothesis and show that 
credibility is not a necessary condition for compliance. 
 
Overall, the macro-level data on Turkey’s compliance with the EU in the area of 
JHA presented in this chapter challenges the EIM’s credibility hypothesis. 
However, it is necessary to complement this analysis with more qualitative 
micro-level data on compliance in particular issue areas. The next chapter 
examines Turkey’s formal and behavioural compliance in six case studies and 
similarly concludes that the EIM’s credibility hypothesis does not hold in the 
Turkish case.  
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Chapter Five: 
The Level of Formal and Behavioural Compliance in 
Turkey (2001-2010): Micro-Level Analysis 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Following on from the macro-level analysis of compliance conducted for the 
entirety of the JHA area in the previous chapter, this chapter provides a more 
detailed, micro-level analysis of formal and behavioural compliance. 
Considering that the macro-level data posed a strong challenge to the EIM’s 
credibility hypothesis, the objective of this analysis is to offer a second test. The 
evidence in this chapter shows that there is continued compliance in all six of the 
cases under analysis,90 namely external borders; illegal migration and asylum; 
organised crime; human trafficking; drugs; and cultural and political rights of 
minorities. This chapter examines each policy area in turn, firstly by examining 
the conditions set by the EU over time giving priority to the most important ones. 
Subsequently, Turkey’s level and quality of formal compliance is analysed. 
Finally, changes in the rate of behavioural compliance over time are studied.91 In 
every policy area new laws were adopted, new international treaties were signed 
and/or ratified and new institutional improvements took place within T2.92 This 
indicates that compliance continued under diminished credibility and increased 
cumulatively rather than remaining stable or declining, thereby challenging the 
credibility hypothesis.  
                                                
90 Formal and behavioral compliance are assessed separately in each case increasing the number 
of observations to 12. 
91  All the data on Turkey’s formal and behavioural compliance with EU conditions are taken 
from the EU’s PRs between 1998 and 2010. 
92 Backsliding in behavioural compliance was only witnessed in the area of cultural and political 
rights of minorities, where some TV and radio channels and language classes operating in 
languages other than Turkish were closed down shortly after being allowed to be set up. 
However, other major developments in this area with regard to compliance after 2005 meant that 
the level and speed of behavioural compliance increased overall. Moreover, the stations and 
courses which were initially closed down were re-established later on in T2. 
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Furthermore the data show that compliance has not only increased, but also the 
rate of formal and behavioural compliance has increased in most of the cases 
under examination. In the remainder of cases the speed of compliance remained 
stable.93 Overall, these findings challenge the EIM’s credibility hypothesis, since 
in almost all of the cases the speed of formal and behavioural compliance has 
either improved or remained stable.  
 
5.1 External Borders  
 
EU Conditions 
 
The EU has made a number of key demands in PRs in the area of external 
borders. The most important formal compliance requirement is the creation of a 
civilian force in charge of the Turkish borders operating in a transparent manner 
under the MI. Secondly, the EU asked Turkey to produce a strategy document; 
an action plan; and a more detailed roadmap. Thirdly, the EU has made more 
specific demands with regard to Turkey’s visa issuing practices and border 
legislation, such as transferring the responsibility of green borders from the 
Gendarmerie to the Land Forces Command; a uniform format for visas; 
residence permits for third-country nationals and visa application forms; 
abolishing the practice of issuing visas at the borders; introducing security 
features and biometrics in passports, visas and travel documents; introducing 
airport transit visas; and obligating of carriers to communicate passenger data.  
 
As for behavioural compliance, the EU has encouraged Turkey to increase 
cooperation and coordination between various state agencies involved in 
                                                
93 Formal compliance showed minor reductions in other parts of minority rights other than 
cultural and political rights of minorities, namely security, economic and social situation in the 
South-east; and the situation of internally displaced persons. 
 
147 
Turkey’s border management.94  Specifically, the EU has recommended that 
Turkish authorities create a shared database for the institutions involved. 
Secondly, Turkey is required to set up the necessary institutions, agencies and/or 
working groups; and thirdly improve the training and professionalism of the 
border staff, as well as the infrastructure at the borders. 
 
Formal Compliance 
 
Taking a brief look at what Turkey has done to address the EU’s legislative 
requirements, it is clear that a non-military border force has not been created and 
it appears unlikely to be set up in the medium-term. At the moment, numerous 
state bodies (the Turkish Armed Forces; Turkish General Staff; MFA; MI; 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs; Ministry of Health; Ministry of 
Transport and Communication; Undersecretariat of Customs; General 
Directorate of Security (GDS); Gendarmerie General Command; Coast Guard 
Command; and Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs) still play an active role at 
the Turkish borders.  
 
At the same time, a strategy document for the protection of external borders was 
published in 2003. The EU Commission evaluated it ‘as a significant step 
towards the harmonisation of the legislation and practice of Turkey related to 
border management with the EU acquis’ (EUSG, 2006a: 14). Turkey also 
adopted a more detailed national action plan in March 2006 to implement the 
strategy. However, a detailed roadmap has not been adopted to date, even though 
a task force within the MI has been preparing a draft.95  
 
Some compliance has occurred with more specific EU demands. The 
responsibility for the Turkish green borders was transferred from the 
                                                
94 The lack of such coordination has resulted in a high degree of inefficiency in the management 
of Turkish borders. For instance, different institutions have separate databases as opposed to 
sharing a common one. What this means is that someone who is crossing the border may be 
checked by the police for his criminal record, but will not necessarily be checked by the Ministry 
of Health whether he poses any threats in terms of public health. This makes the system 
inefficient and time consuming (BMB1). 
95 The EU has set the preparation of a roadmap as an informal condition in 2006 which needs to 
be fulfilled to open the negotiations in 24th chapter (EUSG, 2009f). 
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Gendarmerie to the Land Forces Command in 2001; new visa instructions used 
by both consular and border officials were introduced in 2007; a regulation 
implementing the procedures and principles regarding the declarations made in 
customs administrations was adopted in 2008; a Council decision which 
regulates border commerce was approved in 2009; new passports which are 
compatible with EU security standards were adopted in June 2010; the policy 
regarding the duration of stays was revised in line with the EU acquis in 2010; 
and finally it became possible for the Consular Offices and the MI to issue visas 
online in 2010. However, there are still gaps in legal compliance, since visas are 
still issued at the borders; airport transit visas have not yet been introduced; 
legislation for harmonising the Turkish visa sticker with the EU Schengen visa 
sticker has not been adopted; and finally, the visa descriptions and types have not 
been harmonised with EU standards.  
 
In sum, evidence suggests that Turkey’s harmonisation with the EU in the field 
of external borders is minimal at best. Out of thirteen expert interviewed in this 
field, eight96 have described Turkey’s legislative transposition records as being 
partial and the remaining five97 suggested there was no formal compliance. The 
reason behind this analysis is that the EU’s main condition in this field – creation 
of a civilian professional border security force – has not been realised. This 
condition is by far the most important, as well as being the most difficult to 
achieve. Not only is the creation of this force expensive, it is also takes 
considerable time to set up the necessary infrastructure for the education and 
training of a brand new force. This reform is politically extremely costly as well. 
The terrorism threat in the South-eastern borders of Turkey means that the 
Turkish military is very reluctant to give any powers away to a civilian 
institution. Similarly, all the actors who are currently active at the borders have 
vested interests against this reform, since it involves a reduction in their powers.  
 
Overall, this analysis suggests that the level of formal compliance is very low or 
close to zero, since Turkey has failed to comply with the most important, yet 
costly, condition in this field. Instead, Turkish officials focused on less 
                                                
96 EUSG4; EUSG6; EUSG7; MI1; MI2; MFA5; MFA3; GDS1. 
97 AKP7; MI1; BMB1; EUSG2; GDS2.  
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significant and easier EU demands and strived to harmonise Turkey’s visa and 
border legislation with the EU acquis. However, even in this area, compliance 
was not complete. Despite being inadequate and insufficient, it is crucial to note 
that whatever was done in terms of legislative transposition in this area was 
achieved after 2005. 98  Therefore, both the level and the rate of formal 
compliance improved after 2005. These major improvements in the rate of 
compliance are important to emphasise, since they demonstrate that compliance 
continued at a higher rate even under diminished credibility.  
 
Behavioural Compliance 
 
Turkey’s behavioural compliance record in this field has been comparatively 
better. Firstly, Turkey increased cooperation and coordination among the existing 
state institutions. An inter-agency group – the external borders task force99 which 
brings together all the state institutions active in border management and the 
EUSG – was put in place in 2002. The task force was rejuvenated in 2009 and is 
now meeting every two months (MI1). Moreover, the state institutions involved 
at the borders have been using a shared database since 2007 to screen people 
who are crossing the borders. 
 
With regard to institutional developments, the status of the Border Management 
Bureau (BMB), which was initially established in 2004 as a projects department, 
was changed and strengthened in 2008. Similarly, a unit responsible for risk 
analysis in the customs administration was established in 2007; a new 
department on border security studies has been created in the Police Academy in 
2008; a specialised department for passports was established in May 2010; and a 
coordination board for integrated border management has been established in 
May 2010. 
 
                                                
98 With the exception of the adoption of a Strategy Document.  
99 In additional to enhancing coordination, this force conducts work on legislative harmonisation 
with the EU acquis and is responsible for preparing a roadmap for border management.  
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Finally, Turkey has achieved progress in terms of improving the infrastructure 
and professionalism at the borders. A manual, which includes EU’s requirements 
in the field, was published and distributed to border management staff in 2008. 
In-service training on integrated border management was delivered to all sub-
governors in 2010. The border crossing points have increased from 116 to 120. A 
new sea border gate was opened in Izmir and two air border gates were opened in 
Sivas and Malatya in 2007. Modernisation of six border crossing points was 
completed in 2008 and work is in progress on five more. 
 
Overall, as is clear from the evidence, behavioural compliance in this field has 
been partial and there have been important institutional developments, 
coordination attempts, and a number of crucial infrastructural advances within 
T2. Therefore, it can be concluded that both the level and the speed of 
behavioural compliance has improved in T2 and there has not been any 
backsliding. At the same time, it would be hard to argue that the increase in the 
rate of compliance was substantial. The views of 11 interviewees confirm these 
findings.  All the interviewees agreed on the absence of any backsliding, but 
two100 argued that compliance rate remained stable, whereas the remaining 
nine101 believed it improved. Taking these views into account, it is argued that 
there have been minor improvements in the rate of Turkey’s behavioural 
compliance since 2005. 
 
5.2 Illegal Migration and Asylum  
 
EU Conditions 
 
The most important EU demand in the area of illegal migration and asylum was 
to conclude readmission agreements with various countries and the EU, and to 
lift its reservation to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees. 
Equally important was the EU’s insistence on Turkey to produce a strategy 
                                                
100 EUSG2; AKP7. 
101 MI1; EUSG4; EUSG7; BMB1; MI2; MFA5; MFA3; GDS2; AIB2. 
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document, an action plan and a more detailed roadmap about its compliance with 
the EU acquis. The EU has made other demands with regard to specific 
legislative changes, such as revising the Asylum and the Foreigners laws; 
reducing fees for the six month temporary permits for refugees; establishing a 
procedure for asylum seekers at international airports; improving access to legal 
aid for asylum seekers; reducing the waiting time for asylum seekers; allowing 
the admission of third-country nationals for employment and for study purposes; 
improving the status of third-country nationals residing on a long-term basis; 
adopting new legislation on work permits which is in line with the Geneva 
Convention principles, including minimum standards regarding the employment 
rights of refugees; aligning the Turkish legislative framework with the acquis 
with regard to the residence of students and family reunification needs; as well as 
concluding the Joint Action Programme on Illegal Migration between the EU and 
Turkey.  
 
The EU has also made a number of important demands related to behavioural 
compliance. Most importantly, the EU has asked Turkey to implement the action 
plan on migration and asylum, as well as the readmission agreement signed with 
Greece. Secondly, the EU has encouraged Turkey to set up new state institutions 
and improve the administrative capacity of existing ones to better manage the 
asylum and migration policies. For instance, the EU has advised Turkey to 
establish a specialised civilian unit for migration and asylum issues under the 
MI; an independent asylum board; a nationwide screening mechanism to identify 
asylum seekers among detained illegal migrants; a professional body to carry out 
refugee status determination; as well as another body to provide specific training 
curricula for asylum and migration staff. Thirdly, Turkey is expected to set up 
reception centres for refugees and asylum seekers. Finally, the EU has made 
more general suggestions, such as improving access to asylum procedures, 
deportation procedures and detention conditions, and reducing the number of 
illegal persons trying to reach Western Europe.  
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Formal Compliance 
 
Turkey’s progress has been partial in the area of international agreements. 
Turkey has signed readmission agreements with various countries, such as Syria, 
Iran, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, China, Romania, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine 
and most importantly with Greece between 2001 and 2010; and bilateral 
negotiations with a number of other countries are under way, including 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, 
Moldova, Uzbekistan, Libya, Russia, Jordan and Lebanon. It has also submitted 
draft agreements to some countries, such as Egypt, Israel, Sudan, Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Afghanistan. 
Despite this progress, readmission agreement negotiations with the EU102 which 
started in 2004, came to a deadlock after five rounds, and have only recently 
been resumed in 2009. The Turkish actors perceive demands in this area to be 
unfair, particularly in the absence of any burden-sharing and financial help from 
the EU (EUSG6). Recently, the Commission has made a positive remark about 
Turkey’s progress: ‘[s]ubstantial progress has been made towards finalising 
negotiations on an EU-Turkey readmission agreement’ (Commission, 2010a: 
82). Another factor detracting from progress was that Turkey failed to lift its 
geographical reservation to the 1951 UN Convention, which means that Turkey 
continues to only accept asylum applications from European countries.  
 
In the area of devising strategies and plans for alignment with the EU acquis, 
Turkey has made significant progress. Turkey agreed on a Migration and Asylum 
Strategy in 2003 and subsequently adopted a national action plan in March 2005 
to implement the strategy. Currently, the Asylum and Immigration Bureau (AIB) 
is working on developing a detailed roadmap in this area.103  
 
                                                
102 Completion of a readmission agreement with the EU is the second informal condition set by 
the EU in 2006 to open the negotiations in 24th chapter (EUSG, 2009f). 
103 Adoption of this roadmap is the third informal condition set by the EU in 2006 to open the 
negotiations in 24th chapter (EUSG, 2009f). 
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Looking at specific legal changes, although Turkey failed to formally revise the 
Asylum and the Foreigners laws, progress regarding these two laws gained 
significant speed after the AIB was established in 2008. Once created, it put 
significant resources into drafting these laws and by 2010 the draft versions of 
these laws, as well as the law on the establishment of an asylum unit, were ready. 
Moreover, the TGNA adopted a law centralising the system of work permits for 
foreigners in 2003, aligning Turkey’s legislation with the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention concerning employment of refugees. Secondary legislation 
necessary for the implementation of this law was also adopted shortly after. In 
the same year, the nationality law was also amended to prevent marriages of 
convenience, introducing a probation period of three years to acquire a Turkish 
citizenship through marriage. Turkey also ratified the agreement laying down the 
prerogatives and privileges of the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM). The international convention on the Protection of the Rights of all 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families was signed in 2004 and the new 
Criminal Code brought higher penalties and judicial fines to migrant smugglers 
in 2005. The asylum regulation was revised in 2006 and the Prime Ministry 
issued a circular in 2009 allowing the irregular migrants and victims of 
trafficking to benefit from free health services. The fees for temporary refugee 
permits were reduced by the 2010 circular on the asylum law. Moreover, two 
amendments were adopted, firstly, to the regulation implementing the Law on 
work permits in 2010 to make it possible for the asylum seekers to apply for 
work permits, regardless of the validity of their residence permit; and secondly to 
the law on foreigners’ work permits softening the conditions under which asylum 
seekers can apply for work permits. Furthermore, another circular was issued in 
2010 to ensure data protection, as well as social and general health insurance for 
those asylum seekers who are staying in institutions run by the Directorate 
General for Social Services and the Child Protection Agency. MI issued a 
circular in 2010 laying down the principles concerning the physical conditions in 
removal centres and practices used in these centres to ensure human rights 
violations are monitored. Finally, a circular was issued by the GDS in 2010, 
which allows for each illegal migrant to be accommodated in a removal centre 
where all the costs during their stays will be covered by the state. 
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Overall, the evidence suggests that formal compliance in this area is best 
described as partial. On the one hand, Turkey failed to comply with some of the 
most important conditions in this field, such as completing the readmission 
agreement with the EU and lifting the geographical restriction for asylum 
applications. These two conditions are arguably the most costly ones in the field, 
since compliance would bring a significant material burden on Turkey by 
increasing the number of asylum applications and readmission claims. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that Turkey will comply unless the EU commits to some form of 
burden-sharing. On the other hand, Turkey has made significant progress on 
other important conditions set by the EU. For instance, Turkey completed an 
important readmission agreement with Greece and is currently in the process of 
negotiating others. Similarly, Turkey adopted a strategy document, as well as a 
national plan to align the Turkish legislation with the EU acquis, which is one of 
the most significant steps in this field. Moreover, even though the Asylum and 
Foreigners laws have not been adopted, there has been significant progress 
recently and the draft laws have been submitted to the TGNA for adoption. 
Additionally, the Turkish authorities adopted a number of other measures in this 
field which are compatible with the EU requirements, even though they do not 
carry as much weight in terms of importance. Most of the interviewees share the 
assessment that compliance is partial.104 In terms of change over time, there have 
been important developments in legislative activity since 2005. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the level of formal compliance has increased in T2. The rate of 
compliance can be judged as being stable owing to the limited nature of this 
improvement. 
 
Behavioural Compliance 
 
In terms of behavioural compliance Turkish authorities took fundamental steps 
towards implementing the action plan. A task force bringing together 
representatives from all the relevant state institutions was established in 2002, 
                                                
104 Ten out of 12 experts (MI1; EUSG2; EUSG4; EUSG7; AIB1; MI2; MI3; MFA5; MFA3; 
GDS2) stated that there was partial compliance, whereas one argued for full compliance 
(EUSG6) and the other maintained there was no compliance (AKP7). 
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reactivated in 2007 and has been meeting every two months since 2009. This 
high level working group allows for closer inter-agency cooperation, conducts 
risk analysis and works on developing legislative proposals to comply with the 
EU acquis. According to the EU Commission, this task force ‘plays a key role in 
ensuring uniform implementation of existing legislation’ on illegal migration and 
asylum (Commission, 2009a). With regard to the implementation of the 
readmission agreement signed with Greece, Turkey has made some progress. A 
coordination committee was established in 2004 and both parties have taken 
measures to implement the protocol more effectively. Moreover, in 2010 a joint 
declaration has been signed with the aim of implementing the readmission 
protocol.  
 
Secondly, with regard to strengthening the administrative capacity and 
infrastructure, Turkey has established the AIB in 2008 under the MI. Moreover, a 
coordination board for combating illegal migration, which is chaired by the 
Deputy Undersecretary of the MI, was established in 2010. Additionally, Turkey 
is in the process of setting up a case management system for country of origin 
information and asylum, as well as an asylum management unit for reception and 
integration issues. Compliance is more limited with regard to setting up a body 
for providing training for asylum and migration staff; an independent asylum 
board; a nationwide screening mechanism for distinguishing asylum seekers 
from illegal migrants; and a body to carry out refugee status determination.  
 
Thirdly, in relation to reception centres for refugees and asylum seekers, a new 
centre has opened in Istanbul in 2007 and work on two more centres have 
resumed in 2009. As of 2010, the construction and refurbishment of four removal 
centres are ongoing and two additional removal centres are planned to be built 
through EU-financed projects.  
 
Finally, Turkey has made substantial progress in decreasing the number of illegal 
persons trying to get to Western Europe (Commission, 2010a: 82). The number 
of law enforcement officers working at the border provinces and at busy border 
checkpoints has increased; specialised training on forgery of visas and travel 
documents has been provided to staff appointed to border checkpoints; 1350 staff 
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members have been trained on illegal migration, asylum and forgery issues in 
one and a half year time period; and more control checkpoints have been 
established and sniffer dogs trained by 2002. As a result, the Commission 
maintained that ‘international routes for migration flows have been diverted 
away from Turkey’ (Commission, 2003). Moreover, Turkey continued to 
cooperate with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; participated in 
the activities of the Centre for Information Discussion and Exchange on the 
Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration, such as the early warning system; 
cooperated with the European Civil Aviation Conference Facilitation 
Information System on Illegal Immigration; and published brochures in seven 
languages to inform refugees at the borders in 2007.  
 
The evidence presented above demonstrates that Turkish authorities were not 
able to fully implement all the requirements in this field, therefore behavioural 
compliance is judged to be partial. However, the key is to test whether there has 
been any change in the level of compliance since 2005. It is clear that some of 
the important steps in behavioural compliance were taken prior to 2005. 
However, Turkey invested a lot of resources in this area subsequent to 2005, 
such as improving the condition and capacity of reception centres for refugees 
and asylum seekers; and the creation of working groups and various institutions, 
such as the task force and the AIB. This demonstrates that the level of 
behavioural compliance has increased after 2005. Moreover, the evidence 
suggests that there has not been any backsliding with regard to the rate of 
behavioural compliance in this field. Whether or not the speed of behavioural 
compliance stayed stable or improved since 2005 is a more difficult question. 
Eight out of nine interviewees105 argued that the rate of behavioural compliance 
has improved over time, whereas only one106 maintained that it stayed stable. 
Considering that the implementation of the action plan has improved, the 
administrative capacity was strengthened and the resources devoted to Turkey’s 
reception capacity increased after 2005, it is argued that there were minor 
improvements in the speed of behavioural compliance.  
 
                                                
105 EUSG7; AKP7; MI1; EUSG2; MI2; MFA5; AIB2; BDS2.  
106 EUSG4.  
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5.3 Organised Crime and Human Trafficking 
 
EU Conditions 
 
The EU’s legislative requirements in the field of organised crime fall into three 
main categories. Firstly and most importantly, the EU encouraged Turkey to 
adopt a strategy document and a detailed action plan. Secondly, Turkey needs to 
improve its legislative framework to fight against organised crime more 
effectively. Thirdly, the EU mentioned a number of important international 
treaties for Turkey to adopt and ratify, such as the UN convention against 
transnational organised crime; the 2000 UN protocol to prevent, suppress and 
punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children; the UN protocol 
against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air; the protocol against illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts, components and 
ammunition; as well as the CoE convention on action against trafficking in 
human beings.  
 
Finally, the Turkish authorities need to adopt specific legislation in the area of 
human trafficking. 107  Turkey needs to criminalise human trafficking in its 
legislative framework, meet the minimum legislative standards for elimination of 
trafficking in human beings and adopt an updated version of the national action 
plan.  
 
With regard to behavioural compliance, Turkey is required to improve the 
effectiveness of fight against organised crime by setting up and strengthening 
relevant institutions, such as an internet department; a department for witness 
protection; and a special unit for dealing with organised crime. Secondly, Turkey 
needs to enhance the cooperation between different law enforcement bodies in 
order to fight against organised crime more efficiently. Thirdly, Turkey is 
encouraged to make the necessary infrastructural investments, such as 
establishing a national fingerprint and DNA database; a coherent statistical 
                                                
107 In EU PRs, human trafficking is both discussed as part of the fight against organised crime 
and as a separate section. Both sections are considered here. 
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system for monitoring human trafficking; new methods of technical crime 
investigation; and improving its crime scene investigation and forensic capacity.  
 
In the area of human trafficking, Turkey is expected to implement its legislation 
in this field; ensure the sustainability of the emergency helpline by transferring 
its responsibility to public authorities; and provide funding for reception centres 
for the victims of human trafficking.  
 
Formal Compliance 
 
With regard to formal compliance, Turkey fully complied with the first 
requirement. A strategy document was adopted in 2007. Subsequently, in July 
2010, this strategy document was updated and an action plan against organised 
crime was signed by the PM.108  
 
Secondly, Turkey has significantly improved its legislative framework to better 
fight against organised crime. A new law on combating smuggling of goods, 
which clarifies the definition of smuggling and provides financial penalties and 
sentences of imprisonment for these crimes, was adopted in 2003. The law on 
organised crime was amended in 2005. During the same year, the new code of 
penal procedure gave new powers for investigations in the area of detection, 
surveillance of telecommunications, and shadowing medical examinations. In 
2007, a new law on anti-smuggling and cyber crime was adopted. This law 
adapts the Turkish legislation to the provisions of the new penal code and the 
code on penal procedure, by giving the monitoring, supervision and coordination 
responsibility to the telecommunications authority to prevent cyber crime. This 
law also protects against illegal broadcasting and child pornography. Two 
additional regulations implementing the anti-smuggling and cyber crime law 
were adopted in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Moreover, in 2008, a law on 
witness protection was adopted, as well as a regulation to implement this law. 
                                                
108 Updating the fight against organised crime strategy document was the fourth and the last of 
the informal criteria put forward by the EU for the starting of negotiations in 24th chapter (EUSG, 
2009f). 
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Additionally, the regulation on the principles and procedures about controlled 
delivery was extended in 2008 to incorporate the coast guard and the customs 
administration. Finally, a regulation implementing the electronic communication 
was adopted in 2008 and amended in 2009.  
 
Turning to Turkey’s compliance with the international conventions, Turkey has 
ratified the UN convention against transnational organised crime in 2003; the 
2000 UN protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, 
especially women and children in 2003; the UN protocol against the smuggling 
of migrants by land, sea and air in 2004; the protocol against illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts, components and 
ammunition in 2004; and the Palermo Convention and the additional protocol for 
the prevention, repression and punishment of human trafficking. Turkish 
authorities also signed the CoE convention on action against trafficking in human 
beings in 2009, but this convention is yet to be ratified. Moreover, Turkey also 
signed a cooperation agreement with Europol to combat serious forms of 
organised crime.  
 
Finally, in the area of fight against human trafficking the code of penal procedure 
was amended in 2002 to criminalise smuggling and human trafficking for the 
first time. The punishments for these crimes were further increased in 2005. The 
new 2005 penal code increased the penalties when offences for trafficking are 
committed by an organisation and provided for the freezing and confiscation of 
the assets of smugglers and traffickers. In 2006 the definition of human 
trafficking and the crimes related to it were enlarged further and the law on the 
crime of human trafficking was amended to allow for more effective judicial 
implementation in 2007. Most importantly, a national action plan on the fight 
against human trafficking was adopted in 2003, which introduced emergency 
telephone hotlines; witness protection; measures for the return and integration of 
victims; and shelters for victims of trafficking. Last but not least, a number of 
other legislative changes were made to comply with the EU acquis, such as 
adopting a law on the work permits of foreigners in 2003 to prevent human 
trafficking; amending the law on Turkish citizenship in 2003 to prevent 
marriages of convenience; adopting an implementing directive in 2004 that 
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provided victims of trafficking with entitlement to medical treatment free of 
charge; authorising the governors to extend the temporary residence permits for 
up to six months for victims of trafficking in 2004; signing protocols on 
cooperation and information exchange in the field of trafficking in persons with 
Georgia and Ukraine in 2005; and with Kyrgyzstan and Moldavia in 2007; and 
finally the adoption of an amendment to the Turkish Penal Code to increase the 
sentences for those guilty of smuggling migrants in 2009.  
 
Overall, Turkey’s formal compliance in the field of fight against organised crime 
is very close to full compliance, in other words very high. With regard to 
international treaties, the Commission has stated that Turkey is ‘party to all the 
main international conventions’ (Commission, 2009b) and more importantly it 
has not put forward any criticisms in the last PR regarding formal compliance in 
this area (Commission, 2010a: 84). A very similar picture is observed in the area 
of human trafficking, where compliance is very high. As the Commission has 
stated in 2006 ‘Turkey’s legislation is well aligned with EU legislation on 
fighting trafficking in human beings’ (Commission, 2006a: 64).109 Eight110 out of 
12 interviewees also argued that there was either full compliance or almost full 
compliance in the field of fight against organised crime and human trafficking, 
whereas the remaining four111 viewed formal compliance to be partial. In sum, 
taking into account the views of the Commission, it is argued that there has been 
very high compliance in both of these fields. Since, most of the progress in the 
area of organised crime has been achieved after 2005, the level of formal 
compliance is judged to have improved significantly and the rate of formal 
compliance has also shown major improvements in T2. In the area of human 
trafficking, the level of compliance has also improved over time. However, the 
distribution of reforms is equal between the two periods, therefore the rate of 
compliance is judged to be stable.  
 
                                                
109 Similarly, the legislative changes conducted in this area informed the US State Department’s 
decision to upgrade Turkey from a category of countries that pay inadequate attention to fighting 
human trafficking to a category where countries have introduced legislation and practically 
applied these to enhance prevention of human trafficking (Kirisci, 2007: 31-2). 
110 AKP7; AKP9; MI1; EUSG6; EUSG7; MI3; MFA5; GDS2. 
111 EUSG2; EUSG4; MI2; MFA3.  
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Behavioural Compliance 
 
With regard to behavioural compliance, Turkey performed equally well. Firstly, 
in terms of institutional capacity, an internet department was set up in 2008 to 
take charge of monitoring, supervision and coordination; a department of witness 
protection was set up within the police force in 2008; the capacity of the special 
unit dealing with criminal proceedings within the Department of Combating 
Smuggling and Organised Crime has been enhanced in 2008; and the Turkish 
National Police established further witness protection units in 60 provinces in 
2010. 
 
Secondly, in the area of cooperation among law enforcement bodies, the only 
development was the circular issued by the MI in 2005, which aimed to ensure 
better cooperation and coordination between the police, the gendarmerie and the 
coast guard. However, the Commission described this attempt as limited in later 
PRs and Turkey was encouraged to further improve cooperation (Commission, 
2010a: 84). 
 
Thirdly, Turkey has made a lot of progress in terms of infrastructure. The 
collections of statistics were standardised in 2008; the structure of the forensic 
medicine institute was strengthened in 2003 and the number of its specialisation 
branches were extended; the evidence based prosecutions were also strengthened 
and investment in forensic has increased further in 2008. Moreover, Turkey has 
made progress on the establishment of a legal framework for a nationwide DNA 
and fingerprint database in 2008, although this database is not yet fully 
established.  
 
Finally, in the area of human trafficking, a unit was set up in 2004 within the MI 
to help enhance dialogue and coordination between the police and relevant 
authorities. Since 2004, medical treatment is free for victims of trafficking, and 
there are two shelters for victims in Ankara and Istanbul, which are run by civil 
society. Turkish authorities have also set up an emergency hotline, which has 
been extended to international calls in 2007. In 2005 a programme on combating 
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human trafficking was launched in cooperation with the IOM, and a circular and 
a guide have been published for staff who deal with cases of human trafficking. 
In 2009, the institutional capacity to combat human trafficking was increased 
further by training judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officers. The 
national task force on the fight against human trafficking has met regularly since 
2005. Finally, Turkey managed to secure funding for the operation of two 
shelters for trafficking victims in 2010. On a more negative note, even though the 
task force meets more frequently and it was expanded to include local 
administrations, its structure and powers still need to be improved, according to 
the Commission. Moreover, the emergency hotline is still operated by the IOM, 
and its responsibility needs to be transferred to Turkish public authorities.  
 
Turkey’s behavioural compliance in the fight against organised crime can be 
described as being very high, whereas it is currently partial for human 
trafficking. In the area of organised crime the Commission has continuously 
praised Turkey’s reforms in the latest PRs. The only significant criticisms the 
Commission voiced in these reports were the limited nature of the inter-agency 
cooperation and the need to establish a fingerprint and DNA database 
(Commission, 2010a: 84). Since most of the institutional and infrastructural 
developments took place after 2008, it can strongly be argued that both the level 
and rate of behavioural compliance has showed major improvements since 2005.  
 
In the area of human trafficking, Turkey’s behavioural compliance record has 
been weaker. The Commission’s criticisms related to the administration of the 
emergency hotlines and the structure of the task force demonstrate this point. 
However, the weakness of practical application in this area does not necessarily 
mean that the level of behavioural compliance has decreased over the years. 
Looking at the evidence above, it is clear that a number of important steps were 
taken in 2004 and other significant developments took place subsequent to 2005. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the level of behavioural compliance in this 
field increased over time but the rate of compliance remained stable at worst. All 
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the interviewees112 stated that the rate of behavioural compliance in these two 
fields improved in T2.   
 
5.4 Drugs 
 
EU Conditions 
 
In the field of the fight against drugs, the EU, firstly, recommended Turkey to 
develop a national drug strategy in line with EU’s drug strategy. Turkey was also 
encouraged to adopt an action plan. Secondly, Turkey was required to sign and 
ratify a number of international agreements, such as the agreement between 
Turkey and the EU on precursors and chemical substances used in the illicit 
manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; the 1995 CoE 
agreement on illicit traffic by sea, implementing article 17 of the UN Convention 
against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance; as well as the 
1972 protocol amending the 1961 single convention on narcotic drugs. Thirdly, 
the EU asked Turkish authorities to cooperate with their European and 
international counterparts in the area of drugs. For instance, Turkey was 
encouraged to conclude negotiations for membership with the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and notify the 
central Dublin group that it wishes to become a member.  
 
In terms of behavioural compliance Turkey, firstly, needs to commit itself to 
fighting drugs more effectively through more effective drug seizure operations, 
as well as reduce demand for drugs. Secondly, Turkey is required to make a 
number of institutional advances, such as establishing a national centre for drugs 
and drug addiction; appointing a national drug coordinator; setting a data 
collection network in order to comply with the EMCDDA rules; and establishing 
a mini-Dublin group in Ankara. Finally, the network of treatment and 
rehabilitation facilities for drug users needs to be developed further. 
 
                                                
112 AKP7; MI1; EUSG2; EUSG4; EUSG7; MI2; MFA5; GDS2.  
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Formal Compliance 
 
Formal compliance in this field has been significant. A national drugs strategy 
was adopted in 2006 in line with the EU 2005-2020 anti-drugs strategy. An 
action plan was also accepted in 2008. Subsequent to this, local action plans have 
been adopted in 63 provinces. Moreover, another action plan which deals 
specifically with the fight against drugs in rural areas was adopted in April 2010. 
In line with the national action plan, a new regulation on the harm caused by 
solvents and inhalants has been issued by the Ministry of Health in 2010.  
 
With regard to international agreements, Turkey signed the agreement on 
precursors in 2003 and ratified it in 2004; the 1972 protocol amending the single 
convention on narcotic drugs in 2004; and acceded to the CoE’s agreement on 
illicit traffic by sea in 2004. However, Turkey still needs to ratify this agreement.  
 
Finally, Turkish parties concluded an agreement with the EMCDDA about 
Turkey’s participation in this Centre, but this agreement is still waiting 
ratification. Turkey also submitted its first national report to the EMCDDA in 
2007. Additionally, Turkey notified the Central Dublin group in 2007 that it 
wishes to be a member. Turkey is also a member in the major donors group of 
the UN office on drugs and crime.  
 
Overall, Turkey’s performance in this field has been significant and can without 
doubt be described as very high compliance. Turkish authorities were able to 
comply with all of the EU’s legislative demands successfully, with the exception 
of the ratification of the CoE’s convention and the EMCDDA agreement. An 
examination of the latest PR demonstrates that the EU has not made any other 
criticisms in this area (Commission, 2010a: 85-6). Similarly, eight113 out of 11 
experts interviewed in this field have described Turkey’s compliance as being 
full where as the remaining three114 stated that it was partial. One additional 
point to make here is that the most important legislative developments, such as 
the adoption of the drugs strategy, the action plan and participation in the 
                                                
113 AKP7; AKP9; MI1; EUSG6; EUSG7; MI2; MFA5; GDS2. 
114 EUSG4; EUSG2; MI2. 
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EMCDDA, took place subsequent to 2005. This demonstrates that both the level 
and speed of compliance has shown major improvements after T1.  
 
Behavioural Compliance 
 
Turkey’s track record in the area of behavioural compliance has also been 
considerable. Firstly, Turkey managed to seize large quantities of drugs within its 
borders. According to the statistics of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), Turkish authorities were able to intercept 16% of the total heroin and 
morphine that is estimated to flow through Turkey in 2008. This is impressive, 
since the combination of South-east European countries – Bulgaria, Greece, 
Albania, Romania, Serbia, FYROM, Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro – are 
subject to a similar amount of total flow per year and they only manage to seize 
3% (UNODC, 2010: 51).115  
 
With regard to drug demand reduction, a parliamentary commission was 
established in 2008 with the aim of analysing problems related to drug addiction 
and of achieving demand reduction. This commission issued an important report 
in the same year with recommendations for the institutional and legislative 
framework for the fight against drugs in Turkey. Similarly, the Turkey 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBIM) and it provincial 
centres, through the participation of public officials and volunteers, have 
conducted significant activities to reduce the demand for drugs. Table 5.1 
demonstrates that in a period as short as five years, activities organised for drug 
demand reduction have grown five times. Similarly, Table 5.2 shows that the 
number of people participating in these activities have grown almost ten times 
over the five years.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
115 The only country which was able to intercept a larger percentage of the drugs flow was Iran 
with 23% (UNODC, 2010: 51).  
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Table 5.1: Drug Demand Reduction Activities Conducted by TUBIM 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Conferences 334 634 893 1125 1466 
Theatre/Movie 4 - 29 110 182 
Media Outlets 5 92 90 64 59 
All 343 726 1012 1299 1707 
Source: TUBIM (2008a) 
 
Table 5.2: Number of Participants in TUBIM's Drug Demand Reduction 
Activities 
 
Participant 
Groups 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Students 37200 74435 127640 189781 243263 
Teachers 75 4136 7166 9035 11717 
Families 475 11896 15519 45256 19467 
Members of 
the Press  
- 130 306 179 163 
Public 
institutions 
3150 5921 5926 25554 14573 
Private 
Sector 
1250  
2489 
6535 1725 1972 
NGOs 1750 2767 10891 3352 2193 
Other - 5491 4538 17767 54579 
All 43900 107265 178521 292649 347924 
Source: TUBIM (2008b) 
 
Secondly, a number of institutional changes were introduced, the most important 
of which was the creation of a national centre for drugs and drugs addiction. 
Initially, the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organised Crime 
(TADOC) was established for this purpose within the DGS in 2002. Subsequent 
to a twinning project on fight against drugs in 2006, the TUBIM was set up as 
the operational national drugs coordinator and assumed the role of the Turkish 
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national REITOX 116  focal point in 2008. Turkey also established a drug 
information and documentation centre in 2007 to comply with the EMCDDA 
rules, although it failed to set up a mini-Dublin group in Ankara. Finally, with 
regard to the establishment of treatment and rehabilitation centres for drug users 
a new treatment centre has been established in Gaziantep in 2010.  
 
Figure 5.1: Cannabis and Heroin Seizures in Turkey over Time 
 
Source: TUBIM (2008c) 
 
In sum, Turkey manages to seize a significant amount of drugs within its borders, 
and amount that has increased significantly over the years (see Figure 5.1). 
Moreover, it has also invested substantial resources in drug prevention measures 
and these efforts, once again, have increased significantly over the last few years. 
Similarly, most of the institutional developments, such as the creation of 
TUBIM, which later took on the role of the REITOX focal point, were achieved 
after 2005. Therefore, it is argued that the level of behavioural compliance in this 
field is currently very high and this level has improved over time. Moreover, 
there are no signs of decline in the speed of Turkey’s behavioural compliance; 
instead the speed of compliance demonstrated major improvements in T2.  
 
                                                
116 European Information Network on Drugs and Drugs Addiction. 
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5.5 Cultural and Political Rights of Minorities  
 
EU Conditions 
 
In the area of cultural and political rights of minorities, the EU has urged the 
Turkish authorities to make the necessary legislative changes to protect its 
citizens’ right to communicate in languages other than Turkish in radio and 
television broadcasts, films, festivals, cultural events, election campaigns and 
political party conferences. Similarly, Turkish is the only language allowed in 
Turkish public education, thus children whose mother tongue is not Turkish are 
not educated in their mother tongue. There is also no access to public services for 
non-speakers of Turkish. Moreover, in terms of education of religious minorities, 
parents who belong to different religious minority groups face difficulties 
sending their kids to religious minority schools and there is still discriminatory 
language about minorities in schoolbooks. Finally, in the political sphere, the 
minority political parties, particularly the Kurdish ones, are subject to frequent 
closures and the high threshold for representation prevent them from entering the 
TGNA.  
 
As for behavioural compliance, the EU encouraged Turkey to ensure that 
minority groups can organise cultural festivals and celebrations. The Turkish 
authorities also need to guarantee the right to use minority languages both in 
political life and in broadcasting by removing time restrictions, subtitle 
requirements, and the ban on language education programmes. The judiciary 
should also guarantee the right to use Kurdish by making sure radio and TV 
stations are not tried and banned for trivial reasons. Additionally, the 2002 
reform on the learning of different languages used by Turkish citizen needs to be 
implemented and the establishment of centres for teaching minority languages 
should not be blocked due to stringent requirements. In the field of minority 
education, the restrictions faced by minority schools need to be lifted. 
Restrictions faced by minority groups with regard to inheriting property also 
need to be addressed.  
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Formal Compliance 
 
In terms of compliance, articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution have been 
amended to abolish the provisions forbidding the use of some languages. The 
democratic reform package in 2003 also introduced the possibility of radio and 
TV broadcasting in languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens 
for private channels and the public broadcaster – Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation (TRT). In 2008 a new amendment was made to TRT law to allow it 
to broadcast nationally all day long in languages other than Turkish. The 
amendment of the Regulation on the Radio and Television Supreme Council 
(RTUK) in November 2010 removed all restrictions on broadcasting in 
languages other than Turkish by private and public broadcasters at local level. In 
2003, the civil registry law was amended to permit parents to name their children 
as they desire. However, a circular was also issued to restrict this amendment by 
banning the use of certain letters, which are common in the Kurdish alphabet but 
are not used in the Turkish one. In 2003, article 4 of the law on associations was 
amended, opening up the possibility for associations to use foreign languages in 
official correspondence. In April 2010, the law on elections was amended 
allowing for the use of Kurdish in election campaigns.  
 
With regard to education the law on foreign language education and teaching 
was amended in 2002 to allow different languages and dialects to be taught 
through private courses. Similarly, the seventh reform package in 2003 eased the 
restrictions on the location of teaching establishments and amended the 
legislation on foreign language education and teaching. This amendment stated 
that the cabinet alone is responsible for approving the languages which can be 
taught – eliminating the role of National Security Council (NSC) in the process. 
In the area of minority education, the Ministry of Education issued a statement 
making it easier for parents to choose the school to send their children to and a 
regulation was issued ordering discriminatory language to be eliminated from 
school textbooks in 2004. However, there has not been any progress on the high 
threshold for parties in national elections. Overall, even though Turkey has not 
managed to comply with all the EU conditions in this field, a number of 
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significant laws were adopted. Therefore, overall formal compliance is judged to 
be partial and has increased over time since new laws were adopted in T2. 
Moreover, even though less in number, the formal compliance achieved in T2 
carried more importance, since the use of minority languages in all broadcasting 
and political campaigns have been liberalised. It can, therefore, be argued that 
there has not been any reduction in the rate of compliance. The speed of 
compliance has remained stable over time.  
 
Behavioural Compliance 
 
Turkey’s behavioural compliance has been limited. The ability of minority 
groups to express their culture in the public sphere has increased over time, since 
an increasing number of cultural manifestations were authorised by the Turkish 
state. For instance, whereas Newroz117 celebrations were banned in some cities in 
2001, the governorates subsequently lifted this ban in 2004, and participants 
were able to use Kurdish in these celebrations.118 Moreover, there have been 
improvements in the use of Kurdish in prisons from 2010. In the area of 
broadcasting, Kurdish has been introduced from 2004 onwards, and by 2008, 
there were five radio and TV stations broadcasting in Kurdish. In 2009, TRT 
started broadcasting in Kurdish for 24 hours a day on TRT-6. Since 2009, the 
public radio network has also been broadcasting in Armenian. However, 
restrictions with regard to time and programmes,119 as well as strict requirements 
about subtitles and translation, initially still applied in broadcasting, and some 
TV and radio channels closed down due to the strict monitoring policy. This 
situation was resolved by the 2010 legal change. By the end of 2010, fourteen 
radio and TV channels have been given permission to broadcast in Kurdish and 
                                                
117 Kurdish New Year.  
118 Additionally, the Court of Cassation overruled a decision of a local court in Van which had 
banned the use of Kurdish posters during Newroz celebrations in 2004 (Commission, 2004). 
Moreover, a culture and arts festival took place in Diyarbakir in 2001, Kurdish songs were sang 
during the Victory Day celebrations in 2002, a photographic exhibition on the Syriac minority 
was held in Diyarbakir in 2002, a Kurdish play was staged for the first time in the Diyarbakir 
Municipal Theatre in 2010, and the CN Bagis invited all the EU embassies to a Kurdish literature 
event in Van in 2010 (Commission, 2001; 2002; 2010a). 
119 Educational programmes teaching Kurdish are not allowed. 
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Arabic and most of the restrictions have been removed. TRT also started 
broadcasting in Arabic for 24 hours a day in 2010.   
 
Turkey’s compliance with regard to the use of Kurdish in political life has been 
mixed. On the one hand, the court of cassation revoked decisions banning the use 
of Kurdish during elections campaigns and press conferences in 2004 and the 
political parties were able to use Kurdish in 2009 local election campaigns 
without facing legal actions. On the other hand, a large number of investigations 
and court cases have been launched against officials and executives of the 
Kurdish parties for using Kurdish in party conferences, election campaigns and 
within the TGNA.  
 
In the area of education in minority languages, teaching in Kurdish started in 
2004 in six private schools. However, these schools faced restrictions with regard 
to resources,120 curriculum, appointment of teachers, timetables, as well as the 
attendees,121 and all closed down due to financial difficulties in 2005. A positive 
development to note is the approval given by the higher education board to 
establish a living languages institute providing post-graduate education in 
Kurdish in some universities in 2009. The first Kurdish and Assyrian language 
departments were established in 2010 and they started to accept post-graduate 
students. With regards to education of minorities, minority groups still face 
significant restrictions in recruiting teachers,122 having their teaching materials 
approved, and the Syriac community is not allowed to establish schools. 
Additionally, the discriminatory language in school textbooks still persists. 
Finally, in the area of property rights, minorities continue to face problems of 
property confiscation. Overall, behavioural compliance in this field has been 
rather inconsistent and some of the important EU criticisms have not been 
addressed. Therefore, it can be stated that the level of behavioural compliance is 
partial in this field, but this level has improved in T2. At the same time, the 
speed of behavioural compliance has shown only minor improvements after 
2005. 
                                                
120 They do not receive financial support from the state.  
121 Attendees need to be older than 15. 
122 Greek teachers are only permitted to teach in one school.  
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The EU’s assessment of Turkey’s compliance in its yearly PRs shows clear signs 
of improvement after 2008 in this field. Within T1, the EU has underlined that 
Turkey has achieved ‘important progress since 1999’ in the area of protection of 
cultural rights and the overall situation in the East and South-east of Turkey ‘has 
continued to improve gradually since 1999, both in terms of security and the 
enjoyment of fundamental freedoms’ (Commission, 2004). However, the 
subsequent reports (Commission, 2005a; 2006a; 2007) maintained that there was 
either ‘little’ or ‘no’ progress in this field. The conclusions drawn by the EU in 
these reports became more positive starting with 2008, i.e. ‘Turkey has made 
some limited progress on cultural rights’ (Commission, 2008); ‘overall, Turkey 
has made some progress on cultural rights’ (Commission, 2009a; 2010a); and ‘a 
vibrant domestic debate developed on this subject [minority rights], involving 
public and political authorities, including the opposition and civil society’ 
(Commission, 2009a). These conclusions show that Turkey’s compliance, 
according to the EU Commission, has improved, particularly since 2008. 
 
Turkey’s Compliance with Minority Rights in General 
 
Research has also been conducted on Turkey’s compliance with other aspects of 
minority rights, namely rights of Roma minority; the security, economic and 
social situation in the East and South-east; and the situation of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). Analysis into the needs of the Roma population 
concludes that Turkey’s formal compliance is partial and behavioural 
compliance is low and both the level of formal and behavioural compliance 
increased. The speed of formal compliance has shown minor improvements, 
whereas the rate of behavioural compliance remained stable over time. In the 
area of security, economic and social situation of East and South-east, formal 
compliance is low and behavioural compliance is partial. The level of formal and 
behavioural compliance increased after 2005. The speed of formal compliance 
has shown minor reductions, due to a reversal in a legislation regarding village 
guards, and the speed of behavioural compliance remained stable. Finally, 
Turkey’s formal and behavioural compliance with EU conditions regarding the 
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situation of IDPs have been partial. The level of formal and behavioural 
compliance has improved over time in this field. However, there have been 
minor reductions in the rate of formal compliance in T2, whereas the speed of 
behavioural compliance remained stable at worst.  
 
This evidence demonstrates that the average level of formal and behavioural 
compliance is partial in the field of minority rights. In all of these cases the level 
of formal and behavioural compliance increased after 2005. It can also be 
concluded that the rate of behavioural compliance has overall remained stable in 
T2. However, the rate of formal compliance showed minor reductions in the 
areas of security, economic and social situation of the South-east and the 
situation of the IDPs. 
  
Conclusion 
 
This qualitative analysis on formal and behavioural compliance demonstrates 
that the level of compliance has improved in all six case studies in T2. Reforms 
have been conducted, and therefore compliance did not remain stable, in all the 
cases. Similarly, there was no net reversal of compliance in T1 in any of the 
cases. Instead, in each area, new laws have been adopted, treaties have been 
signed and/or ratified and institutions have been set up. This evidence does not 
fit the EIM’s credibility hypothesis. 
 
Table 5.3: Extent of Formal and Behavioural Compliance 
 
 Formal 
Compliance 
Behavioural 
Compliance 
Overall 
Compliance 
External Borders -- +/-123 - 
Asylum and Illegal Migration +/- +/- +/- 
Organised Crime ++ ++ ++ 
Human Trafficking ++ +/- + 
                                                
123 It is possible for the level of behavioural compliance to be higher than formal compliance in 
T2, since actors may be behaviourally complying with the rules adopted both in T1 and T2. In 
other words, there may be a time lag between formal and behavioural compliance.  
 
174 
Drugs ++ ++ ++ 
Cultural and Political Rights +/- +/- +/- 
Note: ++ (very high), + (high), +/- (partial), - (low), -- (very low). Overall compliance is 
calculated by taking the averages of formal and behavioural compliance, however caution has 
been exercised to not magnify the results by rounding values up.  
 
Table 5.4: Changes in the Rates of Formal and Behavioural Compliance after 
2005 
 Formal 
Compliance  
Behavioural 
Compliance  
Overall 
Change in 
Compliance 
External Borders ++ + + 
Asylum and Illegal Migration +/- + + 
Organised Crime ++ ++ ++ 
Human Trafficking +/- +/- +/- 
Drugs ++ ++ ++ 
Cultural and Political Rights +/- + + 
Note: ++ (major improvements), + (minor improvements), +/- (stable), - (minor reductions), -- 
(major reductions). Overall change in compliance is calculated by taking the averages of changes 
in formal and behavioural compliance, however caution has been exercised to not magnify the 
results by rounding values up. 
 
More significantly, the data show that even the rate of compliance has not 
experienced a significant reduction over time (see Table 5.4). Instead, the speed 
of formal compliance increased in T2 in the cases of external borders; organised 
crime; and drugs; and remained stable in cases of asylum and illegal migration; 
human trafficking; and cultural and political rights of minorities. Similarly, the 
rate of behavioural compliance improved after 2005 in the fields of external 
borders; asylum and illegal migration; organised crime; drugs; and cultural and 
political rights, whereas it remained stable in the case of human trafficking. This 
evidence is further proof that the rationalist credibility hypothesis does not hold 
true in the case of Turkey. Even though the credibility of conditionality 
decreased significantly after 2005, the Turkish officials not only continued to 
comply but also improved the speed of compliance level in T2 in more than half 
of the cases under consideration. This is strong evidence for the existence of 
enhanced compliance even under diminished credibility.  
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The only two exceptions to this stable or increased rate of compliance under 
diminished credibility were observed within the field of minority rights. In the 
areas of security, economic and social situation in the South-east and the 
situation of the IDPs, the rate of formal compliance experienced minor 
reductions whereas the rate of behavioural compliance remained stable. The 
reductions in formal compliance can be explained by the fact that candidate 
countries engage in less costly legislative changes in the initial periods of 
conditionality (T1) and leave the most difficult changes for later periods (T2). 
This was also the case in Turkey and particularly so in these two specific cases. 
The reforms required by the EU in these areas are politically very costly, since 
they are to do with national security issues in a region which is under terrorism 
threat. For instance, in the area of security, economic and social situation of the 
South-east, even though state of emergencies were lifted in T1, it is politically 
costly to entirely remove the presence of security forces and abolish the village 
guard system. Similarly, in the case of IDPs, the Turkish officials adopted laws 
to initiate their return to villages and compensate for their losses, however an 
overall national strategy to cope with their problems was not adopted in T2, 
which is arguably more difficult to devise than individual laws. At the same time, 
the Turkish authorities continued to behaviourally comply at the same rate with 
EU conditionality even after 2005 in these two fields. This shows that 
compliance still continued in these areas, although costly legislative changes 
were pushed back causing the speed of formal compliance to slow down.  
 
Overall, the fact that the rate of formal compliance remained either stable or 
improved in most cases arguably within the most difficult policy area in political 
conditionality poses a serious challenge to the credibility hypothesis. The puzzle 
that remains to be explained is: what explains Turkey’s continued compliance 
with the EU at a period when credibility is not only extremely low but is also 
declining? The following four chapters examine the political leadership’s 
(Chapter Six, Seven and Eight) and bureaucrats’ (Chapter Nine) motives behind 
compliance with EU conditionality under diminished credibility. 
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Chapter Six: 
Broader Compliance Patterns of Political Leadership 
Under Diminished Credibility (2005-2010) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Starting with the announcement of Turkey as a candidate country in 1999, 
Turkey experienced a period of ‘profound and momentous change’ 
unprecedented in its history (Onis, 2003b: 13). These reforms were initially 
engineered by a rather weak coalition government.124 After the election of the 
AKP to power in 2002, the process of reform gathered further momentum. As 
explained in the previous chapters the reforms conducted until October 2005 can 
sufficiently be explained by increasing credibility of the accession reward. 
However, what is puzzling is that the level and speed of compliance not only 
remained stable but also increased in some policy fields after 2005 even though 
credibility diminished. Given that the level of credibility cannot explain 
compliance, do preferences/actions of the political leadership explain continued 
compliance in Turkey? 
 
This chapter answers this question by testing three variables which provide 
different explanations for general compliance levels in T2. These variables do 
not vary across specific issue areas, instead they explain broader compliance 
patterns. They are related to particular features of the governing party, therefore 
remain unchanged within T2. The domestic politics model (DPM) puts forward 
the government’s partisan incentives variable which measures the extent to 
which the governing party benefits domestically from making strategic use of the 
EU. It hypothesises that: if the governing party obtains intrinsic benefits from 
specific EU conditions; and/or gains electoral and reputational benefits from 
                                                
124 Composed of centre-right Motherland Party, centre-left Democratic Left Party and the ultra-
nationalist Nationalist Movement Party. 
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pursuing EU membership in general, then the governing party is likely to 
comply. Secondly, the social learning variable within the social learning model 
(SLM) hypothesises that: if the political leadership identifies with the EU; and/or 
has institutional contacts with the EU and MS officials; and/or has a European 
professional/educational background, then it is likely to comply. Finally, 
historical institutionalism (HI) proposes the political lock-in hypothesis: if 
integration with the EU is the main facet of Turkish FP; and/or if the political 
leadership has already established EU membership as a policy goal and started 
complying with EU conditionality (before 2005), then it is likely to continue 
complying. 
 
Overall, this chapter finds that the government’s partisan incentives variable 
provides the most powerful explanation for the AKP’s continued compliance 
under diminished credibility. At the same time, political lock-in also contributes 
to explaining compliance in T2, but it is not strong enough to cause this single-
handedly. Finally, the conditions for AKP’s social learning are not favourable in 
T2, therefore this variable is not likely to explain continued compliance. 
However, this does not necessarily mean social learning does not matter for 
compliance. Instead it means the case at hand does not allow us to refute or 
confirm the hypothesis. 
 
This chapter starts with a brief overview of the AKP’s roots and ideology. It then 
uses congruence method and counterfactual analysis to examine the 
government’s partisan incentives, social learning and political lock-in variables. 
This analysis is complemented by process tracing in the following chapter. 
 
6.1 The AKP 
 
The AKP emerged from a long lineage of political parties with Islamic roots. 
Since 1970, five such parties have been established in Turkey, namely the 
National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party (RP), the 
Virtue Party (FP) and the Felicity Party (SP). All of these parties, with the 
exception of the still existing SP, have been closed down, either by a military 
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coup or the Constitutional Court, for engaging in anti-secular activities. All these 
parties also shared a common national outlook ideology, which can be read as 
‘Islamic outlook’ (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 5). An important feature of this 
national outlook movement (NOM) is its fundamental opposition to Western 
civilisation. This anti-Western position manifested itself as hostility towards the 
secular republican reforms and strong opposition to Turkey’s integration with the 
West and particularly with the EU125 (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 5-7).  
 
The most significant change to NOM’s views on the EU came with the so-called 
‘28 February Process’. The RP, who had gained 21.4% of the votes in the 1995 
general elections, formed a coalition government with the centre-right True Path 
Party (DYP) in 1996.  However, this government survived less than a year due to 
strong pressures from the military, the Kemalist state establishment and secular 
civil society organisations. The National Security Council (NSC) issued a clear 
ultimatum to the government on February 28, which is usually referred to as the 
soft or post-modern coup in the literature. Following this declaration, the 
government was forced to resign in 1997 and the Constitutional Court closed 
down the RP for anti-secular activities. The 28 February Process created a 
powerful sense of insecurity among NOM (Yavuz, 2003: 248-9). NOM 
understood that it needed universal human rights and the EU’s political 
conditionality more than any other political actor in Turkey to guarantee 
religious freedoms and its own existence (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 10-11; Dagi, 
2006: 89-90; Duran, 2004: 140; AC2). This realisation explains the more 
moderate outlook of the FP126 towards the EU. However, even this moderation 
was not able to save the FP from being banned by the Constitutional Court in 
2001.  
 
The moderation of the FP, however, was not universally accepted within the 
party. More and more there emerged a split between the traditionalists and the 
modernists (Cinar, 2006: 473; Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 5, 11). Once the 
Constitutional Court banned the FP, the modernists managed to establish a new 
                                                
125 NOM described the EU as a ‘Christian Club’ and expected that Turkey’s membership in the 
EU would ‘result in her complete loss of sovereignty and cultural identity, as well as in her 
economic exploitation’ (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 6). 
126 Established in 1997. 
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party – the AKP – in August 2001. Under the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan, the 
AKP adopted a more liberal and democratic discourse than the FP. The 
traditionalists, on the other hand, established the SP, abandoning a more 
moderate path. 
 
The AKP defines itself as a conservative-democratic party. Even though parallels 
have been drawn with the European Christian democrats, the AKP rejects the use 
of Muslim democrat as a label and is against using Islam in its political ideology. 
The party programme and election manifestos set out the AKP’s positive stance 
on democracy, human rights and rule of law; and argue for unconditional EU 
membership (AKP 2002; 2007; 2010). As Duran maintains, the AKP 
representatives ‘insist that theirs is a conservative party seeking the religious 
freedoms enjoyed in the West and will not follow an Islamic agenda’ (2004: 
134).  
 
Both the party itself and its electorate are very heterogeneous. They incorporate, 
on the one hand, more nationalistic, conservative and religious groups, and on 
the other hand more economically and politically liberal elements (CS2; AC2). 
This wide base forces the party to act as a catch-all party with little ideology. Its 
voter base perceives itself to be very close to the voters of the centre-right 
Motherland Party (ANAP) and the DYP, as opposed to the ultra-nationalist 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) (Carkoglu, 2006: 164). At the same time, the 
AKP’s voters are more religious and right-wing than the Republican People’s 
Party’s (CHP) voters (ibid.: 174). Overall, the AKP is best described as the 
continuation of the well-established centre-right parties in Turkey, such as the 
Democrat Party, Justice Party, ANAP and DYP (Duran, 2004: 134; Hale and 
Ozbudun, 2010: 25, 29), as opposed to an extension of NOM.  
 
The AKP diverges from NOM on two significant respects. Firstly, the AKP 
explicitly disassociates itself from religion. Failures of NOM, and particularly 
the RP, to use religion in the political sphere without incurring military or 
constitutional censures have informed the AKP’s decision to abandon this 
reference. With the realisation that ‘political Islam was detrimental to Islam’s 
social and economic influence in Turkey, the AKP defined itself as 
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“conservative-democrat” in an attempt to escape from the self-defeating success 
of political Islam’ (Dagi, 2006: 95). The AKP’s dilution of its religious ideology 
not only protected the party against the military and the secular establishment, 
but also contributed to larger electoral gains at the ballot box. As the role of 
Islam was watered down, the AKP was able to position itself in the centre-right 
of the political spectrum to attract more votes with a rather vague conservative-
democratic label (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 25-7). This label allowed the AKP to 
describe without difficulty what it is not, but increasingly it found it difficult to 
assert what it is. As Yavuz argues the AKP’s ‘identity and ideology resembles a 
fabric that changes colour depending on the light. This eclectic aspect of the 
party is the reason for its broad appeal. It is simultaneously Turkish, Muslim and 
Western’ (2003: 260).  
 
Aside from the lessons learned from NOM, the AKP’s non-ideological turn can 
be explained by its leader’s previous political career. Erdogan’s experience as the 
mayor of Istanbul has led to his position as a pragmatic and service-oriented 
politician who views politics as a non-ideological means to solve the daily 
problems of people (Dagi, 2006: 91-2). According to Dagi, this experience 
informed his choice to detach his politics from ‘grand ideologies, transformative 
projects, salvation, or reawakening of the people’ (ibid.: 91). This allowed the 
AKP to distance itself from the ‘politics of identity’ employed by its political 
ancestors and instead choose a ‘politics of services’ approach, which is less 
confrontational and based on compromise (Yavuz, 2006: 2-3). Overall, in an 
evaluation of the AKP ideology, Yavuz argues that the AKP does not only 
refrain from developing its policies on the basis of identity, but also actively 
hinders the articulation of arguments on the basis of Islamic values, therefore it is 
no longer an Islamic movement (ibid.: 2; Patton, 2007: 343).  
 
Secondly, the AKP associates itself firmly with the EU, as well as with 
democratic freedoms, human rights, pluralism, secularism, and free market 
economy in marked contrast with NOM. NOM saw Turkey’s membership in the 
EU as the ‘last stage of the assimilation of Turkey’s Islamic identity into the 
Christian West’ and a Kemalist solution to prevent ‘the growing influence of 
political Islam’ (Duran, 2004: 127). In contrast, the AKP considers the EU 
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membership as an effective way to realise Islamic demands, which had been 
suppressed by the secular Turkish state (ibid.: 128).  
 
Overall, it is clear from this discussion that the AKP has a radically different 
outlook from NOM regarding Islam and the EU. However, the interesting 
question is whether it uses the EU strategically to serve its own ‘hidden’ agenda. 
The section below tackles this question. 
 
6.2 The Government’s Partisan Incentives 
 
The puzzle of continued compliance identified at the start of this chapter is even 
more perplexing considering that the traditional supporters of a Western style of 
life and Turkey’s integration with Europe, such as the judiciary, the military, the 
secular/Kemalist elite, the centre-left and centre-right parties, are increasingly 
found within the Eurosceptic coalition (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 36; Ugur, 
2010: 971). At the same time, the AKP, with its explicit Islamic roots, became 
the leading and most vocal supporter of the EU accession and the reform process 
(Keyman and Onis, 2004: 183; Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 36; Baran, 2008: 56).  
 
This section addresses this puzzle by introducing a new variable: the 
government’s partisan incentives. This variable, together with economic/political 
costs is part of the DPM of conditionality, where domestic cost-benefit 
calculations are key for explaining compliance outcomes. This variable is treated 
separately from economic/political costs. Unlike economic/political costs, the 
government’s partisan incentives do not vary across issue areas, and therefore the 
two variables must be tested differently. Whereas a comparative analysis of 
policy areas can be conducted to test political/economic costs, the government’s 
partisan incentives need to be assessed through within-case methods, since it 
does not vary within T2 when the AKP is in government.  
 
The government’s partisan incentives hypothesis is: if the governing party 
obtains intrinsic benefits from specific EU conditions; and/or gains electoral and 
reputational benefits from pursuing EU membership in general, then the 
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governing party is likely to comply. This section confirms this hypothesis. On the 
one hand, it shows that the AKP uses particular aspects of EU conditionality 
strategically to curb the powers of the Kemalist establishment. This way it not 
only secures its survival in the Turkish political system, but also ensures 
effective governance without intervention by the military. On the other hand, the 
evidence demonstrates that the AKP presents itself as a moderate and Westward-
looking party to the Turkish electorate by pursuing EU membership objective 
and thereby increases its vote share. Patton summarises these motives:  
‘Several pragmatic purposes were served by employing a 
discourse that downplayed the party’s religious roots, and 
emphasised support for market liberalism and democratic political 
reforms. First, it shielded the party from the likelihood of 
imminent closure; second, it safeguarded an Islamic lifestyle 
under the rubric of democratic freedoms; and third, it broadened 
the party’s appeal to liberal minded voters’ (2007: 343). 
 
This section measures the extent to which the AKP has benefited from the 
process of compliance with EU conditionality, firstly by looking at intrinsic 
benefits of specific EU conditions and then examining the incentives offered by 
EU conditionality in general. The section then introduces a counterfactual case to 
assess competing explanations of compliance. Overall, it concludes that the 
government has high incentives to continue complying with the EU and therefore 
this variable is found to hold strong explanatory power. 
 
6.2.1 Issue-specific Incentives  
 
The most important incentive EU conditionality offers the AKP is not only the 
security to survive in the Turkish political system dominated by Kemalist/secular 
forces,127 but also to curb their powers. This incentive is offered specifically 
through EU’s political conditionality which encourages demilitarisation of 
politics and sets high standards for human rights and democracy. 
 
The fact that all the previous political parties with explicit references to Islam 
have been banned from politics creates an ‘unsettling problem of legitimacy’ and 
                                                
127 For a similar argument see Saatcioglu (2010). 
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an inherent source of anxiety for a party like the AKP, which has emerged from 
NOM (Dagi, 2006: 89). More significantly, the 28 February Process has made 
the Islamic movement even more vulnerable vis-à-vis the military and rest of the 
Kemalist establishment (Robins, 2003: 553). This permanent insecurity, 
according to Dagi, is both the AKP’s Achilles’ heel (2006: 89) and, at the same 
time, the primary driving force behind its pro-EU stance (ibid.: 88). 
 
There is a wide consensus in the literature that the February 28 post-modern coup 
has been a turning point for NOM and particularly the modernists, who later 
established the AKP. The Islamists have learned through this experience that 
‘challenging the secular state in Turkey is a dead-end street involving serious 
political, economic and personal risks’ (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 27). Therefore, 
they decided to revise their views on the EU with the recognition that EU 
conditionality and the eventual membership would allow them to more 
effectively realise their demands, regarding increasing religious freedoms, 
containing the powers of the military, and making the Kemalist ideology less 
repressive (Patton, 2007: 19; Duran, 2004: 128, 140; 2006: 282; Yavuz, 2003: 
249; Fokas, 2004: 147). The increasing support for the EU, therefore, was a 
‘natural consequence of this realisation’ (Baran, 2008: 57). As Dagi argues: 
‘Islamists realised the legitimising power and virtue of democracy 
… They saw that they could survive only in a country that is 
democratically oriented, respects civil and political rights, and 
moreover is integrated into the Western world, particularly the 
European Union … The shift from anti-Westernism to Europhilia 
is based … on an observation that the more Turkey was distanced 
from the West – and the EU in particular – the stronger would be 
the dominance of the army that treated the Islamic groups as an 
anomaly and threat’ (2004: 142-3). 
 
Arguably, the AKP came out of the 28 February Process more successfully than 
any other actor in Turkish politics, having learnt that a pro-EU stance was 
necessary if it ever wanted to come to power, remain in power and govern 
effectively. The EU, and the principles of democracy, human rights and rule of 
law, offered the AKP a ‘political opportunity structure’ (Ulusoy, 2009: 368) to 
safeguard its continued existence in Turkish politics and to justify itself through 
this new discourse in its ‘confrontation with the Kemalist/secularist center’ 
(Dagi, 2006: 92). Most importantly, by providing the AKP a significant level of 
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legitimacy, the EU protects it against threats from the most powerful veto-player 
in Turkish politics, namely the military (Ugur, 2010: 979). EU membership 
requires demilitarisation of politics and restriction of the military’s ability to 
interfere against parties with a religious background, such as the AKP itself 
(Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 592). In other words, for the AKP, the EU is not only 
desirable on its own right, but it also ‘provides the opportunity to contain 
arguably its most implacable domestic opponent: the Kemalist/secularist-oriented 
military establishment’ (Yavuz, 2006: 13) and eliminates the risk of a potential 
coup (BDP2). It was precisely this containment policy towards the Turkish 
military which pushed the Islamists to become pro-EU overnight on 28 February.  
 
The empirical evidence shows that a year after coming to power, the AKP did 
indeed start to restrain the powers of the military with the help of EU 
conditionality. The EU harmonisation package in 2003 restructured and 
weakened the National Security Council (NSC), which is the institutionalisation 
of the Turkish military in politics. This reform reduced the number of military 
officials in the Council to make the majority civilians; reiterated that the NSC 
was a only a consultative body; allowed it to appoint a civilian leader, which 
happened for the first time in 2004; removed the NSC’s representation in a 
number of public agencies; and finally eliminated its crucial executive, 
monitoring and implementation powers. These reforms demonstrate how the 
AKP made strategic use of EU conditionality to weaken the military’s veto-
power, since the government justified them to the electorate with references to 
EU’s political conditionality. The AKP would not have been able to conduct 
these reforms in a purely domestic setting independently of EU conditionality.  
 
Moreover, the AKP was also able to change the law on political parties through 
the 2003 EU harmonisation package to make it more difficult for the secular 
establishment to ban political parties with Islamic references.128 Once again the 
EU link made this change possible. This was an issue the EU has continuously 
raised in the context of freedom of association and therefore strongly condemned 
                                                
128 In 2010, the AKP tried to change the constitution to make further reforms in this area, 
however the two-thirds majority required to include this in the constitutional referendum was not 
met in the TGNA. 
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Turkey each time a political party was banned (Saatcioglu, 2010: 25). Using the 
EU justification made it possible for the AKP to conduct this reform without 
fierce opposition from the Kemalists. At the same time, this legal change did not 
prevent the AKP from being tried for anti-secular activities by the Constitutional 
Court in 2008 where the risk of its closure was high. While the case was 
ongoing, the EU officials strongly denounced the possibility of closure. Most 
particularly, the Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn declared a possible ban of 
the party as unjustified and suggested that the issue needs to be addressed with 
further Constitutional reform (Euractiv, 2008). Such strong pressures from the 
EU against the case and for further reform are likely to have influenced the 
Constitutional Court’s decision, which warned the party without banning it. In 
this respect, EU conditionality protected the governing party against the 
Kemalist/secular establishment and prepared a ground for further reform in an 
area where the AKP’s interests overlapped with EU conditions. 
 
AKP’s pro-EU position did not only ensure its survival against the military threat 
and the Kemalist/secularist opposition, but also legitimised its standing in the 
eyes of the Kemalist bureaucracy, judiciary and the CHP, as well as the secular 
civil society. By defining its ideology and policies through direct references to 
Europeanisation, globalisation and human rights (as well as secularism), the 
AKP was able to speak the same language as the Kemalists. For example, the 
AKP framed the political reforms conducted in the context of EU conditionality 
within the truly Kemalist ideal of ‘reaching the level of contemporary 
civilisations’ – originally put forward by Ataturk. In other words, even though 
the AKP’s reform agenda intended to diminish the military’s role in politics and 
opposed the Kemalist understanding of secularism,129 the Kemalists found it 
increasingly difficult to counter the AKP’s discourse and reform program which 
emphasised human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The AKP also 
portrayed its EU reform agenda ‘as being above and beyond politics and as a 
technical process of adjusting to European and global structures’ (Cinar, 2011: 
                                                
129 Kemalists favour a Jacobin version of secularism where religion is excluded from the public 
sphere and is also controlled by the state. However, the AKP opposes the intervention of state in 
people’s private lives and instead defends a complete separation between the state and religion 
(Patton, 2007: 343).  
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22). In this respect, the AKP’s EU agenda appeared to be apolitical and therefore 
potential clashes with the secular establishment were minimised.  
 
Additionally, the AKP’s pro-EU stance also helped delegitimise the opposition 
parties. The social-democratic CHP, which was initially supportive of EU 
integration, backed the AKP on most EU-related reforms in T1. However, when 
it realised its support helped the AKP to gain more popularity as the reformist 
party in Turkish politics, it changed its policy in T2 and became Eurosceptic 
(Somer, 2011: 30). Therefore, it was seen not only as contradicting itself with 
regard to its EU policy, but also as a conservative and status-quo biased force 
against the reformist AKP (AC2). In other words, the ‘EU process created a 
paradox for the opposition who had defended Westernisation for decades’ (AC2). 
Overall, attachment to EU and particularly to its political conditionality allowed 
the AKP to legitimise itself to the secular establishment and also delegitimise its 
Kemalist opponents.  
 
In addition to demilitarisation of politics, making political party bans more 
difficult and weakening the Kemalist/secularist opposition, the AKP used EU’s 
political conditionality strategically in areas where its preferences overlapped 
with EU conditions. For instance, the AKP’s ambition to guarantee freedom of 
religion and expression of its members and electorate corresponded with EU 
demands for human rights. By using EU conditionality as a justification for 
reform to increase freedoms, the AKP, on the one hand, increased its appeal to its 
core Islamist constituency, the conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie and the 
liberals, and on the other hand, silenced the Kemalists’ opposition to reform in 
these areas. 
 
More specifically, the AKP made a strong reference to EU conditionality to 
gather support for the 2010 referendum on a package of 26 proposals to amend 
the Constitution. This package included reforms which were advocated by the 
EU for some time, such as altering the makeup of Turkey’s highest judicial 
institutions; allowing for military personnel to be tried in civilian courts; creating 
the constitutional ground for the ombudsman law; strengthening gender equality; 
banning discrimination against children, the old and disabled; allowing the 
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workers to join more than one union; and removing the ban on politically 
motivated strikes. Therefore, the EU leaders welcomed the proposed reform, as 
well as the positive result of the referendum where 58% of the people voted 
‘yes’. The Enlargement Commissioner described the results as a ‘step in the right 
direction’ and the German Foreign Minister maintained that the referendum was 
‘another important step on the road towards Europe’ (Akyel, 2010: 2). The AKP 
leaders, anticipating the EU’s support, strategically linked the referendum to EU 
conditionality. Erdogan has argued the referendum would significantly 
strengthen democracy in Turkey and thereby improve Turkey’s prospects of 
joining the EU (Head, 2010: 1). Similarly, the CN Bagis has maintained that 
these reforms would signify a turning point and significantly speed up Turkey’s 
accession negotiations with the EU (Euractiv, 2010b). At the same time, the 
AKP’s opponents saw the constitutional change as a way for the AKP to gain 
control over the judiciary, since the changes give the parliament more authority 
over the appointment of constitutional court judges and members of the Supreme 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors. AKP has continuously weakened the powers 
of the military in Turkish politics and with this constitutional change it was seen 
as undermining the independence of the higher levels of secular judiciary with 
which it was repeatedly in conflict in the past (Head, 2010: 1). Overall, this 
example demonstrates how the AKP was able to gain support for domestic 
changes in line with its preferences through tactical use of EU conditionality.  
 
Finally, the AKP also benefited financially from EU conditionality. The EU 
offered the ‘necessary financial resources and know-how’ to reform the Turkish 
state and society throughout the compliance process (Dogan, 2005: 431). The 
AKP took advantage of the increased tax income due to the inflow of foreign 
capital, as well as the lower unemployment rate due to the increase in real 
investment (ibid.: 430-1). These economic benefits were significant both for the 
AKP to carry out its domestic political programme, but also to gain the necessary 
domestic popularity for re-election. 
 
Overall, the AKP made strategic use of particular aspects of EU conditionality to 
signal to the Kemalist elite that it was not a threat for the secular Turkish state. 
This secured its survival in the system and also allowed it to attain political 
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legitimacy domestically. The AKP’s pro-EU stance acted as a ‘protective shield’ 
against the oppressive actions of the secular establishment (Hale and Ozbudun, 
2010: 27) and allowed the AKP to engage in reforms that weakened the powers 
of the military without engaging in an outright battle with the Kemalists.  
 
6.2.2 General Incentives  
 
Apart from specific incentives, EU conditionality as a whole also provides 
important incentives for the governing party to continue complying. The AKP 
uses its pursuit of EU membership as a signalling device to different sections of 
Turkish society to demonstrate that it is a moderate, secular, pro-Western and 
business-friendly party.130 This way it increases its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
electorate, thereby widening its electoral appeal. As an AKP MP maintained: 
‘[t]he EU issue increases the legitimacy of our party. We can access a wider 
range of people than those who would normally support us’ (AKP4).  
 
The AKP aimed to attract votes from two main sections of society by adopting a 
pro-EU stance, namely the newly emerging conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie 
and some secular groups, such as the business community and the liberals, who 
under normal conditions would not vote for a party with Islamic roots. In 
addition, the AKP’s core religious electorate also became more pro-EU in time, 
which meant the party did not suffer any loss of votes. 
 
Among these groups, the role of the Anatolian bourgeoisie was the most crucial 
as the driving force behind the AKP’s strong pro-EU stance (Yavuz, 2003; 2006; 
2009; Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 28).  This new middle class emerged with the 
neoliberal policies of Turgut Ozal 131  in 1980s and started to replace the 
traditional republican bourgeoisie. They are distinguished from the traditional 
bourgeoisie located in Istanbul by their ‘culturally conservative, politically 
nationalist and moderately authoritarian’ outlook (Insel, 2003: 298). According 
                                                
130 For similar arguments see Patton (2007); Yavuz (2003; 2006; 2009); Saatcioglu (2010). 
131 The PM of Turkey between 1983 and 1989 and subsequently the President between 1989 and 
1993. During his tenure, he transformed the Turkish economy through significant privatisation. 
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to Yavuz, this new bourgeoisie has been the prime agent of a ‘silent revolution’, 
which has made it possible for Islamic actors, such as the AKP, to democratise 
and liberalise (2009: 11). The economically liberal and socially conservative 
values of this new bourgeoisie were neither compatible with the politically 
liberal mainstream parties, nor with the anti-Western, anti-capitalist position of 
NOM. Moreover, the February 28 coup has taught this bourgeoisie an important 
lesson on the unfeasibility of Islam’s representation in Turkish politics. They, 
compared to other groups in Turkish society, had the most to lose from another 
open confrontation with the secular establishment (Onis, 2006: 212). Therefore, 
they wanted to be represented by a party that was socially conservative, 
economically liberal, pro-business, pro-EU and, most importantly, one which 
would provide economic and political stability and refrain from engaging in an 
open conflict with the secular establishment. The AKP was very quick to respond 
to these demands. Having understood the electoral and economic benefits to be 
obtained by appealing to this constituency, it adopted a strong pro-EU stance. 
This pro-EU turn made the alliance between the AKP and the so-called 
‘Anatolian tigers’ (Tepe, 2006: 111) possible. The fact that the AKP maintained 
its pro-EU outlook over the years and continued to comply with EU 
requirements, despite declining prospects of membership, has cemented this 
alliance, thereby securing a strong electoral base for the AKP.132 
 
The AKP’s strong pro-EU stance also attracted the support of a second group of 
voters composed of the secular business community and the liberals. The AKP, 
with its pro-EU outlook, was able to present a moderate, pro-business, free 
market and liberal ideology to these groups, who under normal conditions would 
not vote for a party with NOM roots. Once again the post-modern coup of 
February 28 was influential in shaping the opinions of the secular business and 
the liberals. These groups came to realise that the protagonists, as well as the 
proponents, of the coup actually formed the core of the anti-EU coalition in 
Turkey. This coalition believed that EU conditionality, which promotes religious 
freedoms, individual and minority rights to citizens, was detrimental for the 
                                                
132  The MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association) is a typical 
embodiment of this new Islamist leaning bourgeoisie. It played a crucial role in the election of 
the AKP both in 2002 and 2007 and still strongly supports the governing party’s democratisation 
and pro-EU policies (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 28; Insel, 2003: 298).  
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unitary and secular character of the Turkish state (Patton, 2007: 341). This 
realisation motivated the secular business community and the liberals to look 
elsewhere for political representation. Patton summarises this change of heart on 
the part of the secular businessmen and liberals: 
‘Open interference by the military in civilian politics, which 
exposed the country’s democratic deficit and compromised 
fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria was enormously catalytic in 
mobilising popular support for the EU process… The pro-EU bloc 
thus widened in the aftermath of the soft coup, drawing together 
Islamists and liberal secularists who wanted to disassemble the 
illiberal political design of the 28 February process. The pro-EU 
bloc also included many who saw opportunities for economic 
gains from deepening integration with the EU’ (ibid.: 341-2). 
 
Once again, the AKP made good use of this electoral opportunity. Through its 
strong pro-EU stance, it convinced the secular business community that it was 
able to deliver the political stability necessary for economic development. The 
AKP’s unparalleled support for privatisation, as well as its single party 
government, attracted the business community who were weary of the 
inefficient, unstable and corrupt coalition governments of the 1990s. The AKP, 
due to its business and free market-friendly pro-EU outlook, built a cooperative 
relationship with the most powerful secular business lobby – the TUSIAD 
(Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) – even before the 2002 
elections. The TUSIAD publicly announced its support for the AKP and its pro-
EU programme both in Turkey and Europe, thereby legitimising the AKP against 
powerful veto-players like the military and judiciary (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 
593). The AKP’s continued commitment to the EU after its election ensured 
continued support from the business community, who feared the possibility of a 
coalition government between the two opposition parties (the CHP and the 
MHP), which are anti-privatisation, anti-EU and anti-US. The start of EU 
negotiations attracted foreign capital, which was a great benefit to a Turkish 
economy that was largely reliant on foreign direct investments. The foreign 
businesses have increased their profits during the AKP’s tenure (Baran, 2008: 
61), partly due to the stability provided by the AKP government. The AKP’s 
commitment to compliance with EU conditionality, therefore, allowed the 
Turkish economy to flourish through foreign investments, in turn further 
increasing the secular business community’s support for the AKP.  
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The pro-EU AKP was also able to appeal to the liberals, or ‘protest’ voters, who 
were increasingly alarmed by the actions and statements of the military, and who 
demanded more inclusive policies for the religious and ethnic minorities living in 
Turkey, particularly the Kurds (Baran, 2008: 61). Moreover, many others who 
would originally vote for a centre-left party also supported the AKP (ibid.: 64; 
Insel, 2003: 303). This is because they realised that the AKP offered social 
services, education and health programmes to more unfortunate segments of 
society and developed policies for Kurdish minorities and IDPs living in the 
South-east in an attempt to comply with EU conditionality. Finally, wide ranging 
civil society organisations, whose demands had been ignored and marginalised 
by the state establishment prior to EU conditionality, also gave support to the 
AKP’s pro-EU policies (Ugur and Yankaya, 2008: 593). Even though the votes 
of this constituency were not considerable enough to be decisive for the AKP’s 
re-election, liberal and social-democratic support was crucial for the party to 
‘consolidate [its] power and widen [its] legitimacy’ (AC2). 
 
Finally, the AKP leaders were aware that they also had to appeal to the 
conservative NOM voter base. Until 2002, Islamists supported parties with a 
NOM heritage and their support allowed the FP to obtain 15% of the votes in the 
1999 general elections. The AKP was able to appeal to these voters and gain 
their support in the 2002 elections through the personal charisma of its leader 
Erdogan; the material help it provided to more deprived parts of society; its 
economic policies; and its support for fundamental human rights and freedoms. 
The fact that the AKP got 34.3% of the votes, whereas the SP’s votes were 
limited to 2.5% in the 2002 general elections demonstrates this appeal. When 
appealing to the NOM base in 2002, the AKP was cautious about its discourse on 
the EU. It was aware that, even though the 28 February Process allowed the 
Islamists to reconsider their views on the EU, this realisation was predominantly 
limited to the elite level. The segments of the Turkish public supporting NOM 
were not necessarily aware of the benefits EU membership could confer to 
religious freedoms. Therefore, the AKP’s pro-EU stance was not emphasised 
prior to the 2002 elections. However, once it came to power, it made use of its 
electoral victory to strengthen its stance on the EU (Carkoglu, 2004: 21). The 
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AKP strategically drew parallels between EU conditionality and the Islamists’ 
desire to weaken the role of military in politics and the protection of religious 
freedoms in Turkey, such as lifting the headscarf ban in universities. Soon, the 
Islamists realised that the EU reforms were not contrary to their preferences. 
Within the first couple of years of the AKP’s tenure the electoral allegiance of 
the Islamists to the EU cause was ensured. This way the AKP’s pro-EU outlook 
did not damage its core vote. 
 
The empirical evidence on the composition of the AKP’s support base verifies 
the above arguments. Analysis of the 2002 and 2007 election results shows that 
the AKP’s voter base is a mix of religious and protest voters (Kumbaracibasi, 
2009: 106-23). This cross-class base is politically and socially extremely 
heterogeneous (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 38), incorporating traditional NOM 
voters, the newly emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie, as well as protest votes from 
the liberals and the centre-left. As Onis argues, the AKP’s electoral success lay 
in its ability to construct a broad-based interclass coalition, which included both 
the winners of globalisation, notably the rising Anatolian bourgeoisie, as well as 
the more underprivileged parts of society (2006: 211). Moreover, those groups 
who were marginalised by the secular Kemalist state establishment due to their 
ethnic or religious identities have also sought representation by the AKP. What 
all these distinct groups shared was their overlapping interest in Turkey’s 
compliance with the EU and they found this commonality in the AKP. 
 
To assess the extent to which the AKP has used EU incentives to widen its 
constituency, it is necessary to analyse the changing views of the AKP’s 
electorate and the Turkish public on the EU. Firstly, the AKP has increased its 
support in general elections over the years, gaining 34.3% of the votes in the 
2002, 46.7% in 2007 and 49.8% in 2011.133 What is key here is whether the 
support for the EU has increased among the AKP’s constituency. Carkoglu 
demonstrates that the EU support within the AKP electorate was initially lower 
than the national average (2006: 176-7). However, it increased significantly to a 
clear majority during the AKP’s first term in government (ibid.: 176-7, 181). 
                                                
133 It gained 41.6% and 39% in 2004 and 2009 local elections respectively. 
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Yilmaz’s study reaches a similar conclusion (2006). The percentage of AKP 
voters supporting the EU has increased by 20 points between May 2002 and 
January 2006, whereas support decreased by 23 points among CHP voters 
(Yilmaz, 2006). This data on the AKP’s electorate demonstrate that the EU 
offered electoral benefits to the AKP. 
 
Secondly, it is also important to analyse the overall Turkish public opinion 
towards the EU over the years. The Eurobarometer results demonstrate that 
Turkish public support for the EU increased and reached a peak of 71% in 2004 
(Eurobarometer, 2004b). After this date, the support continuously declined until 
2006 to 44% (Eurobarometer, 2006b).134 Between 2006 and 2010 the support 
undulated around an average of 47% (Eurobarometer, 2006a; 2007a; 2007b; 
2008a; 2008b; 2009a; 2009b; 2010a; 2010b). These results seem to contradict the 
argument that the AKP strategically uses EU conditionality as a signalling device 
to the electorate to increase its vote share, given that the public’s support for the 
EU has fallen over the years. In this respect, the second part of the government’s 
partisan incentives argument, which is related to electoral politics, is weakened. 
However, this conclusion needs to be qualified:  
 
Firstly, the views of the general electorate need to be separated from particular 
groups. Whereas the general public, and predominantly the secular, nationalistic 
and religious-conservative sections, support the EU less in T2, the secular 
business community, conservative Anatolian businessmen, the liberal sections of 
society, as well as some minority groups like the Kurds continue to support the 
EU. In this respect, the argument presented above is still valid, since the AKP’s 
pro-EU stance continues to attract these groups to the party. The unceasing 
support of the secular and conservative businessmen is particularly important for 
the AKP, since they not only assist the party financially, but also they are very 
                                                
134 The anti-EU coalition composed of the nationalists, security officials and Kemalists grew 
stronger in T2 mainly because of the EU’s increasing demands with regards to Cyprus, rights of 
Kurdish minority and the recognition of Armenian genocide, as well as the decline in EU 
accession credibility which created a ‘less predictable international environment’ causing these 
groups to feel they have been treated unfairly by the EU (Turan, 2007: 337). Additionally, the 
nationalist reaction gained strength with the increased terrorist activity in the South-east Turkey, 
since they perceived the EU to be protecting the PKK (ibid.: 337).  
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influential actors in Turkish politics. In this respect, the lower levels of public 
support for the EU in T2 are only costly for the AKP with regard to its 
nationalistic and religious-conservative voter base. Despite this, the support for 
the EU among the AKP’s voter base has still increased, as demonstrated above. 
In addition, while the general public’s support for the EU fell after 2004, it has 
remained reasonably stable in the T2 period, around 47%. Given the support is 
more or less stable in T2, the AKP’s pro-EU stance has not become increasingly 
costly. 
 
6.2.3 Results 
 
The discussion above has illustrated that the AKP can benefit from using EU 
conditionality strategically to secure itself in the Turkish political system against 
the secular establishment and to increase its electoral support, although the 
decline in public support for the EU weakens the electoral politics incentive to a 
certain extent. The views of interviewees including AKP MPs also support this 
view, since they have stated that the AKP ‘has an instrumental approach to the 
EU’ (AC2; EUSG1); sees the ‘EU as a tool for establishing external and internal 
legitimacy’ (CS5); is ‘very pragmatic in its use of the EU’ (BDP2); and ‘EU is 
beneficial for the AKP’ (AKP13). It can therefore be concluded that the value 
assigned to the government’s partisan incentives variable is high for the AKP 
throughout its tenure. Since this value of the independent variable is congruent 
with the compliance levels in T2, the AKP’s partisan incentives are very likely to 
explain continued compliance with the EU under diminished credibility.135 
However, it is still crucial to test through counterfactual analysis whether there 
are other alternative explanations which also fit the compliance outcome well. 
 
For a counterfactual analysis the question that needs to be addressed is: would 
the same outcome of the dependent variable have occurred in the absence of the 
independent variable under analysis? In other words, if the AKP did not make 
use of EU conditionality strategically, would it still have been possible for these 
                                                
135 The following chapter will check whether this relationship is actually causal and not just a 
correlation through process tracing.  
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reforms to take place in T2? A number of alternative explanations can be 
discussed:  
 
Firstly, we assess whether the AKP would be able to conduct these reforms 
incidentally without the presence of any EU incentives or EU conditionality. It 
has been so far demonstrated that the AKP’s preferences in many occasions 
overlap with EU requirements, namely demilitarisation of politics, more religious 
freedoms and protection from political party bans. However, the history of 
political parties with a NOM outlook and with very similar preferences to AKP 
demonstrates that it would not have been possible to conduct these reforms 
without the EU justification. Each NOM party wanting to increase religious 
freedoms and take actions against the Kemalist establishment has been banned 
from politics. It can be argued that without the EU link the AKP would have 
shared the same destiny, since the Constitutional Court came very close to 
banning it in 2008. Moreover, it would not have been possible for the AKP to 
adopt the 2010 constitutional change via a referendum without reference to EU 
conditionality, since the Kemalist/secularist opposition would have been much 
stronger. As argued by a civil society representative ‘[d]oing things because the 
EU… wants made the government’s life so much easier… If not for the EU and 
its demands, I believe the government would be much less courageous in the face 
of such pressure, criticism and anxieties’ (CS2). This demonstrates that even 
though the AKP was interested in conducting various reforms independently of 
the EU, it would not have been possible to do so. 
 
Secondly, we evaluate whether the AKP would have been able to continue to 
comply with the EU if it did not have specific incentives to do so. In other words, 
we examine whether there are any alternative explanations of AKP’s continued 
compliance, which have stronger explanatory power than the independent 
variable under analysis.136 The remainder of this chapter tests social learning 
                                                
136 To answer this question, one could also consider previous governments in office. The 
government’s partisan incentives variable was not strong for both the ANAP-led (1997-1999) and 
the DSP-led (1999-2002) coalition governments. However, in these cases other important 
variables such as the credibility of accession also varied. Moreover, these coalition governments 
were very unstable and in the case of ANAP-led coalition it was a minority government. This 
made it much more difficult for them to agree on a single EU policy and pursue the goal of 
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dynamics and political lock-in effects. It finds that the lock-in effects carry 
explanatory power to explain continued compliance, but this is not strong enough 
to cause continued compliance alone under diminished credibility. Moreover, the 
conditions which make social learning likely are not conducive in the AKP’s 
case, therefore this variable is not likely to result in continued compliance in T2.  
 
Finally, other possible explanations of compliance, such as public opinion and 
election cycles, actually created pressures against reform in T2. Therefore they 
can be eliminated as competing explanations. The declining public support for 
and increasing nationalist backlash  against the EU in the presence of 2007 
general elections made it less likely for the AKP to continue its EU reform 
process in T2. Moreover, there were other crucial issues on the AKP’s agenda 
during the T2 period which were likely to distract the party from its EU reform 
programme. This includes the controversy surrounding the presidential elections 
between April and August 2007.137 Additionally, a closure case was brought to 
the Constitutional Court against the AKP for anti-secular activities between 
March and July 2008. All of these factors moved the AKP’s focus to domestic 
politics and made it less likely for them to continue complying with EU 
conditionality in T2, therefore they are ruled out as competing explanations. 
 
Overall, given that it was extremely unlikely for the AKP to conduct these 
reforms incidentally without EU conditionality, and considering that other 
possible alternative explanations of continued compliance, such as political lock-
in, social learning, public support for the EU, and election cycles cannot (or are 
not strong enough to) explain continued compliance in T2, it can be concluded 
that the government’s partisan incentives variable carries the strongest 
explanatory power. 
 
                                                                                                                               
compliance coherently. Therefore, these cases are not considered suitable for comparative 
analysis. 
137 After the TGNA completed the first round of elections to bring Gul to presidency, the 
Constitutional Court annulled this election on the basis of a quorum requirement (two-thirds of 
the MPs). Since all the opposition MPs boycotted the upcoming presidential elections in the 
TGNA, the AKP called for an early general election in July 2007. After the 2007 elections the 
AKP attained a larger majority in the TGNA and was able to elect Gul to the presidency.  
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6.3 Social Learning 
 
An alternative to the government’s partisan incentives explanation for continued 
compliance is social learning.  The social learning hypothesis states: if the 
political leadership identifies with the EU; and/or has institutional contacts with 
the EU and MS officials; and/or has a European professional/educational 
background, then it is likely to comply. This hypothesis incorporates two sets of 
factors. Firstly, identification with the EU and its underlying values, such as 
human rights, democracy and the rule of, is hypothesised to be a result of social 
learning, therefore is treated as an indicator of social learning. The analysis 
below demonstrates that the AKP’s identification with the EU has been fairly 
low. Other factors, like exposure to and background in Europe, are conditions 
which make social learning more likely, although they cannot estimate whether 
social learning takes place or not. The section shows that the conditions for 
social learning are not conducive in the case of the AKP making it very difficult 
to assess socialisation levels. However, given the low level of identification and 
unfavourable conditions for social learning, it can be argued that the level of 
social learning is likely to be very low. Even though we cannot reject the social 
learning hypothesis with the data at hand, this variable it not expected to have an 
impact on continued compliance in Turkey in T2.  
 
To test this hypothesis this section examines whether the AKP officials actually 
believe in and have internalised EU norms or whether they only use an EU 
discourse strategically as argued in the previous section. In other words, have 
they really changed their views on the EU since NOM or, in the words of Robins, 
are they ‘wolves in sheep’s clothing’ (2003: 552)? Given that the level of social 
learning does not change significantly for the governing party within T2138 
within-case analyses such as congruence method and counterfactual cases are 
used. The following section initially assesses the level of AKP’s identification 
with the EU. The subsequent two sections demonstrate that conditions which 
                                                
138 In reality, there is likely to be differences between AKP MPs regarding their identification 
with the EU, and their European backgrounds. This is particularly so since the party itself is very 
heterogeneous. However, this research focuses on why the AKP, as a whole, complies, therefore, 
these differences are not examined. Attention is devoted to the socialisation of the AKP’s 
leadership. 
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make social learning more likely, such as background and exposure, are also 
weak in the case of AKP. Finally, counterfactual analysis is employed in order to 
validate the finding that social learning plays a very limited role in explaining 
AKP’s continued compliance.   
 
6.3.1 Identification 
 
The AKP’s party programme and election manifestos portray its strong 
commitment to the EU and to values of democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, pluralism, freedom of thought and expression, and respect for diversity 
and minorities (AKP, 2002; 2007; 2010; Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 20-1). These 
documents consider accession to the EU and compliance with Copenhagen 
criteria as a ‘natural outcome’ of Turkey’s modernisation process (AKP, 2002; 
Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 23). It is worth noting that, all these documents are 
extremely careful to separate the aims (democratisation) from the means (EU 
conditionality/accession). They maintain that the reforms are conducted because 
they are beneficial for Turkish people and not because international institutions 
demand them (AKP, 2010). Put differently, according to the AKP the 
Copenhagen political criteria should be realised even independently of the EU 
accession process (AKP, 2002; 2007). Along these lines, an AKP MP from the 
EUHC stated that they care about the content of Copenhagen and Maastricht 
criteria, therefore they continue to work on these even if the negotiations are 
blocked in many chapters (AKP14). He added that ‘if our relations with the EU 
do not go well, we can name these Ankara and Istanbul criteria and still 
implement them’ (AKP14). 
 
The PM Erdogan has also on many occasions stated that the EU model has no 
political alternatives in promoting democratisation in Turkey; EU membership is 
a necessary step to not be on the periphery of civilisation and development; the 
AKP would continue to conduct these reforms even if the EU does not accept 
Turkey in; and the AKP believes in a direct overlap between the EU membership 
and Turkish national interests (Duran, 2004: 135; Fokas, 2004: 158; CS2). 
Moreover, the interviews conducted with AKP MPs also demonstrate their 
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identification with the EU. All those MPs who were willing to express views, 
stated that EU membership was a ‘good thing’139 and they generally perceived 
themselves as being Turkish first and then European.140 AKP’s identification 
with and support for EU is much higher than the Turkish public, whose support 
was 47% on average in T2. Overall, these documents and statements show that 
the AKP is attached to democratic norms and, for them, attaining these values 
takes priority over EU accession or any other benefits which may come along 
with it. 
 
Contrastingly, there is also a view that the AKP’s attachment to European norms 
is not entirely genuine. One argument in support of this view is that AKP has 
emerged out of NOM tradition (Yavuz, 2006: 2) and continues to follow this 
anti-EU trajectory. Some analysts believe that AKP’s strong compliance record 
contradicts with its NOM roots and, therefore, compliance cannot be explained 
by social learning (Camyar and Tagma, 2010: 375). It must be acknowledged 
that social learning is a process and having an anti-European stance in the past 
does not rule out the possibility of socialisation in the future. However, in the 
AKP’s case, there was strong suspicion that its leaders’ views changed overnight 
without experiencing a lengthy period of social learning and that they still hold 
views incompatible with EU values.  
 
Although both Erdogan and Gul were leading figures of NOM’s modernist 
branch, according to Hale and Ozbudun, this did not necessarily mean they were 
ideologically more moderate or liberal than the traditionalists (2010: 9). For 
instance, Gul has been reported saying that an important aim of the Welfare 
Party (RP) was to ‘protect Turkey’s values against the EU’ (Robins, 2003: 553); 
and ‘Turkey should not join the European Union’ (Woollacott, 2002). Similarly, 
Erdogan’s past statements demonstrates his attachment to political Islam, his 
anti-democratic, anti-liberal and anti-secularist views. While he was the mayor of 
Istanbul he was quoted saying: ‘for us, democracy is a means to an end’; ‘I 
banned alcohol, because I believe I am the doctor of this community’; ‘in view of 
                                                
139 AKP2; AKP3; AKP4; AKP5; AKP7; AKP8; AKP9; AKP10; AKP12; AKP14. 
140 Three out of five MPs said they were Turkish first and then European. The remaining two 
identified themselves as ‘world citizens’. 
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the future of our nation, I am against birth control’; ‘Thank God, I am for 
Sharia’; ‘democracy is like a train, we shall get out when we arrive at the station 
we want’; ‘the system we want to introduce cannot be contrary to God’s 
commands’; ‘human beings cannot be secular’; ‘one cannot be both secular and 
Muslim’ (Fokas, 2004: 158; Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 7, 9; AKP Watch, 2007). 
These quotes from late 1990s demonstrate that Erdogan was, according to 
Robins, ‘an Islamist party apparatchik, … an RP activist and Erbakan loyalist’, 
causing many to mistrust his real intentions today and worry that ‘a dogmatic 
ideology might lurk beneath the smooth persona’ (2003: 552).  
 
What adds to this suspicion is Erdogan’s incredibly quick and substantial 
transformation. An AKP MP remembers Erdogan’s speech in Izmir shortly 
before the 2002 general elections where he declared his pro-EU views for the 
first time (AKP14). The MP recalls Erdogan saying: ‘[i]n line with my political 
party’s [RP’s] views, I have up until now stood against the EU. However, I now 
declare here that when I compare the EU’s demands on us and the place we want 
to be, all of these demands are beneficial for Turkish citizens’ (AKP14). This 
overnight transformation generates doubt about whether the AKP has really 
internalised these changes. In addition to this speedy alteration, some of AKP’s 
current policies and the remarks of its leaders add further suspicion on their 
genuineness. 
 
Two main critiques can be raised against the AKP’s policies. Firstly, the AKP is 
criticised for adopting a rhetoric of democracy in an instrumental fashion to 
impress the EU. This argument suggests that the AKP conducts democratisation 
reforms selectively to politically empower itself domestically, as opposed to with 
a real commitment to democracy. Baran argues that democracy is only rhetoric 
for the AKP, since she believes it was ‘absurd’ to make major changes in the 
constitution, while leaving key issues untouched (2008: 63). Issues such as the 
immunity from prosecution enjoyed by the MPs; the lack of transparency in 
political party financing; and most significantly the 10% threshold for political 
parties’ representation in the TGNA have been ignored. According to Baran, 
only those democratic reforms that do not threaten the AKP’s control in the 
TGNA were carried out (ibid.: 63). Erdogan’s response to a CoE 
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parliamentarian’s question about the high threshold in Turkey is also noteworthy. 
Erdogan argued that the threshold issue had nothing to do with democracy in 
Turkey (Bianet, 2011). In similar vein, Kumbaracibasi finds it ironic that the 
AKP would adopt a strong rhetoric on democracy and at the same time fail to 
ensure inter-party democracy (2009: 145-8). Overall, these examples show that 
while the AKP supports democracy in its discourse, it is instrumental and 
selective in its approach to democratic reforms in order to fortify its power and 
satisfy the EU. In the words of Cinar:  
‘It is true that the AKP’s claim to credibility was based on its 
promise to protect democracy, but, what it understood by 
democracy was the transfer of power by free elections without 
any military intervention. The mandate included to survive in 
power so as to provide a counterbalance to the secular 
establishment and thereby protect its constituency in the face of 
yet another attempt to discipline Islamic identity in the public 
sphere. But again, it did not include a liberal transformation of 
polity so as to prevent the possibilities of such a disciplining for 
good’ (2011: 22) 
 
Secondly, there are claims that the AKP has pursued specific policies that go 
against the spirit of democracy (Saatcioglu, 2010: 16-21) and show they are more 
interested in pushing forward an Islamic agenda rather than complying with the 
EU. The most obvious example is the AKP’s attempt to criminalise adultery in 
2004, since this goes against the EU’s liberal norms. After strong opposition 
from the EU leaders, and the domestic civil society, the AKP immediately 
removed this change from the agenda. According to Hale and Ozbudun, this 
move demonstrates, on the one hand, the AKP’s concerns for the demands of its 
Islamic core constituency, and on the other, its flexible and pragmatic approach 
to EU conditionality (2010: 71). The AKP’s proposal to reform the institutional 
structure of the Council of Higher Education (CHE)141 carried similar religious 
undertones and showed the party’s desire to appeal to the Islamic core voters by 
making it easier for graduates of religious vocational schools to go to university.  
 
Overall, the AKP claims a strong attachment to the EU and its values. However 
the overnight transmission of its leaders, their statements and contradictory 
                                                
141 The CHE was established after the 1980 military coup to impose ideological controls on 
higher education and particularly academics whose views may diverge from Kemalist orthodoxy 
(Patton, 2007: 351).  
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policies cast doubt on whether they have really internalised this change and 
identify with the EU.  
 
6.3.2 Background 
 
The primary material on AKP MPs’ previous educational and professional 
experiences in the West demonstrates that the conditions for social learning are 
not favourable. The researcher has compiled a comprehensive database on 
backgrounds of governing party and opposition MPs using the online biographies 
on the TGNA website (TGNA, 2010). Educational and professional experiences 
of individual MPs in the West, including Europe, Canada and US, are 
considered. In this analysis, each experience counts as one regardless of its 
length. Subsequently, the average number of experiences per MP are calculated 
for each party in the TGNA, namely the AKP, CHP, MHP and Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP).142 Table 6.1 below demonstrates that every AKP MP 
had an average of 0.43 educational/professional experiences in 
Europe/US/Canada. This suggests only about one in two AKP MPs has lived for 
a period of time in a Western country. This is not substantial and therefore is not 
likely to facilitate a high level of socialisation for AKP MPs. The AKP average is 
higher than the CHP’s (0.36) and only slightly lower than the MHP average 
(0.46). Overall, the differences between the three main parties with regard to this 
indicator are marginal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
142 BDP replaced the pro-Kurdish DTP in December 2009 after the DTP was banned by the 
Constitutional Court.  
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Table 6.1: Average Number of Foreign Experiences per MP 
 
 Number of Western 
Experiences 
Number of Middle Eastern and 
Central Asian Experiences 
AKP 0.43 0.07 
CHP 0.36 0.03 
MHP 0.46 0.00 
BDP 0.00 0.00 
Source: Author’s analysis from the TGNA (2010) website 
 
MPs’ knowledge of EU languages is another factor that can make social learning 
more likely. Once again the researcher has compiled a dataset on the MPs’ 
language knowledge using the TGNA’s database.143 The results demonstrate that 
each AKP MP speaks around one language at a good level, and speak EU 
languages better than other parties. 
 
Table 6.2: Level of Foreign Language Knowledge per MP 
 
 Level of EU Languages 
Knowledge 
Level of Arabic and Persian 
Knowledge 
AKP 2.81 0.67 
CHP 2.49 0.17 
MHP 2.49 0.03 
BDP 1.05 0.10 
Source: Author’s analysis from the TGNA (2010) website 
 
The data on MPs’ backgrounds show that the AKP MP’s 
educational/professional backgrounds in the West are not substantial although 
their knowledge of EU languages is good. This suggests that the conditions 
which make social learning likely are not particularly conducive in the case of 
AKP, although they are slightly higher than for the CHP and MHP MPs. Overall, 
one must approach this data with caution and not overstate the conclusions. 
                                                
143 Score of four for very good knowledge, three for good, two for intermediate and one for little. 
If an MP knows more than one language a single score is given by summing up the scores for 
each language.  
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Firstly, it is important to be aware of the limitations of constructing a direct 
causal link between this evidence and social learning. In other words, one may 
have stayed in Europe for a long time and learned many European languages, 
and still oppose EU integration. Secondly, even though the data allow for a 
comparison between different political parties within the TGNA, this comparison 
does not necessarily help us in building causation. For instance, the evidence 
shows that the AKP MPs are to some extent more exposed to the West and know 
more European languages than the CHP MPs. At the same time, it is also known 
that CHP is very critical of Turkey’s integration with the EU. Therefore, it is 
difficult – if not impossible – to deduce that the AKP MPs identify more with 
Europe and therefore will comply better.  
 
Another interesting point to deduce from the above data is the MPs’ 
educational/professional experiences in Middle East and Central Asia and their 
knowledge of Arabic/Persian. On average one out of 14 AKP MPs have had an 
educational/professional experience in Middle East or Central Asia. This average 
is much lower than their Western experiences, but at the same time it is more 
than twice as much as the MPs of the next party in the list, namely the CHP. 
Similarly, two out of three AKP MPs speak a little Arabic or Persian, which is 
significantly less than their EU language knowledge. What is interesting here is 
that AKP MPs’ level of Arabic/Persian is considerably higher than the other 
parties, i.e. almost four times as high as the CHP. This suggests the AKP MPs 
scored considerably higher than the other parties with regard to their exposure to 
Middle East and Central Asia, as well as their familiarity with Arabic/Persian. 
This implies that the AKP MPs possess a different outlook than the rest of the 
MPs, which is more oriented towards the Islamic world. The recent orientation of 
AKP’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, Asia and Africa may also be 
linked to this (Oguzlu and Kibaroglu, 2009: 590; Burgin, 2010: 430-2; AKP14; 
BDP2; CS7). 
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6.3.3 Exposure 
 
The final condition which makes the government’s social learning more likely is 
their level of exposure to the EU though interactions with EU and MS officials in 
meetings, projects or working groups. Interviews as well as the secondary 
literature demonstrate that the political leadership has a low level of exposure to 
the EU. Governing party MPs very rarely get together with EU officials and 
whenever they do they find themselves in conflictual situations. As an EUSG 
official explained: ‘[t]he communication [between the EU and the political 
leadership] is very limited. Even when it happens, everyone tries to impose their 
own opinion on others. For instance, an MEP comes to Turkey and makes a 
remark about Turkey, the Turkish politicians feel they have to address this 
criticism. They adopt a very defensive reflex’ (EUSG4). Similarly, the Turkish 
MPs are exposed to the MEPs in JPC meetings, however these instances are 
intermittent and do not allow the AKP MPs to engage in social learning. 
Moreover, the JPC meetings tend to be extremely conflictual and dominated by 
discussions about very difficult and sensitive issues like Cyprus, Armenia and 
Turkey’s human rights records. As an AKP MP in the JPC explained, most of the 
MEPs within the JPC come from countries which are against Turkish accession, 
such as Cyprus and Greece, and also from right-wing parties from Holland and 
Germany (AKP14). He believes it is impossible to arrive at a single constructive 
resolution in that environment where most MEPs are trying to sabotage Turkey’s 
accession process (AKP14).  
 
The actors who actually communicate with EU officials on a day-to-day basis are 
the EU-related bureaucrats mostly working in the EUSG through twinning 
programmes, TAIEX activities and other EU projects. The political leadership 
does not have direct contacts with the EU Commission or its representation in 
Turkey and does not participate in association sub-committee meetings. Overall, 
very low levels of exposure mean that conditions for social learning are very 
unfavourable for the governing party. 
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6.3.4 Results 
 
The evidence above shows that the AKP does not identify strongly with the EU 
and conditions are not conducive to initiate social learning. To confirm the 
validity of these findings a counterfactual case needs to be examined. The key 
question is: would the AKP still comply with EU conditions if Turkey was no 
longer considered an EU candidate? The assumption behind this is that, if the 
AKP officials have genuinely internalised EU norms, such as democracy and 
human rights, they would continue the reform process even in the absence of 
membership incentive, in other words, under zero credibility. The AKP leaders 
and key party documents have continuously stated their commitment to these 
values independently of the EU. The Foreign Minister Ali Babacan has also 
maintained ‘Turkey would continue to undertake the liberal-democratic reforms 
even if the EU suspended the accession negotiations’ (Oguzlu and Kibaroglu, 
2009: 586).  
 
These claims, however, should be approached with some caution as Turkmen 
argues: ‘[i]t is a well-known fact that Turkey would not have undertaken these 
substantive reforms on its own, had there been no prospect of joining the 
European Union’ (2008: 148). Similarly, all the interviewees conducted with 
AKP and CHP MPs and bureaucrats, except one,144 maintained that if it was not 
for the EU the speed and extent of democratic reforms would not have been the 
same.145 More specifically, they have suggested that without the EU anchor these 
reforms ‘would be extremely difficult’ (PM2) and ‘would not take place’ (PM1; 
BMB1; SPO1; CHP4). They argued the AKP would not conduct reforms in areas 
which are not a policy priority for the party without the benefits offered by EU 
conditionality. The words of an AKP state minister are critical: ‘[i]f it was not for 
the EU, it would be very difficult to realise these reforms… The EU gave 
motivation and widened the extent of these reforms. If it were not for the EU, 
these reforms would remain as pure wishes’ (AKP5). 
 
                                                
144 EUSG5.  
145 MI1; MI2; BMB1; EUSG2; EUSG4; EUSG5; EUSG7; EUSG9; EUSG10; SPO1; SPO2; 
PM1; PM2; MFA1; MFA3; MFA4; GDS1; GDS2; AKP5; AKP9; AKP14; CHP1; CHP4; CHP5; 
DSP1; BDP1; BDP2; CS2.  
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Overall, the evidence provided above, which makes use of the relevant literature, 
interview data and key AKP documents, portrays a mixed picture. On the one 
hand, the AKP claims a strong attachment to EU and its founding values. 
Similarly, many Islamist circles believe that the political parties with Islamic 
roots, such as the AKP, not only learned a lesson with the 28 February process, 
but also went through a genuine transformation (Fokas, 2004: 154). On the other 
hand, a more common view is that the modernist faction of NOM learned a 
lesson overnight on February 28 and their commitment to the EU is only 
‘tactical’ and a result of ‘realpolitik’ (ibid.: 152-3). When this conflicting picture 
is complemented by further evidence on the current policies of the AKP, their 
relatively strong Middle Eastern outlook, and their unsubstantial European 
background and exposure, there is more support for the view that the AKP 
ascribes only an ‘instrumental value’ to democracy (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 7). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the AKP’s identification with the EU is low 
and the conditions for its social learning are unfavourable. Overall, this suggests 
that the AKP experienced low social learning.  
 
To test the relationship between social learning and compliance through 
congruence method it is necessary to determine the outcomes consistent with low 
levels of social learning. It has been established in the literature that rationalist 
variables carry more power in explaining compliance than social learning 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Therefore, low social learning alone 
may be congruent with either no compliance or low levels of compliance. In this 
respect, it is extremely unlikely for social learning variable alone to explain 
continued compliance under diminished credibility in Turkey. Social learning 
may still matter and it is possible for it to be part of a wider explanation, which 
incorporates other variables such as government’s partisan incentives. However, 
even this scenario is not very likely, since social learning is likely to be weak for 
the current governing party.  
 
Taking into consideration the fact that social learning requires time and does not 
happen overnight, it is very unlikely that it would precede and, in some way, help 
bring about other factors for compliance. At the same time, this research would 
argue that the opposite dynamic is a possibility. It is more convincing to explain 
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the AKP’s compliance under diminished credibility by government’s partisan 
incentives, which in turn, may trigger social learning. It is not possible to say at 
this point whether the AKP will over time internalise these democratic values 
and norms (Robins, 2003: 553), but according to Dagi this is a possibility: 
‘The search for systemic legitimacy and security has thus shaped 
the JDP’s [AKP’s] approach to human rights, which are expected 
to resolve these problems for the JDP [AKP]. This may well be 
regarded as the instrumentalisation of human rights in daily 
politics rather than the internalisation of them. Yet it is argued 
that instrumentalisation through the recognition of the utility of 
human rights for self-preservation may also lead to 
institutionalisation of human rights’ (2006: 89). 
 
 
6.4 Political Lock-in 
 
The final variable to be considered to explain broader compliance patterns in 
Turkey is political lock-in within HI. The political lock-in hypothesis is: if 
integration with the EU is the main facet of Turkish FP; and/or if the political 
leadership has already established EU membership as a policy goal and started 
complying with EU conditionality (before 2005), then it is likely to continue 
complying. This hypothesis makes two claims. Firstly, it suggests that the 
traditional orientation of Turkish FP may have an influence on how the future 
governments formulate their EU policy. Secondly, the hypothesis assumes that 
once a government sets a FP priority and starts acting on it, this policy is likely to 
become path-dependent and sticky. It becomes very costly for the government to 
alter a set policy substantially, since it may seem to contradict itself. This section 
finds that there is a high level of political lock-in with regard to both aspects. At 
the same time, the counterfactual analysis shows that even a high level of lock-in 
does not hold strong enough explanatory power to explain continued compliance 
alone. It is only meaningful to consider this factor in conjunction with the DPM’s 
government’s partisan incentives variable. Once again, this variable does not 
vary over the time period under analysis. Therefore, congruence method coupled 
with counterfactual design is used. 
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6.4.1 Turkish FP Trajectory 
 
Modernisation and reaching a higher level of civilisation was equated with 
Westernisation in Turkey from the late Ottoman period onwards (EUSG9). When 
the Turkish Republic was established in 1923 the direction of its FP was also set 
as West, which was most commonly interpreted as Europe (AKP14). As a result, 
Europeanisation and further integration with Europe formed the ‘spine of 
Turkish foreign policy’ (CS5) and became a strategic target (BDP2). 
 
In line with this state policy, Turkey has built close institutional ties with the 
West and Europe since the 1940s. Turkey is a founding member of the UN, a 
member of the CoE (since 1949), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1952) and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1961). Moreover, 
it is an associate member of the Western European Union (1992), a party to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1954), and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(1975). Turkey’s search for EU membership is, therefore, only a continuation of 
this trajectory of relations with Europe.  
 
The AKP’s continued compliance with the EU can be seen in this light. Given 
that integration with the EU is recognised as a key feature of Turkish state policy 
(CS1), it can be argued that the political lock-in for any party in government to 
comply is high. This political lock-in can explain why the AKP is not really in a 
position to abandon this state policy (SPO2; MFA3) and continues to comply 
even under diminished credibility. Even if the relations between the EU and 
Turkey deteriorate during negotiations, the AKP cannot afford to terminate the 
process (MFA3). As the CN Bagis has recently maintained ‘we will not be the 
ones pulling the plug’ in this process (Haberturk, 2011). Overall, the direction of 
the independent variable is congruent with continued compliance. 
 
A counterfactual case can be used to test whether this established relationship is 
causal.  The key question here is: would compliance continue in T2, regardless of 
the party in government? To address this it is necessary to examine the reform 
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trajectory of the previous government in power between 1999 and 2002, namely 
the DSP-led coalition. It is clear that important constitutional changes and 
harmonisation packages related to EU’s political conditionality were adopted 
during this government’s tenure. Most importantly, the death penalty was 
abolished. This reform is significant because the ultra-nationalist partner of the 
coalition – the MHP, approved it even after the PKK146 leader was captured 
(CS7). The fact that a party like the MHP gave its consent to such a reform 
shows the significance of the political lock-in effects. Due to the fact that EU is a 
state policy in Turkey, it seems to be above politics and political parties. Also 
considering the fact that parties tend to be more pro-EU once in government, this 
counterfactual analysis suggests compliance would continue in T2 regardless of 
who was in power.  
 
The key point here, however, is the extent of compliance. Compliance may have 
continued marginally by other parties under diminished credibility in T2. But it is 
not likely to be at the same extent and speed as the current government, who has 
strategic interests to comply. As a high level MFA official stated:  
‘The process would have progressed in one way or another. The 
government in 1999 was very different from today’s but they also 
passed three important reform packages. Everyone forgets this but 
they abolished the death penalty… In that respect, the process 
would have continued. But the current government held onto the 
process more eagerly than any previous government. Therefore, 
we would not have come this far with other parties’ (MFA3).  
 
In sum, this factor is causally related to continued compliance, however it fails to 
explain why compliance increased as much as it did, and at a higher speed in 
some areas, under diminished credibility in Turkey.  
 
6.4.2 AKP’s Previous Policy  
 
In addition to Turkey’s FP targets, the AKP’s previous policy may also create 
political lock-in effects, which would explain the AKP’s continued compliance 
within T2. The fact that the AKP adopted a language of reform, democratisation 
                                                
146 The Kurdistan Workers’ Party is a separatist terrorist organisation. 
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and human rights and acted on this successfully within the T1 period, creates 
expectations from both inside and outside of Turkey for further reform. If the 
AKP abandons its attachment to EU compliance in T2, it would be taking a 
significant political risk or even committing a ‘political suicide’ in Dagi’s words 
(AC2).  
 
Firstly, if the AKP abandoned these reforms, it would contradict itself and 
‘experience a similar paradox CHP experienced’ (AC2). Secondly, it would stop 
being praised for its record of reform. In a way, the AKP’s reform record has 
become part of its pro-EU and neo-liberal identity. If it stops complying, its past 
reform performance will no longer be a reference for the AKP (AC2). As Dagi 
argues, ‘[w]hat will keep AKP a reformist party is mostly its reformist past. It is 
like a bicycle. If you stop you’ll fall’ (AC2). Finally, it will no longer be able to 
distinguish itself from the Eurosceptic opposition parties within the Turkish 
political system, such as the CHP and MHP.  
 
Due to all these reasons, an AKP no longer committed to EU compliance risks 
losing a significant portion of its public support. Therefore, it is compelled to 
continue its pro-EU rhetoric and compliance in T2. In this respect, the direction 
of political lock-in variable is congruent with the AKP’s compliance in T2. At 
the same time, only using the AKP’s past performance to predict future 
compliance provides a limited explanation, since it fails to explain why the level, 
and in some areas the speed, of compliance increased as much as it did in T2. Put 
differently, even though the direction of the variance in the independent and 
dependent variables are congruent, the magnitude of variance in compliance 
cannot be explained by political lock-in effects.  
 
Overall, both the Turkish FP and the AKP’s past policy trajectories create 
important political lock-in effects. This is congruent with the AKP’s continued 
compliance under diminished credibility in T2. However, the political lock-in 
effects alone are not strong enough to explain the broader patterns of continued 
compliance and the AKP’s selective approach to it. This explanation is only 
meaningful when considered in combination with the government’s partisan 
incentives.  
 
212 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out to explain broader compliance patterns in T2 under 
diminished credibility by examining the preferences and actions of the political 
leadership. It has shown that the most important motive behind the AKP’s 
compliance was the government’s partisan incentives. The AKP used the EU as a 
signalling device to the Kemalists and the electorate in order to survive, gain 
political legitimacy and increase its electoral appeal in the Turkish political 
system. The AKP’s strategic use of the EU in this manner provides a strong 
explanation of the extent and speed of compliance within T2. Dagi summarises 
this tactical use:  
‘[The relation between the EU and AKP is an] obligatory love… 
It started as a love story in 2002, which the AKP was confined to. 
The AKP tried to create political and societal legitimacy around 
the EU. Secondly, through the EU it tried to secure its political 
identity, power and presence… [T]his lies at the bottom of AKP-
EU relations. The AKP’s existential need for the EU and its 
domestic political needs overlapped with the EU’s demands… By 
being attached to the EU target, the AKP reached out to other 
societal groups which were outside of its natural constituency… 
The AKP’s EU target was a very important mechanism and 
framework to build wide societal and political coalitions’ (AC2). 
 
Additionally, the political lock-in effects stemming from the general direction of 
Turkish FP and the AKP’s previous reform trajectory also contribute to 
explaining continued compliance, albeit to a lesser extent. At the same time, the 
AKP’s identification with the EU has been assessed to be low and the conditions 
which make social learning likely are not favourable. Therefore, the level of 
social learning is likely to be low for the governing party and is likely to have 
had a very limited impact on continued compliance.  
 
This analysis has used congruence method and counterfactual design to arrive at 
these findings. Since all three variables were specific to the governing party in 
power, no variance was observed within the T2 period, thereby making it 
necessary to use within-case methods. Even though the relationships established 
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by the congruence method has been checked by counterfactual design it is 
imperative to use other within-case methods to validate these conclusions. The 
next chapter uses process tracing in the field of broadcasting rights of minorities 
to test these three variables.  
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Chapter Seven: 
The AKP’s Kurdish ‘Opening’ in the Area of 
Broadcasting Rights: A Process Tracing Analysis 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There have been significant policy changes in line with EU demands for minority 
rights in Turkey. It has been argued that the freedom to use Kurdish in 
broadcasting, books, music cassettes and language courses today would have 
previously been unimaginable without the pressure of EU conditionality (Usul, 
2011: 154). Yet an exclusive focus on EU conditionality fails to explain why 
compliance continued in this politically costly area despite decreasing credibility 
after 2005? 
 
The previous chapter has concluded that the AKP complies with EU conditions 
primarily due to government’s partisan incentives. This chapter probes the 
validity of this finding through an in-depth examination of one particular legal 
change: the broadcasting rights of minorities in Turkey and more specifically a 
particular law147 which allowed for television broadcasting by the state channel 
TRT148 in languages and dialects other than Turkish, 24 hours a day. The chapter 
initially examines the overriding features of the AKP’s Kurdish policy and looks 
at how Law No. 5767 was adopted in more detail. Following this analysis, three 
competing explanations for compliance are assessed – government’s partisan 
incentives, social learning and political lock-in. 
 
The analysis confirms that the AKP was motivated by partisan incentives for 
legislating in this area and used EU conditionality strategically to justify its 
reforms. It firstly aimed to increase its voter base in the Kurdish-dominated 
                                                
147 Law No. 5767. 
148 Turkish Radio and Television Corporation. 
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regions without losing its traditional electorate. Secondly, by legislating, it was 
able to control the content of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish 
through a state broadcaster. Finally, this legislation allowed the AKP to gain 
credit with the EU. Additionally, the liberalisation dynamic created by the 
coalition government in early 2000s created a political lock-in effect, which 
made it more likely for the AKP to adopt this law. Lastly, this chapter 
demonstrates that social learning mechanisms have been weak for the governing 
party. Substantial evidence in this case study shows that the party’s discourse and 
some of its policies contradict the protection of minority rights. Overall, the 
adoption and the timing of the Law No. 5767 are best explained by government’s 
the partisan incentives and political lock-in effects.  
 
7.1 The AKP’s Kurdish Policy 
 
The AKP government’s policy towards the Kurdish population in Turkey has 
been recognised by some as the ‘boldest effort ever made by a Turkish 
government to find a peaceful political resolution to the long-festering Kurdish 
question’ (Somer and Liaras, 2010: 152). However, even though some aspects of 
AKP’s Kurdish policy contradict the traditional Kemalist line taken by previous 
governments,149 a closer look demonstrates that it has also borrowed a number of 
important elements from the established state tradition in Turkey.  
 
Firstly, the AKP stresses the rights of individuals rather than the collective rights 
of Kurdish people. This is in line with the Turkish state ideology which sees 
collective rights as a form of discrimination and more importantly as a ‘trigger 
for the territorial disintegration of the country’ (Tocci, 2006: 124). Secondly, the 
AKP adopts a classic statist response in thinking it can, alone, solve this problem 
and deliver results. In this respect, it refuses to negotiate with legitimate parties 
representing the Kurdish population. As the head of Human Rights Association 
maintained: ‘you cannot solve the Kurdish problem this way. There is a Kurdish 
side. You need to sit down and talk to them, negotiate with them, solve the 
                                                
149 With the exception of the ANAP government led by Ozal who was also sympathetic to the 
demands of Kurdish minority. 
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problem together with them… The AKP is pursuing the same old 90 year old 
policy of ignoring the Kurds’ (CS7). Overall, the AKP’s Kurdish policy is 
frequently criticised as being statist and not sufficiently reformist (CS7; BDP1; 
BDP2). 
 
At the same time, the AKP’s Kurdish policy does have some distinct features. 
Firstly, for the AKP, ‘Islamic solidarity’ is the solution to the Kurdish problem 
(Oktem, 2008: 2; Yavuz, 2009: 187-91; Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006: 103).  The AKP 
government has framed the Kurdish problem to be a result of the secular 
divisions created between Turks and Kurds by the military (Yavuz and Ozcan, 
2006: 103). The AKP believes this problem can best be addressed by ‘Muslim 
brotherhood’ and therefore puts forward Islam as ‘cement’ (ibid.: 102) or ‘shared 
glue’ (Yavuz, 2009: 191) to end the societal divisions between Turks and Kurds. 
 
Secondly, the AKP sees economic problems in the predominantly Kurdish 
South-east region as the primary concern. This is in contradiction to Kurdish 
groups who believe that the economic underdevelopment of the region is a side-
effect of years of cultural oppression (Liaras, 2009: 9).150 As a result, the AKP 
addresses this perceived problem through economic means.151 In other words, the 
AKP, with the support of charity organisations close to the party, aims to 
encourage investment and reduce unemployment in the region. This way, they 
were able to increase the living standards in the region without fully addressing 
the Kurdish demands with respect to individual and collective rights (Oktem, 
2008: 8; BDP2).  
 
The final and the most important aspect of the AKP’s Kurdish policy is its 
vagueness (CS1; CS2; EUSG1). From 2002 onwards, the AKP either chose to 
ignore the Kurdish issue or mentioned it without clearly articulating the policy 
content (Yavuz, 2009: 173, 185; Somer and Liaras, 2010: 152; Oktem, 2008: 2). 
This was particularly the case with the ‘democratic opening’ process announced 
to the public in 2009. The announcement was not followed by any concrete 
                                                
150 Many Kurds voted for the AKP due to this economic focus. Yavuz argues that ‘people want 
tangible improvements in their lives rather than intangible ideological rhetoric’ (2009: 197). 
151 The AKP is known to have provided material inducements to people in the region, such as 
coal aid and food (Tezcur, 2010: 782; The Economist, 2008). 
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roadmap about the manner in which this opening was to be accomplished. 
Instead, the AKP’s Kurdish policy continued to be vague.  
 
7.2 The Broadcasting Rights of Minorities in Turkey and the Law No. 5767 
 
The political reforms in the area of broadcasting rights of minorities started to 
take place with the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999. 
Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution were amended under the DSP-led coalition 
government in 2001. However, without the necessary regulatory framework, 
these changes did not actually improve minority protection in broadcasting. The 
coalition government also passed a law152 in 2002 which paved the way for 
broadcasting in languages and dialects traditionally used in the daily lives of 
people in Turkey, on the condition that these broadcasts do not oppose the 
unitary nature of the Turkish state. The AKP continued these reform efforts after 
it came to power through the 6th and 7th reform packages in 2003, which had 
more impact on the situation of minorities (Yildiz and Muler, 2008: 82). More 
reforms followed in 2004, with a new law on broadcasting adding enforceable 
provisions to the previous changes that allowed TRT, as well as the private 
radio/television stations, to broadcast in minority languages. Starting with June 
2004, TRT started to broadcast in Bosnian, Kurdish, Arabic and Circassian, but 
the private broadcasters did not receive permission until January 2006. Even then 
only three out of twelve media outlets obtained permission and these started to 
operate under strict time153 and programme154 restrictions. Later in 2006, some of 
these time restrictions were lifted for music and cinematographic works, but they 
still held for news programmes and discussion shows. In June 2008, Law No. 
5767 which allows for broadcasting in languages and dialects other than Turkish 
on TRT was approved and a separate channel, TRT-6, solely devoted to Kurdish 
started to broadcast 24 hours a day from January 2009 onwards. Finally, all the 
restrictions on broadcasting in minority languages at the local level were 
removed in 2010.  
                                                
152 Law No. 4771 Concerning Amendments to Miscellaneous Laws.  
153 Forty minutes a day and four hours per week allowed on TV. 
154 State authorisation is required for the content of TV programmes.  
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The particular legislation under examination here is Law No. 5767 Concerning 
Amendments to the Turkish Radio and Television155 adopted in June 2008. 
During the preparation stage of this draft law, neither the EU-related bureaucracy 
nor civil society had any input regarding the broadcasting rights of minorities 
(EUSG1; EUSG2; EUSG10; CS2). More importantly, the AKP did not consult 
the Kurdish groups or the DTP (BDP1; BDP2). Instead, it was mainly prepared 
within the AKP circles. The draft law was forwarded to the TGNA from the 
Prime Ministry on March 7, 2008. At the TGNA, the draft bill received positive 
feedback from the Plan and Budget Committee.156 Finally, the TGNA adopted 
the bill on June 11, 2008 and it was published in the Official Gazette on June 26, 
2008. 
 
The discussions in the TGNA regarding the 12 articles of this law were heated 
and spread over six sessions within three weeks.157 The key point of debate was 
regarding article 6 which changed article 21 of the original TRT law158 by 
allowing the ‘TGNA, open university, educational and teaching broadcasts, and 
other broadcasts’ to be conducted ‘in languages and dialects other than Turkish’ 
(TGNA, 2008b: 60). The nationalist MHP was a very harsh critic of the proposal 
because of this clause. The main opposition party, the CHP, was less vocal 
during the parliamentary debates but it too was against adoption due to this 
clause. The Kurdish DTP, on the other hand, made some demands going beyond 
this proposal, but they were generally in line with the government’s position.  
 
The MHP tried to make the case that making this amendment to the TRT’s law 
was unconstitutional, since the constitution maintains that Turkish is the official 
language of the state, therefore a state institution should not be allowed to 
broadcast in languages other than Turkish. Moreover, they speculated that 
                                                
155 This law predominantly aims to reform and restructure TRT so that it has a more flexible 
organisation, less bureaucratic structure, more accountability and is able to better follow 
technological advances (Prime Ministry, 2008: 2-7). 
156 It was also sent to the Constitutional Committee, however this committee did not provide any 
opinion. 
157 The 23rd parliament’s 2nd legislative year, 102nd, 110th, 111th, 114th, 115th and 116th sessions 
between May 9, 2008 and June 11, 2008. 
158 No. 2954. 
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broadcasting in languages other than Turkish would lead to a national education 
transmitted through minority languages, eventually causing the breakdown of 
national unity (TGNA, 2008c: 61). Additionally, the MHP claimed that this 
legislative amendment was being conducted under the pressure of external 
imperialistic powers, such as the US and the EU. They argued that the AKP aims 
to impress these external powers by making this change, which would eventually 
lead to the ‘balkanisation’ of Turkey (TGNA, 2008d: 62-9). The nationalist party 
even went as far as saying that there was no domestic demand for such 
legislation, and it was solely externally initiated.  
 
The DTP, on the other hand, generally went along with the governing party, in 
criticising the MHP MPs’ speeches and applauded the AKP MPs’. But they too 
had some reservations. Most importantly, the DTP wanted the TRT’s law to be 
restructured so that the clause about broadcasting in languages and dialects other 
than Turkish are among the main institutional principles, as opposed to being 
added as a side clause related to educational broadcasts (TGNA, 2008b: 44). The 
DTP believed that this was a suboptimal solution and ran the same risk as the 
2002 law which was interpreted restrictively by the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council (RTUK).  
 
The AKP’s suggested formula, which was marginally closer to the DTP’s 
position, prevailed. The law gave permission to TRT to broadcast in minority 
languages without restrictions for 24 hours a day. At the same time, this right 
was not inscribed as part of the underlying principles guiding the operation of 
TRT.  
 
7.3 The AKP’s Motives behind Adopting Law No. 5767 
 
This section addresses the central question of this chapter: why has the AKP 
initiated this costly legislation at the particular moment it did? The following 
three sections examine various competing explanations of compliance under 
diminished credibility, namely the government’s partisan incentives, social 
learning and political lock-in. 
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7.3.1 The Government’s Partisan Incentives 
 
‘EU discourse has legitimised what were previously considered taboo subjects, 
providing the political space both for suppressed Kurdish demands to come to 
the fore and for these to be discussed (albeit not necessarily accepted) within the 
more liberal segments of the establishment’ (Tocci, 2006: 133). In other words, 
EU conditionality offered a legitimate ground for reform in the area of minority 
rights for the AKP by weakening the opposition from the nationalists, Kemalists 
and secularists. The fact that most of the minority-related reforms were adopted 
within EU harmonisation packages demonstrates this point.159 More specifically 
in the case of Law No. 5767, the AKP MPs made references to EU demands to 
justify Kurdish broadcasting on a state channel during discussions in the TGNA 
(TGNA, 2008a: 66, 75). As the previous chapter explained, the EU’s demands 
regarding the rights of minorities overlapped with the AKP’s domestic political 
interests. In other words, domestic political considerations were the main force 
behind this reform, but the AKP could not have delivered it without aligning it to 
EU conditionality. The section below demonstrates how the AKP used EU 
conditionality strategically in this area to push forward this reform and achieve 
three main goals: improve its domestic popularity; control the broadcasting in 
minority languages with a state channel; and finally gain credit with the EU.   
 
7.3.1.1 Enlarging Electoral Support 
 
The first and the most important motive for compliance in this area is increasing 
domestic popularity with potential Kurdish and liberal voters. The DPM 
hypothesises that the AKP would conduct reforms addressed at the Kurdish 
population if they think this would increase their domestic support. Moreover, 
given the costly nature of reforms in this field, the AKP would be expected to 
conduct reforms after general elections so as not to lose any of its traditional, 
conservative and nationalistic voter base.  
                                                
159 For instance the 7th harmonization package facilitated Kurdish broadcasting in 2003.  
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The timing of the preparation and adoption of Law No. 5767 confirms these 
hypotheses. The cabinet agreed on the draft version of Law No. 5767 on January 
21, 2008 and the Prime Ministry forwarded the final draft to the TGNA on 
March 7, 2008 (Prime Ministry, 2008). After a few weeks of debate, the TGNA 
finally adopted the Law on June 11, 2008. This suggests the cabinet started 
working on the legislation shortly after the general elections and agreed on a 
common draft only six months after the July 2007 general elections. The bill was 
adopted and published in the official gazette less than a year after the elections. 
In this respect, 2008 offered a great opportunity for the AKP to conduct risky 
political reforms, since it was feeling particularly confident after having secured 
a popular mandate in 2007. As one interviewee confirmed: ‘[TRT-6] was not 
costly for the AKP [in terms of votes]. Usually these kinds of changes are 
harmful for parties… But they had just come out of the elections as a strong 
party. There weren’t any upcoming elections’ (CS1). 
 
Moreover, the conflict between the AKP and the secular/Kemalist establishment 
regarding the presidential elections ended to the advantage of the AKP in 2007. 
The AKP was able to renounce the military’s interference with the presidential 
elections and succeeded in securing the presidency (Somer and Liaras, 2010: 
156). In other words, the two important veto-players in Turkish politics, namely 
the military and the presidency, had either been weakened or switched to the 
AKP (Liaras, 2009: 7). According to Somer and Liaras, the ‘changes in civil-
military relations since 2007 have increased the autonomy of civilian politics 
from military supervision and the government’s ability to institute liberal 
reforms, to which the security-conscious and defensive nationalist military and 
judiciary might object’ (2010: 156). Moreover, after this confrontation, the AKP 
was seen as the victim and was rewarded with an increased majority in the 2007 
elections. In this respect, the AKP had found the perfect opportunity after the 
2007 elections to focus on minority reforms without risking a conflict with the 
secular establishment. 
 
 At the same time, this reform was conducted shortly before the March 2009 
local elections. The AKP, whose support had increased in the South-east region 
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in 2007 in comparison to 2002, sought to gain more local representation in 2009. 
As a DTP MP explained: ‘[b]reaking the DTP hegemony in the region [in the 
2009 local elections] required taking steps. There is no other party in the region 
other than the AKP. In comparison to the DTP they [the AKP] have more MPs… 
But they needed to take further steps. They knew that they could not take 
tangible steps right before the general elections’ (BDP2). In line with this, the 
AKP prepared a very popular and eye-catching reform before the local elections, 
allowing 24 hours of Kurdish broadcasting on TRT, and hoped that this would 
transfer DTP votes to the AKP.  
 
Electoral competition between the AKP and the pro-Kurdish DTP had always 
been strong since the AKP gained a substantive amount of votes in the Kurdish 
regions in 2002. This result threatened the very existence of the DTP and has 
automatically made it suspicious and critical of the AKP’s reform attempts 
targeting the Kurdish population as these reforms were likely to garner more 
support for the AKP at the expense of the DTP. However, this risk did not 
prevent the DTP from siding with the government during the discussions and 
voting for Law No. 5767 in the TGNA. At the same time, DTP MPs still 
maintained a sceptical stance towards TRT-6 outside of the parliament and 
believed that the reforms conducted by the AKP were utilitarian, and aimed in 
essence at attracting more Kurdish votes as opposed to actually guaranteeing 
human rights. The leader Ahmet Turk declared that: ‘[t]here is a need for a 
broadcasting policy that understands Kurds and meets their demands. We are 
carefully observing the process. We will see in time whether this is something 
that was initiated with the elections in mind’ (TRT, 2009).  
 
Overall, the timing of Law No. 5767 suggests that the AKP conducted a utility 
calculation to expand its domestic support in the Kurdish areas, without 
sacrificing its original voter base. Taking a step back and briefly examining the 
AKP’s broader Kurdish policy shows that similar calculations were at work. 
After 2002, the AKP’s Kurdish policy was to postpone any action until the 2007 
elections and even to pretend that there was no problem, so as not to get into a 
potential conflict with the secular establishment and particularly the military 
during its first term in office (Yavuz, 2009: 185; Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006: 108). 
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Once it secured a popular mandate in 2007 for the second time; resisted a ban by 
the Constitutional Court; undermined the secular establishment by winning the 
presidency; and weakened the military through the Ergenekon investigations,160 
it then focused on the Kurdish issue. However, even then, the AKP lacked a 
clearly articulated policy, let alone a detailed programme or a roadmap. This was 
mainly due to the fact that the Kurdish issue was extremely divisive within the 
party and among its voter base,161 who are predominantly Turkish Muslims, 
many of whom are strongly nationalistic (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 76-7). In line 
with this vague policy, Erdogan tailored his discourse on the South-east 
depending on who he was addressing. For instance, he talked about the problems 
related to Kurdish identity, cultural rights and democratic reform packages 
during his visits in the South-east; whereas he focused exclusively on terrorism 
and military operations during his encounters with the secular establishment and 
more nationalist voter base situated in central Anatolia (Cakir, 2007).  
 
The AKP’s ‘democratic opening’ policy was similarly vague in content. Somer 
and Liaras argue that from the beginning the public support for the opening was 
extremely weak and criticism was very strong even within the government’s own 
constituency. Despite such reaction, the AKP continued to talk about its 
democratic opening policy up until 2011 general elections. However, this policy 
did not end up being politically costly for them, since no controversial reforms 
were proposed during this period. In this respect, the AKP acted strategically by 
conducting important reforms, such as Law No. 5767, shortly after general 
elections to attract the Kurdish vote. However, despite keeping up the discourse 
of reform, the AKP did not introduce any other substantial reforms afterwards so 
as not to alienate its support from ethnic Turks. 
 
Overall, the AKP’s Kurdish policy was informed by electoral politics, as 
demonstrated by the timing of legislation and its vague content in order to attract 
new votes without threatening its core support. This strategy in general can be 
                                                
160 The name of an alleged Kemalist ultra-nationalist organization with ties to Turkish security 
forces that is claimed to be responsible for almost all acts of political violence and to have 
connections with all terrorist groups in the last 30 years in Turkey. 
161 A content analysis of religious-conservative newspapers conducted by Somer and Liaras 
reveals that there are very strong internal divisions within this camp (2010: 157-62).  
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described as being successful, since the AKP’s votes in the Kurdish regions has 
continuously increased in general elections since 2002. The 2007 elections was a 
big success for the AKP, since it became the largest party in most of the Kurdish 
provinces with 52% of the votes, where the DTP won only 16% (Ali, 2011). 
Similarly, in the 2011 general elections the AKP managed to increase its votes 
further and gained 62% of the votes in the region, whereas the pro-Kurdish BDP 
remained at 23.4%. The only disappointment was the 2009 local elections, where 
the AKP’s percentage of votes decreased.  
 
7.3.1.2 Controlling Broadcasting 
 
As a second motivation, Law No. 5767 enabled the AKP to control the content of 
broadcasting in minority languages through a state channel. This is also in line 
with the DPM which would hypothesise that the AKP would only engage in 
liberalisation reforms if the benefits exceed the costs. In this respect, it is useful 
to explain why the AKP adopted this law in 2008 rather than before. The legal 
framework for broadcasting in minority languages was already in place in 2002 
and private channels were allowed to broadcast in languages other than Turkish 
under various restrictions after 2006. So, why did the AKP wait this long to 
liberalise broadcasting in Kurdish? The answer to this has been explicitly voiced 
both by government and DTP MPs during TGNA discussions. A DPT MP 
explained the justification for this law:  
‘Did you ever think about the fact that at a time when 
communication and media have been developing at an incredible 
speed and at a time when there are more than ten Kurdish TV 
channels broadcasting all over the world through satellite, it is not 
meaningful to have these restrictions anymore?’ (TGNA, 2008a: 
74).  
 
Similarly, during a speech by a MHP MP criticising the law, an AKP MP 
interrupted: ‘[t]ake your heads out of the sand. They [Kurdish people] are 
watching ROJ-TV 24 hours a day anyways. Let them watch TRT. What’s wrong 
with that?’ (TGNA, 2008c: 63). These statements show that this legislative 
change came at a time when the Kurdish people in Turkey were already able to 
watch more than ten channels broadcasting in Kurdish, 24 hours a day. Some of 
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these channels were even banned by the Turkish state, such as ROJ-TV, for 
conducting propaganda for a terrorist organisation. The fact that these broadcasts 
took place beyond Turkish state control and provided uncensored news and 
opinions about the Kurdish issue constituted a problem for the governing party 
(Ayata, 2011: 6). In this respect, the AKP realised that the time and programme 
restrictions applied to private and public TV/radio channels in Turkey no longer 
made sense. Moreover, it would no longer be costly to legislate in this area, since 
broadcasting was already de facto liberalised. 
 
Moreover, the AKP became concerned that some of these illegal channels 
viewed by satellite were highly popular in the region and the state had no power 
to control the content of these broadcasts.  
‘We are aware that an important part of our nationals have a 
different mother tongue. At a time when technology is so far 
advanced, our nationals who have a different mother tongue 
watch broadcasts by different channels and are subject to 
information from all around the world … and they are going into 
different zones of influence. Do you think that this is an issue 
which we can close our eyes to or turn our heads away and 
ignore? Don’t you think we need people from our country, 
amongst our own nationals to explain, to broadcast and to talk to 
our own nationals about what is going on in Turkey and in the 
world?’(TGNA, 2008e: 27). 
 
Similarly, another AKP MP maintained:  
 
‘Today, completely illegal channels are able to broadcast via 
satellite in Turkey materials, which threaten the unity of our 
country and our nation. Our main aim is to prevent these 
broadcasts conducted in different languages and dialects from 
being abused by others, and instead be conducted by an institution 
which is controlled by state’ (TGNA, 2008c: 73, italics added). 
 
This final quotation is particularly interesting since it explicitly states controlling 
the content of broadcasts as a motive behind adopting Law No. 5767.  In this 
respect, the utilitarian logic is once again confirmed by the AKP MPs’ 
statements, which mostly centred on fighting terrorism, justifying the military 
operations conducted outside of Turkey’s borders to people in the region (ibid.: 
67) and controlling the content of broadcasts, rather than improving the cultural 
rights of Kurdish people.  
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The DTP MPs criticised the AKP’s justification for the law, rather than its 
content: 
 ‘It is also crucial with what aim you are broadcasting in Kurdish. 
The PM’s speech on this issue yesterday in Diyarbakir was really 
cautionary… [H]e said the following: “Our new openings in 
television and radio broadcasting will remove the psychological 
and cultural ground for terrorism in an important respect.” Our 
PM did not say that it is the duty of TRT to respond to the needs 
of every citizen living in this country as a requirement of public 
broadcasting and democracy. He doesn’t say that Kurds, Arabs, 
and other different ethnic identities, from now on you too are 
going to find yourselves on TRT, and this is your natural 
right…[B]ut what does he say? He builds sentences which imply 
that this channel will serve the aim of psychological war’ (TGNA, 
2008b, 44-5). 
 
Similarly, the civil society representatives also questioned the actual motives 
behind the AKP’s reform: 
‘A change is approaching and if they [the AKP] do not control 
this they [the Kurds] will. “If we don’t make them watch us rather 
than ROJ-TV, these people will once again start to arm”… Some 
people see this [law] as a good development… Others think this is 
only show and the government is trying to impose the same state 
ideology but this time in Kurdish’ (CS6). 
 
‘The aim is not to broadcast in the Kurdish mother tongue. The 
PM has said in a speech: [the aim is] “to explain our views in this 
language”. This is unacceptable “our views”. If you base your 
broadcasting philosophy on this, it won’t have a backing from the 
pubic’ (CHP5). 
 
From a utilitarian point of the view, the AKP did not have much to lose from this 
law. People in the region were already able to watch illegal broadcasts in 
Kurdish. The AKP brought an alternative to these channels and at the same time 
maintained the right to control the content of the broadcasts via a state channel. 
As Ayata argues: ‘the state television’s Kurdish broadcast has to be evaluated in 
the context of the Turkish state’s … effort to close down ROJ-TV. Rather than 
fighting ROJ-TV by diplomatic means only – which has proved largely 
unsuccessful for the past fifteen years – the Turkish state has now entered into a 
competition with ROJ-TV through TRT 6’ (2011: 14). 
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7.3.1.3 Gaining credit with the EU 
 
As a final utilitarian motivation, the AKP aimed to create a favourable 
impression with the EU. 2008 was a time when the relations between the EU and 
Turkey were not progressing well. Since the negotiations opened in 2005, most 
of the chapters had been blocked by the EU, which also prevented other chapters 
from being provisionally closed. Liberalising broadcasting rights was important 
because it allowed the AKP to demonstrate to the EU that Turkey was still 
complying with the EU despite the blocked chapters. As Yildiz and Muler argue 
the reforms conducted in the area of broadcasting were ‘eye-catching’, 
‘dramatic’ and ‘readily cognisable across Europe’ when reported (2008: 90). 
They go on to argue that ‘they [these reforms] have met with considerable 
recognition among European media commentators as indicative of Turkey’s 
efforts to satisfy EU demands to improve the protection of Kurdish rights’ (ibid.: 
90). Similarly, a former high level EUSG official declared that: ‘[t]his law was 
adopted to suggest activity [to the EU]… The end of 2008 [is when] changes in 
the cabinet [took place], Egemen Bagis came. The AKP wanted to make one last 
move in this area, wanted to take one more step. TRT-6 was crucial for this. I 
was in the EUSG then, and we used this as an example in every single report we 
prepared for the EU’ (EUSG1). 
 
Overall, the evidence in this section gives strong support to the government’s 
partisan incentives explanation for the adoption of Law 5767. As shown above 
this law was adopted shortly after the general and before the local elections, at a 
time when there were already more than ten Kurdish channels broadcasting over 
satellite. Therefore, the timing of law demonstrates that the AKP made a utility 
calculation in terms of maximising votes without threatening its traditional voter 
base. Moreover, the AKP also minimised the costs of opposition from outside 
and within the party, since the AKP was able to present this reform as a way to 
control dangerous broadcasts already available to Kurdish population. Finally, 
the generally vague nature of the AKP’s Kurdish policy confirms the utilitarian 
expectations, since this vagueness allowed the AKP to look attractive to Kurdish 
voters without losing any nationalistic supporters.  
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At the same time, it needs to be underlined that reform in minority rights in 
Turkey was only made possible through the influence of EU conditionality 
starting with its candidacy in 1999 (Tocci, 2006: 129). As Karakaya Polat argues 
‘[t]he normalisation of the state and the mainstream discourses in regard to the 
Kurdish issue would not have been possible without the external legitimisation 
provided by the EU’ (2008: 2). In this respect, the AKP made strategic use of the 
favourable context provided by EU conditionality to push forward the reform in 
the area of broadcasting.  
 
7.3.2 Social Learning 
 
Social learning offers an alternative explanation to why the AKP adopted the 
Law No. 5767. This line of thought hypothesises that if the AKP genuinely 
believes in the liberalisation of cultural rights for minorities, it would adopt this 
legislation. Chapter Six demonstrated the AKP’s social learning to be weak and 
therefore suggested it was not likely to explain continued compliance. The 
analysis of Law No. 5767 finds equally weak levels of social learning, which is 
therefore unlikely to explain why the AKP liberalised broadcasting in minority 
languages.  
 
If the AKP is genuine about attachment to minority rights, then these values 
would shape its policy programme and be mentioned in the speeches of high 
level officials, particularly PM Erdogan. The AKP party programme sees 
‘cultural differences as richness’ and maintains that ‘languages other than 
Turkish strengthen the unity of the country’ given that ‘the official language and 
the language of education remain Turkish’ (AKP, 2010). This demonstrates that 
the AKP has verbally committed itself to protecting the cultural rights of 
minority groups. Additionally, the PM has also voiced his support in various 
speeches. The most ground-breaking of these was the August 12, 2005 speech 
given in Diyarbakir,162 which resulted in a PKK ceasefire.163 This speech was 
                                                
162 Largest city in the Kurdish region.  
 
229 
extremely important since the PM, for the first time in Turkish history, has 
declared that the previous Turkish governments had made mistakes and 
mishandled relations with the nation’s Kurdish minority (Galali, 2005: 10). He 
also, for the first time in his career, accepted that there was a ‘Kurdish problem’ 
in Turkey which can be solved through greater democracy (ibid.: 11). Another 
interesting concept Erdogan introduced in his speech was the idea of supra and 
sub-identities. Erdogan explained that citizens of Turkish Republic have sub-
identities which may differentiate them, but they all come together under a 
Turkish supra-identity (ibid.: 22). About a week after the speech in Diyarbakir, 
Erdogan continued his conciliatory tone on a televised address. Erdogan 
separated the Kurdish problem from PKK terrorism and warned the public 
against confusing the two. Moreover, he clarified the argument about identities: 
‘[t]he Kurdish citizens are my citizens. [Kurdishness] is a sub-identity. We must 
not confuse sub-identity with supra-identity. They must all be viewed as a whole, 
as citizens of the Republic of Turkey’ (Balta-Paker, 2005). 
 
Erdogan’s speeches got mixed reactions from different sections of Turkish 
society. The Kurdish community celebrated them. The DTP mayor of 
Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir, maintained that this constituted ‘the foundation 
for turning a new page in relations between Kurds and the government’ (ibid.). 
At the same time, the CHP, the MHP and the secular establishment gave a very 
negative reaction. The army, in particular, reacted very strongly. During the NSC 
meeting on August 23, 2005, the General Staff warned Erdogan not to mention 
the ‘Kurdish problem’ again (ibid.) and declared that debates about sub/supra-
identities would endanger Turkey’s unitary structure (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010: 
77). In this respect, the fact that the AKP committed itself to a politically costly 
discourse on Kurdish identity and risked a confrontation with the armed forces, 
demonstrates the AKP’s attachment to the protection of minorities.  
 
Despite these positive indicators, Erdogan’s other speeches contradicted the 
above messages. Moreover, the policies followed by the AKP also cast doubt 
                                                                                                                               
163 There is a continuing military conflict between the Turkish army and PKK, which is fighting 
for an autonomous Kurdistan and improved cultural and political rights for Kurds living in 
Turkey. 
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upon whether the AKP was genuinely attached to the protecting the rights of 
minorities. 
 
7.3.2.1 Contradictions in Discourse 
 
Firstly, if Erdogan really believed in the intrinsic merits of liberalising 
broadcasting in minority languages, he would not want to limit such rights to 
Kurds and would want to expand its scope to other minority languages. 
However, on a visit to Diyarbakir in January 2008, he was questioned by the 
Chair of the Diyarbakir Bar Association whether reforms allowing for education 
and broadcasting in Kurdish could help ease the current conflict. Erdogan’s 
response directly challenged the idea of social learning: ‘[t]here are not only 
Kurds in Turkey. What if tomorrow, the Cherkez or Laz ask for the same? 
Everyone will demand it. How are we going to sustain unity then?’ (The 
Economist, 2008). As one civil society representative explained in an interview: 
‘Erdogan had said if we give freedoms to one group others will demand freedom 
as well. But this is normal... If you truly believe in these rights you should not be 
worried about this’ (CS2).164 This shows that the AKP was prepared to give 
certain right to only one minority group, arguably large enough to provide 
electoral benefits. 
 
Secondly, the AKP justified Law No. 5767 in a language of terrorism rather than 
cultural rights. As examined earlier the discussions in the TGNA focused on the 
benefits this law would bring in fighting terrorism (TGNA, 2008c: 66) and in 
explaining ‘our [military] struggle to people who live in the region’ (ibid.: 67). If 
the AKP was really socialised into protecting minority rights, it would adopt a 
different language. Its heavy use of terrorism and armed struggle in its discourse 
suggests that it is acting strategically so as not to alienate its nationalistic voters 
and to appease the military and secular establishment. As one interviewee 
maintained:  
‘If you talk about this in line with universal criteria and rules and 
place this reform in that context, the reaction you get a certain 
                                                
164 Similar remark made by BDP2. 
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reaction from the public. But if you insist on mentioning terrorist 
organisations every time you talk about the Kurdish issue, and 
conduct the democratic opening process this way, the reaction you 
get is different’ (CS2). 
 
Finally, over the years, Erdogan has made inconsistent and even contradictory 
references to the Kurdish problem. For example, in 2002, Erdogan argued in an 
interview that there was no ‘Kurdish problem’ in Turkey (Diyar, 2011). 
Similarly, a few days after he declared that Turkish identity was a supra-identity 
for both Turks and Kurds in Diyarbakir in 2005, he emphasised the unitary 
nature of the Turkish state and single nationhood (Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006: 111). 
According to Somer and Liaras ‘Erdogan’s overall record of public statements on 
the Kurdish issue was mixed and confusing, at times denying the existence of a 
problem’ (2010: 154). The fact that Erdogan contradicted himself over the years 
with regard to his discourse on the Kurdish issue and adopted an exceptionally 
vague policy is best explained by strategic motives. On the one hand, he did not 
want this issue to be divisive within his own party/party-base, and on the other 
hand he tried to appease the Kurds with this discourse.  
 
7.3.2.2 Contradictions in Policy 
 
In addition to inconsistencies in discourses, the AKP’s specific policies also 
contradict its stated overall Kurdish policy. For instance, given that the legal 
framework for broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish was 
established by the coalition government in 2002 before the AKP came to power, 
it is surprising that the AKP waited this long to fully liberalise broadcasting in 
Kurdish. The AKP initiated this law only when illegal channels were already 
broadcasting in the region. Similarly, once Law No. 5767 was adopted, it would 
be expected that the AKP would continue its efforts to protect the cultural rights 
of other minorities. However, related reforms did not follow. The AKP was 
particularly silent about minority rights before the 2011 general elections, as the 
DPM would expect. 
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Along the same lines, the AKP’s policy towards language rights within Turkey 
contradicted the policies they supported outside of Turkey. For instance, the 
AKP has been a strong supporter of both the independence of Kosovo, as well as 
the introduction of Turkish as the official minority language in three 
municipalities in Kosovo (Oktem, 2008: 7). Similarly, as a DPT MP argued, 
when Erdogan goes to Germany he supports the rights of Turks with regard to 
using their mother tongue and in Macedonia he claims that Turkish should have a 
status in the constitution (BDP2). Such inconsistencies in Erdogan’s policies at 
home and abroad challenge his credibility and cast doubt on whether he really 
supports cultural rights for minorities.  
 
Finally, the SLM would argue that if the AKP genuinely believes in the rights of 
minorities, they would not limit themselves only to particular reforms, but 
instead adopt a more comprehensive approach making changes in areas which 
may even be costly for party. The maintenance of the 10% threshold in general 
elections for parties to be represented in the TGNA is a very good illustration of 
this point. This example shows that the AKP is not motivated by social learning 
mechanisms and instead makes a cost/benefit calculation by picking and 
choosing reforms which would benefit itself. Yavuz and Ozcan argue that this 
threshold currently puts significant limits on the representation of ethnic Kurds in 
the parliament and if it were to be decreased to 5% the pro-Kurdish parties could 
win as much as 54 seats in the TGNA (2006: 113). Having a smaller Kurdish 
group in the TGNA obviously benefits the AKP by magnifying their 
representation. Similarly, Somer and Liaras acknowledge the fact that, while the 
opposition parties celebrated it, the AKP expressed its disapproval of the closure 
of the DTP by the Constitutional Court, since the AKP itself faced a similar 
threat (2010: 160).  ‘At the same time, however, the AKP government did not 
introduce any discussion of reforming the 10% threshold, which has left the 
Kurdish parties out of the parliament in the past’ (ibid.: 160). Overall, only 
picking issues which benefit the government and building a discourse of 
protection of minority rights around them, while ignoring other important 
problems, demonstrates that the AKP deploys minority rights in a purely 
instrumental fashion. The words of Yavuz clearly show how the AKP is 
motivated by utility rather than socialisation in its choice of policy areas:  
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‘The EU has been calling on Turkey to restructure the Kemalist 
Republic to open political spaces for the Kurds and other minority 
voices; to reduce the ten per cent threshold requirement that 
would open up the possibility of ethnic Kurdish representation in 
parliament; and to declare a general amnesty for PKK guerrillas 
and members. The issue has been the redefinition of sovereignty 
and the enhancement of local municipalities. Although the AKP 
has agreed to restructure the Republic and empower local 
municipalities, since it hopes to benefit from these constitutional 
changes more than the Kurds, it is adamant in not wishing to 
change the ten per cent threshold. The issue of a general amnesty 
for PKK members is also very unpopular among the AKP’s grass 
roots supporters. Yet, the AKP’s main strategy is to demilitarise 
state and society. It measures its democratisation successes in 
terms of rolling back the military presence in politics’ (2009: 185) 
 
 
In conclusion, despite presenting a reformist image and claiming attachment to 
the rights of minorities, the analysis above has demonstrated that the AKP’s 
discourse and policies are in contradiction. The AKP, during its tenure has made 
‘gradual, tactical concessions rather than the policy revolution’ demanded by the 
Kurdish population (Liaras, 2009:9). The government has maintained a vague 
Kurdish policy and chosen to conduct reforms selectively and strategically, both 
to avoid confrontation with the secular establishment and to meet the demands of 
its very heterogeneous voter base.  
 
Overall, this particular reform can best be described as motivated by the 
government’s partisan incentives, as opposed to sincere attachment to minority 
rights. As Somer and Liaras argue, ‘[d]espite the AKP’s reformist image, our 
findings indicate a limited amount of discussion and normative change in 
religious-conservative thinking on the Kurdish issue’ (2010: 152). 
 
7.3.3 Political Lock-in 
 
The political lock-in variable explains the adoption of Law No. 5767 through 
earlier reforms. In other words, it hypothesises that Law No. 5767 was a path-
dependent result of previous amendments to broadcasting legislation and a very 
similar legislation could have been adopted in any case regardless of who was in 
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government due to path-dependent mechanisms. In this respect, this model views 
the role played by the AKP as minimal and considers previous reforms as the 
main determining factor.  
 
Article 4 of Law No. 3984 on the Establishment and Broadcasting of the Radios 
and Televisions was amended in August 9, 2002 by Law No. 4771. Article 8 of 
Law No. 4771 allowed for radios and televisions to broadcast in languages and 
dialects used by Turkish nationals in their daily lives, given that these broadcasts 
do not contradict the constitutional principles. Subsequently, the RTUK 
interpreted this legislation and adopted regulations to put restrictions on the times 
and content of programmes broadcasted in languages other than Turkish. Finally, 
Law No. 5767 made further changes to the Radio and Television Law to allow 
the state channel TRT to broadcast in languages other than Turkish. The political 
lock-in explanation suggests that the most ground-breaking change with regard 
to broadcasting in minority languages was the 2002 reform conducted during the 
tenure of the DSP-led coalition government.  
 
The AKP MPs also explicitly voiced the view that the previous coalition 
government allowed for minority language broadcasts during the TGNA 
discussions on Law No. 5767 (TGNA, 2008c: 66, 73). They stated this to 
convince the opposition, and particularly the MHP, that the legislation they were 
trying to adopt was not that controversial and, on the contrary, the framework for 
it had already been adopted in 2002 during the reign of the coalition government 
when the MHP was also a partner.  
 
Some of the literature and interviews conducted with experts also support the 
claim that the most crucial reform was conducted by the coalition government, 
rather than the AKP. Therefore, the AKP should not take full credit for it (Somer 
and Liaras, 2010; BDP2). The head of the Human Right Association argued that 
broadcasting rights for minorities was not something invented by the AKP 
(CS7). Instead it was part of state policy following the announcement of 
Turkey’s candidacy by the EU in 1999. As established in the previous chapter, 
integration with the EU has always been a core feature of Turkish FP. Once 
candidacy status was given, the membership possibility became more real and 
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Turkish authorities felt obliged to conduct a series of reforms to attain their FP 
goal.  
 
When EU conditionality started in 1999, improving the living standards and 
cultural rights of the Kurdish population became an important part of Turkish 
state policy. The AKP’s 2008 reform could therefore be explained by HI as a 
continuation of reforms started in 1999 by the previous government (CS7). 
Along the same lines, Oktem argues: 
‘It was not the incumbent AKP government that passed this key 
reform package, paving the way for Turkey’s EU membership 
negotiation, but the coalition led by the late Bulent Ecevit, which 
voted in this package just before the November 2002 elections. 
The AKP government managed to take the credit and create a 
narrative of democratisation that impressed the liberals at home 
and analysts abroad, while in reality it shied away from even the 
most timid steps towards recognition of Kurdish concerns’ (2008: 
3). 
 
This research takes a more nuanced view than the HI argument that the adoption 
of Law No. 5767 was somewhat inevitable. It is acknowledged that the most 
ground-breaking reform in this field was conducted by the coalition government 
in 2002. In other words, the reform process was set in motion in 2002. However, 
we must bear in mind that this change was conducted at a time when the 
credibility of EU conditionality was high and increasing. The fact that the AKP 
continued this reform under diminished credibility cannot solely be explained by 
political lock-in mechanisms. It can be argued that the AKP would not have 
come up with the initiative to reform this area if not for the 2002 change, but it is 
certainly the case that it could have easily stopped it. The fact that they did not 
stop this reform and continued to comply at a time when the credibility of 
conditionality was significantly reduced suggests that they also benefited from it. 
In other words, the self-interested AKP took advantage of the incentives offered 
by EU conditionality in this area. Overall, the political lock-in model contributes 
to explaining continued compliance in T2, however it is only meaningful when 
considered alongside the explanations of DPM regarding the government’s 
partisan incentives, as there were opportunities not to comply for the AKP.  
 
 
236 
Conclusion 
 
‘From now on nothing will be the same, not just concerning 
restrictions on the Kurdish language, but also the overall Kurdish 
question. It will now be impossible to argue that the Turkish state 
is an ethnically homogenous nation state. We will, in time, 
discover post nation-state political models of coexistence within a 
recognized multiethnic social community… Given the way 
Kurdish has been treated by the Turkish state over the decades, 
the establishment of a Kurdish TV channel by the state is a true 
revolution’ (Dagi, 2009). 
 
Dagi’s words on the opening of the state-run TRT-6 broadcasting in Kurdish 
demonstrate how important and controversial Law 5767 was. The AKP was 
aware of the political risks involved with this move. The governing party risked 
creating internal divisions inside the party and constituency, and risked a 
confrontation with the secular establishment. Despite all these risks, the AKP 
still went ahead and pushed for this change.  
 
This chapter explained the push forces behind this reform as well as the timing of 
legislation. It concluded that, although the political lock-in effects created by the 
2002 reform in this area played a role, the real motivation behind it was 
utilitarian. The AKP government realised that adopting this legislation would 
allow it to increase its voter base without sacrificing its traditional supporters; to 
control the content of broadcasting in the region; and gain credit with the EU. 
However, the government was only able to justify this policy to its electorate and 
the opposition through a strong link to EU conditionality. At the same time, the 
analysis did not find support for the social learning model. The evidence 
demonstrated that the AKP’s policies and discourse often contradicted the 
protection of minority rights. These findings, therefore, confirm the conclusions 
of the previous chapter.  
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Chapter Eight: 
Political Leadership’s Compliance in Specific Issue Areas 
Under Diminished Credibility (2005-2010) 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have explained the AKP’s compliance with broader 
EU conditionality in the area of JHA in Turkey. It demonstrated that the 
government’s partisan incentives together with political lock-in effects provide a 
powerful explanation for the AKP’s compliance with EU conditionality under 
diminished credibility. This chapter focuses on more specific issues to explain 
why compliance was more successful in some fields than others, in other words 
why it was selective. 
 
This chapter introduces economic costs and political costs variables put forward 
by the DPM. The economic costs hypothesis is: if the economic benefits 
associated with complying with a specific EU condition are higher than its 
economic costs, then the political leadership is likely to comply. Similarly, the 
political costs hypothesis states: if the political benefits associated with 
complying with a specific EU condition are higher than its political costs, then 
the political leadership is likely to comply. HI also offers two variables to 
understand how compliance with specific EU demands continues, namely sunk 
costs and vested interests. The sunk costs hypothesis is: if Turkish authorities 
have already invested resources into compliance (before 2005); and/or if 
projects funded by the EU are ongoing (in 2005), then the political leadership is 
likely to continue complying. The vested interests hypothesis maintains: if the 
already conducted reforms (before 2005) are beneficial for the (potential) 
domestic constituencies of the governing party, then the political leadership is 
likely to continue complying. 
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Since these four factors vary across different issue areas, this chapter conducts a 
comparative analysis to assess their explanatory power in the following six cases: 
external borders; asylum and illegal migration; organised crime; human 
trafficking; drugs; and cultural and political rights of minorities. The chapter 
measures the values of each independent variable across the six cases and 
subsequently compares the results. The comparative analysis finds that variables 
within the DPM, which take into account economic and political cost-benefit 
calculations, successfully explain why compliance is greater in some issue areas 
than others.  From the two, the political costs variable carries more explanatory 
power. In contrast, the HI variables do not carry explanatory power. 
 
8.1 Economic costs 
 
To test the economic costs variable it is necessary to assess the net economic 
costs of compliance for each policy area. To do this, Turkish state officials’ own 
cost analyses and the EU’s financial contributions through projects165 are taken 
into account. The analysis below demonstrates that the net economic costs of 
compliance are highest for the cases of asylum and immigration (very high) and 
external borders (high). For the fight against organised crime, human trafficking 
and drugs, the costs of compliance are assessed to be low, whereas costs are very 
low in the area of cultural and political rights of minorities.  
 
8.1.1 External Borders  
 
Complying with the EU in the area of external borders is very costly, since 
Turkey’s policy and institutional fit with the EU acquis is low. Establishing a 
new civilian force to protect the borders; providing training for them; setting up 
expulsion centres; strengthening the administrative and technical capacities of 
the institutions, which are currently involved in protecting Turkey’s borders; 
                                                
165 There are no other expected economic benefits provided by the EU in the short and medium-
term for specific policy areas. Of course the EU membership itself would bring substantial 
economic benefits, however due to very low levels of credibility the membership outcome is not 
considered as a possibility in the short or medium-term. 
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complying with EU visa requirements; and modernising the border control gates 
requires considerable financial resources. Turkish authorities have estimated the 
amount needed to formally and behaviourally comply with EU conditionality in 
various NPAAs. The 2003 NPAA estimated the costs to be €26,655,000 for the 
actions to be taken between 2003 and 2005 (2003: 660-5). The 2008 NPAA, 
which identified more considerable reforms between 2009 and 2011, calculated 
the costs to be €38,631,880 (2008: 273-6). Finally, the most comprehensive 
financial plan was put forward as part of the action plan developed to implement 
the strategy document on integrated border management. The annex of this 
document suggested that a total of 29 EU projects were required to comply with 
the acquis in this field, requiring a total budget of €3,779,750,000 (BMB, 2006: 
18-40).166 The experts interviewed in this field all share the view that external 
borders is a very, and potentially the most, expensive field within JHA (MI1; 
BMB1), which cannot be delivered without substantial EU funding (AKP7; 
EUSG7; EUSG6; EUSG2; BMB1; MI1).  
 
Considering the costs are very high in this field, it is necessary to assess to what 
extent the EU funding, as part of its Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, has 
been able to meet these expenses. Between 2002 and 2008 a total of eight 
projects167 have started related to external borders and the EU has agreed to 
provide €37,276,750 (see Table 8.1). This amount appears to be considerable, 
particularly in comparison to the budgets put forward by the two NPAAs. 
However, it has to be acknowledged that this sum allows Turkey to address only 
a small part of EU conditionality in this area, such as the development of an 
action plan, a roadmap, visa policy; training of current border police; and 
investment into border surveillance architecture. The EU Commission has 
suggested that the Turkish government itself needs to provide the majority of the 
material resources necessary for compliance, since the EU’s limited funds would 
                                                
166 Moreover, Turkey will have to take on a substantial administrative and financial burden if it 
complies with the EU’s Schengen visa regime, since it would have to issue visas to a large 
number of people through its representations abroad (rather than at the borders). Furthermore, 
this new visa regime may lead to a considerable fall in the number of people visiting Turkey 
(Kirisci, 2007: 38). 
167 Projects conducted in areas of human trafficking, migrant trafficking and customs 
administration are closely related to external borders. However, for this analysis only the projects 
that specifically relate to integrated border management are taken into account.   
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only be able to cover a minor part of compliance costs (Kirisci, 2007: 21). 
Therefore, the economic costs of compliance are still high, since the most 
expensive institution-building reforms have not yet been completed.168   
 
8.1.2 Asylum and Illegal Migration 
 
Complying with the EU acquis on asylum and illegal migration is also extremely 
costly. In this area, Turkey is required to establish reception centres for asylum 
seekers, guesthouses/shelters for refugees and expulsion centres for illegal 
migrants; set up a country of origin database; provide social support mechanisms 
for refugees; establish institutions to operate in this area; and provide training for 
personnel. In addition to these costly behavioural compliance measures, formal 
compliance with asylum and illegal migration acquis is also very expensive. In 
particular, when Turkey concludes a readmission agreement with the EU and 
lifts its geographical limitation on the Geneva Convention, there is likely to be a 
significant influx of illegal migrants and asylum seekers into Turkey. Kirisci 
claims the greatest nightmare scenario for Turkey would be to lift the 
geographical limitation without being seriously considered as a new EU member, 
since Turkey would have to bear large economic costs without the benefits of 
membership (2007: 16-17). Moreover, Turkey’s geographical position, linking 
Middle East and Central Asia to Europe, makes it an attractive gateway to 
Europe for illegal migrants, as well as a buffer zone for EU’s unwanted asylum 
seekers and refugees, which in turn adds to its material burden.  
 
The statistics suggest that more than 620,000 illegal migrants were arrested in 
Turkey between 1995 and 2006 (Kirisci, 2007: 23). Once they are caught, the 
costs of providing them shelter and sending them back to their country of origin 
are very high (AIB1). Similarly, around 3,500 asylum applications were 
submitted per year between 1995 and 2006, totalling 45,000 applications 
(Kirisci, 2007: 13-14). The average number of applications substantially 
                                                
168 Two interviewees shared this view. They maintained that even though a considerable amount 
of funding has been used in this area, this is ‘nowhere near enough’ to comply fully with the EU 
conditionality (EUSG2; EUSG6).  
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increased recently, with 11,248 new asylum seekers in 2008 and 7,834 
applications in 2009 (Commission, 2010a: 82). Regardless of whether their 
application is accepted or rejected, these asylum seekers stay for approximately 
two to three years in Turkey and make use of social services during this time. 
Once again, the total costs of hosting asylum seekers are very high.  
 
The 2003 NPAA has estimated the costs of compliance in this field as 
€102,150,000 in the initial stages of conditionality (2003: 655-9, 665-8) and this 
amount increased to €120,010,000 in the 2008 NPAA (2008: 252-72). 169 
However, these estimates do not consider the material costs of concluding a 
readmission agreement with the EU and lifting the geographical limitation.170 
The number of people who would arrive at Turkey due to these changes is 
uncertain, but it is expected to be extremely high. According to experts this 
would put a significant burden on Turkey, which it is financially not ready to 
cope with (EUSG2; EUSG 6; EUSG7; MI1; AIB1). Therefore, some form of 
burden-sharing between the EU and Turkey needs to take place. 
 
So far, four EU projects have been agreed in this area. The first small-scale 
project in 2002 helped Turkish authorities develop an action plan in this field. 
The EU has approved three larger-scale projects in 2006 and 2007, which are 
still ongoing. These projects have received €79,473,500 of EU support in total to 
help Turkey set up a country of origin information system, and establish two 
removal and seven reception centres (see Table 8.1). The two projects to 
establish removal and reception centres are particularly expensive with a total 
budget of €81,833,333, the EU providing €62,100,000. This amounts to 24% of 
EU’s total financial assistance for Turkey in 2007. Funding of this size for 
infrastructure projects is by far the largest Turkey has received from the EU. In 
this respect, the EU’s contribution in the area of asylum and illegal migration is 
undeniable (EUSG2; EUSG6; AIB1). At the same time, the interviewees share 
the belief that in an area as costly as asylum and illegal migration, these funds 
                                                
169 Unfortunately, a more detailed cost analysis, as in the case of external borders, has not been 
conducted. 
170 One interviewee speculated the costs of complying with all the EU requirements in this area, 
including signing the readmission agreements and lifting the geographical limitation, would cost 
Turkey around eight billion Euros (AKP7). 
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remain symbolic. They guide Turkey’s further reform efforts by offering pilot 
cases, rather than easing Turkey’s actual financial burden (EUSG6; AIB1). For 
instance, the nine reception and removal centres which are planned to be built 
with the EU help will be able to accommodate around 4000 people, whereas 
Turkey will be expected an influx of around two million people (AIM1; AIM2; 
EUSG6). Therefore, despite the fact that the EU supported Turkey’s compliance 
efforts with substantial amount of funding, the economic costs of compliance in 
this area are still very high.  
 
8.1.3 Organised Crime, Human Trafficking and Drugs 
 
The fields of organised crime, human trafficking and drugs have similar 
economic costs of compliance.171 The most costly reforms in these areas are to 
do with behavioural compliance, such as strengthening the administrative 
capacity of government institutions, enhancing cooperation between law 
enforcement bodies and training of staff. The 2003 NPAA estimated the costs of 
compliance as €5,539,000 in organised crime and human trafficking, and 
€2,000,000 in the field of drugs (2003: 668-76). The 2008 NPAA arrived at a 
similar figure, €8,205,000, in all three policy areas combined (2008: 277-81). In 
comparison to the costs of complying with EU’s acquis in external borders and 
asylum and illegal migration, compliance costs in these three areas are minimal. 
In fact, in both the 2003 and the 2008 NPAAs, the material costs in these three 
areas combined amount to only 5% of the total costs in all areas considered in 
this research. The experts also shared the view that these areas did not have 
serious economic costs in comparison to the previous two areas (AKP7; MI1; 
EUSG2). Moreover, a significant number of EU projects have commenced in this 
area. Four projects have been initiated in the area of organised crime, two in 
human trafficking and three in the area of drugs. With these nine projects, the EU 
has committed itself to allocate a total of €39,765,485 (see Table 8.1). This is 
significant, since it is almost five times as the costs estimated in the 2008 
                                                
171 Moreover, the NPAAs do not distinguish between these issues when developing budgets.     
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NPAA.172 Overall, it can be argued that most of the costs of compliance in this 
field have been offset by the material funds delivered by the EU and therefore 
the costs are judged to be low.  
 
8.1.4 Cultural and Political Rights of Minorities 
 
Finally, in the area of cultural and political rights of minorities, the costs of 
formally complying, changing legislation in the TGNA, are minimal. Similarly, 
the only major cost regarding behavioural compliance in this area is the training 
of judges, law enforcement officers and experts responsible for following the 
broadcasts in languages other than Turkish. Therefore, the costs in this area are 
very low (AKP7; MI1; EUSG2). It is rather difficult to accurately identify costs 
in this area, since Turkish authorities do not propose a budget for compliance 
with the political criteria. However, one cost analysis was included in the 23rd 
chapter of the 2008 NPAA to reform the RTUK between 2009 and 2011 with a 
budget of €30,000 (2008: 249). This number is extremely low in comparison to 
the budgets devised in other policy areas and amounts to only 0.02% of the total 
budget. The EU, on the other hand, has granted €2,500,000 for a project in this 
area (see Table 8.1). Overall, the EU’s contribution is considerably more than the 
costs put forward by the Turkish authorities, therefore is assumed to cover the 
majority of the costs in this area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
172 One has to be cautious in using the costs estimated by the NPAAs because these only consider 
the costs of compliance in the medium-term, rather than the entirety of conditionality. For 
instance, the 2008 NPAA estimates the costs of compliance in the area of external borders to be 
€38,631,880, whereas a more detailed analysis measured the total costs of compliance in this area 
to be €3,779,750,000, which is nearly 100 times greater than the 2008 NPAA’s estimate.  
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Table 8.1: Comparison of Costs173 and EU’s Financial Contributions174 
 
 Costs (2003) 
€ (% of total) 
Costs (2008)  
€ (% of total) 
EU Funding 
€ (% of total) 
No. of EU 
Projects 
Cost 
Assessment 
External 
Borders  
26,655,000  
(20%) 
38,631,880 
(23%) 
37,276,750 
(23%) 
8 High 
Asylum and 
Illegal 
Migration 
102,150,000 
(75%) 
120,010,000 
(72%) 
79,473,500 
(50%) 
4 Very High 
Organised 
Crime 
5,539,000  
 
(4%) 
8,205,000  
 
(5%) 
29,748,735 
(19%) 
4 Low 
Human 
Trafficking 
4,200,000 
(3%) 
2 Low 
Drugs 2,000,000  
(1%) 
5,816,750 
(4%) 
3 Low 
Cultural and 
Political Rights 
of Minorities 
- 30,000  
(0%)175 
2,500,000 
(2%) 
1 Very Low 
Total 136,344,000 
(100%) 
166,876,880 
(100%) 
159,015,735 
(100%) 
22 - 
Source: Author’s analysis from NPAAs (2003; 2008); Commission (2006b; 2010b) 
 
Overall, as Table 8.1 above demonstrates, the costs of compliance in these areas 
vary considerably. According to the NPAAs, asylum and illegal migration makes 
up over 70% of the total costs; external borders over 20%; the fight against 
organised crime, human trafficking and drugs in combination around 5%; and a 
negligible cost for compliance in cultural and political rights of minorities. It is 
also important to take into account the EU’s financial contributions. JHA is a 
priority area for the EU (Kirisci, 2007: 8; EUSG2), and therefore the EU has 
                                                
173 The 2003 and 2008 NPAAs put forward budgets which cover the costs of compliance in the 
medium-term (3-4 years), and not the entirety of costs of compliance. However, considering them 
is still useful for comparative purposes.  
174 The EU contributions in the context of PHARE cover at least 75% of the budget in each 
project. Therefore, these numbers do not indicate the total budget for each project, since Turkey’s 
financial contribution has not been taken into account.  
175 Originally 0.02%. 
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granted substantial funds to all six of the issues considered in this research.176 
However, as the Table 8.1 demonstrates, these funds have not been distributed 
equally. Most EU funds have addressed the asylum issue (50%); external borders 
received 23%; organised crime, human trafficking and drugs got 26% and 
cultural and political rights received only 2%. Overall, it can be argued that even 
though the EU funds addressed some of the costs, economic costs of compliance 
are still very high for asylum and illegal migration and high for external 
borders.177  The costs of compliance have been much less in the areas of 
organised crime, human trafficking and drugs, and EU funding addressed most of 
these needs. Therefore, the remaining economic costs of compliance are low. 
Finally, EU funding substantially exceeded the short-to-medium costs in the area 
of cultural and political rights of minorities, where the costs were low to begin 
with; therefore costs of compliance are very low.  
 
8.2 Political costs 
 
This section measures the net political costs for each policy area, firstly by 
assessing the strength of domestic resistance to reform. Resistance incorporates 
veto-players but is not limited to it. It also considers whether compliance with 
the EU contradicts the unitary nature of the Turkish state and whether powerful 
groups and/or the general electorate are opposed to compliance. As 
Schimmelfennig et al. argue the political costs of compliance increase as the EU 
negatively affects the ‘security and integrity of the state, the government’s 
domestic power base, and its core political practices for power preservation’ 
(2005: 31). Secondly, it is also possible for the EU reforms to provide political 
benefits for the governing party. This depends on the extent to which the EU 
demands overlap with the AKP’s policy aims. This section finds that the political 
costs of compliance are very high in the area of cultural and political rights of 
minorities, high for external borders, low for asylum and illegal migration, and 
                                                
176 For instance, in 2003, five out of the total of 18 twinning projects dealt with JHA issues 
(Kirisci, 2007: 8). 
177 These two areas are identified as the most costly by most of the interviewees consulted 
(EUSG2; EUSG6; GDS1; GDS2; BMB1; BMB2; AIB1; MI1; MFA3). 
 
246 
finally very low for the fight against organised crime, human trafficking and 
drugs.  
 
8.2.1 External Borders  
 
Complying with the EU’s requirements on external borders incurs high political 
costs on the governing party due to a number of reasons. Firstly, there are 
currently twelve state bodies involved in Turkey’s borders. This creates problems 
not only for coordination in the management of borders, but also for its reform. 
All the bodies involved resist reform, since they do not wish to give away their 
power and influence at the borders to a new civilian institution (Kirisci, 2007: 
21; EUSG7; MI1; BMB1). In particular, the military is extremely reluctant to 
transfer powers to a civilian institution and acts as a veto-player against reform. 
Turkey’s geographic position and the presence of a terrorism threat in its South-
eastern borders make the military’s approval to any kind of change regarding the 
protection of borders even more unlikely (Kirisci, 2007: 2). The Turkish military 
insists that it should continue to be present, both physically and in the decision-
making process, particularly due to the stated difficultly of controlling the 
extremely mountainous areas alongside the East and South-east borders with 
countries like Syria, Iraq and Iran (EUSG6). 
 
Secondly, the creation of a professional civilian border management force is 
likely to restrict illegal activities across the borders, such as smuggling and 
bribery. It is known that border provinces receive a substantial part of their 
revenue from such illegal activities and therefore there is likely to be some public 
opposition to reform in border provinces (BMB1, MI1, EUSG2). In other words, 
the loss of revenue in these provinces may translate to loss of votes for the 
governing party in the general and/or local elections, although this is not 
expected to be significant. Moreover, conducting reform in this area does not 
offer the AKP any additional benefits. The issue of reforming borders has not 
been incorporated into any of the AKP’s party programmes or election 
manifestos as a policy priority. Similarly, the experts interviewed in this field 
have all maintained that, if it were not for the EU, the AKP would not commit 
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itself to any reforms in this area (AKP7; BMB1; MI1; EUSG2; EUSG7; MFA3; 
GDS2). Overall, even though the general public opinion is not opposed to reform 
in this area and the AKP’s important constituencies, such as the Islamist and 
business circles, do not oppose change, the military’s resistance to change is 
considerable. Therefore, the political costs of compliance are judged to be high 
in this area.178  
 
8.2.2 Asylum and Illegal Migration 
 
The political costs of complying with EU’s asylum and illegal migration acquis 
are low for the governing party, since there are no serious public resistance or 
domestic veto-players against reform. With respect to public opinion, even 
though some public opposition is present, this is expected to be rather limited. 
There may be local opposition to accommodating a larger number of refugees 
and illegal migrants due to the perception that this may lead to unemployment 
within a region (AIB1). At the same time, there may also be support for this 
change counteracting the opposition, since hosting refugees and illegal migrants 
may help the local economy by increasing economic activity (EUSG2). The 
general public may also be unhappy about the government using taxpayer’s 
money to look after asylum seekers and illegal migrants (MI1). However, this 
type of public resistance is extremely unlikely. Considering that the Turkish 
public has never experienced a serious migration flow into the country in the 
recent past, there is currently little negative public opinion regarding this issue 
(AIB1). Similarly, accepting to host a large number of asylum seekers may be 
politically beneficial for the current government, since it would show the 
compassionate face of the AKP to the public. Due to these reasons, serious 
public opposition is not expected (AIB1; AKP7; MI1; EUSG2). Other important 
domestic actors, namely the military, the judiciary, the Kemalist elite and the 
AKP’s important constituencies, such as the Islamists or the business lobby, are 
not expected to resist compliance either.  
                                                
178 Similarly, in a comparative analysis of external borders, asylum, illegal migration, human 
trafficking and visa regime, Kirisci assesses this area as the most costly one, since it requires 
cooperation with the military (2007: 22). 
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It should also be acknowledged that compliance with the EU in this area does not 
provide any specific benefits to the governing party either. It is clear from 
examining the AKP’s party programme and election manifestos that the party has 
not made any references to this issue. Therefore, it can be assumed that the AKP 
would not have committed itself to make these changes were it not for the EU 
(AKP7; BMB1; EUSG2; EUSG7; MFA3; GDS1; GDS2). Overall, taking into 
account both the costs and benefits, compliance with the EU in this area is 
expected to incur low costs for the AKP.  
 
8.2.3 Organised Crime, Human Trafficking and Drugs 
 
In the areas of the fight against organised crime, human trafficking and drugs the 
political costs of compliance are negligible for the AKP. All the experts 
interviewed in this field have maintained that these were easy fields and it was 
very unlikely for the Turkish public to oppose any reforms regarding the fight 
against organised crime, human trafficking and drugs (AKP7; EUSG1; EUSG2; 
EUSG7; MI1; MFA3; GDS2; AKP12). Similarly, veto-players and important 
AKP supporters are not likely to oppose reforms. In other words, compliance 
with the EU in these three fields is unlikely to create any losers in society.179 On 
the contrary, compliance is likely to be politically beneficial for the governing 
party. Even before it came to power, the AKP had identified these issues180 in its 
party programme and election manifesto (AKP, 2010; 2007). Similarly, the 
interviewees maintained that the AKP would still conduct reforms in these areas 
even in the absence of any EU conditionality (AKP7; EUSG1; EUSG2; EUSG7; 
MI1; MFA3; GDS2; AKP12). In this respect, there has been an overlap between 
the priorities of the governing party and EU conditionality. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the political costs of compliance with the EU in these three areas 
are very low for the AKP. 
 
                                                
179 With the possible exception of the underground economy.  
180 The fight against organised crime and drugs was mentioned.  
 
249 
8.2.4 Cultural and Political Rights of Minorities 
 
Finally, in the area of cultural and political rights of minorities the net political 
costs of compliance are very high for the governing party. This is essentially 
because reforms conducted in this area are seen to contradict the unitary nature 
of the Turkish state and influential groups strongly oppose any reform. Most 
significantly, the military and the Kemalist establishment are staunchly resistant 
to reform, since they believe that the EU reforms, which define Kurdish citizens 
as a minority group and grant them cultural and political group rights,181 will 
transform Turkish state into a multicultural, decentralised, federal political 
system (Oguzlu and Kibaroglu, 2009: 586). Whereas the AKP has framed the 
cultural and political rights of minorities, particularly the Kurdish minority, as a 
domestic politics issue, these two important veto-players have outlined it as a 
national security threat (Patton, 2007: 353). Similarly, the nationalist sections of 
society, which also exist amongst the AKP’s Islamic constituency, are also 
heavily opposed to any kind of change in this area. According to Onis, even 
limited proposals on setting up courses to teach languages other than Turkish as 
part of the Turkish national curriculum have received ‘vigorous opposition from 
the nationalistic bloc’ (2003b: 15). In sum, this analysis demonstrates that reform 
in this field is politically extremely costly. Both the important veto-players in the 
Turkish political system and the general Turkish public are suspicious of reform. 
The experts interviewed also shared this view and described this policy area as 
the most difficult one to reform (AKP7; AKP9; EUSG2; MI1). 
 
At the same time, it can also be argued that conducting reforms in this area may 
provide certain political benefits to the AKP. The issues regarding the cultural 
and political rights of minorities, as well as the general situation of the East and 
South-east Anatolia, have been incorporated into the AKP’s party programme. 
This programme maintains that the party ‘shall respect the rights and freedoms of 
those who are in the minority’ and also, given Turkish remains the official 
language, ‘cultural activities in languages other than Turkish, including 
broadcasting’ are regarded as assets which reinforce the unity and integrity of 
                                                
181 Currently, they are not recognised as a minority in Turkey, therefore only have individual 
rights. 
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Turkey as opposed to weakening it (AKP, 2010). Similarly, the interviewees 
argued that this would be an area where the AKP could commit itself to reforms 
even in the absence of EU conditionality (AKP7; AKP12; EUSG2; EUSG7; 
MI1; MFA3; GDS1; GDS2). The election results also demonstrate that the AKP 
was able to increase its share of votes in the Eastern and South-eastern provinces 
since 2002 (Kotan and Benli, 2009). Overall, even though the EU conditionality 
overlaps with some of the policy priorities of the AKP, complying with EU 
requirements in this field still incurs very high political costs due to the presence 
of strong veto-players and opposition from the nationalists. 
 
8.3 Sunk Costs  
 
Historical institutionalism (HI) suggests that the resources invested into formal 
and behavioural compliance within T1, be they long-term compliance plans or 
material funds from the EU, will have an impact on whether the government 
officials continue complying in these areas within T2. This section, therefore, 
measures the sunk costs associated with each policy area and concludes that 
these costs are low in external borders, high in asylum and illegal migration, very 
low in the fight against organised crime and drugs, very high in human 
trafficking, and medium in cultural and political rights of minorities.  
 
8.3.1 External Borders  
 
In the area of external borders formal and behavioural compliance conducted 
within T1 is negligible and has not created any noteworthy sunk costs. Most 
significantly, the most politically and economically costly reform – the creation 
of a civilian border force – has so far not been realised. Lack of reform on this 
front is the main reason behind the lack of any considerable sunk costs. Within 
T1 the control of some borders have been transferred to land forces, however this 
particular issue is not necessarily linked to future compliance. Additionally, the 
strategy document for border management has been adopted in 2003, but this 
document is rather brief and does not provide a detailed programme for future 
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compliance as action plans do. Moreover, only one of the three EU projects, 
which started in T1, was planned to be completed in T2 and this project’s budget 
constitutes only 5% of the total EU funding granted in the area of external 
borders (Commission, 2006b; 2010b). On the other hand, setting up the BMB, 
the task force and the border management project departments are significant 
institutional developments achieved within T1, which would have incurred some 
sunk costs. In sum, even though some institutional developments took place, the 
sunk costs of compliance in T1 are low for external borders due to the lack of 
any progress in the establishment of a civilian border force. 
 
8.3.2 Asylum and Illegal Migration 
 
In the area of asylum and illegal migration, the Turkish authorities have invested 
considerable resources into compliance within T1. Even though there were no 
ongoing EU projects at the end of T1 and Turkey failed to comply with two 
costly EU conditions (readmission agreements and lifting the geographical 
limitation), Turkey’s compliance within T1 constitute high sunk costs for future 
reform. Most importantly, not only a strategy document, but also a detailed 
action plan, laying down the future reform schedule, have been adopted within 
T1. Moreover, a lot of progress has been achieved in the readmission 
negotiations with Greece, as well as with other countries in T1. Additionally, by 
2003 Turkey has managed to divert illegal migration routes away from Turkey, 
because of progress achieved at border checkpoints and the training provided to 
law enforcement officials. Overall, due to Turkey’s progress regarding long-term 
plans and behavioural compliance in this field, the sunk costs are judged to be 
high.  
 
8.3.3 Organised Crime 
 
In the area of organised crime, even though some compliance was conducted 
within the T1 period, the most important developments have taken place after 
2005. The adoption of both the strategy document and the action plan and all of 
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the institutional and infrastructural developments took place in T2, such as the 
standardisation of statistics; progress on setting up a nationwide DNA and 
fingerprint database; and strengthening of forensic capacity. On the other hand, a 
number of international treaties and legal changes were adopted before 2005. 
However, these are stand-alone acts and are not necessarily linked to future 
compliance. Moreover, an EU project in this area, which started in 2002, was 
completed before the end of T1 period (Commission, 2006b; 2010b). Overall, the 
sunk costs in this area are very low.  
 
8.3.4 Human Trafficking 
 
In human trafficking, a significant level of formal and behavioural compliance 
has been conducted prior to 2005; therefore the sunk costs are very high. A 
considerable number of legislation have been adopted within T1 and most 
importantly a detailed national action plan was prepared in 2003. Moreover, 
there have also been important reforms in institution-building, which are crucial 
for sunk costs. For instance a human trafficking unit has been set up and two 
shelters started to operate in 2004. Additionally, a programme on combating 
human trafficking was launched in 2005. Finally, a financially significant 
(Commission, 2006b; 2010b) EU project, which started in 2003, was planned to 
be finished after the T1 period.  
 
8.3.5 Drugs 
 
In the area of drugs the significant part of formal and behavioural compliance 
took place in T2. These include the adoption of the strategy document, national 
and local action plans; enhanced cooperation with international bodies; 
strengthening of drug demand reduction; improving treatment and rehabilitation 
facilities; as well as institutional advancements. Moreover, an EU project, which 
started in 2002, was completed within the T1 period (Commission, 2006b; 
2010b). Some international treaties were signed prior to 2005, however these are 
isolated acts and do not necessarily make future compliance easier or less costly. 
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The TADOC was also set up within the T1 period, but this development alone 
does not constitute significant sunk costs. Overall, the sunk costs in this area are 
judged to be very low.  
 
8.3.6 Cultural and Political Rights of Minorities 
 
Finally, in the area of cultural and political rights of minorities, there are medium 
sunk costs. A number of important legal changes have been adopted prior to 
2005, regarding minority associations; civil registry law; broadcasting in 
languages other than Turkish; and languages used in education. More 
significantly for sunk costs, an EU project which started in 2005 continued onto 
the T2 period and this project constitutes the entirety of the EU’s funding in this 
area (Commission, 2006b; 2010b). Overall, even though some compliance was 
achieved and substantial EU funding was guaranteed within T1, important long-
term programmes have not been adopted and/or crucial 
institutional/infrastructural advancements did not take place within T1. 
 
8.4 Vested Interests 
 
In line with HI, altering or reversing reforms which have already been conducted 
may be costly for particular groups in society. These costs would have an impact 
on the governing party’s compliance, if these groups are part of their current or 
potential constituency. This section assesses the level of vested interests in each 
policy area and concludes that whereas the level of vested interests are very low 
in the areas of external borders, asylum and illegal migration, the fight against 
organised crime, human trafficking and drugs; and they are medium in the area of 
cultural and political rights of minorities.  
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8.4.1 External Borders; Asylum and Illegal Migration; Organised Crime; 
Human Trafficking; and Drugs 
 
In five of the cases under analysis it is difficult to identify groups who have 
gained specific benefits from the reforms conducted in T1. Important groups and 
interests in Turkish society, such as the security establishment, the judiciary, 
Kemalist/secularist elite, nationalists, Islamists, minority groups, conservative 
and secular business communities, as well as the leading political parties, such as 
the CHP, MHP or the DTP, who may benefit from these reforms have so far not 
benefited significantly enough to hold strong vested interests in these areas. 
Moreover, although the public as a whole generally regard these changes 
positively, this is not to the extent that they could be identified as having strong 
vested interests in the continuation of reform in these policy areas. In this 
respect, the general public is not expected to show strong opposition if the AKP 
stops complying with the EU and therefore, their views on these reforms are not 
likely to have an impact on the AKP’s compliance. Overall, vested interests in all 
five of these areas are very low.  
 
8.4.2 Cultural and Political Rights of Minorities 
 
In the area of cultural and political rights of minorities, certain groups in Turkish 
society have strong vested interests in continued compliance. Even though the 
military, judiciary, Kemalist elites, nationalist segments of society, the CHP and 
the MHP are staunchly against continuation of reform, the liberal segments of 
society, the religious and ethnic minority groups and the DTP have so far 
benefited from the reforms conducted in T1 and they all have expectations 
regarding further reform. Future reform has been promised to them through the 
NPAAs, the government’s party programme and election manifestos. The AKP’s 
commitment to reform Turkey’s human rights record was the main reason why 
the liberals voted for the AKP both in 2002 and 2007. If the AKP reverses its 
policy in this area, it is likely to cost the AKP votes.  
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The minority groups, and particularly the Kurds who have so far benefited from 
reforms, have strong vested interests in further reform. It must be acknowledged 
that not all these minority groups are part of the AKP’s constituency. A 
substantial part of the Kurdish population living in the East and South-east of 
Turkey, which is electorally the most significant among the minority groups, has 
been supporting the DTP. However, Carkoglu has shown that this party’s vote 
share has remained around 5% of the national vote between 2004 and 2009, 
which ‘by all estimates is well below the share of the ethnic-Kurdish population 
of voting age’ (2009: 2). The only other party that has a presence in the region 
has been the AKP. Since 2002, the AKP not only continuously increased its vote 
share in the region but has also always won the largest share of votes ahead of 
the DTP. What this suggests is that the AKP was able to attract an important part 
of the Kurdish votes since 2002. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the 
AKP would take the views of this Kurdish constituency seriously and consider 
the electoral costs of altering/reversing their reform process with regards to the 
rights of minorities. Overall, due to these various actors’ interest in continued 
compliance, it can be concluded that the level of vested interests are medium in 
this field. 
 
 
8.5 Results 
 
 
This chapter has so far measured the levels of four variables from the DPM and 
HI in six case studies (see Table 8.2). The objective here is to compare the power 
of these four variables in explaining compliance in T2. To do this it is necessary 
to refer to Chapter Five’s conclusions regarding compliance levels in T2 in these 
case studies. Chapter Five has calculated a single compliance score for each case 
study, by taking the average of formal and behavioural compliance outcomes. It 
concluded that the average level of compliance is low for external borders; 
partial for asylum and illegal migration; very high for organised crime; high for 
human trafficking; very high for drugs; and finally partial for cultural and 
political rights of minorities (see Table 5.3). At the same time, the rate of 
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compliance on average showed minor improvements in external borders; minor 
improvements in asylum and illegal migration; major improvements for 
organised crime; stable for human trafficking; major improvements for drugs and 
minor improvements in cultural and political rights of minorities (see Table 5.4). 
 
Table 8.2: Values of the Variables from the DPM and HI 
 
Issue Areas Economic 
Costs 
Political 
Costs 
Sunk 
Costs 
Vested 
Interests 
External Borders  High High Low Very low 
Asylum and Illegal 
Migration 
Very high Low High Very low 
Organised Crime Low Very low Very low Very low 
Human Trafficking Low Very low Very high Very low 
Drugs Low Very low Very low Very low 
Cultural and Political 
Rights of Minorities 
Very low Very high Partial Partial 
 
To comparatively assess these variables, firstly, the value assigned to each 
variable in each policy area in Table 8.2 (expressed as very high, high, partial, 
low or very low) is reassessed using the research hypotheses. This is done so that 
the new values represent the hypothesised effects of these variables on 
compliance. For instance, the political costs of compliance with the cultural and 
political rights of minorities have been assessed to be very high. Considering that 
the political costs hypothesis puts forwards an inverse relationship between costs 
and likelihood of compliance, the hypothesised effect of this variable in this 
particular case for compliance is measured to be very unlikely (--). The same 
reassessment is conducted for other variables as well. The economic costs 
variable is also inversely related to compliance, whereas both the sunk costs and 
vested interests variables are directly related to compliance. Table 8.3 below 
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summarises all these hypothesised effects and also incorporates the values of the 
dependent variable182 taken from Chapter Five.183 
 
 
Table 8.3: Comparison between Hypothesised Impact of Independent Variables 
and Actual Compliance Outcomes 
 
Issue Areas Economic 
Costs 
Political 
Costs 
Sunk 
Costs 
Vested 
Interests 
Compliance 
Level 
Change in 
Compliance 
Rate 
External 
Borders  
- - - -- - + 
Asylum and 
Illegal Migration 
-- + + -- +/- + 
Organised 
Crime 
+ ++ -- -- ++ ++ 
Human 
Trafficking 
+ ++ ++ -- + +/- 
Drugs + ++ -- -- ++ ++ 
Cultural and 
Political Rights 
of Minorities 
+ + -- + /- +/- +/- + 
Notes: Hypothesised effects of independent variables on compliance: highly likely (++), likely 
(+), possible (+/-), unlikely (-), highly unlikely (--). Compliance Level is: (++) very high, (+) high, 
(+/-) partial, (-) low, (--) very low. Change in compliance rate is: (++) major improvements, (+) 
minor improvements, (+/-) stable, (-) minor reductions, (--) major reductions.  
 
                                                
182 This analysis uses two similar measurements of compliance, both of which relate to the main 
focus of this research – continued compliance in T2. The economic and political costs hypotheses 
set up a relationship between these variables and the levels of compliance. This version of the 
dependent variable measures the extent of continued compliance in T2. The vested interests and 
sunk costs hypotheses explain how the investments made in the past make it easier to continue 
compliance in T2. Therefore, the extent of compliance in T2 can still be used as a dependent 
variable. Additionally, another relationship can be formulated between these independent 
variables and the change in the rate of compliance in T2. Chapter Five measures both versions of 
the dependent variable for each cast study.  
183 It would also be useful to analyse the configurational effects of these variables through 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The present analysis considers each variable in isolation, 
therefore is not completely accurate. However, this is still a good indicator of the explanatory 
power of each variable, which can then be compared, and is therefore sufficient for the purposes 
of the research.  
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Table 8.3 demonstrates that the DPM’s economic costs and political costs 
variables are more successful at explaining continued compliance in the six cases 
under consideration, than HI’s variables. Out of the two DPM variables, the 
political costs variable is particularly strong in explaining continued compliance 
levels. There is an exact match between the hypothesised effects and the 
compliance outcomes in three cases, namely external borders, organised crime 
and drugs. In the areas of asylum and illegal migration and human trafficking 
there is only one value difference and finally in the area of cultural and political 
rights of minorities, there are two values difference. In none of the case studies 
the direction of the hypothesised effect contradicted the actual compliance level. 
In other words, there are no cases where the variable suggested unlikely or very 
unlikely compliance and the compliance outcome was high or very high. 
 
The hypothesised effects of the economic costs variable exactly corresponds to 
compliance levels in the areas of external borders and human trafficking, and are 
one value apart in the cases of drugs and organised crime. In the cases of asylum 
and illegal migration and cultural and political rights of minorities the 
hypothesised effects and actual outcomes are different by two values. In none of 
the cases was the direction of the hypothesised effect opposite to the actual 
outcome.  
 
 
The sunk costs and vested interests variables, on the other hand, do not provide 
as accurate or systematic explanations of compliance. For sunk costs, even 
though the hypothesised effects accurately match the outcomes in the cases of 
external borders and cultural and political rights of minorities and they are only 
different by one value in the cases of asylum and illegal migration and human 
trafficking, the values completely contradict in the two remaining cases. In other 
words, in organised crime and drugs, the value of the sunk costs variable 
suggests that compliance is very unlikely, yet there is very high compliance. The 
vested interests variable is even less successful in explaining compliance. Apart 
from the cases of cultural and political rights of minorities (values match), 
external borders (one value difference) and asylum and illegal migration (two 
values difference), the hypothesised effects and the actual compliance outcomes 
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are considerably different in human trafficking (-- and +) and at two opposite 
ends (++ and -- ) in the field of drugs and organised crime. 
 
Another way to interpret the HI variables is to compare their hypothesised effects 
with the change in compliance rate as opposed to compliance levels. Both of the 
HI hypotheses put forward a relationship between these independent variables 
and the likelihood of continued compliance after 2005, therefore this analysis 
appears to be more suitable. However, the change in compliance also cannot 
sufficiently be explained by sunk costs or vested interests, since there is too 
much discrepancy between the hypothesised effects and the actual changes in 
compliance. For sunk costs the values match perfectly in asylum and illegal 
migration, differ by one value in cultural and political rights of minorities and by 
two values in external borders and human trafficking. However, in the areas of 
drugs and organised crime they are at opposite ends (-- and ++). Similarly the 
hypothesised effects of the vested interests variable and continued compliance 
are one value apart in the case of cultural and political rights of minorities and 
apart by two values in the case of human trafficking. In the remainder of four 
cases, the results are contradictory.  
 
Overall, based on this comparative analysis the two DPM hypotheses, economic 
and political costs, are confirmed, and at the same time the two HI hypotheses, 
sunk costs and vested interests, are refuted. These HI variables not only offer 
much weaker explanations of compliance, but more particularly the direction of 
the hypothesised effects and the actual outcomes contradict in one third of the 
cases. On the other hand, this analysis demonstrates that the two DPM variables 
when considered together successfully explain continued compliance in the six 
case studies under analysis. When these two variables are compared, the political 
costs variable holds higher explanatory power than the economic costs.  
 
The only case where the political costs offer a comparatively weaker explanation 
is the case of cultural and political rights of minorities. In this case, even though 
the political costs of compliance were very high, making compliance highly 
unlikely, the level of compliance was measured to be partial. In other words, the 
compliance result was better than expected on the basis of specific political costs. 
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This is a very important point to emphasise, since it demonstrates that issue-
specific costs and benefits do not provide a comprehensive explanation for 
continued compliance in Turkey. This suggests that there must be other factors at 
work improving compliance, such as the government’s partisan incentives.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The previous two chapters have explained the broader compliance patterns in 
Turkey in T2 period, by examining the actions and preferences of the governing 
party. However, these chapters did not account for why compliance was better in 
some policy areas and lagged behind in others. This chapter has set out to explain 
differences in compliance across issue areas by comparing four variables. It has 
concluded that the economic and political costs variables within the DPM 
explain continued compliance much better than the sunk costs and vested 
interests variables within HI. Particularly, the political costs of compliance carry 
the strongest explanatory power to account for the selective approach to 
compliance. 
 
This analysis seems to offer a very accurate picture of compliance outcomes in 
specific issue areas. It almost gives the impression that international politics do 
not matter at all, and compliance can purely be explained by domestic cost-
benefit calculations. However, this view is misleading. As shown in the example 
of cultural and political rights of minorities, political costs associated with this 
reform cannot fully explain why compliance turned out to be higher than 
expected. Even though the economic and political costs variables explain the 
selective approach to compliance, the overall compliance in Turkey requires a 
broader approach, and can only be explained by taking into account external 
incentives provided by EU conditionality. The previous two chapters have done 
exactly this to demonstrate that the EU is still crucial in providing incentives for 
the governing party to comply. It has been shown that without the EU the AKP, 
or any other government for that matter, would not have been able to conduct 
reforms to this extent.  
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This thesis has initially recognised that compliance continued to be conducted by 
Turkish officials under diminished credibility. In order to resolve this puzzle, it 
has focused on the political leadership and explained why they continued to 
formally and behaviourally comply with EU conditionality. At the same time, 
there are reasons to believe that the EU-related bureaucracy in Turkey may also 
be driving compliance forward under diminished credibility. The following 
chapter examines whether the EU-related bureaucracy’s actions can offer an 
alternative explanation for continued compliance in T2.  
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Chapter Nine: 
Bureaucratic Politics of Compliance under Diminished 
Credibility (2005-2010) 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This thesis has so far explained continued compliance under diminished 
credibility in Turkey with the actions and preferences of the political leadership. 
Even though this explanation is causally strong, it fails to take into account other 
actors which may also have an influence on continued compliance. This chapter 
examines the role of bureaucrats in the compliance process and tests whether 
they play an independent role to increase compliance in T2. In other words, to 
what extent can the bureaucrats be a driving force of compliance under 
diminished credibility, which is independent of the strategies and choices of 
political leadership? This is an important question since the role of bureaucracy 
in compliance has been ignored in conditionality literature. Given that EU-
related bureaucrats carry out all the necessary preparatory work for formal and 
behavioural compliance, they are an important actor in the process. It is a 
worthwhile exercise to analyse how significant or marginal their influence on 
compliance is. Even if they have marginal influence in helping achieve 
compliance, this is interesting since it goes against the expectation that 
bureaucracy is generally an obstacle to change. Moreover, it is important to 
understand under which specific circumstances they are able to drive forward 
reform and whether their compliance operates in the same manner as the political 
leadership.  
 
Chapter Four has demonstrated that the EU-related bureaucrats continued to 
conduct administrative compliance in T2, which incorporates all the work done 
to bring about formal compliance, such as preparation of draft legislation, long-
term programmes and other strategic documents. But what explains the EU-
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related bureaucrats’ continued administrative compliance under diminished 
credibility? Can it be explained by the preferences/actions of political leadership 
as in the previous three chapters? In other words, do the bureaucrats continue to 
comply because they are instructed to do so by the politicians, or are the EU-
related bureaucrats an independent force pushing compliance from the bottom-
up? This chapter addresses these questions by testing the domestic politics 
model’s (DPM) assumption that bureaucrats’ compliance reflects the political 
leadership’s cost-benefit calculations. This suggests that the bureaucrats’ 
compliance is driven by and completely dependent on the political leadership. 
 
This null hypothesis can be broken down further. The principal’s 
economic/political costs hypothesis asserts that: if the political leadership’s 
economic and political benefits associated with complying with a specific EU 
condition are higher than its economic and political costs, then the bureaucrats 
are likely to comply. Secondly, the administrative capacity hypothesis states 
that: if the political leadership improves the structure of the candidate’s 
administration and institutional resources, such as budget and staff; then 
compliance is likely to improve.  
 
On the other hand, the bureaucratic politics model (BPM) argues that the EU-
related bureaucracy can be an independent force behind improving compliance. 
More specifically, two hypotheses have been put forward. The organisational 
lock-in hypothesis following HI states that: if a specific institution/department 
has been created for the purpose of complying with the EU; and/or if remaining 
on the EU path maintains/strengthens the role, power and mandate of an 
institution/department; and/or if the relevant institution/department has 
developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) and prepared long-term 
programmes for compliance; then the bureaucrats within those 
institutions/departments are likely to continue complying. Secondly, the social 
learning hypothesis claims that: if the bureaucrats identify with the EU; and/or 
have institutional contacts with the EU and MS officials; and/or have a European 
professional/educational background, then they are likely to comply. 
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The dependent variable for this analysis, administrative compliance, has been 
measured in Chapter Four by examining the changes in the bureaucrats’ 
workloads and the time they devote to compliance-related activities. This chapter 
concluded that despite an initial fall in the level of administrative compliance 
during the initial stages of T2, it picked up after 2007 and reached levels equal to 
or higher than T1 period. This chapter measures the values of the independent 
variables discussed above and tests whether they are congruent with the level of 
administrative compliance in T2. Interview data are used to validate this 
congruence analysis. Since this research focuses on the areas of JHA and human 
rights, the EU-related bureaucrats working in the EUSG, MFA, MI and MJ are 
included. 
 
This chapter concludes that the compliance of bureaucrats does not play a 
determining role in Turkey’s general compliance with EU conditionality. The 
bureaucrats are not an autonomous actor in Turkish politics and their compliance 
does not take place independently of the political leadership’s preferences. The 
bureaucrats consider their principals’ preferences when they conduct 
administrative compliance and the political leadership decides whether this 
administrative compliance translates into formal/behavioural compliance. In 
sum, the DPM’s null hypothesis is confirmed in this analysis. The evidence in 
this chapter particularly supports the principal’s economic/political costs 
hypothesis, whereas the level of administrative capacity was not found to be 
causally related to compliance.  
 
On the other hand, this chapter also shows that the bureaucrats demonstrate some 
characteristics of actorness in areas where the political leadership is indifferent 
to compliance. Moreover, the bureaucrats’ compliance operates according to a 
different logic to the political leadership. The organisational lock-in is very high 
for the bureaucracy and they are likely to experience strong social learning 
during the process.184 In other words, there is a particular bureaucratic politics of 
compliance. After a brief analysis of the relationship between the bureaucracy 
                                                
184 Both variables are causally related with continued compliance and therefore both hypotheses 
are confirmed in this chapter.  
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and politicians in Turkey, this chapter considers the BPM and subsequently 
moves on to test the DPM. 
 
9.1 The Relationship between the Bureaucracy and Politicians in Turkey 
 
The history of the Turkish republic is characterised by continuous conflict 
between the bureaucratic elites and the government authority. This conflict has 
its roots in the Ottoman system of administration. Ottoman society was strictly 
divided along ruling vs. non-ruling classes. Up until later periods of the Empire, 
the bureaucracy remained as a passive tool of the Sultan (Roos and Roos Jr., 
1968: 271). However, as the Empire and, together with it, the Sultan’s position, 
weakened, the bureaucracy increasingly attained ‘virtually unlimited powers’ 
(Heper and Sancar, 1998: 146). This is the reason why no regional/territorial 
powers or any kind of aristocracy was able to develop in the Ottoman period. A 
similarly strong bureaucratic tradition continued once the Turkish Republic was 
established. As this was a revolution from above, a strong centralised state 
bureaucracy was needed to ensure the implementation of the reform process and 
to guarantee that there were no challenges to the centralised state 
(Konstantinidis, 2002: 6). In the initial periods of the Republic, there was no real 
distinction between the political and bureaucratic elites, since a group of people 
committed to Ataturk and his principles ‘circulated as members of the ruling 
party, members of the parliament, cabinet ministers and high officials’ (Evin, 
1996: 4; Heper and Sancar, 1998: 147-8). 
 
The differentiation of the state bureaucracy from the political elite and the intra-
elite conflict between these two groups did not start until the introduction of the 
multi-party system in Turkey. From 1950s onwards the new political elites, 
represented by various centre-right parties, such as the Justice Party, Democrat 
Party, DYP, ANAP, and most recently the AKP, presented themselves as the real 
representatives of the public, against the state bureaucracy (Heper and Keyman, 
1998: 262). These so-called ‘anti-state parties’ faced opposition from a very 
strong bureaucratic tradition, which saw itself as the guardian of the Republic, 
Kemalist principles and the protector of the long-term interests of the Turkish 
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nation (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 148). The newly emerging political elite 
decided to establish its authority, firstly by ‘destatising and then politicising the 
bureaucracy’ (ibid.: 148). This was done through employing new personnel 
through patronage ties to newly created positions (Evin, 1996: 6) and to so-called 
autonomous agencies (Heper, 1990: 611). In such a patrimonial system, a more 
specific party-political politicisation replaced the Kemalist politicisation within 
certain sections of the state. The Kemalist state bureaucracy, on the other hand, 
did not turn a blind eye to this encroachment to their authority, and instead used 
their veto-power. Three military interventions and a post-modern coup in 1997 
were conducted by officials who shared with the state bureaucracy the view that 
they should be holding the real power to govern the Turkish society as opposed 
to the elected officials. These interventions removed anti-state parties from the 
government for a short while and established limits on the exercise of political 
control over the state bureaucracy (Evin, 1996: 5).  
 
This brief background demonstrates that a clear distinction, as well as 
competition, between the political cadres and Kemalist state elites is a common 
feature of Turkish politics. A similar competition was present during the AKP’s 
tenure. Given this existing tension, it is important to assess how this influences 
Turkey’s compliance with the EU. On the one hand, it is true that the Kemalist 
state elites, for instance within the MFA, always perceived themselves as 
Western and have continuously struggled to be part of European international 
community (Schimmelfennig et al., 2005: 42). However, their attachment to 
Europe and the EU is conditional. The Kemalist elite, despite equating 
civilisation and modernisation with Europe, is also sceptical about the EU in a 
number of important respects. They have very strong red lines when it comes to 
the Cyprus or the Armenian issue, demilitarisation of politics, giving more rights 
to minority groups, and even increasing freedoms within Turkey. Therefore, they 
find it unacceptable to make concessions on these issues to become an EU 
member. In this respect, it can be argued that the Kemalist bureaucracy identifies 
strongly with the EU and may push for further integration in some 
uncontroversial areas, however they are also highly Eurosceptic when it comes to 
important aspects of EU’s political conditionality. In this respect, they can 
become an important force against further reform in the Turkish political system. 
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The views in the literature also confirm this assessment. Kemalist ideology is 
described as going against the democratic norms of the EU and being resistant to 
change in terms of further democratisation (Turkmen, 2008: 161-2).  
 
On the other hand, other parts of Turkish bureaucracy, which are not staunchly 
Kemalist and more subject to politicisation by the political leadership, approach 
EU integration differently. The recently established EU-related bureaucratic 
agencies/units, such as the EUSG, SPO’s DGEU, and the Border Management 
Bureau (BMB) within the MI, are more pro-European in line with the 
preferences of the political leadership. The main reason for this is that these 
institutions have more limited mandates – to comply with EU requirements – 
rather than to protect the security and the unity of the state. Moreover, due to 
their recent development, they are comparatively less socialised within the 
domestic administrative structures and less governed by tradition and history. 
Therefore, they are generally not attached to the Kemalist ideology as strongly as 
the more established institutions. This in itself makes it easier for them to support 
the EU’s political conditionality. This view is also confirmed by the interviews. 
The head of Human Rights Foundations maintained that: ‘the Turkish 
bureaucracy is not a progressive bureaucracy in these [human rights] issues… 
The EUSG is a bit different’ (CS7). Similarly, a member of another civil society 
organisation argued that: ‘[t]he bureaucratic mechanisms which are more 
alternative, more democratic and liberal are very recent and they need to fight the 
structure which is rooted in centuries… For example, the EUSG always makes 
similar comments to [draft] laws as we [human rights organisations] do. But the 
law goes back to its old bad form, older ministries change these back’ (CS2).  
 
Overall, the above discussion demonstrates that there are strong tensions between 
the Kemalist bureaucracy and the AKP cadres. The newly established EU-related 
bureaucracy stands closer to the AKP in this divide and supports Turkey’s 
compliance with the EU. At the same time, the established Kemalist strongholds 
are likely to be staunchly opposed to Turkey’s compliance with EU’s political 
conditionality and therefore obstruct further compliance. In the face of such 
Kemalist opposition, the continuation of administrative compliance under 
diminished credibility becomes even more puzzling. 
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9.2 Bureaucratic Politics of Compliance 
 
Chapter Four has demonstrated that administrative compliance has not followed 
a linear path in T2 period. It went through an initial period of decline between 
2005 and 2007 since Turkish officials failed to produce an NPAA in 2006 and 
there was a slow down in the preparation of political reform packages. However, 
even during this slow period the EU-related bureaucracy was kept busy with the 
screening process where the Turkish legislation was compared to the EU acquis 
in a detailed manner and Turkey’s negotiating positions were determined for 
each chapter. After this relatively slow period administrative compliance picked 
up and reached levels equal to or higher than T1. The TPAA, a new NPAA, as 
well as an Action Plan were prepared; a strategy document for Turkey’s 
accession and a communication strategy were published; a harmonisation reform 
package, a judicial reform strategy and a constitutional reform package were also 
prepared by the bureaucrats at the later stages of T2. Moreover, most of the 
improvements within the JHA field took place in the T2 period.  
 
This section tests whether this continued administrative compliance can be 
explained by the independent action of EU-related bureaucrats. In other words, 
can the bureaucrats improve compliance outcomes in a bottom-up manner 
despite the preferences of political leadership or are they completely confined to 
doing what they are instructed by the politicians in a top-down style? To respond 
to this question, the following section initially reviews the bureaucratic politics 
approach to FP and subsequently tests whether continued compliance can be 
explained by organisational lock-in and social learning models. It concludes that 
organisational lock-in and social learning are very high in the case of bureaucrats 
and these levels are causally congruent with continued administrative 
compliance. Therefore, we can actually talk about a specific bureaucratic politics 
of compliance. The final sub-section demonstrates that the EU-related 
bureaucrats are a limited actor in the compliance process, whose actions may 
improve compliance outcomes.  
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9.2.1 Bureaucratic Politics Model 
 
To understand the role of Turkey’s EU-related bureaucracy in the accession 
process, it is necessary to take a step back and briefly run through the BPM in FP 
analysis. The BPM in political science literature has emerged initially in 1950s 
and was later developed by scholars like Halperin, Destler, Steinbruner, 
Galluci185 and most famously by Graham Allison in ‘Essence of Decision’ 
(1971). Allison’s account of FP decision-making came as a reaction to the 
dominant realist explanation of the time. Allison did not believe states acted in 
unitary and centrally controlled ways (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 143). Instead, 
FP analysis should open the ‘black box’ of the state by focusing on the role of 
organisational behaviour and the bureaucrats who are involved in the making and 
implementation of FP decisions, as well as the political games played amongst 
these actors (Smith, 1989: 109).  
 
The BPM maintains that the field of FP requires the involvement of multiple 
state actors and in such a system coordination is achieved by following ‘SOPs’, 
which are not flexible and unlikely to change (Allison, 1999: 143-4). The 
specific routines followed by each bureaucratic department have an important 
influence on the behavioural outcomes of FP. Moreover, according to Allison, 
‘where you stand depends upon where you sit’ (Allison, 1971: 176). In other 
words, members of an organisation feel obliged to represent the operational 
codes, cultures, values and worldview of their organisation. In time role-
socialisation takes place and organisational identities emerge. As a result, in the 
process of FP decision-making, these bureaucratic organisations each follow ‘at 
best their own versions of the national interest and at worst their own parochial 
concerns’ (Hill, 2003: 85-6). FP decision-making becomes an outcome of SOPs 
and conflicting organisational preferences, which frequently lead to bureaucratic 
turf wars.186 
 
Eight characteristics of bureaucratic institutions are important to identify to 
explain bureaucratic behaviour (Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf, 1991: 466-72). 
                                                
185 See Smith (1989: 130) for more detailed references on the BPM. 
186 For a critique of Allison’s BPM see Smith, 1980; 1989; Hollis and Smith, 1986. 
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Parochialism refers to the fact that each bureaucratic organisation aims to pursue 
its own interests, enhance its power and status in the government hierarchy. In 
other words, the job security of a bureaucrat takes priority over everything else. 
Bureaucratic agencies also compete with each other for scarce state resources and 
power so that they can increase the morale of their staff and thereby 
effectiveness. In this respect, many bureaucratic organisations define policy 
success not through national interests but in terms of organisational interests and 
their organisation’s position vis-à-vis others in the government hierarchy. 
Moreover, bureaucratic agencies seek imperialistic task expansion by increasing 
their staffs, budgets, functional powers and prerogatives, either absolutely or in 
relation to other agencies. The bureaucratic agencies also have strong endurance 
and are survival-oriented. Once they are created, ‘they usually persist, even in the 
face of great adversity’ (Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf, 1991: 470). They also value 
secrecy and exclusiveness in order to prevent other organisations or political 
leadership interfering in or regulating their operations. Each agency also 
develops over time attitudinal conformity where the bureaucrats within that 
organisation start sharing a similar institutional mind-set and values without 
substantial questioning. This is the reason why different organisations have 
genuinely different views of what the national interest is depending on their 
organisational preferences and goals. There is also a high degree of deference to 
tradition in bureaucratic agencies. Bureaucrats, rather than trying to find new and 
more efficient ways of solving problems, usually defer to SOPs, established rules 
and tradition. Finally, there is a high reliance on historical analogies, where 
policy-makers tend to search history for parallel scenarios to find ways of 
dealing with a problem at hand.  
 
Having clarified the main characteristics of the BPM, let us now apply these 
concepts to the EU-related bureaucracy in Turkey and examine the extent to 
which they can assume a decisive role in the compliance process. The following 
sections test whether SOPs/lock-in effects and organisational 
identities/socialisation can explain the EU-related bureaucrats’ continued 
administrative compliance in T2 respectively. 
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9.2.2 Organisational Lock-in  
 
The BPM established that routines and SOPs followed by bureaucrats have a 
significant influence on policy outcomes. The organisational lock-on model 
hypothesises that: if a specific institution/department has been created for the 
purpose of complying with the EU; and/or if remaining on the EU path 
maintains/strengthens the role, power and mandate of an institution/department; 
and/or if the relevant institutions/department has developed SOPs and prepared 
long-term programmes for compliance; then the bureaucrats within those 
institutions/departments are likely to continue complying. The empirical data 
used in this section confirms all three of the propositions put forward by the 
organisational lock-in hypothesis and demonstrates that the level of 
organisational lock-in for the EU-related bureaucrats is very high in Turkey. This 
result is congruent with the continued administrative compliance within T2. The 
interviewee data also support the view that there is a causal relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables. 
 
9.2.2.1 Organisational Purpose 
 
As the hypothesis suggests all the institutions and departments that are of interest 
to us in the administrative phase of compliance, namely the EUSG, and the EU 
units within the MI, MFA and MJ, have been created for the purpose of 
complying with the EU. Their stated institutional goals and priorities also 
demonstrate this.187 In this respect, the predominant responsibility of all the EU-
related bureaucrats working in these institutions is to keep on complying with the 
EU regardless of the negative signals coming from the EU institutions or the 
declining credibility. In other words, they need to continue to fulfil the 
requirements of their professional positions and they do not have much choice. 
Tugrul Arat explains this lack of choice: ‘[t]he EUSG continues to work because 
they have been employed for this purpose only. They have only worked on EU 
                                                
187 Even though some of these departments, as in the case of the MI’s unit, are identified to be 
responsible for ‘Foreign Affairs and the European Union’, the interviews with the MI department 
officials show that compliance with the EU is their main responsibility (MI1; MI2; MI3). 
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issues… They cannot do any other work’ (AC3). The interviewed EU-related 
bureaucrats explain their continued compliance under diminished credibility 
through their ‘work ethic’ (BMB2): ‘[p]eople [EUSG bureaucrats] continue to 
work. I don’t know how many actually believe in the EU process and how many 
don’t, but it is more to do with their work ethic and institutional belonging… The 
EUSG’s legal status was bad, things were uncertain [prior to the 2009 reform]. 
But I realised the young civil servants in particular conducted their work in a 
truly ethical and proper way’ (EUSG1). This evidence demonstrates that the EU-
related bureaucrats all work in departments created specifically for the purpose 
of EU compliance, and they continue to comply even within the T2 period 
because this is part of their job requirement.  
 
The main reason why these EU departments have been created within the 
Turkish state is that integration with Europe is Turkey’s official state policy and 
unless an institution like the EUSG is dismantled they will continue to comply. 
Even if the political conjuncture within Turkey or the EU affects this strategic 
goal negatively at times, the direction of this state policy does not change 
(MFA3; MFA5; MI2; EUSG9; SPO2; CS1; CS5; CS7; BDP2; AKP14). 
Therefore, as the deputy Undersecretary of the MFA maintained: ‘[i]f you ask 
our Ministry most of them won’t believe we’ll be an EU member. But overall 
this is the state policy, therefore regardless of whether we believe in it or not we 
have to do it’ (MFA3). Overall, the EU-related bureaucrats continue to comply 
not only because of their institutional requirements, but also because Turkey’s 
strategic goal of Europeanisation continues to inform the state policy.   
 
9.2.2.2 Organisational Power 
 
The organisational lock-in hypothesis also proposes that the EU departments 
may either maintain or improve their power, resources or mandates as long as 
Turkey remains on the road to EU accession. This assumption is also confirmed 
by the empirical data. The Turkish state’s institutional capacity for EU 
compliance was very weak to start out with when Turkey was accepted as a 
candidate in 1999. Particularly with the start of the negotiations and the 
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screening process, improving the capacity became a necessity. The institutional 
capacity, namely staff levels and budgets, of the EU-related bureaucracy has 
improved significantly over time, particularly in the case of the EUSG.188 In 
addition to these institutional resources, the EU-related bureaucracy’s mandate 
has also expanded to cover all the acquis areas with the start of accession 
negotiations. 
 
Moreover, the bureaucracy’s financial resources increased with more available 
EU funding through projects. These material resources provided by the EU in the 
form of technical assistance projects, such as twinning, provides important 
incentives for the bureaucracy to continue to comply at a time when the 
credibility of conditionality is diminished. This is so even though the funding 
provided by the EU is limited at times and is predominantly used to pay the 
salaries of the EU experts working in twinning projects in Turkey. However, 
even small projects can make a difference for the workings of public institutions 
and help Turkish bureaucrats to gain expertise about best practices within the 
EU. Overall, in line with the propositions of the BPM, these departments 
continue to comply with the EU because this improves their resources, expand 
their tasks and therefore place them higher within the state hierarchy. 
 
But what would happen to these bureaucrats and departments in a counterfactual 
scenario where Turkey is no longer an EU candidate? Most of the interviewees 
agree that the relatively smaller EU departments within line ministries would 
either become part of the ministry’s foreign affairs department or be abolished, in 
which case the staff would be transferred to other ministry departments (MI1; 
MI2; MI3; BMB2; MJ2; MJ3; EUSG2). This would mean a decline in the power, 
mandate and resources of these departments. However, when it comes to an 
institution like the EUSG, the interviewees agree that it would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to abolish it in Turkey (EUSG1; EUSG2; EUSG4; 
EUSG5; EUSG6; EUSG7), since bureaucracies are survival-oriented and they 
tend to endure. Instead, what is more likely to happen is that its staff levels, 
                                                
188 A more detailed analysis of changes in the administrative capacity is conducted later in the 
chapter.  
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budget and mandate would be significantly downgraded to reflect a lesser 
responsibility, for instance, for the EU-Turkish relations in the customs union. 
 
Overall, this section has shown that remaining on the EU accession path 
maintains or improves the resources, power and mandates of EU-related 
bureaucrats and this is very likely to explain their continued compliance under 
diminished credibility. As one EUSG official succinctly stated: ‘[i]f we don’t do 
these our existence will start to be questioned’ (SPO2). 
 
9.2.2.3 Organisational Rules 
 
The hypothesis also suggests that the EU-related bureaucrats continue to comply 
because of SOPs, which have developed within their institution or between 
Turkey and the EU; and/or long-term programmes prepared for compliance. In 
the context of SOPs there is an established system of contacts, meetings and 
reports between the EU and Turkey within compliance process. For instance, the 
EU Commission writes yearly PRs about the developments in Turkey, regardless 
of how low accession credibility is or how little progress Turkey has achieved. 
This is part of the Commission officials’ job. The EU-related bureaucrats in 
Turkey, knowing that this report will be published every year around October, 
have to send contributions to the Commission as part of their job. They do not 
need to take instructions from the higher levels of the bureaucracy or the political 
leadership to do this. Similarly, if the EU Commission prepares the AP, the 
Turkish side produces an NPAA.189 An EUSG official describes the path-
dependent nature of this process: 
‘What can we do but not comply? How can we stop the process? 
What are we going to say to cancel the meetings? There are a lot 
of platforms where two sides meet in the framework of 
Association Treaty. These meet once or twice a year. The 
Association Council meets, its committee meets, and the sub-
committees meet. You cannot not attend these, you cannot attend 
and not participate in these either. You have to make preparations 
before these meetings… We do not want to appear as if we 
                                                
189 As an exception to this, the Turkish side failed to produce a 2006 NPAA to address the 2006 
AP. This was partly due to the low administrative capacity of the EUSG and the lack of will on 
the part of the political leadership. 
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haven’t done anything. Therefore we continue to work… There is 
an established and functioning system. This needs to continue… 
No one has said the process is over… Even though there are 
political problems both sides continue to play this role they are 
given…’ (SPO2). 
 
Similarly, the EU-related bureaucrats prepare long-term programmes, such as the 
NPAA, action plans, roadmaps or strategy documents, and these also make it 
likely for the administrative compliance to continue. Some interviewees 
explained how bureaucracy works ‘according to a timetable’. For instance, a 
bureaucrat from the MI stated that: ‘the work we do here is clearly set out in a 
timetable… This is clearly explained in the NPAA… Therefore, we’re not in a 
situation to be motivated or demotivated. Everything is set out in a programme 
and we are working on those issues’ (MI3). These long-term programmes also 
explain why compliance halted in some periods and picked up in others. At the 
start of T1, two NPAAs were produced which allowed for a high level of 
administrative compliance. The lack of an NPAA in 2006, on the other hand, 
caused a slowdown in administrative compliance at the start of T2, since there 
were no long-term programmes for the EU-related bureaucrats to follow. 
However, starting in 2007, various new programmes, strategy documents, an 
NPAA, the TPAA, and issue-specific roadmaps were produced. This 
improvement is also congruent with a period of faster administrative compliance.  
 
In sum, the established structured relations with the EU, the SOPs and long-term 
programmes make harmonisation path-dependent for the bureaucrats. The 
Association Agreement signed with the EU or the NPAA produced by the 
Turkish bureaucrats in previous years, make it likely for the bureaucrats to 
continue to progress on the road to membership even under diminished 
credibility. An EU law professor who joined the EUSG as a high level bureaucrat 
after the 2009 reform explains the continued compliance at the administrative 
level as: ‘[w]e had always read this in theory but you realise it more when you 
actually get into it. I experienced here that even when the process comes to a 
point of political deadlock, the relations [with the EU] are progressing very 
intensely and fast on a technical level… This was striking’ (EUSG4). 
 
 
276 
Overall, the sections above demonstrate that all three indicators of the 
organisational lock-in hypothesis are strongly present in the case of Turkey 
demonstrating very high organisational lock-in. This finding is congruent with 
continued compliance in T2. The slow down in administrative compliance in the 
initial period of T2 is also congruent with the lack of long-term programmes 
during this period.  
 
9.2.3 Social Learning Model  
 
A key argument of the BPM contends that ‘where you stand depends upon where 
you sit’ (Allison, 1971: 176). According to this organisational cultures emerge in 
state institutions over time and this has a socialising effect on the bureaucrats 
working there, shaping their preferences as well as behaviour. Continuing this 
line of argument the social learning hypothesises that: if the bureaucrats identify 
with the EU; and/or have institutional contacts with the EU and MS officials; 
and/or have a European professional/educational background, then they are 
likely to comply. This section uses evidence based on interviews to demonstrate 
that the EU-related bureaucracy identifies strongly with the EU and the 
conditions which facilitate bureaucrats’ social learning are very favourable. 
These findings show that the level of social learning for the EU-related 
bureaucracy is likely to be strong and therefore is likely to explain continued 
administrative compliance under diminished credibility. This section initially 
examines the extent of exposure of the Turkish bureaucracy to their EU 
counterparts and subsequently analyses the bureaucrats’ identification with the 
EU by using interviews and secondary literature. It then assesses to what extent 
these findings are congruent with continued compliance.  
 
9.2.3.1 Exposure 
 
It has been argued in the literature that there is a positive causal relationship 
between institutional contacts and socialisation (Checkel, 2005), therefore this 
research considers exposure of Turkish bureaucracy to the EU counterparts as a 
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condition which makes social learning likely. In the context of EU integration, 
Lindberg and Scheingold argue that contexts within which policy is made has 
ceased to be autonomous and instead there are growing interactions between 
interest groups, bureaucrats and statesman across the EU MSs during decision-
making processes (1970: 119). These mutual interactions result in new 
perspectives, loyalties and identifications, in other words, in actor socialisation 
(ibid.: 119). Lindberg and Scheingold maintain that the actors who participate in 
this joint policy-making exercise ‘may come to value the system and their roles 
within it, either for itself or for the concrete rewards and benefits it has produced 
or that it promises’ (ibid.: 119). These actors who come to realise an enlarged 
common interest, may encourage their own governments to delegate more tasks 
to the supranational level (ibid.: 119),190 thus increase integration. This process 
through which the national elites, who realise that specific issues cannot be dealt 
with at the domestic level, experience a gradual learning process and thereby 
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new European 
centre, is called political spillover in the neofunctionalist literature (Haas, 1958; 
Lindberg, 1963; Niemann, 1998: 430). Through the political spillover 
mechanism, domestic actors are able to enhance the EU integration process. This 
neofunctionalist literature predominantly looks at the loyalty transfers of 
domestic interest groups (Haas, 1958: 16). However, the role of state elites is 
equally crucial for furthering EU integration. Lindberg points out that the vast 
number of working groups and committees formed at the EU level among 
national civil servants and Commission officials has led to a system of 
bureaucratic interpenetration (1963: 49-93). Such complex system of interaction 
has later been called engrenage (Taylor, 1983: 9-10). Engrenage specifically 
refers to national bureaucrats who increasingly take integrative decisions due to 
their intensified involvement with Community officials and bureaucrats from 
other MSs (Niemann, 1998; 430, 436). Sheinman and Feld illustrate how 
engrenage works by examining national bureaucrats who are seconded to EU 
institutions. According to the authors, these officials experience political 
socialisation and they adopt a more European orientation than before through 
                                                
190 At the same time, this positive relationship between socialisation through participation and 
positive attitudes towards integration should not be assumed to be true in every case (Lindberg 
and Scheingold, 1970: 119). It is also possible that such exposure to community structures and 
actors may ‘increase enmity and reduce incentives for further collective action’ (ibid.: 119). 
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their community experience (1972: 122-3, 133).191 Sheinman and Feld conclude 
that interpenetration into Brussels ‘provides a positive socialising experience 
facilitating the integrative process’ (ibid.: 133).  
 
Similar political spillover and engrenage mechanisms are present in the context 
of EU enlargement.  Candidates’ state officials start interacting with the EU 
elites even before accession. They are given observer status within various EU 
institutions (Miles et al., 1995: 181), they interact with MS and EU officials 
through the twinning instrument (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004: 619; 
Tulmets, 2005: 58, 78-9), TAIEX seminars, working groups, other joint projects 
funded by the EU, as well as in various association councils, committees and 
sub-committees (Niemann, 1998: 436; Macmillan, 2009: 800). This exposure 
facilitates social learning and encourages more favourable attitudes to the EU 
amongst candidates’ bureaucrats. Along these lines, Drulak et al. in their study of 
Czech civil servants demonstrate that those officials who are more exposed to the 
EU are better informed about the EU and, more importantly, the intensity of their 
interactions are positively related to support for deeper integration (2003: 648-
51). Niemann’s study reaches similar conclusions. He shows that due to intense 
interactions with the EU officials, the candidates’ bureaucrats experience strong 
socialisation during the pre-accession stage (1998: 436).192  
 
The Turkish bureaucracy undergoes a similar social learning process in the pre-
accession stage. The Turkish officials, particularly the EU-related bureaucracy, 
are in frequent contact with the EU Commission, its representation in Ankara, as 
well as MS civil servants through twinning projects, TAIEX seminars, working 
group meetings, association committee meetings, screening process and through 
the negotiations themselves (Tocci, 2006: 133). Throughout this process, it is 
predominantly the bureaucracy, led by the EUSG, which interacts with the EU 
counterparts, rather than the political leadership. Moreover, the bureaucrats hold 
more permanent positions which makes their relations with the EU bureaucrats 
more long-lasting than the politicians’ and thereby makes social learning more 
                                                
191 Arguably, the strength of engrenage is also positively related to the duration of the 
socialisation experienced (Niemann, 1998: 437). 
192 However, he does not analyse the consequences of this socialisation, i.e. whether or not it 
leads to more support for integration. (1998: 436). 
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likely. Even though the same party remained in government during most of T1 
and T2, not all the MPs were in the TGNA for both terms and the members of 
the EUHC changed over time. Therefore, the conditions are much more 
favourable for the bureaucracy to experience strong social learning in 
comparison to the political elite. 
 
Kirisci’s study illustrates how contacts between the Turkish bureaucracy and EU 
officials have initiated a ‘paradigmatic shift’ to occur among Turkish officials 
with regards to asylum policy (2007: 15). He argues that the close cooperation 
between the Turkish authorities and the EU officials through training seminars, 
informal consultations, working groups and EU-funded twinning projects 
‘constituted a massive learning and socialisation experience for Turkish officials’ 
(ibid.: 14-16). The move from a security-oriented asylum policy to one with a 
more human rights focus and the 2006 amendment of the Asylum law, are 
illustrations of this change (ibid.: 14-16). Kirisci particularly underlines the 
importance of the training seminars for ‘helping to develop a “common 
language” between Turkish officials and their EU counterparts’ and the twinning 
project supported by British and Danish governments for triggering social 
learning (ibid.: 16). This specific project was crucial because it allowed the 
Turkish authorities to work on a daily basis over many months with MS officials 
for the first time in their careers (ibid.: 16). 
 
The interview evidence suggests that the Turkish bureaucrats experience a high 
degree of engrenage. This offers a very favourable environment for social 
learning to take place. According to the interviewed bureaucrats, the main 
advantage of working together is the fact that both sides can get to know each 
other better. On the one hand, the Turkish bureaucrats felt that by working 
closely with EU officials they were able to break some of the EU officials’ 
prejudices about Turkey (MI3; MJ2). On the other hand, the bureaucrats were 
able to get to know the EU better and make a much more informed decision 
about their support for the EU (MJ2). Most of the interviewees explained that by 
getting to know the EU standards and system better, they came to value them 
more and therefore wanted to bring these standards to Turkey. For instance, one 
interviewee from the MI explained that before she started working on EU issues, 
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her views on Turkish accession were solely informed by big political debates 
such as the Cyprus issue. However, after working in the EU department in MI 
and conducting projects with the EU officials, she realised that ‘the technical side 
of this process [was] more beautiful’ (MI3). The bureaucracy’s general attitude 
towards the EU also changed positively in time. According to a previous EUSG 
official, the Turkish bureaucracy’s initial response to working with EU officials 
in EU-funded projects was very negative and they even saw the EU officials as 
‘crusaders’ (GDS1). However, in a very short period of time views have become 
much more positive and the EU-related bureaucracy started to identify more with 
EU values and standards.  
 
In addition to contacts with the EU officials, EU-related bureaucrats in Turkey 
had frequent opportunities to go abroad to Europe during the accession process. 
They went to various EU countries for EU projects, to continue their studies at 
post-graduate level or attend language training. According to a GDS official, 
those police officials who went to EU countries with EU funding gained brand 
new perspectives, understood multiculturalism and learned a lot about different 
security systems (GDS2). In addition to police officials, a high number of judges 
and prosecutors went abroad for language courses and masters studies.193 The 
interviewed EU-related bureaucrats in the MJ believed that the judges and 
prosecutors who came back from these trips were very different from when they 
went away (MJ1; MJ2; MJ3). The change was expressed as ‘black and white’ in 
one interview (MJ2). In sum, such visits are extremely important for Turkey’s 
compliance, since the bureaucrats who conduct administrative compliance widen 
their perspective and experience social learning.  
 
Overall, the evidence from interviews suggests that having close contacts with 
EU counterparts and spending time abroad helps the EU-related bureaucracy to 
value EU standards as better alternatives to the current Turkish ones. The high 
level of exposure to the EU makes it likely for the EU-related bureaucracy to 
continue complying even under diminished credibility. As Acikmese explained:  
                                                
193 More than 100 judges and prosecutors went abroad for the duration of at least one year in the 
last five years and ‘around 30-40 of them conducted masters studies’ (MJ1). 
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‘I think that this socialisation has an important role to play to 
motivate the bureaucracy.  In other words, even if the government 
doesn’t want it, or the process comes to a deadlock, their 
[bureaucrats’] desire to do something and their efforts to continue 
the harmonisation process, can only be explained through this 
[socialisation mechanism]; the relations they build with them [EU 
officials] and their identification with the EU’ (CS5).  
 
9.2.3.2 Identification 
 
While the exposure factor determines whether the conditions are conducive for 
social learning, identification is a more direct indicator. Two Eurobarometer 
questions194 are used to measure the identification of the EU-related bureaucracy 
with the EU. 17 out of 18 EU-related bureaucrats (94%) stated that EU 
membership was a good thing for Turkey, 195  whereas one interviewee 196 
suggested it was neither good nor bad. The EU-related bureaucracy’s support for 
EU integration is much higher in comparison to the general public, which was 
only 42% in the autumn of 2010 (Eurobarometer, 2010a: 35). With regard to the 
second question, only 17% of the EU-related bureaucrats defined themselves as 
‘Turkish only’,197 whereas 78% of them198 saw themselves as ‘Turkish and 
European’ and 5% of the interviewees199 identified themselves as ‘European and 
Turkish’. This shows that 83% of the EU-related bureaucrats identify at some 
level with being European, whereas this level was only 43% among the general 
public in Turkey in 2004 (Eurobarometer, 2004b: 183). Moreover, these levels 
are also considerably higher than the identification of the political leadership, as 
shown in Chapter Six. Overall, the results demonstrate that the EU-related 
bureaucracy identifies strongly with the EU in comparison to both the general 
public and the political leadership.  
 
                                                
194 (1) Do you see yourself as, Turkish only, Turkish and European, European and Turkish, or 
European only? (2) Generally speaking, do you think that Turkish membership of the EU is a 
good thing/bad thing/neither good nor bad/do not know? 
195 MI1; MI2; MFA4; MFA5; GDS1; GDS2; BMB1; AIB1; AIB2; EUSG2; EUSG4; EUSG5; 
EUSG6; EUSG7; EUSG10; SPO1; MJ2.  
196 MI3. 
197 MI1; MI2; MFA4. 
198 MI3; AIB2; MFA5; MJ2; GDS2; EUSG10; GDS1; BMB1; AIB1; EUSG2; EUSG4; EUSG5; 
EUSG6; EUSG7. 
199 SPO1. 
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The views in the literature confirm this assessment. The public bureaucracy in 
Turkey can be divided into two groups in line with their views on the EU. On the 
one hand, there are the more established and traditional key bureaucracies such 
as the military, judiciary and security forces connected to the MI. These 
institutions are more status-quo biased and therefore they do not see reforming 
Turkey in the context of the EU conditionality as something desirable (Turkmen, 
2008: 161-2). On the other hand, the EU-related bureaucracy is more progressive 
and identifies more strongly with EU values, such as democracy and human 
rights. Along these lines, Turkmen argues that, apart from specific institutions 
directly involved in the accession process, such as the EUSG, it is impossible for 
the Turkish bureaucracy to pursue steps for further democratisation (ibid.: 162). 
Similarly, Keyman and Onis argue that one of the important consequences of 
Turkey’s EU candidacy was that a rift has been created between different parts of 
the state bureaucracy (2004, 184). They maintain that only a part of the state 
bureaucracy adopted a liberal approach towards the EU-related reforms including 
the EUSG, the Central Bank, the Treasury and the SPO (ibid.: 184). The more 
liberal outlook of these newly established institutions made it easier for them to 
engage in social learning. Moreover, according to Drulak et al. specific 
institutions and civil servants who socialise with the EU start to support the EU 
more, ‘especially if they have been less socialised into the domestic 
administrative structures’ (2003: 651). This is certainly the case in Turkey for the 
EU-related bureaucracy, which has been created only in the last decade. 
 
The interviews held with EU-related bureaucrats also support this strong 
identification view. The bureaucrats were asked about why they continued to 
comply with the EU conditions even though Turkey’s membership perspective 
got continuously weaker over time. The responses centre on three common 
issues. Firstly, a majority of the interviewees underline the fact that Turkey 
‘needs to solve’ various problems through new laws and standards; thus the 
technical reforms conducted to comply with the acquis address ‘national needs’ 
(MJ1; MI2; EUSG4; AIB2; GDS2; MFA2; MFA6). These needs were underlined 
in the context of 23rd and 24th chapters, and more specifically in 
asylum/immigration standards, the way foreigners are treated, and the judicial 
system (MI2; EUSG4; AIB2; MFA6; CS6). Similarly, many interviewees shared 
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the view that EU reforms help improve the living ‘quality’, ‘standards’ and 
‘conditions’ in Turkey and help Turkey reach ‘international standards’ (MI2; 
GDS1; MJ1; MJ2; AIB2). Secondly, the interviewees also emphasised the fact 
that reforms conducted in the context of EU conditionality were useful for 
attaining universal human rights standards (MJ2; MJ3; AI2). In this respect, the 
EU-related bureaucracy sees the EU as a union of values, standards and norms 
and one interviewee stated that they appreciate ‘these values more than the 
material aspect of the EU’ (MJ3). Finally, and related to the previous two points, 
the EU-related bureaucracy explained that they continued to comply with the EU 
not only to impress the EU (MFA6; MJ1), but to transform Turkish society. For 
instance, a MFA official stated that: ‘[w]e want a more structured, rule-bound 
life. We’re not doing these for the EU. We’re doing these for ourselves’ (MFA6). 
In that respect, the EU was described as a means to an end rather than an end in 
itself (MFA3; MFA5; GDS1). Overall, the EU-related bureaucrats agree that it 
was initially EU conditionality which triggered these reforms, where the EU 
acted as an anchor, but in time these reforms created their own dynamic and 
fostered a realisation, particularly among the bureaucrats, that they were 
beneficial and addressed national needs (MFA6; EUSG4). 
 
The view that the EU-related bureaucracy has identified with EU rules/norms 
during the compliance process and experienced social learning as a result can be 
demonstrated with a few examples. The MJ’s EU-related bureaucrats explained 
that EU conditionality allowed their department and the wider judiciary to 
experience a transformation. Initially, their department limited itself to 
complying with formally set EU conditions. However, over time they went 
beyond these minimum requirements by studying and copying best practices 
among EU countries (MJ1; MJ3). For instance, the MJ’s EU-related bureaucracy 
initiated a relationship with the Venice Commission 200  even though such 
cooperation was not a formal EU requirement. They did this with the belief that 
asking this Commission for feedback on important laws concerning the judiciary 
would be beneficial for the quality of Turkish legislation. As a result, some of the 
                                                
200 An advisory board of the CoE with the official name ‘European Commission for Democracy 
through Law’, which gives legal advice to countries in constitutional matters so that they can 
improve their democratic and human rights standards. 
 
284 
most important laws; such as the law on the organisation of the constitutional 
court, the organisation of the MJ, judges and prosecutors, the council of judges 
and prosecutors; and the ombudsman law; were recently sent to Venice 
Commission for feedback. This demonstrates that the MJ’s bureaucracy values 
Western standards as desirable and therefore worked towards improving the 
domestic conditions as much as possible even in the absence of formal EU 
conditions.  
 
A caveat to this argument needs to be discussed. Once the Venice Commission 
checks the Turkish legislation it becomes easier for the EU to accept them as 
compatible with its acquis. Admittedly, this can also be a motive for the 
bureaucracy to improve cooperation with the Venice Commission, following a 
utilitarian logic. However, the fact that this route was not followed at the start of 
the compliance process in T1 shows that some form of learning took place. 
During the initial periods of conditionality, compliance with specific conditions 
was seen as the ultimate goal. However, once wide-ranging reforms started, the 
process created its own dynamic, allowing the EU-related bureaucracy to 
experience social learning.  
 
The MJ’s EU-related bureaucracy also explained how judges and prosecutors 
have transformed over time, mainly due to the human rights training they 
received. This change can be observed by the references they make to 
international court decisions. According to an interviewee, about ten years ago 
courts like the European Court of Human Rights were seen as ‘someone else’s 
court’, which continuously decided against Turkey, therefore references to their 
rulings were minimal (MJ1; MJ2). However, over time, the judges started to see 
these courts as ‘their own’ courts and referrals increased dramatically. Today, the 
data show that there were about 4500-5000 references to international law in 
Turkish courts in 2010 alone (MJ1).  
 
An EU law professor, who took up a position as the head of the EU law 
department in the EUSG, gave another example of the transformation of the 
Turkish bureaucracy. She explained how, not only the laws were changing 
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during the compliance process, but, more importantly, the people and the ways of 
doing things were transforming as well: 
‘I saw in a very explicit way how this thing called 
“Europeanisation” happens in the EU departments of various 
ministries… Things are done in a much more participatory, 
transparent way, allowing the civil society to participate… I saw 
how the bureaucrats who prepare these have transformed due to 
their presence within the EU process. This is apparent in 
ministries such as the MI and MJ… It is not only the legal 
changes but the methods which are used to bring about those legal 
changes have transformed. … I saw that things, which used to be 
handled behind closed doors in the past, are being conducted in a 
much more transparent manner. I think the EU process has a huge 
role in this because all those people who have been transformed 
are EU’s counterparts in Turkey, for instance in the context of 
twinning projects. Because of their communication with the EU, 
they started to see things differently’ (EUSG4). 
 
Overall, the interview evidence used in this section has shown that the conditions 
which make social learning likely for EU-related bureaucrats are very favourable 
and these bureaucrats strongly identify with the EU and its values. This makes it 
very likely for them to experience social learning. This result is generally 
congruent with continued levels of compliance within T2 under diminished 
credibility. At the same time, the fall in administrative compliance at the start of 
the T2 needs further explanation. At first glance this fall is not compatible with 
the SLM which would expect continuing levels of compliance once learning 
starts to take place. However, since social learning is a time consuming process, 
it is likely that its effects only started to be explicit after 2007 in the Turkish 
case. In this respect, administrative compliance conducted by bureaucrats in T1 
was driven by factors other than social learning. The exposure of Turkish 
bureaucrats to their EU counterparts and their identification with the EU started 
to determine their behaviour only after 2007. Alternatively, it is possible that 
other factors at work had a negative impact on compliance at the start of T2 
resulting in lower levels of administrative compliance despite strong socialisation 
at the start of T2. Finally, there is also a possibility that the relationship between 
social learning and administrative compliance is a spurious one. 
Notwithstanding, the interview evidence above demonstrates that the level of 
social learning among the EU-related bureaucracy is likely to be very strong and 
as the literature suggests this is likely to be causally related to compliance.  
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9.2.4 Bureaucratic Politics of Compliance in Turkey 
 
The previous two sections have demonstrated that there is a high organisational 
lock-in for the EU-related bureaucrats and they are very likely to experience 
strong social learning mechanisms. These findings are in line with the BPM. 
Therefore, we can talk about a specific form of bureaucratic politics of 
compliance in the Turkish case where the factors motivating the EU-related 
bureaucrats for more administrative compliance are very different from the ones 
which drive political leadership to compliance. This conclusion is an important 
contribution to conditionality literature. At the same time, what these sections did 
not explain was the extent to which the bureaucratic politics of compliance could 
improve Turkey’s overall compliance with the EU. In other words, can 
organisational lock-in and social learning actually lead to independent 
compliance by EU-related bureaucrats even in costly areas where the politicians 
do not think compliance is worthwhile? This section answers this question and 
argues that the EU-related bureaucrats demonstrate some characteristics of 
actorness but only in areas where the political leadership does not have strong 
preferences.  
 
The bureaucratic politics of compliance can improve compliance outcomes 
through a number of ways. Firstly, the SOPs used by EU-related bureaucrats are 
crucial for the continuation of compliance. The bureaucrats prepare long-term 
programmes for compliance, such as the NPAAs, where compliance deadlines 
are set for each public institution involved. In this respect, the bureaucrats do not 
need to be instructed by the politicians to conduct progress on these 
programmes.201 Similarly, there are established relations with the EU within the 
framework of Association Agreements and there are regular reports which need 
to be produced. Both the Turkish and Commission bureaucrats continue to 
conduct this established relationship without the political leadership telling them 
                                                
201 It is true that once the NPAA is prepared, bureaucratic compliance is almost automatic. 
However, the bureaucrats still need the political leadership’s will to prepare an NPAA as 
demonstrated by the absence of 2006 NPAA.  
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to do so, since it is part of their job. Interestingly, many EU-related bureaucrats 
have mentioned during the interviewees the fact that even though there are 
political deadlocks on the road to Turkey’s membership, they continue to 
conduct administrative compliance even on blocked chapters – 23rd and 24th – as 
if the negotiations could open any moment (EUSG1; EUSG2; EUSG4; EUSG5; 
EUSG6; EUSG7; EUSG10; MJ1; MJ2; MJ3; MI1; MI2; GDS2; BMB2; AIB1).  
 
Secondly, as Allison argues, bureaucratic positions determine the views and 
stances of individuals. Each different bureaucratic unit working on 
administrative compliance has a set of objectives they want to achieve for their 
own unit, which reflects their particular view of what national interest is. Given 
that these bureaucracies are parochial, competitive and aim to expand their tasks, 
bureaucratic rivalry is unavoidable in the administrative phase of compliance. 
Such rivalry may sometimes be costly where certain tasks are duplicated, and 
coordination and leadership becomes difficult. But at the same time, competition 
between bureaus may also lead to more productive outcomes. For instance, the 
TPAA produced by the SPO is known to be an outcome of inter-institutional 
conflict. According to an EUSG official, the failure of the EUSG to produce an 
NPAA in 2006 led the SPO to think: ‘[t]he EUSG cannot do it, so we will do it. 
And we’ll do it in a more nationalistic way… We’ll prioritise the needs of the 
country’ (EUSG1). Competition between bureaucratic agencies regarding access 
to EU funds also results in better projects being proposed by the bureaucrats. 
Overall, bureaucratic organisations develop an institutional identity with a set of 
preferences, frequently resulting in inter-institutional rivalry among agencies, 
which in turn may have a positive influence on compliance.  
 
Thirdly, the EU-related bureaucrats have informational advantages and they can 
improve compliance by using their expertise. The relationship between the 
political leadership and the bureaucracy can be understood as a principal-agent 
relationship. The politicians delegate certain tasks to the EU-related bureaucrats 
in the compliance process and use various ways to check and constrain their 
actions. Tasks are delegated for cost efficiency purposes so that the bureaucrats 
gather information and develop expertise in areas where the politicians cannot 
afford to invest time. However, as in any principal-agent relationship, the agent 
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may move away from the preferences of its principal, causing bureaucratic drift. 
The EU-related bureaucrats in Turkey develop expertise in the areas of 
conditionality and through this expertise they are able to informally set the 
agenda of compliance even when there are no formally delegated tasks. They can 
produce research papers, analyses or even draft laws where they deem necessary 
and then pass them onto the politicians202 who are not experts as regards to 
specific EU demands or not necessarily aware of gaps in Turkish legislation. The 
EU-related bureaucrats come up with initiatives in these areas, try to convince 
the politicians on the usefulness of conducting reforms and finally may get 
approval for their initiatives. In this respect, the EU-related bureaucrats are not 
completely independent actors, but they are still actors who can have important 
influence on the policy outcomes. For instance, the interviews with officials from 
the MJ’s EU unit demonstrate how they came up with initiatives and obtained the 
support of their minister (MJ1; MJ2; MJ3). As the head of the EU directorate 
summarised:  
‘MJ bureaucracy is one which can influence higher levels of 
politics through our Minister here… We easily could go up to the 
Minister [of Justice] and tell him that “these things need to be 
done, these are the gaps and laws the EU wants us to do, we 
definitely need to consult the Venice Commission and get their 
opinion before adopting this legislation, we need to meet with the 
EU ombudsman and get his opinion”. He always said yes and 
even provided his private jet for us to go together to Venice to 
meet up with the Venice Commission… [T]hese things all 
happened with the bureaucracy’s initiative. The bureaucracy 
informed the Minister and led and convinced him to take the 
correct steps in these areas. And he also supported us’ (MJ3). 
 
This example demonstrates how the initiative for cooperation actually came from 
the bureaucrats from below. But this cooperation would not have been possible 
without the approval of the Minister of Justice; therefore the role of political 
leadership cannot be underestimated. 
 
Similarly, EU-related bureaucrats within the MI explained how an initiative 
taken by the GDS gained politicians’ support: ‘[t]he GDS wanted to sign a 
protocol. They developed this initiative alone, tried to organise us [the MI’s EU 
department], went to the Minister [of Interior], and explained how this would be 
                                                
202 The RMG is an important channel for this.  
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beneficial for Turkey. This protocol was signed and is at the TGNA for 
ratification at the moment’ (MI2; MI3).  
 
As a final example, the head of EUSG’s EU law department explained how she, 
on her own initiative, examined the roadmaps to understand how visa 
liberalisation came about in the Western Balkans and prepared service notes for 
the politicians on the application of this policy in Turkey. Subsequently this issue 
was taken up by the political leadership and developed further (EUSG4). In this 
respect, due to the EU-related bureaucracy’s informational advantages, they are 
able to take initiative in certain issues. This does not necessarily mean the EU-
related bureaucrats drift away from the preferences of the political leadership, 
but what it means is that they act as a strategic actor and can increase Turkish 
compliance. 
 
Overall, all these examples demonstrate that EU-related bureaucrats can act as a 
force to improve compliance in conditionality. In this respect, it can be argued 
that they have actorness qualities to positively influence compliance outcomes. 
They are able to come up with new initiatives and speed up the compliance 
process through their informational advantages. The bureaucratic rivalry between 
agencies may also increase the speed and quality of compliance. In all these 
instances, compliance operates with a degree of bottom-up influence.  
 
9.3 Domestic Politics Model 
 
While the section above demonstrated that EU-related bureaucrats are an actor in 
the compliance process whose preferences and actions may have a positive 
influence on the outputs of compliance, it is important to underline that they are 
not an entirely independent force. This section assesses to what extent the 
compliance of the EU-related bureaucrats follows the politicians’ preferences. 
Two particular variables are tested within this model, namely principal’s 
economic/political costs and administrative capacity. This section confirms the 
principal’s costs hypothesis and concludes that compliance is predominantly 
determined by the cost-benefit calculations of political leadership. In this respect, 
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the bureaucratic politics of compliance plays a minor role in furthering 
compliance. At the same time, the politicians’ decision to improve administrative 
compliance in T2 was not found to be causally related to continued compliance, 
therefore this hypothesis is rejected.  
 
9.3.1 Costs of Compliance for the Political Leadership 
 
The principal’s economic/political costs hypothesis is: if the political 
leadership’s economic and political benefits associated with complying with a 
specific EU condition are higher than its economic and political costs, then the 
bureaucrats are likely to comply. This hypothesis is tested by looking at the 
administrative compliance activities of EU-related bureaucrats, such as the 
preparation and content of NPAAs, long-term programmes and other 
compliance-related work conducted in the field of JHA and political 
conditionality. This section finds that Turkish bureaucracy, following the 
preferences of the political leadership, adopts a selective approach to compliance 
by postponing preparatory work on harmonisation in particularly costly areas. 
Along the same lines, they go ahead in other areas where economic and political 
costs of compliance are either minimal, where rewards outweighed the costs, or 
in areas where the AKP’s own priorities overlapped with EU demands. This 
shows that the DPM’s costs variable carries explanatory power to elucidate why 
administrative compliance in some areas continues under diminished credibility. 
This result weakens the role played by bureaucratic politics of compliance.  
 
Turkey’s compliance with the entirety of the acquis has been somewhat 
selective, where Turkey’s own needs and less costly reforms are prioritised. 
Administrative compliance conducted by the bureaucrats has also shown a 
similar trend. For instance, the bureaucrats from the SPO had this selective 
approach in mind when they prepared the TPAA in 2007. The TPAA was 
prepared in line with Turkey’s own priorities and developmental goals. In this 
respect, the TPAA set earlier deadlines for EU demands which overlap with 
Turkey’s own needs. Work in other areas, such as free movement of people, 
which is only meaningful in the context of Turkey’s full EU membership, have 
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been shelved until Turkey’s actual accession. As a former SPO bureaucrat active 
in the preparation of the TPAA elucidates: ‘[w]hy would we do these [reforms] 
which are only useful in the context of membership? But other standards or 
conditions are important for national needs’ (SPO2).  
 
The 2008 NPAA prepared by the EUSG follows a similar approach and sets ‘full 
membership prospect’ as a deadline for a number of costly reforms, such as 
complying with the EU’s negative and positive visa lists, establishing a Sirene 
Office and a national Schengen information system (NPAA, 2008). The deputy 
undersecretary of the MFA accounted for this selective approach by stating that 
it would not be necessary for Turkey to make large-scale investments in 
technical areas such as agriculture or environment if Turkey is not going to be an 
EU member (MFA3). He also added that ‘[w]e do not make reforms in sensitive 
areas. There is no improvement on the Cyprus issue for instance. Turkey has not 
given any concessions on this issue. All the reforms conducted up until now in 
the context of negotiations have been beneficial for Turkey. No one can say that 
Turkey has lost from these reforms’ (MFA3).  
 
Aside from these long-term plans, the EUSG’s EU Strategy document also 
prioritises Turkey’s own needs. Turkey’s stated goal is to resume the 
commitments put down in the TPAA and the NPAAs in line with ‘Turkey’s own 
priorities and timetables’ regardless of whether a chapter is blocked or suspended 
(EUSG, 2010b: 2). This way Turkey will be able to progress in areas that are 
‘important for itself’ and also make ‘its own decisions on timing and pace’ of 
reform (ibid.: 2). The Strategy document adds that ‘[p]roblematic issues for 
Turkey may be postponed; areas with priority would take precedence’ (ibid.: 2). 
Overall, in the preparation of all these documents, the EU-related bureaucracy 
has been conscious of the economic and political costs and benefits of specific 
reforms for the political leadership. 
 
This utilitarian strategy is also evident in the manner in which the EU-related 
bureaucracy is conducting the negotiations. As discussed earlier, there are at 
present 18 blocked or suspended negotiating chapters and therefore only three 
chapters can be opened for negotiations. These chapters are: public procurement;
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competition policy; and social policy and employment. These three chapters are 
known to be particularly difficult and have usually been dealt with at the end of 
the negotiation process by previous applicant countries (EUSG1; MFA4). 
Despite their difficult nature, we would expect the EU-related bureaucracy and 
the political leadership in Turkey to focus most of their attention on these three 
chapters where concrete outcomes can be obtained unlike the blocked ones. 
Being able to open these chapters to negotiations and subsequently provisionally 
closing them would motivate the bureaucracy in the stagnant negotiation process. 
Moreover, the government would be able to claim a FP success domestically. 
The bureaucracy continues to work on these costly chapters, in line with 
established SOPs and long-term programmes. However, they find it increasingly 
difficult to fulfil the criteria to start negotiations, particularly when the political 
will for doing so is weak. Overall, rather then focusing most of their attention on 
these chapters where negotiations can progress, the bureaucrats conduct 
administrative compliance in line with Turkey’s own needs, even on other 
chapters which are blocked on political grounds, such as 23rd and 24th chapters.  
 
Overall, this section has demonstrated that the EU-related bureaucracy, in light 
of the preferences of the political leadership, sets out Turkey’s long-term 
compliance plans so that Turkey’s own priorities and low cost reforms take 
precedence, whereas costly reforms are postponed until membership prospect 
becomes more credible. In other words, the economic and political cost-benefit 
calculations conducted by the political leadership determine the extent to which 
the EU-related bureaucrats comply under diminished credibility. The EU-related 
bureaucracy cannot independently push forward reforms in areas where the 
political leadership is not too keen either due to reform costs. For important and 
risky decisions, the politicians’ approval is required for bureaucracy to conduct 
work. In cases where their preferences contradict, the EU-related bureaucracy is 
greatly restricted by the politicians’ will. These conclusions demonstrate that in 
many respects the compliance process operates in a top-down manner, where the 
political leadership has the upper hand and the bureaucratic politics of 
compliance play limited independent role.  
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9.3.2 Administrative Capacity 
 
The administrative capacity hypothesis posits that: if the political leadership 
improves the structure of the candidate’s administration and institutional 
resources, such as budget and staff; then compliance is likely to improve.203 This 
variable is considered within the DPM rather than the BPM, since it is the 
political leadership who determines the resources available to the EU-related 
bureaucracy. Therefore the strength of the bureaucracy’s administrative capacity 
depends on the preferences of the political leadership. It is also different from the 
BPM’s organisational lock-in variable. In administrative capacity we are 
interested in whether the decisions taken by the politicians to improve 
bureaucratic capacity actually has a positive impact on compliance. It is true that 
once the capacity is built, this can create it own dynamic in the long-run and 
create lock-in effects for compliance. However, we are not able to assess these 
long-term effects in the Turkish case, whose institutional structures to comply 
with the EU are only a decade old. Therefore, we only focus on the political 
leadership’s initial input into administrative capacity.  
 
This section demonstrates that the administrative capacity of the EU-related 
bureaucracy has remained more or less stable between 2000 and 2009, but 
thereafter improved significantly. Therefore, this finding is congruent with 
continued administrative compliance in T2. This is particularly so because 
administrative compliance has also picked up in the second half of T2 in parallel 
with improvements in administrative capacity. However, interview data show 
that the increase in administrative capacity did not necessarily lead to more 
efficient functioning of the system and did not always lead to more compliance. 
Therefore, a causal relationship between administrative capacity and compliance 
as stated in the hypothesis is rejected in this section.   
 
                                                
203 The improvement is argued only take place only after a certain threshold has been reached in 
the level of administrative capacity. In the Turkish case, administrative compliance is taking 
place since 2000, therefore it can be assumed that this threshold has already been passed. 
Thereafter, any improvement in the administrative capacity within T2 is hypothesized to have a 
positive effect on administrative compliance.  
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Institutional capacity of a national administration is closely related to compliance 
(Hille and Knill, 2006: 538-40). If the administrative structure and resources are 
not sufficient or effective in a candidate, this makes is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for the EU-related bureaucracy to conduct administrative 
compliance. As Falkner et al. argue the two main aspects that are central to 
administrative capacity are the number of staff and budget devoted to EU-related 
bureaucracies (2004: 461). Changes in the staff numbers, in other words, 
variations in the extent of institutionalisation, are likely to be important for the 
quality and level of administrative compliance. The reason behind this, as Zubek 
maintains, is that the number of staff who deal with EU-related legislation is 
likely to have a significant effect on the transposition record (2008: 44). 
Similarly, a lack of financial resources can be a barrier against administrative, 
formal and behavioural compliance (Hille and Knill, 2006: 538-9). According to 
Hille and Knill greater financial resources allow for a more speedy, 
comprehensive and sophisticated implementation of policies (ibid.: 539). This 
section firstly looks at the overall leadership structure and hierarchy in the 
process. Subsequently, it measures the staff levels in the main institutions of 
administrative compliance, such as the EUSG, SOP, MFA, MI and MJ; as well 
as the specific fora created for compliance. Finally, the financial resources of the 
EUSG are analysed over time. 
 
The most important development with regard to the level of institutionalisation in 
the administrative phase of compliance was the appointment of Egemen Bagis on 
January 8, 2009 as the Chief Negotiator (CN). The appointment of a non-sectoral 
minister to this post creates a more powerful leadership structure in the 
compliance process, where the CN is given formal competences to monitor, 
sanction and reward other actors (Zubek, 2008: 5-6). With a strong leader at 
minister level, the EUSG’s status automatically improved among other state 
institutions and became – almost – equal to important line ministries such as the 
MFA, MI and MJ. In the past, whenever a disagreement emerged between the 
EUSG and a line ministry regarding compliance, the EUSG’s GS pressured the 
line ministry for further compliance, but frequently without much success. 
However, with the appointment of a state minister as a CN, deadlocks with other 
ministries can now be resolved by the minister (EUSG4; MFA4). This kind of 
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intervention allows the EUSG to have greater impact. Similarly, in cabinet 
meetings there is now a minister who solely represents the EUSG’s interests and 
preferences (EUSG1). According to EUSG officials, whenever the cabinet is 
discussing an EU-related law, ‘our Minister [Egemen Bagis] asks us whether 
there is anything we’d like to comment on’ (EUSG10). This means that the 
EUSG bureaucrats can now provide their input even in later stages of legislative 
activity through their minister.   
 
Moreover, this appointment prevented the problem of having a CN who was at 
the same time either the foreign minister or the minister in charge of economics. 
Assigning ministers with such busy portfolios as a CN has proven to be very 
costly in terms of Turkey’s compliance record in the past. These ministers ended 
up spending insufficient amount of time and energy on EU-related work, which 
also includes travelling and lobbying. When appointed, Bagis took on an 
extremely busy travelling schedule across the EU countries for lobbying 
activities (EUSG9).  
 
The administrative capacity of the EUSG was significantly improved towards the 
end of T2 as well (see Table 9.1). The EUSG was originally created with a 
permanent staff of 76 in 2000, which actually decreased to 60 officials at the start 
of 2010 (EUSG, 2010b; 2010a: 20). At the same time, the number of seconded 
officials increased to a total of 59 by 2010 (EUSG, 2010a: 20). These numbers 
signify a marginal increase over the EUSG’s ten-year lifespan, where the total 
number of staff increased from 76 to 110 (ibid.: 20). As maintained in Chapter 
Three, this number is extremely limited in comparison with other Turkish state 
institutions and to similar organisations in other candidates. However, the June 
2009 reform radically transformed the resources of the EUSG by increasing its 
total number of employees to 340 (EUSG, 2009d: articles 14 and 20). Moreover, 
this reform also created the Department of Civil Society, Communication and 
Culture which is particularly important for the manner in which the 
administrative phase of compliance operates. This department fills an 
institutional gap for the coordination of Turkey’s EU communication strategy 
(EUSG, 2010c) by bringing together various state institutions, civil society 
organisations, think tanks, universities, private sector and businesses under the 
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same umbrella. In this respect, it allows a more open and a transparent 
administrative compliance process. In conjunction to this communication 
strategy, a deputy governor from each Turkish province is assigned as EU 
contact point responsible for informing citizens about the EU and ensuring their 
participation in the accession process (EUSG, 2009e: 2). According to an official 
from the MI’s EU department which has close institutional contacts with these 
deputy governors, this reform was crucial and allowed ‘the blood going through 
the main arteries to spread through the capillaries’ (MI2).  
 
The 2009 reform also created a small unit of seven officials operating abroad, as 
well as a small EUSG office in Istanbul, which was established in December 
2009 (EUSG, 2009e: 2). Finally, appointments within the EUSG became much 
more flexible with this reform. Up until 2009 the head of Political Affairs and the 
DSG in charge of political affairs were always seconded from the MFA. 
However, both positions are now filled internally by EUSG officials. This allows 
for more continuity in the operation of the EUSG (EUSG1), particularly valuable 
for an important area like political affairs. Moreover, it can be a source of 
motivation for the EUSG officials, since they can see new possibilities for 
internal progression.  
 
Table 9.1: EUSG’s Staff Levels 
 
Date Permanent Staff Seconded Officials Total Staff 
2000 76 N/A 76 
2006 59 43 102 
2008 58 49 107 
2009 79 46 125 
2010 (beginning) 60 59 119 
2010 (end) 340 n/a 340 
Source: Author’s analysis from EUSG documents (2010a; 2009d; 2009i; 2008; 2006b; 2000b) 
 
Even though the SPO’s DGEU with 35 staff was closed down with the 2009 
reform, this does not necessarily signify a decrease in administrative capacity, 
since the tripling of the EUSG’s staff more than compensates for it. Moreover, 
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the high level SPO officials moved to the EUSG after this reform and assumed 
responsibilities as a DGS, a department head, and as legal advisors. This way 
expertise was centred in a single institution and the administrative phase of 
compliance became more cost-efficient and coherent. 
 
The administrative capacity of other important line ministries has not changed 
substantially in T2. The core EU units within MFA204 and MI205 have remained 
more or less stable. The MJ’s EU unit206 experienced the biggest improvement in 
terms of administrative capacity, however this took place in T1 and not under 
diminished credibility. Therefore, the changes in the administrative capacity of 
these units are not congruent with continued administrative compliance in T2. At 
the same time, when the specialist MI bureaus207 and the reactivated taskforce208 
are taken into account, it can be argued that the administrative capacity improved 
marginally in T2, therefore some congruence can be observed.  
 
In addition to the ministries, specific fora created for compliance are also crucial 
for administrative capacity. In this respect, the frequency of Reform Monitoring 
Group (RMG) and the Political Affairs Sub-committee (PAS) meetings have 
increased. Even though the RMG used to meet regularly (around three times a 
year) between 2003 and 2005, this rate fell drastically during the following three 
years (only four meetings between 2006-8). However, with the CN’s proposal in 
2009, the RMG started meeting even more frequently than ever (EUSG7). It met 
ten times in the last two years (2009-2010), whereas it has only met a total of 
thirteen times over the previous six years (2003-2008). Additionally, the PAS209 
was (re)created under the auspices of the RMG to speed up the reform efforts in 
                                                
204 15 officials remained unchanged (MFA2). 
205 The Department of Foreign Affairs and the EU was established in 2001 by a ministerial 
decision which prevents it from employing permanent staff. The department currently employs 
15 officials seconded from other MI departments  (MI1; MI2). 
206 It was established as a department with only nine officials in 1989 and its status changed into 
a general directorate in 2001. Currently it employs 24 technical staff (MJ, 2011; MJ2). 
207 BMB and AIM were established in 2004 as part of the GDS within the MI but their status 
changed in 2008 which attached them directly to the Undersecretary of the MI. This change 
increased the bureaus’ powers and replaced the security officials employed in these bureaus with 
a higher number of expert civilian officials (BMB, 2010; BMB1; AIB2). 
208 The Task Force on Asylum, Migration and Border Protection was reactivated in 2007 and has 
been meeting every two months since 2009.  
209 Composed of high level bureaucrats from the MJ, MI, MFA, the Prime Ministry and Human 
Rights Presidency.  
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the realm of political conditionality and JHA by meeting at least once after each 
RMG meeting (EUSG, 2010b: 3-4). The PAS also set up two working groups 
responsible for 23rd and 24th chapters in 2009. Overall, the revitalisation of the 
RMG and the PAS in 2009 has been crucial developments strengthening the 
administrative capacity of the EU-related bureaucracy.  
 
Aside from the staff levels, the size of the institutional budget is also a good 
determinant of administrative capacity. As the EUSG is the most important 
institution in the administrative phase of compliance, the changes in its budget 
are considered. Until 2010, the EUSG’s budget only increased marginally, as 
shown in Table 9.2 below. This marginal increase can be explained by the 
increase in inflation over the years (EUSG3) rather than any other factor, since 
the permanent staff levels remained constant.210 However, the EUSG’s 2010 
budget demonstrated an 87.9% increase from 2009. This increase not only 
reflects the sharp boost in the EUSG staff levels, but also the recently adopted 
and expensive EU communication strategy. The salary bands of the EUSG 
employees have also increased. They are now set at the highest rate for civil 
servants at their level and they are able to receive bonuses as well. These 
numbers, therefore, show that 2010 was a critical year for the EUSG’s 
administrative capacity. 
 
Table 9.2: EUSG’s Budget 
 
Years Budget (Turkish Lira) 
2005 4,918,000 
2006 8,410,510 
2007 9,759,000 
2008 9,509,000 
2009 11,420,000 
2010 21,456,000 
Source: Author’s analysis from EUSG documents (2009a: 22; 2008: 75) 
 
                                                
210 Officials who are seconded from other public institutions and agencies continue to receive 
their salary from their original posts.  
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Overall, the above evidence demonstrates that the staff levels and budget of the 
most important institution in the administrative phase of compliance has 
improved in T2. A CN solely responsible for EU accession process has been 
appointed making the process more hierarchical. Finally additional bureaus and 
fora were created/reactivated within T2. This suggests that the administrative 
capacity was enhanced particularly in the later stages of T2. This finding is 
congruent with the continuing levels of administrative compliance under 
diminished credibility. However, interviews conducted with the EU-related 
bureaucrats working in these institutions cast some doubt on whether increased 
institutionalisation improved compliance. The critiques centre on three points:  
 
Firstly, some EU-related bureaucrats questioned the merits of having a CN who 
holds a ministerial position solely responsible for EU affairs, since working 
towards Turkey’s EU accession can be a very risky job for a politician. 
According to some interviewees, when Bagis started his job as a CN he was very 
dynamic and motivated. He was noted saying ‘I personally believe in this 
process, this is one thing. But at the same time, I have a political identity and I 
want to be successful here. This is important for my future political career’ 
(EUSG1). However, as the EU credibility weakened, it became more and more 
difficult for Bagis to maintain his motivation. According to a high level former 
EUSG official, once he realised the difficulties involved in this process and 
understood that being successful would be very difficult, he stopped ‘prioritising 
and taking ownership of the process’ (ibid.). Another EUSG official, who was 
the acting GS, remembered a conversation he had with the CN (EUSG9). When 
analysing some public opinion polls which show that 62% of the Turkish 
population would like Turkey to be an EU member, whereas 67% of people do 
not actually believe Turkey will be a member, he recalled Bagis saying: ‘[c]an 
you see what a difficult position I am in. 62% of the public believes what I do is 
right, however 67% of them do not actually believe I will be successful at it’ 
(ibid.). In sum, whereas it is important to have a minister leading the EUSG to 
make the process more hierarchical, it is also likely for a politician to become 
demotivated when things become thorny on the road to accession and to 
prioritise his own future political career as a result. For instance, among the 
EUSG circles Bagis was heard saying that he would talk to the PM to have him 
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removed from the CN position since he does not want to be seen as unsuccessful 
anymore and he would like to get other ministerial positions (EUSG1).  
 
Secondly, the three fold increase in the EUSG’s staff may not necessarily 
improve the administrative capacity, at least in the short-term. Apart from a 
number of high level officials moving to the EUSG from the SPO, almost all of 
the new staff employed in the EUSG were at the level of assistant experts. They 
were chosen through a general examination on the EU and without considering 
any background or experience in this field. Therefore, the EUSG currently has a 
large number of new staff who need to go through intense training. According to 
one official who was seconded to the EUSG from the GDS, at least five years are 
required for these assistant experts to gain the necessary expertise to have any 
positive influence on the process (GDS1). Along the same lines, some 
interviewees commented on the fact that inexperienced personnel were appointed 
to important positions with this reform. For instance, the EUSG appointed a 
representative to Brussels in 2009, who used to be an expert level official 
working on transportation, and therefore cannot be expected to successfully 
explain Turkey’s position to EU parties in political fields, such as minority rights 
(GDS1; EUSG1). Finally, the reform also created a ground for politicisation, 
where some appointments were made on the basis of the individuals’ closeness 
to the CN rather than their merit. It was claimed that a technical EUSG expert 
rose very quickly to the DGS post responsible for political affairs without having 
sufficient relevant experience (GDS1; EUSG1; EUSG2).  
 
Finally, even though the staff and budget of the EUSG has increased, this change 
was not matched by improvements in other ministries. The EUSG is the 
institution coordinating and motivating other ministries to fulfil their 
responsibilities in line with the NPAA. However, the line ministries are crucial 
for drafting and implementing new legislation in their fields. If they lack the 
necessary staff, they cannot fulfil the EUSG’s expectations. For instance, the 
MI’s EU department claims that they have not experienced any benefits from the 
2009 EUSG reform. On the contrary, they are now expected to correspond to and 
develop expertise in 16 different EUSG departments rather than the previous 
seven with the same number of officials (MI2; MI3). In other words, when the 
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improvements in a coordinating institution do not mirror developments in other 
relevant bodies, it makes it difficult to develop administrative capacity at the 
national level.  
 
Overall, even though the CN’s appointment initially speeded up compliance in 
T2 in some respects, such as the 2009 EUSG reform and the revitalisation of the 
RMG and PAS; and although he was dynamic and motivated to begin with, the 
difficulties and risks associated with Turkey’s accession soon started to 
demotivate Bagis. Moreover, the increase in the EUSG’s administrative capacity 
in 2009 did not immediately make the institution and the harmonisation process 
at the national level more effective. Therefore, the enhancement of the 
administrative capacity within T2 is unlikely to be causally related to continued 
compliance under diminished credibility within this same period.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that there is a particular bureaucratic politics of 
compliance at work in Turkey’s compliance process. The high levels of 
organisational lock-in and strong likelihood for social learning motivate the EU-
related bureaucrats in Turkey to continue to comply with the EU under 
diminished credibility. This was particularly the case after 2007 where 
organisational lock-in became more powerful with the production of new long-
term programmes and where social learning, which requires time to take place, 
started to show its full effects. In this sense, the values of these variables are 
congruent with the levels of administrative compliance over time and the 
causality of this relationship has been confirmed by fieldwork evidence. These 
findings are particularly important since they demonstrate that the manner in 
which bureaucrats comply and the motivations behind their compliance is very 
different from those of the politicians, who are less likely to experience strong 
social learning.  
 
The evidence has also demonstrated that EU-related bureaucrats assume some 
actorness role in the compliance process. They can initiate further compliance by 
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making use of their informational advantages, developing new initiatives and 
subsequently forwarding these to higher levels. Moreover, the use of SOPs and 
bureaucratic rivalry among the public agencies may also have a positive impact 
on the outputs of compliance. In this respect, bureaucratic politics of compliance 
may improve compliance outcomes. However, this positive impact is only 
possible in areas where the political leadership does not have strong preferences 
or where the costs of compliance are low. The bureaucrats are not entirely 
independent. Instead they receive instructions from the political leadership above 
them. Therefore, their compliance is highly dependent on the preferences and 
actions of politicians. This chapter has tested and confirmed the DPM hypothesis 
that EU-related bureaucrats follow the compliance decisions of politicians. The 
political leadership engages in cost-benefit calculations and their decisions guide 
whether or not the bureaucrats comply. The strong explanatory power of the 
principal’s economic/political costs variable is demonstrated by the bureaucrats’ 
selective approach to compliance. At the same time, this chapter has concluded 
that the political leadership’s decision to improve administrative capacity is not 
causally related to continued compliance in T2. Even though there is convincing 
literature on the positive influence of strong administrative structures on 
compliance, such improvement in the case of Turkey did not translate into a 
more effective system of compliance at least within the time period considered in 
this research.  
 
Overall, most conditionality studies treat the EU-related bureaucracy as a simple 
agent of the governments which implement instructions from above. This chapter 
has shown that this view is not entirely wrong in the sense that the EU-related 
bureaucrats are largely dependent on the preferences and actions of the political 
leadership. At the same time, what is noteworthy is that the EU-related 
bureaucrats in Turkey do not obstruct or undermine the compliance desired by 
politicians. In fact, they can have a positive impact on compliance given that the 
political leadership is indifferent but not opposed to compliance.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
This conclusion starts with a summary of the main empirical findings of the 
research, before elucidating the research’s contributions to the literature. It also 
contains a brief examination of recent developments in Turkey since 2010 to 
evaluate whether they are consistent with the arguments developed in this thesis, 
and a final section discussing the limitations of the thesis and further areas of 
research. 
 
10.1 Research Findings 
 
This thesis draws three principal conclusions. Firstly, the evidence gathered 
challenges the EIM’s credibility hypothesis. When examined through a number 
of methodological lenses, credibility has been shown not to be a necessary 
condition for compliance in Turkey. An examination of three quantitative 
indicators of compliance in the JHA field over time demonstrates that the levels 
of both formal and behavioural compliance increased continuously over time for 
all three indicators. Moreover, the average rate of compliance remained stable at 
worst. Given that candidates comply with easier and more technical conditions in 
the earlier stages of conditionality, this evidence demonstrates that the Turkish 
officials continued to comply with more difficult conditions at the same speed – 
and even faster in some cases – as they did before 2005. The qualitative data 
gathered in six case studies lead to very similar conclusions. Both formal and 
behavioural compliance continued to increase in all six cases in T2. Furthermore, 
the micro-level evidence demonstrates the speed of formal and behavioural 
compliance increased in more than half of the cases. All this evidence 
demonstrates very clearly that there has not been a significant decline in 
compliance following the significant decline in credibility as the EIM would 
suggest. Instead, positive reformist steps continued to be taken and at times at a 
higher speed, even though credibility declined. The fact that compliance 
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increased in the least-likely case of Turkey is a very strong challenge to the EIM 
which sees credibility as a necessary condition for compliance with costly 
conditions.  
 
Secondly, this research put forward an alternative explanation of continued 
compliance under diminished credibility. It found that the domestic politics 
model (DPM) provides the most powerful explanation of the AKP’s compliance 
with EU conditionality in T2. In particular, the government’s partisan incentives 
variable best explains the governing party’s compliance record in the field of 
JHA and political conditionality. More specifically, the AKP used EU 
conditionality strategically as a signalling device to the Kemalist state elite and 
the wider electorate. On the one hand, this allowed the AKP to secure its survival 
in the Kemalist/secularist dominated political system and ensured that it can 
govern effectively without any intervention from the military. On the other hand, 
EU conditionality allowed the AKP to present itself as a Western, reformist, neo-
liberal and secular party to the electorate and thereby increase its support. 
Process tracing analysis conducted on the broadcasting rights of minorities 
supports these conclusions. The AKP adopted the law liberalising broadcasting 
on minority languages on state TV to increase its voter base in the South-east of 
Turkey, to control the content of this broadcasting, and finally to gain credit with 
the EU.  
 
Moreover, the DPM also offers explanations specific to particular issue areas. 
This thesis concludes that issue-specific political and economic costs provide 
powerful explanations for why compliance has been selective across issue areas 
over time. In other words, these variables do not explain the AKP’s more general 
compliance patterns but instead they account for why less costly and more 
technical reforms are conducted earlier, at a higher level and speed, than reforms 
which are expensive and face opposition. Particularly, the political costs of 
compliance variable carries strong explanatory power. At the same time, these 
issue-specific variables need to be considered together with the government’s 
partisan incentives, otherwise they fail to explain why the AKP has conducted 
politically very costly reforms, such as for the broadcasting rights of minorities, 
under diminished credibility.  
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In addition to this rationalist account, explanations stemming from historical 
institutionalism (HI) also help to explain continued compliance. The political 
lock-in variable tests whether the overall direction of previously set Turkish FP 
has path-dependent influence on future policies, or more specifically on EU 
compliance. It also measures the extent to which compliance already conducted 
either by the current or previous governments creates a lock-in effect that 
influences the current government’s compliance with the EU. The research has 
shown that political lock-in is causally related to continued compliance. 
However, both the counterfactual analysis and process tracing demonstrated that 
political lock-in does not carry sufficient explanatory power to account for 
compliance singlehandedly. Put differently, variables stemming from HI need to 
be considered, but in conjunction with the DPM. 
 
Apart from these factors which carry explanatory power, this thesis has 
discounted a number of other variables which were found to be either too weak 
to cause compliance in the Turkish case or causally not related to compliance. 
Firstly, the social learning variable explains compliance through identification 
with and exposure to the EU. This thesis has demonstrated that the AKP officials 
do not identify strongly with the EU. Moreover, the conditions which make 
social learning more likely, such as having a professional or educational 
background in the EU or being exposed to EU officials, were also found to be 
weak in the AKP’s case. Overall, the research concluded that the level of social 
learning is not likely to be high for the AKP. This conclusion does not rule out 
the possibility that social learning is causally related compliance, however the 
evidence obtained from the Turkish case does not allow us to accurately test this 
variable and therefore it is argued that social learning is not likely to be part of 
the explanation of continued compliance in Turkey in T2. 
 
Secondly, two other variables derived from HI were found not to be causally 
related to continued compliance. Vested interests and sunk costs variables which 
vary across different issue areas were tested among six case studies. The results 
demonstrate that the value and direction of the variables were not congruent with 
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the compliance outcomes. Therefore, the vested interests and sunk costs 
hypotheses are rejected by the thesis.  
 
To sum up, the government’s partisan incentives together with political lock-in 
effects provide the most complete explanation of the political leadership’s 
continued compliance under diminished credibility in the Turkish case. The 
findings of this thesis have largely confirmed the most basic aspects of the EIM, 
since compliance was shown to mostly follow the government’s cost-benefit 
calculations. However, the EIM also generally assumes that compliance involves 
domestic costs. This study has challenged this view. It showed that the 
governments may have intrinsic domestic partisan benefits to comply with the 
EU, other than the rewards that the EU offers. This explains why compliance 
continues under diminished credibility. In other words, external rewards and 
their credibility are not always necessary for compliance with costly conditions. 
 
As a third and final finding, this thesis demonstrated that the EU-related 
bureaucrats are not a significant driving force in compliance. It is true that they 
show some actorness qualities and can improve compliance under specific 
circumstances. For instance, they may use their informational advantages, come 
up with initiatives and push forward reform in a bottom-up direction, but only in 
areas where the political leadership is indifferent to reform. They are 
predominantly dependent on the actions and preferences of the political 
leadership who instruct them about compliance in a top-down manner. At the 
same time, what this thesis also showed was that the EU-related bureaucrats 
comply due to different motivations than the politicians. They are likely to 
experience stronger social learning and they have high organisational lock-in, 
which explains their continued compliance alongside the cost-benefit 
calculations of politicians. Put differently, there is a specific bureaucratic politics 
of compliance but its impact on the overall performance of compliance is limited.  
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10.2 Discussion and Contributions  
 
This thesis makes a number of important contributions to the literature. Firstly, it 
poses a strong challenge to the EIM’s assumption that credibility is a necessary 
condition for compliance. Secondly, this thesis contributes to the conditionality 
literature through its detailed examination and operationalisation of domestic 
costs of compliance. Thirdly, it develops the DPM as part of the EIM to better 
study such domestic political factors. Fourthly, it introduces new variables, 
hypotheses and causal mechanisms into the conditionality literature to explain 
continued compliance under diminished credibility. Finally, the research 
distinguishes between the compliance of political leadership and EU-related 
bureaucrats. In this respect, it finds that the factors motivating bureaucracy for 
compliance are significantly different than in the case of politicians.  
 
10.2.1 Credibility as a Necessary Condition of Compliance? 
 
The widely accepted EIM of conditionality asserts that a credible membership 
offer from the EU is necessary for candidates’ compliance with costly 
conditions. More particularly, Schimmelfennig has argued that credibility is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for compliance, since compliance also 
needs to ‘fall on fertile domestic ground’ (2008: 918-21). Looking at the EU’s 
Eastern enlargement, one can see why this argument was developed. As 
Schimmelfennig asserted: ‘nothing short of a credible conditional accession 
perspective has proven effective’ (ibid.: 920).  However, arguably, these 
candidates did not offer a favourable ground to test the necessity of credibility, 
since credibility was mostly high. For an accurate test, one either has to examine 
the new MSs or the (potential) candidates, where credibility is much lower. 
Particularly, the Turkish case, where credibility is extremely low, offers the most 
suitable environment to test the EIM’s credibility assumption.  
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This thesis has addressed this gap in the literature and tested whether credibility 
is necessary for compliance in the least-likely case of Turkey. The fact that this 
research demonstrated continued compliance under diminished credibility 
challenges the necessity argument. Both macro-level quantitative and micro-level 
qualitative analysis has demonstrated that there were absolutely no signs of 
decline in the level and speed of compliance in the T2 period. The fact that this 
conclusion is supported by three quantitative and one qualitative indicators of 
compliance demonstrates its reliability.  
 
10.2.2 Operationalisation of Domestic Costs  
 
The conditionality literature tends to explain compliance through external and 
domestic factors. One the one hand, external factors, such as the EU’s 
membership credibility or the quality of specific conditions, are effectively 
conceptualised and operationalised. On the other hand, conditionality studies 
tend to group all domestic political factors, such as institutional capacity, 
presence of national elections, public opinion, veto-players, under the label of 
domestic adoption costs or veto-players rather than conceptualising them in more 
detail (Sedelmeier, 2011: 30). This is despite the fact that factors related to 
domestic costs are employed very frequently in conditionality studies.  
 
In its attempt to explain continued compliance under diminished credibility, this 
thesis also makes use of domestic explanations of compliance within the DPM. 
However, rather than using a vague variable like domestic costs, various 
components of these costs are unpacked and tested as separate variables. For 
instance, this thesis operationalises the government’s partisan incentives as part 
of the DPM. This variable measures the extent to which the government gains 
electoral and reputational benefits from EU conditionality. The absence of these 
makes compliance more costly and therefore less likely. This research also takes 
into account political costs and economic costs variables in the context of 
rationalist DPM and operationalises them in detail. Moreover, two other 
variables which are considered within the framework of HI are also related to 
domestic compliance costs and veto-players. The presence of sunk costs and 
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vested interests is hypothesised to make compliance easier, whereas their 
absence poses an obstacle. Finally, the thesis considers administrative capacity 
as an additional variable which is hypothesised to make compliance more likely. 
In sum, this research addresses a shortcoming in conditionality studies by 
unpacking domestic costs into six specific variables which are fully 
operationalised and subsequently tested. 
 
10.2.3 Domestic Politics Model 
 
This thesis has developed the DPM as a subcategory of EIM to specifically 
address the above-mentioned gap in conditionality literature regarding the under 
emphasis on domestic costs. The DPM, from the outset, resembles the lesson-
drawing model (LDM), where compliance is domestically-driven. Both models 
agree that compliance is a result of domestic political considerations. For 
instance, both models would take into account particular costs associated with a 
change. The main difference between the two is that DPM still sees the EU as a 
causal factor in compliance and therefore does not see it likely for compliance to 
take place in the absence of EU conditionality. For instance, although the 
credibility of EU’s accession reward has diminished in the Turkish case after 
2005, EU conditionality still offers specific incentives to the governing party by 
legitimising it and providing it a political bargaining advantage against the 
opposition. In other words, even though the AKP was interested in pushing 
through certain reforms to strengthen its domestic standing, it would not have 
been able to do so in the absence of EU conditionality. So compliance stems 
from domestic politics but it only takes place in the shadow of conditionality. At 
the same time, the DPM is part of the EIM, since it is not sufficient that the AKP 
has intrinsic partisan incentives for conducting various reforms. AKP is only able 
to continue complying if the EU formulates these reforms as conditions.  
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10.2.4 New Explanations of Compliance 
 
In solving the puzzle of continued compliance this research also aimed to refine 
theories of conditionality by introducing new variables and hypotheses. Most 
significantly, it has introduced the government’s partisan incentives variable. 
This variable predominantly considers domestic politics as key to explaining 
compliance. At the same time, the EU still plays an important causal role since 
domestic change is only possible when particular reforms or the reform process 
as a whole are linked to EU conditionality.  
 
This variable is particularly important in the Turkish case where the moderately 
Islamic AKP is in government. Many secularists and liberal sections of the 
Turkish public mistrust the AKP and believe that its real intention is to increase 
the role of religion in society. In this respect, the EU plays a significant role to 
justify AKP’s stance and legitimise its polities to the public. It allows the AKP to 
be perceived as a Western, modern, reformist and neo-liberal party and thereby 
increase its domestic popularity. At the same time, reference to EU conditionality 
allows the AKP to survive in the political system despite opposition and threats 
from the military and Kemalist/secularist forces. The AKP was able to 
demilitarise politics, increase the difficulty of banning political parties, gain the 
upper hand in the judiciary by constitutional reform, only through the strategic 
use of EU conditionality. Moreover, it survived a closure case at the 
Constitutional Court with the help of EU. The EU link sanitised the AKP’s 
reforms in the eyes of voters and Kemalist/secularist establishment, who found it 
increasingly difficult to undermine the AKP’s efforts. Moreover, the history of 
NOM with similar religious roots to AKP has showed that these reforms would 
not have been possible without the EU link. Every previous NOM party that 
acted to diminish the powers of the military or increase religious freedoms in 
society, was banned by either the military or the Constitutional Court. As Dogan 
maintains ‘[i]n order to stay in power and provide pragmatic solutions for its 
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supporters, the AKP has no choice other than standing by the EU cause’ (2005: 
432).  
 
In addition to introducing this rationalist variable, this thesis also makes use of 
the concepts borrowed from new institutionalist theories to develop new 
variables to explain continued compliance. The most important concepts used in 
this thesis are path-dependency and lock-in mechanisms derived from HI. This 
thesis considers political lock-in, organisational lock-in, sunk costs and vested 
interests variables as part of HI and shows that the first two of these variables are 
causally related to compliance. In this respect, this research has contributed to 
the debate on conditionality by complementing the existing either/or 
explanations of compliance with the rationalist EIM on the one side and 
sociological SLM on the other. This research has demonstrated that a 
government’s previous policies, candidates’ established FP direction, compliance 
conducted by previous governments, the SOPs and long-term programmes used 
by the bureaucrats have an impact on compliance.  These factors have not been 
taken into account and operationalised as fully in previous conditionality studies.  
 
10.2.5 Bureaucratic Politics of Compliance 
 
As a final contribution, this thesis differentiates itself from other conditionality 
studies. Instead of treating candidates as a unitary entity complying like a single 
actor with a single motive, it demonstrates that different actors within the 
compliance process conduct different types of compliance and argues that they 
may also have distinct motives for complying with the EU. More particularly, 
this thesis brings to attention the role of EU-related bureaucrats in compliance 
and distinguishes their compliance – administrative compliance – from other 
types of compliance, such as formal, behavioural or discursive. The bureaucrats’ 
compliance is worth studying since they may act as either an obstacle or a 
facilitator for reform, depending on the political system they operate it and their 
level of politicisation, turnover and independence from the political leadership.  
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The Turkish case is particularly interesting since the established Kemalist 
bureaucracy was expected to be an inhibitor to reform. Instead what this research 
has shown is that the recently established EU-related bureaucrats are able to 
improve compliance in areas where the political leadership does not have strong 
preferences. Even though their contribution to compliance is not significant and 
despite the fact that they largely rely on the preferences of politicians, the 
bureaucrats are still an actor in compliance. This research has demonstrated 
under what specific circumstances the EU-related bureaucrats can demonstrate 
actorness qualities and drive compliance forward. 
 
Furthermore, this research also demonstrates that the bureaucrats’ motives for 
compliance are completely different to the politicians. They are much more 
socialised into the EU because of their frequent interactions with their European 
counterparts. Moreover, working on technical issues rather than more 
controversial political problems make it easier for them to agree with their 
European partners and identify with the EU rules and norms. This is what drives 
the EU-related bureaucrats to comply. Additionally, they experience stronger 
organisational lock-in dynamics, since they work with SOPs and long-term 
programmes, work in institutions/departments created solely for the purpose of 
EU compliance, and continued compliance allows them to maintain and even 
increase their institutional role/power/mandate. When both of these factors are 
considered together it becomes clear that we can talk about a distinct 
bureaucratic politics of compliance, where EU-related bureaucracies compete 
with each other for power and scarce state/EU resources and they take on 
institutional identities. In other words, the bureaucratic compliance approach to 
foreign policy has something to contribute to how bureaucrats comply with the 
EU.  
 
10.3 Recent Developments in Turkey 
 
In the nine months following the end of the time period that this thesis covers, 
some developments have taken place in Turkey. Examining this recent period is 
essential as it provides an opportunity to test the conclusions of this research.  
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The first point to note is that compliance continued to be conducted in the policy 
areas examined in this research. Most importantly, the cabinet adopted a decree 
law on June 3, 2011 to close down the EUSG and instead establish a Ministry of 
European Union (MEU) at the same time as it restructured the ministries prior to 
the general elections on June 12, 2011. The government was able to pass this law 
with ease using its newly attained ability to issue decree laws after April 2011. 
The EUSG’s senior structure remained, with the GS renamed as the 
Undersecretary and the four DGSs becoming Deputy Undersecretaries (Official 
Gazette, 2011). More significantly the number of departments increased from 16 
to 19 with the addition of the Department of Law Consultancy; Media and Public 
Affairs Consultancy; and Executive Assistants (ibid.). Moreover, the minister is 
now able to appoint five additional personal consultants (ibid.). The decree 
allowed a new ‘Internal Coordination and Harmonisation Committee’ to be 
established which is led by the Undersecretary (ibid.). This decree also paved the 
way for the employment of new EU experts and assistant experts for the MEU. 
Overall, the establishment of the MEU is one of the most significant 
developments in Turkey’s compliance process and demonstrates how the level of 
administrative compliance has continued to increase significantly after 2010. 
 
Formal compliance also continued in the JHA and political conditionality areas. 
The TGNA passed a significant number of laws prior to the general elections in 
June 2011 with more than 60 laws adopted in the month of February alone 
(BDP2). Among the most important changes in the first nine months of the 2011 
was the TGNA’s ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture (OPCAT) in March. This is a significant development since the 
ratification of OPCAT was one of the informal conditions set by the EU for the 
opening of negotiations in 23rd chapter. Moreover, the foreigners’ law and law on 
services were adopted, and the law on the work permits of foreigners and law on 
political parties were amended in 2011. Turkey also amended the Agreement on 
Illicit Traffic by Sea to align with article 17 of the UN Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Additionally, significant 
legislative developments were observed in the judiciary following the adoption 
of the Judicial Reform Strategy and Action Plan in 2009 helping harmonise 
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Turkish legislation with the EU in the 23rd chapter. The most important of these 
were the amendments to the Laws on the Court of Auditors, Council of State, 
Court of Cessation, Constitutional Court, and Code of Civil procedure, as well as 
the adoption of legal changes to increase the speed of judiciary. All these 
changes demonstrate that compliance continued to be conducted in the areas of 
JHA and political conditionality. 
 
What is also interesting is that the types of reforms conducted or planned in 2011 
give support to the government’s partisan incentives hypothesis. A number of 
symbolic changes took place in 2011 in the civil-military relations, significantly 
undermining the military’s powers. For instance, whereas the PM and the chief 
of General Staff used to sit together at the head of the table in Supreme Military 
Council, this year the PM sat alone. Similar developments were observed in the 
National Security Council. Most significantly, the AKP’s Deputy Chairman 
recently announced a 15-article roadmap to curb the powers of the military and 
ensure Turkish politics becomes entirely civilian. This roadmap incorporates 
reforms that tie the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence; abolish an article 
from the military’s internal service law that was used as a legal basis for most of 
the previous coups; restructure the gendarmerie; abolish national security classes 
in schools; make military spending more transparent; and also shorten 
compulsory military service (Radikal, 2011). These changes appear to support 
the argument that the AKP makes strategic use of EU conditionality in order to 
undermine the power of the secular/Kemalist opposition, including the military.  
 
This brief analysis of the last nine months in Turkey demonstrates that the end of 
the time period under analysis – 2010 – does not appear to be a cut off year after 
which the arguments developed in this thesis no longer hold. Instead, it appears 
that compliance has continued to occur after this date, although further research 
would be necessary to make any conclusive remarks.   
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10.4 Limitations and Areas of Further Research 
 
The methodologies used in this thesis allowed for important contributions to the 
literature, but also posed some challenges. Most significantly, whilst the study of 
continued compliance in a single case allows for an in-depth analysis of the 
complexities of the Turkish case; the gathering of significant amounts of data 
from primary sources and interviews largely absent from the literature; as well as 
the use of qualitative within-case analyses, such as process tracing; it also suffers 
from problems of generalisability.  
 
To address these limitations, further research needs to be conducted in other 
contexts and preferably in a comparative manner. The EIM’s credibility 
assumption can be tested in other (potential) candidates or new MSs where 
credibility is low to validate the findings of this research.  
 
In addition to testing the EIM in new contexts, the new causal mechanisms and 
variables introduced in this research need to be tested in other cases as well. For 
instance, the government’s partisan incentives variable is developed specifically 
for the case of AKP in Turkey. However, the incentives offered by EU 
conditionality to post-communist or ultra-nationalist parties may also be studied 
in a similar way. In other words, it would be useful to test the explanatory power 
of this variable in other (potential) EU candidates, such as in Serbia in the 
context of the Serbian Progressive Party or in Croatia for the Croatian 
Democratic Union. Moreover, it is possible for EU conditionality to offer other 
partisan incentives to governments, where domestic political considerations are 
still the key for reform but EU conditionality plays a more complementary role. 
For instance, Brusis’s study on regionalisation in Czech Republic and Slovakia 
shows how the governments made instrumental use of EU conditionality in line 
with their partisan interests (2005). Similar studies can be conducted in other 
issue areas and country cases. 
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Similarly, the new variables developed in the context of HI, such as political 
lock-in and organisational lock-in, also need to be tested in other countries. 
Moreover, this research has not found high enough social learning in the 
governing party to be able to sufficiently test its impact on continued 
compliance. Cases where the value of social learning is high for the political 
leadership would prove to be useful for testing this hypothesis. Finally, this 
research has examined the fields of JHA and political conditionality. It would be 
useful to check whether these conclusions are also valid in other fields of 
conditionality.  
 
At the same time, the Turkish case and the issue areas have been carefully 
selected for the purposes of this thesis. Turkey is arguably the candidate with the 
lowest level of credibility. Moreover, JHA and political conditionality fields 
incorporate the most challenging conditions and the acquis chapters which 
incorporate these areas have been politically blocked for negotiations by the EU. 
In other words, both Turkey and the issue areas have been selected as the 
toughest tests for continued compliance. If compliance was found to exist in 
these contexts – which is something this thesis has done – this strongly suggests 
these conclusions will be valid for other country cases and policy areas. 
 
Additionally, given that credibility continues to stagnate or even decline in the 
Turkish case, it would be interesting to examine what happens to compliance 
levels after 2010. It would be particularly interesting to test whether the 
government’s partisan incentives still continue to motivate the governing party to 
comply. Moreover, social learning mechanisms, which take some time to show 
their full effect, may attain more importance over time. In this respect, adding 
later temporal comparisons to this research would be very desirable. 
 
In terms of the measurement of independent and dependent variables this thesis 
would benefit from further qualitative and quantitative data gathering. Firstly, the 
different ways to measure the dependent variable – compliance – have been 
subject to intense debate in the conditionality literature. In order to avoid bias 
this research incorporated as many methodologies as possible to measure 
compliance. More specifically, three quantitative and one qualitative indicators 
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were used to assess formal and behavioural compliance over time. This allowed 
the research to counterbalance the particular problems and shortcomings 
associated with using a single measure of compliance. Incorporating four 
different measures also allowed the thesis to verify the findings comparatively 
across methodologies. As further research, other indicators of compliance can be 
incorporated into the analysis to validate the conclusions further. 
 
Secondly, the qualitative methods used to measure the social learning variable 
for both the political leadership and EU-related bureaucrats would benefit from 
using further sources. This research has taken into account the declarations of 
political leaders, the governing party’s party programme and election manifestos, 
coupled with interviews, to measure social learning. Increasing the number of 
interviews and using a more structured discourse analysis of the political 
leadership’s declarations in the media would strengthen the conclusions.  
 
Finally, further research about reforms conducted in Turkey in the pre-1999 
period, prior to EU conditionality would be useful. It would be highly unrealistic 
to expect all legislative activity to stop altogether in a country due to a decline of 
credibility. Any country would pass some legislation in the JHA field regardless 
of an external anchor. So it is important to test whether the compliance in T2 
differs from the status-quo situation or a Turkey which is not under the influence 
of the EU. The best way to test this is to collect data on the legislative activity in 
a field of JHA prior to Turkey’s EU candidacy and draw a base line level for 
Turkish legislative activity without an external anchor. Once this value is 
determined it can be compared to compliance levels in T2 to further test whether 
there is a significant decline in compliance under diminished credibility.  
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Appendix: List of Interviews 
 
Table Appendix.1: List of Interviewed Politicians 
 
No Interviewee 
Code 
Position211/Institution Date of 
Interview 
1 AKP1 Deputy Undersecretary, Prime Ministry 21.07.2008 
2 AKP2 MP, Chairman of the Turkish Delegation to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
22.07.2008 
3 AKP3 MP, Chairman of EU Harmonisation Committee 22.07.2008 
4 CHP1 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee, Foreign 
Affairs Committee 
23.07.2008 
5 AKP4 MP, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee 24.07.2008 
6 AKP5 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 24.07.2008 
7 AKP6 MP, Chairman of Human Rights Inquiry Committee 28.08.2008 
8 
 
AKP7 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 28.08.2008 
17.09.2009 
9 AKP8 MP, Deputy Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee 29.07.2008 
10 CHP2 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee, Deputy 
Secretariat General of CHP 
30.07.2008 
11 CHP3 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee, Vice 
President of CHP 
30.07.2008 
12 CHP4 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 31.07.2008 
13 DSP1 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 31.07.2008 
14 AKP9 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 15.09.2009 
15 AKP10 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 24.09.2009 
16 AKP11 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 29.09.2009 
17 AKP12 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 23.03.2011 
18 BDP1 MP 23.03.2011 
19 AKP13 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 23.03.2011 
20 BDP2 MP 29.03.2011 
                                                
211 These are the positions of interviewees at the time of the interview. A second position is 
included if they have been interviewed again and if their position has changed. 
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21 AKP14 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 30.03.2011 
22 MHP1 MP, Member of EU Harmonisation Committee 05.04.2011 
23 CHP5 Vice President of CHP 13.04.2011 
 
 
  
 
358 
Table Appendix.2: List of Interviewed EU-Related Bureaucrats 
 
No Interviewee 
Code 
Position/Institution Date of 
Interview 
1 SPO1 Head of EU Policies Department, SPO 21.07.2008 
Deputy Secretary General, EUSG 24.09.2009 
2 MFA1 Deputy Head of Political Affairs Department, Directorate 
General of EU, MFA 
22.07.2008 
3 PM1 Head of Department of Foreign Relations, Prime Ministry 24.07.2008 
4 PM2 President of Human Rights Presidency, Prime Ministry 24.07.2008 
5 SPO2 President of the European Union Relations General 
Secretary, SPO 
28.07.2008 
Advisor to the CN, EUSG 12.04.2011 
6 SPO3 Head of Department, General Directorate of Economic 
Sectors and Coordination, SPO 
28.07.2008 
7 TGNA1 Assistant Expert at EU Harmonisation Committee, TGNA 28.07.2008 
8 EUSG1 Head of Department of National Programme, EUSG 29.07.2008 
TEPAV (Economic Policy Research Foundation of 
Turkey), Foreign Policy Studies 
24.03.2011 
9 EUSG2 EU Expert, Department of Political Affairs, EUSG 29.07.2008 
23.09.2009 
10 EUSG3 Head of Department of Political Affairs, EUSG 29.07.2008 
11 TGNA2 Expert at EU Harmonisation Committee, TGNA 14.09.2009 
12 MFA2 Political Affairs Department, Directorate General of EU, 
MFA 
15.09.2009 
13 MI1 Deputy Head of Department of Foreign Affairs and EU, MI 17.09.2009 
14 EUSG4 Head of Department of EU Law, EUSG 24.09.2009 
25.03.2011 
15 AIB1 Deputy Head of AIB, MI 25.09.2009 
16 EUSG5 Expert, Department of Political Affairs, EUSG 25.09.2009 
17 EUSG6 Head of Department of Education and Institution-Building 25.09.2009 
18 BMB1 Expert, BMB, MI 28.09.2009 
19 EUSG7 Head of Department of Political Affairs, EUSG 01.10.2009 
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20 EUSG8 Deputy Secretary General responsible for Political Affairs, 
EUSG 
01.10.2009 
21 BMB2 Deputy head, BMB, MI 25.03.2011 
22 BMB3 Project Officer, BMB, MI 25.03.2011 
23 BMB4 Chief Superintendent, BMB, MI 25.03.2011 
24 EUSG9 Acting Secretary General, EUSG 29.03.2011 
25 MJ1 Head of Department, EU General Directorate, MJ 29.03.2011 
26 MI2 Deputy Head of Department of Foreign Affairs and EU, MI 31.03.2011 
27 MI3 Expert, Department of Foreign Affairs and EU, MI 31.03.2011 
28
29 
AIB2 Director of Security, AIB, MI 11.04.2011 
30 MFA3 Deputy Undersecretary, MFA 11.04.2011 
31 MFA4 Head of Accession Process Department, Directorate 
General of EU, MFA 
11.04.2011 
32 MFA5 Head of Political Affairs Department, Directorate General 
of EU, MFA 
11.04.2011 
33 MJ2 Investigating Judge, EU General Directorate, MJ 12.04.2011 
34 EUSG10 Head of Department for Social, Regional and Innovative 
Policies, EUSG 
12.04.2011 
35 MJ3 Director General, EU General Directorate, MJ 13.04.2011 
36 GDS1 Seconded to EUSG from the General Directorate of 
Security 
14.04.2011 
37 GDS2 Head of EU Division, General Directorate of Security, 
Foreign Relations Department 
14.04.2011 
38 MFA6 Head of Asylum and Immigration Department, MFA 14.04.2011 
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Table Appendix.3: List of Interviewed Civil Society Representatives 
 
No Interviewee 
Code 
Position/Institution Date of 
Interview 
1 CS1 Head of Amnesty International Turkey, academic 23.07.2008 
14.04.2011 
2 CS2 Secretary General of MAZLUMDER (The Association of 
Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People) 
23.07.2008 
Coordinator, SETA (Foundation for Political Economic 
and Social Research), Law and Human Rights Studies 
24.03.2011 
3 CS3 President of Human Rights Association 24.07.2008 
4 CS4 Secretary General of Human Rights Foundation of Turkey 30.07.2008 
5 CS5 TEPAV (Economic Policy Research Foundation of 
Turkey), Foreign Policy Studies, Academic 
30.03.2011 
6 CS6 Deputy Head, Human Rights Research Association 31.03.2011 
7 CS7 President of Human Rights Association 31.03.2011 
8 CS8 Secretary General of MAZLUMDER (The Association of 
Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People) 
13.04.2011 
 
 
  
 
361 
Table Appendix.4: List of Interviewed Academics 
 
No Interviewee 
Code 
Position/Institution Date of Interview 
1 AC1 Academic, Ankara University Faculty of 
Political Sciences, Human Rights Centre 
30.07.2008 
2 AC2 Academic, Middle East Technical University, 
Department of International Relations 
28.03.2011 
3 AC3 Academic, TOBB University, Department of 
International Relations 
14.04.2011 
 
 
